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Abstract 
Through a close analysis of four plays by Shakespeare this thesis argues that the question of 
subjectivity ultimately comes to be negotiated around a structural impasse or certain points of 
opacity in each of the text's signifying practices. Challenging assumptions about the 
putatively "theatrical" contexts of Richard IlL Richard Il Hamlet and Antony and Cleol2atr , 
I argue that, to varying degrees, the specular economy of each play is in fact traversed by a 
radical alterity that constitutiyLly gives rise to a notion of subjectivity commonly referred to 
as "Shakespearean. " 
Elaborating upon the work of both Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida, I argue that 
"subjectivity" in the plays is, rather, the articulated confrontation with a non-dialectizable 
remainder that haunts each text from within. Crucially in this respect I relate each of the texts 
to Lacan's account of the "gaze" as a species of what he calls the object a: an alien kernel of 
jouissance exceeding all subjective mediation yet, paradoxically, also that which confers 
internal consistency both to subjectivity and to the very process of symbolization as such. I 
am, moreover, also concerned to read the work of Jacques Derrida as providing an illuminating 
context for how this incursion of alterity that he terms differance (what Lacan calls the Real) 
may be read as the unacknowledged support of subjectivity. The thesis concludes with a 
consideration of how this analysis of the Shakespearean object, rather than succumbing to the 
heady pleasures of an unfettered textuality, opens, ineluctably, onto a rethinking of the very 
category of the "political" itself. 
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Preface 
Sections of the following two chapters have already been published: an edited 
version of chapter three entitled ... Rewriting the (S)crypt': Gazing on Hamlet's 
Interiors, " appeared in QWERT ,6 (October 1996), pp. 5- 17; also, an edited 
version of chapter one was published in Critical Survey, 9,3 (1997), pp. 32-59. 
An edited version of chapter two, "'Tis In Reversion That I Do Possess: 
Speculation and Destination in Richard II" is due to appear in The South Atlantic 
Quarterly. 
References to Shakespeare's texts throughout are to the Arden editions of individual 
plays unless otherwise stated. 
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Introduction 
"We Three" 
Shakespeare's Twelfth Night is a text that, in many respects, is quite remarkable for the 
way that it scrutinizes what remain some very orthodox assumptions about how 
language relates to identity. Perhaps most explicitly so, it is through the anarchic wit of 
Feste the clown that language in the text comes to gorge itself on a reality that can, 
apparently, either be created or annihilated at will. In only one of several memorable 
incidents in the play, at one point Feste delivers a message to someone that he assumes 
is named Cesario. Met with angry incomprehension, the clown deals with this 
predicament through what is, effectively, a wholesale denial of the deixis of difference 
itself- 
No. I do not know you, nor am I sent to you 
by my lady, to bid you come speak with her; 
nor your name is not Master Cesario; nor this is not 
my nose either. Nothing that is so is so. 
(Il. ii. 38-41) 
Similarly, at the close of the play, Duke Orsino is presented with the task of negotiating 
this perplexing co-presence of identity and difference when he is confronted with the 
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twins of Viola and Sebastian. Paradoxically, both twins are presented as identical but 
not, strictly speaking, in a way that is identifiable: 
One face, one voice, one habit, and two persons - 
A natural perspective, that is and is not. 
(V. i. 214-15) 
What the Duke encounters here, I would like to suggest, is that surplus which is missing 
in the mirror image, i. e. something unspecularizable yet, precisely as such, present in the 
shape of an unfathomable X on account of which the double obtains its unheimliches 
character. That is to say, the double here is the same yet totally strange, a sameness 
which all the more accentuates the uncanniness of that which "is, and is not. " 
Earlier in the play, in another example of the text's strangely skewed perspectives, we 
find a more explicit commentary on what might account for this gap - this "hin that 
makes the difference where it is impossible to establish any positive difference as such. 
Offering a genially insulting greeting to Sir Andrew and Sir Toby, Feste inquires 
whether they did "never see the/picture of'we three"'? (Il. iii. 16-17). Thejoke, of 
course, refers here to a popular sixteenth-century painting depicting two asses which, 
when viewed from a prescribed angle, also includes the spectator as the "third" ass. 
Indeed, the title of the painting offers itself as an eloquent conunent on the way that 
identity comes to be negotiated beyond the dyadic structure of the miffor image. What 
is at issue here, it seems, is a dialectical inversion that exceeds the logic of doubling and 
opens instead on to the implied accommodation of, precisely, a certain third element 
that eludes capture at the level of any "natural perspective. " In the example of "We 
Irilmdudion 
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Three" not only is the frame of the picture in a sense already framed by part of its 
content: it is at this very point of formal inconsistency (the picture's anamorphic stain 
of non-sense) that the viewer also finds himself inscribed or, quite literally, caught in 
the picture. 
The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan addresses a similar paradox in his seminar on 
anamorphosis where he discusses the example of Hans Holbein's The Ambassadors. 
Lacan similarly argues that it is this point of anamorphic tension (which in Holbein's 
painting, when the viewer assumes the proper position, is subsequently revealed to be a 
floating skull) that functions "to catch, I would almost say, to catch in iLs trrU, the 
observer. "' For Lacan, however, what is in fact "caught" here, what is momentarily 
rendered visible, is the materialized nothing that incarnates the decentred symptom of 
the 'subject' itself. Indeed Lacan argues that the Renaissance experimentation with 
trompe Foci is suggestive of nothing less than the passage to modernity itself, 
precisely insofar as Renaissance culture became increasingly fascinated by this " thing 
,, 2 that mediates the relationship between the subject and the signifier. Renaissance 
painting, literature and architecture, Lacan was to argue on more than one occasion, is 
characterized by a preoccupation with what he calls the domain of the "vacuole, " this 
,, 3 "construction around emptiness that designates the place of the Thing. Moreover, in 
a comment that is impossible to read without recalling the contemporary political 
anxieties aroused by the signifying practices of Shakespeare's "wooden 0, " Lacan in 
I Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, 
trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1994), p. 92. 
2 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan 
Book VII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (London, 1992), p. 1 29. In his seminar 
on anamorphosis Lacan argues that "at the very heart of the period in which the subject 
emerged and geometral optics was an object of research, Holbein makes visible for us 
something that is simply the subject as annihilated. " The Four Fundamental Concepts, p. 88. 
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fact privileges the "Elizabethan theatre as the turning point in European eroticism.. It is 
,A at that moment, in effect, that the celebration of this idealized object occurs. 
In short, for Lacan, every scene of representation is both haunted and impelled by a 
foreign element that yawns in the midst of meaning itself. That is to say, there can be 
no symbolic communication without this piece of the real or phallic detail that serves as 
a kind of pawn to guarantee the very consistency of the symbolic order. It is precisely 
to this extent that every symbolic relationship implies a minimal distance toward this 
unheimliches third element that cannot accede to presence, but whose very elision gives 
rise to the scene of presence as such. In a comment that would appear particularly 
apposite to Twelfth Night in this respect, Lacan also goes so far as to claim that "If 
something ex-ists with respect to something else, it is precisely inasmuch as it is not 
coupled, but rather 'tripled' to it, if you will allow me this neologism. "' In other 
words, according to Lacan symbolization constitutively turns around a void, a nothing 
that insists in the symbolic network as a "Thing that will always be represented by 
emptiness, precisely because it cannot be represented by anything else - or, more 
,, 6 exactly, because it can only be represented by something else. 
Alternatively, in an effort to define the contours of the problematic that we are trying to 
get at here, we might refer to an example that Lacan provides from the field of linguistics 
3 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 140. 
4 flbýid., p. 100. For a brilliant study of the significance of the'O' in Elizabethan culture see Bruce 
Smith, The Accoustic World of Early Modern England: Attending to the O-Factor (London, 
1999), cf: pp. 207-45. 
5 Quoted in Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance 
(Chichester, 1997), p. 195, n. 34. 
'3 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 1 29-30. 
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which serves as yet another variation of this paradox of "We Three. " Here, Lacan 
argues that 
... before any formation of the subject ... things are counted, and in this 
counting he who counts is already included. It is only later that the subject 
has to recognize himself as such, recognize himself as he who counts. 
Remember the nalve failure of the simpleton's delighted attempt to grasp 
the little fellow who declares -I have three brothers, Paul, Ernest and me. 
But it is quite natural - first the three brothers, Paul Ernest and I are 
counted, and then there is I at the level at which I am to reflect the first I, 
that is to say, the I who counts. 7 
In what is, effectively, another kind of Lacanian reflexive inversion, the speaker includes 
his own position of enunciation within the statement itself. Lacan, however, pushes 
this distinction between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the enunciated 
even further to suggest that this moment of self-relating negativity hollows out the very 
space of what we call subjectivity itself- everything that "I" positively am, every 
enunciated content I can point at and say "that's me, " is not "I"; "I" am only the void 
or surplus of form over content that remains as the empty distance toward every 
content as such. 
In terms of Lacan's logic of the signifier we once again encounter here how, 
paradoxically, the horizon of meaning is always already linked to a point within the 
field disclosed by it. As a variation of the dialectic between the view and the gaze, it is 
this very point of a certain formal inconsistency or locus of non-sense that actually 
condenses that Thin Z beyond the mirror image that the subject is. "We Three" offers, 
then, an eloquent gloss on the function of the gaze as the place holder of this beance in 
the symbolic order: what is available to the subject's view, what is experienced as 
Tho fý--haho: 7poam-an Obje-cl 
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66reality" in fact constitutes itself through the foreclosure of some traumatic x, some 
extimate kernel of that both provides the obscene support of meaning qua the 
law and also that which threatens to disrupt the internal consistency of the law itself. 
Indeed, we might consider briefly here what is in many respects that most Shakespearean 
of moments - the soliloquy - as a particularly resonant example where "self- 
consciousness" is shown to depend upon a similarly strange dialectical inversion. 
Commenting specifically upon Hamlet's soliloquies as an ambivalent marker of "emergent 
consciousness, " Margreta de Grazia argues that the soliloquy posed a contradiction for an 
Elizabethan theatre that aspired increasingly to naturalistic conventions: "it is an awkward 
solution to be sure: speaking is asked to give the illusion of non-speaking. "s A little later 
de Grazia somewhat teasingly asks the question of whether the soliloquy can be thought of 
in terms of a "dramatized cogito? "9 
What is peculiar about the soliloquy, rather, is that its "theatrical" illusion properly 
consists in the way that speech is always-already mediated through an agency that exceeds 
any intersubjective relation, whereas naturalistic speech seeks to privilege what is said by 
failing to account for its place of enunciation. 10 What this suggests, in a strictly Lacanian 
reading, is that as soon as the subject comes to be, he owes it to a certain non-being on 
which he raises his being. A "pseudo-Shakespeare stuck for improvisation, " is Lacan's 
7 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 20. 
8 Margareta de Grazia, "Soliloquies and wages in the age of emergent consciousness, " Textual 
Practice, 9,1 (Spring 1995), pp. 67-93, p. 74. 
9 Ibid, p. 75. 
10 In other words, as a theatrical device the soliloquy actually engages a critique of Cartesianism 
by implying that the subject of enunciation, who relates to himself only on condition of projecting 
himself 'outside' himself, is not reducible to the subject of the statement. This 'dramatization' 
compels the ggcLito to exceed its own laws in a way that conforms to its Lacanian rewriting as "I 
frifindurlior, 
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appropriate choice of metaphor, "who paces up and down, repeating - To be or not.. to be 
or not.., again - To be or not ... to be. " 
11 In fact, we might recall here that for Hamlet to 
speak is also to submit to a certain disappearance: either to hold discourse "with the 
incorporeal air" (III. iv. 118) or to "eat the air" (III. ii. 93) is simultaneously to bear witness 
to the fact that as soon as words are spoken they are no longer "mine now" (III. ii. 97). In 
other words, the speaking subject is no longer to be found at the axis of the relation 
between the signifier and the signified, but is the locus of a certain non-sense where, in 
Lacanese, the subject of enunciation quite literally "vanishes" into the subject of the 
statement. 
Not only does the soliloquy announce that reflexive gesture where our direct immersion 
in narrative reality is momentarily perturbed, is not the soliloquy also a species of that 
putatively post-modern moment par excellence when the actor extracts himself from his 
narrative context and assumes the position of an observer of his own diegetic position of 
enunciation? In an argument that extends beyond the conventional wisdom relating to 
questions of self-reflexivity, Slavoj Zizek avers that "this apparently innocent 
procedure threatens the very foundation of the standard ontological edifice; it inscribes a 
subjective point of view into the very heart of 'objective reality. "' 12 Again, the Lacanian 
point here is that this logical snare that would appear to impede self-identity is in fact 
the embodiment of a structural antagonism within the symbolic order itself that is, 
strictly speaking, the very cause of the subject as such. In many respects the soliloquy 
stages how, in this retreat from reality, we are brought closer to some repressed formal 
think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think. " Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977), p. 1 66. 
11 Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III: 1955-195a, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (London, 1993), p. 262. 
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inconsistency within the symbolic order that is also constitutive of the very "frame" of 
reality itself 13 This enigmatic cause is what Lacan, of course, came to call the object a: 
that little piece of the Real or trace of jouissanc that is also, paradoxically, nothing but 
the "subject" itself in its negative magnitude. 
This thesis argues that the production of subjectivity in four plays by Shakespeare also 
inverts the standard notion of the symbolic order as the agency that mediates or 
interposes itself between the subject and reality. Rather, following Lacan, I argue that 
the subject and the Other variously come to overlap in the object a as something which 
incarnates a void that irretrievably bars both the subject qILa %, and the symbolic order 
itself (4). That is to say, in the Shakespearean texts under discussion subjectivity 
comes to find its most pronounced aspect of articulation at those moments when this 
trace of alterity is shown to confound the mastery of all dialectics: i. e. the "effect of 
subject" takes place precisely insofar as this remainder of substance (Louissance) 
escUes the grasp of subjective mediation. The further supplementary twist (and one 
that I read as both Shakespearean and Lacanian), is that far from simply being an 
impediment preventing the subject's full actualization, this remainder is strictu sensu 
correlative to the very being of the subject. 14 It is here, precisely, that we reach what 
12 V Slavoi Ziz**ek, The Plague of Fantasies (London, 1997), p. 66. 
13 See also Franco Moretti's comments on soliloquy where he argues that with Shakespeare it is 
not part of "promoting the action or establishing its implications, but rather of retarding it and 
making its implications ungraspable. " "'A Huge Eclipse': Tragic Form and the Deconsecration of 
Sovereignty, " Genre, 15 (1982), pp. 7-40, p. 32. 
14 We are now able to extrapolate a working hypothesis of the subject that is yet to find any 
adequate degree of articulation in Renaissance Studies: "I" am aware of myself, I am compelled 
to turn reflexively on to myself, only insofar as "I" can never "encounter myself" in my noumenal 
dimension, as the Thing I actually am. Herein resides the importance of Lacan's comments on 
the gaze. The subject, strictly speaking, becomes a placeholder for the fact that reality (the 
socio-symbolic structure) always already includes the gaze of the subject. It is, precisely, in this 
respect that I wish to argue that what we call subjectivity is inherently pathological: i. e. 
something that is both biased and limited to a distorting, unbalanced perspective on the whole. 
Irilmdulion 
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is perhaps the most concise definition of what I will refer to as the Shakespearean 
object: that surplus of substance in the plays which , precisely insofar as 
it resists 
subjectivization, also comes to open the very space of desiring subjectivity itself. 
It may seem contradictory to thus attribute ontological or real status to what has 
hitherto been characterized as precisely a lack of substantial existence. 15 However, both 
the Shakespearean and the Lacanian subject- as unavailable void- frequently appear as 
correlative or even isomorphic to the object a. In my reading of the texts it is not so 
much "theatricality" as a certain incursion of the gaze that I read as the preeminent 
example of this object. For both the gaze and the subject properly consist in those 
epistemological gaps which take on substantial or real status not in themselves but as 
object g. It is, precisely, this object a that constitutes the "substance" of the subject: a 
substance that, as Lacan never tired of repeating, is also the only one that is recognized 
by psychoanalysis. 
v4 
Slavej Zizek explains succinctly the identity of subject and object a in his discussion of the 
subjectivation of the field of reality in Hegelian philosophy: ... subject' and 'object' are the 
two leftovers of this same process, or, rather, the two sides of the same leftover conceived 
either in the modality of form (subject) or in the modality of content, of 'stuff (object): a 
is the 'stuff of the subject -qua empty 
form. "' 6 The "subject qua empty form" is the same 
subject cleared of substantial content that we encountered above, but it contains a new 
15 In this respect Francis Barkers famous description of Hamlet as the harbinger of an incipient 
"modernity" is perhaps more Lacanian than would first appear: "At the centre of Hamlet, in the 
interior of his mystery, there is, in short, nothing. The promised essence remains beyond the 
scope of the text's signification: or rather, signals the limit of the signification of this world by 
marking out the site of an absence it cannot fill. It gestures towards a place for subjectivity, but 
both are anachronistic and belong to a historical order whose outline has so far only been 
sketched out. " The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection (London, 1984), p. 37. 
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substance - an ungraspable surplus object leftover by the symbolic organization of 
reality. 17 It is, in many respects, an aim of this thesis to consider the ways that the 
Shakespearean texts under discussion are preoccupied with certain remainders or islands of 
jouissanc (with that residual trace of "stuff') that both imperils and gives rise to the 
symbolic sufficiency of the plays' own putatively hegemonizing fictions. 18 
Iff 
In the light of our foregoing discussion, how are we to account for those explicitly 
historical contingencies in the production of subjectivity, especially in an age that 
appears so inhospitable to the Lacanian categories with which we are concerned? 
Bearing in mind the pervasive influence of what has come to be known as "New 
Historicism" in Shakespeare studies in the last twenty years or so (and whose own 
commitment to theory is, at best, ambivalent), I am mindful of a powerful, if not yet 
fully institutionalized, resistance to psychoanalysis in this regard. Stephen 
Greenblatt, for example, offers a suggestive yet still deeply inadequate account of the 
limitations of psychoanalysis as a strategy of interpretation in reading early modern 
texts. Arraigning psychoanalysis for making "universalist claims" that are "unruffled 
by the indifference of the past to its own categories, " Greenblatt is especially impatient 
16 Vq Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying With The Negative (Durham, 1993), pp. 21-2. 
17 The Lacanian subject is not an autonomous power "positing" the substance but precisely a 
name for the M within substance, for the disco ntin uitywh ich prevents us from conceiving the 
substance as a self-contained totality. 
18 In this respect my own interests are both a response to and further elaboration of the 
extraordinary (and much too neglected) work of Joel Fineman. Fineman has gone further than 
any other critic in trying to identify this substantial or "Real" object with the substance of the 
"subjectivity effect" that has been adduced as characteristically "Shakespearean. " See, for 
example, his remarkable study of the "Sound of 0 in Othello where Fineman argues that "this 
sound - these abject Os, which I associate with Lacan's obiet a, and the mark of the Real - is, 
Irstron'tif-lior, 
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with what he sees as a "totalizing vision" that ignores the "historical" contingencies 
which in fact fashioned a "mode of selthood that psychoanalysis has tried to 
universalize into the very form of the human condition. "19 
At the close of his essay, however, Greenblatt in fact unwittingly stumbles upon the 
very paradox that psychoanalysis reads as the constitutive antagonism that gives rise to 
the very moment of "historicity" itself. Stopping short of dismissing psychoanalysis as 
an anachronism Greenblatt nevertheless avers that 
[ ... ] psychoanalytic interpretation is causally belated, even as it is 
causally linked: hence the curious effect of a discourse that functions 
is if the psychological categories it invokes were not only 
simultaneous with but even prior to and themselves causes of the 
very phenomenon of which in fact they were the results. [ ... ] 
psychoanalysis can redeem its belatedness only when it historicizes 
its own procedures. 20 
This temporal paradox that Greenblatt cites as impoverishing the force of 
psychoanalysis as properly "historical, " is also, precisely, what psychoanalysis insists 
upon as the very moment of the historical itself. Whether in terms of Freud's 
both for Shakespeare and for Othello, constitutive of Othello's self. " "Sound of 0 in Othello in 
The Suboectivity Effect in Western Litera! )t Tradition (Cambridge MA, 1991), pp. 1 43-64, p-1 52. 
19 Stephen J. Greenblatt, "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture" in Learning To Curse: 
Essays in Early Modern Culture (London, 1992), pp. 131-45, p. 136,137,138. In the wake of 
new historicism, this claim is variously rehearsed in a shower of publications on early modern 
"subjectivity" that are either politely dismissive of or openly hostile to psychoanalysis on account 
of its putatively "universalizing" tendencies. See, for example, Francis Barker, The Tremulous 
Private Body: Essays on Subjection (London, 1984), pp. 31-7, p. 58; Margareta de Grazia, 
"Motives for Interiority: Shakespeare's Sonnets and Hamlet, " Ej "11 23,3 (Fall 1989), pp. 430- 
44; Peter Stallybrass, "Shakespeare, the Individual and the Text, " in Lawrence Grossberg et. al. 
eds., Cultural Studie -612; Katherine Eisaman Maus, "Proof and ,a (London, 1992), pp. 593 Consequences: Inwardness and Its Exposure in the English Renaissance, " Representations, 
34 (Spring 1991), pp. 29-52; Emily C. Bartels, "Breaking the Illusion of Being: Shakespeare and 
the Performance of Self, " Theatre Journal, 46 (1994), pp. 171-85. For a trenchant critique of 
current accounts of early modern subjectivity, see David Aers, "A Whisper in the Ear of Early 
Modernists; or, Reflections on Literary Critics Writing the 'History of the Subject, " in David Aers 
ed., Culture and Histoty: Essays on English Communities. Identities and Writing (Detroit, 1992), 
pp. 177-202. 
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Nachtradichkeit or Lacan's future anterieur, psychoanalysis posits the priority of 
synchrony over diachrony in a way that remains decidedly problematic for classical 
historicism. This aspect of retroactive causalily, at least for Lacan, arises on account of 
the fact that language as synchronic order itself comes up against an internal limit, a 
vv foreign kernel that can only be integrated after the fact. As Slavoj Zizek maintains, "if 
the passage from 'genesis' to 'structure' were to be continuous, there would be no 
inversion of the direction of causality,,, 21 to the extent that it is this inert presence 
which opens the very space for any reordering of the past. Epistemologically, it is this 
posture that, perhaps surprisingly, brings psychoanalysis into closest proximity with 
historical materialism whose "knowledge" is similarly self-referential; i. e. whose object 
of critique is comprised of no substantial content that is prior to the very intervention 
that would seek to reintegrate it into the symbolic network. That is to say, it is only 
through the act of knowledge that the object becomes what it truly 4'is. ýS 
Briefly: the problem with Greenblatt's conception of historicism is that it assumes that 
what we call "history" has always already begun, and that therefore it merely continues. 
In other words, Greenblatt presupposes. history, instead of taking it as that which 
remains to be thought. 22 Insofar as it names a praxis wherein all historical content is to 
some extent relativised, i. e. made dependent on "historical circumstances, " the problem 
with historicism (as opposed to historicit ) is that it routinely evades every encounter 
20 Ibid., p.;, 142. 
21 Salvoj Zizek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enioyment as a Political Facto (London, 
1994), p. 171. 
22 Indeed, Greenblatt's own historical rigor has itself become the focus of some debate, see for 
example, Carolyn Porter, "Are We Being Historical Yet?, " South Atlantic Quarterl , 87 (1988), pp. 743-86; Joseph Kelly and Timothy Kelly, "Searching the Dark Alley: New Historicism and Social History, " Journal of Social History, 25 (1991-92), pp. 677-94; and Robert D. Hume, "Texts 
Within Contexts: Notes Towards a Historical method, " Philoloaical Quarterly, 71 (1992), pp. 69- 
100. 
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with the Real. In other words, historicisms both new and old are, ultimately, in thrall to 
the notion of a linear succession of historical epochs that (according to Lacan) are 
nothing other than, precisely, a series of failed attempts to deal with this radically 
unhistorical traumatic kernel that always returns to the same place. In an argument that 
appears to offer itself as concise rejoinder to Greenblatt in this respect, Slavoj Zizek 
makes the broader claim that "the most succinct definition of historicism is [] 
historicity minus the unhistorical traumatic kernel which returns to the Same through all 
,, 23 historical epochs. In this respect, psychoanalysis (and Lacan in particular) is as far 
as it is possible to be from "universalizing" the Real into something that is exempted 
from historical analysis. Lacan's point, rather, is that the only true ethical stance is to 
assume fully the impossible task of symbolizing the Real, inclusive of its necessary 
failure. 
The truly radical critique of ideology should therefore go beyond the self-congratulatory 
"social analyses" which continue to participate in the fantasy that sustains the object of 
their critique and to search instead for ways to sap the force of this underlying fantasy- 
frame itself - in short, to perform something akin to what the later Lacan called "going- 
through the fantasy. " Indeed, in many respects, it is an aim of this thesis to begin 
thinking another historicity - not a new history or still less a "new historicism, " but 
something closer to what Jacques Derrida has elsewhere referred to as "another opening 
of event-ness as historicity.,, 24 In this crucial respect, my reading of Derrida 
v 14 11 Slavoj Zizek, En'oy Your Symptom: Lacan in HollMood and Out (Routledge, 1996), p. 81. 
24 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt. the Work of Mourning. and the 
New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London, 1994), pp. 75-6. It is well known that in the 
French academic scene of the 60s and 70s Derrida and Lacan were regarded as a somewhat 
uncomfortable pair of intellectual bedfellows. Lacan was derisive and often openly dismissive of 
what he regarded as Derrida's 'derivative' project of deconstruction. See Elizabeth Roudinesco, 
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throughout this thesis is concerned, precisely, to maintain a sensitivity to each text's 
"logic of repetitio and the trace, for it is difficult to see how there could be history 
without it. q125 
Beginning with an analysis of Richard 111,1 argue that the question of Richard's 
deformity comes ultimately to be negotiated at the level of a more persistent kind of 
formal or anamorphic tension that haunts the texts own signifying practices. To this 
extent, the formal consistency of the text's historical project is routinely implicated with 
the figure of Richard as, in many ways, the embodiment of the text's own difficulties in 
trying to secure the illusion of temporal homeostasis. Turning more explicitly to the 
work of Jacques Derrida, the second chapter focuses on Richard II as a text that is 
similarly preoccupied with the relationship between history and temporality. The gaze 
here, however, becomes an index for the traumatic incursion of an other repressed scene 
Jacques Lacan & Co. (London, 1986). Similarly, Derrida maintained a critical distance from many 
of Lacan's ideas - most obviously so in his charge of Lacan's'phallogocentrism'in "Le facteur de 
la verite, " in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, Alan Bass trans., (London, 
1979), pp. 411-79. For a dazzling analysis of both Lacan and Derrida in this regard see Barbara 
Johnson "The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida7 in Shoshana Felman ed., Literature 
and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading Otherwise (London, 1982), pp. 457-506. It was 
not until only very recently that Derrida publicly affirmed his indebtedness to Lacan in an essay 
entitled "For the Love of Lacan " Peggy Kamuf trans., in Jacques Derrida, Resistances of 
Psychoanalysis (California, 1998), pp. 39-70. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to engage a diacritical encounter between Derrida and 
Lacan. Rather my concern is to show that Derridean differance offers a productive insight into 
considering the ways that the negotiation of jouissance in the Shakespearean text is also never 
faraway from "the-effect of-subject. " Inthisrespect, I propose to take as axiomatic Derrida's 
claim that "Every time there is `ouissance' (but the 'there is' of this event is in itself extremely 
enigmatic), there is 'deconstruction. "' Indeed, Derrida's further reflections on this issue are 
worth quoting at length: "Deconstruction perhaps has the effect, if not the mission, of liberating 
forbidden *ouissance. That's what has to be taken on board. It is perhaps this jouissance which 
most irritates the all-out adversaries of 'deconstruction. ' Who, moreover, blame those they call 
'deconstructionists' for depriving them of their habitual delectation in the reading of the great 
works or the rich treasures of tradition, and simultaneously for being too playful, for taking too 
much pleasure, for saying what they like for their own pleasure, etc. An interesting and 
symptomatic contradiction . ..... This Strange Institution Called Literature': An Interview with Jacques Derrida, " in Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London, 1992), 
pp. 35-76, p. 56. 
25 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London, 1981), p. 57. 
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of radical alterity that I argue to be that of writing itself. If, as I maintain, writing 
names a relation of interiority that is in fact without belonging, this strange movement so 
contaminates the text's signifying practices that Richard 11 comes to stage a drama of 
"de-positioning" in a way that has hitherto been given insufficient attention in critical 
accounts of the play. 
I examine the question of interiority further in the third chapter. Hamlet I argue, is only 
able to sustain the illusion of its interiorizing voluminosity through the elision of an 
extimate kemel of jouissang that, ultimately, the play itself is powerless to occlude. 
Reading Lacan alongside Derrida's preoccupation with cryptonymy, identity is 
variously shown to be negotiated around certain topological paradoxes whose very 
formal inconsistencies, I argue, are in fact crucial to the production of subjectivity itself. 
The concluding two chapters offer a more extensive consideration of the question of 
jouissanc and how it comes to threaten the socio-symbolic edifice to which it gives rise. 
Antony and Cleopatra I argue, is a text that both routinely and ambivalently comes to 
meditate upon the incursion of an excess that complicates the historical project of its 
imperial narrative. Variously negotiating the excessive presence of some remainder or 
trace of enjoyment that come to antagonize the authority of Roman "Law, " this is also 
reticulated within the text at the site of certain metastases that I read as disclosing the 
discontinuous production of subjectivity peculiar to the colonial encounter itself. In the 
conclusion I offer a brief introduction to Romeo and Juliet as a text which more 
explicitly locates enjoyment as the element that sustains desiring subjectivity. To this 
end it is argued that, far from appeasing social conflict, every "love story" is to some 
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extent a compromise formation which attempts to fill out the place of a radical stain of 
non-sense that comes to threaten the coherence of the Law itself. 
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Chapter One 
Back to the Future: 
Subjectivity and Anamorphosis in Richard III 
.. the unconscious 
is manifested to us as 
something that holds itself in suspense 
in the area, I would say, of the unborn 
Me And My Shadow 
Having confounded his own expectations in the successful wooing of Lady Anne, the 
Duke of Gloucester has recourse to a model of ego formation that, for a modem audience 
at least, has much in common with the Lacanian archetype: 
I do mistake my person all this while: 
Upon my life, she finds, although I cannot, 
Myself to be a marv'llous proper man. 
I'll be at charges for a looking glass, 
And entertain a score or two of tailors, 
To study fashions to adorn my body: 
Shine out, fair sun, till I have bought a glass, 
That I may see my shadow as I pass. 
(I. ii. 252-258,262-263) 
Internalising the gaze of the Other, in this case that of Lady Anne, Richard's acquisition of 
a looking glass is accompanied by an idealisation of body image that is redolent of the 
"jubilation" experienced by the subject of Lacan's mirror stage. To recount briefly, in the 
mirror stage the ego is formed in terms of an identification with one's specular image: the 
infant who has not yet mastered the upright posture upon seeing himself in the mirror will 
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"jubilantly assume" this upright position. I The apparently "orthopaedic" effect of 
captation by the mirror image would appear especially apposite for a character who is 
frequently disposed to descanting upon his own deformity. This transition from an 
uncoordinated body image, what Lacan refers to as the cojj2s morcele, to the Gestalt of 
bodily wholeness is not, however, reducible to a myth of origins. As Jane Gallop has 
argued, the mirror stage involves a temporal dialectic that is simultaneously anticipatory 
and retroactive and, in many ways, is of paradigmatic importance for Lacan's lifelong 
preoccupation with the anachronistic relationship that inheres between subjectivity and the 
signifying chain: 
The mirror image would seem to come after "the body in bits and 
pieces" and organise them into a unified image. But actually, that 
violently unorganised image only comes after the mirror stage so as to 
represent what came before. What appears to precede the mirror stage 
is simply a projection or a reflection. There is nothing on the other side 
of the miffor. 2 
The miffor stage, it seems, is the threshold for a paradoxical short circuit from a not ye to 
the always-already: that is to say, eluding a moment of pure, undivided presence, the "I" 
produced in the mirror stage is Lacan's earliest pronouncement on the status of the subject 
as something that constitutively lacks its own place. Lacan's subsequent engagement with 
paradoxical models of temporality was always implicitly concerned to rearticulate the 
question of the subject's being as something that, in a quite radical sense, is crucially 
dependent upon this formal inconsistency in the signifying network. 3 Indeed, if the 
1 Jacques Lacan, "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I, " Ecrits: A 
Selection. ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1977), pp. 1-8, p. 2 
2 Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (Ithaca, 1988), p. 47. 
3 Lacan's most considered excursus on this relation is elaborated in the seminar 
entitled "The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian 
unconscious" in. Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 292-325. See also figure 1 on p. 293 of this 
thesis. 
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category of the Real was to enjoy increased theoretical elaboration in Lacan's later work, 
it was partly in order to emphasise this point: that the subject crucially owes its ontological 
consistency to a certain formal inconsistency in the symbolic order. 4 There can only be an 
"I, " Lacan maintains, precisely insofar as somewhere there remains a formless stain, a 
quotient of non-sense wherein the subject finds his or her being condensed. 
Alternatively, we might recall here Lacan's audacious revision of Decartes' formula for 
the ! ýito: "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think. " 5 According to 
Lacan, not only the subject but also the symbolic order itself is rendered efficacious by 
virtue of an antagonism that is, ultimately, the void around which every moment of 
symbolization turns. Of central importance here is Lacan's invocation of what he 
frequently refers to as the "future anterior, " which is given its most succinct definition in 
his account of the temporality of a subject where 
What is realised in my history is not the past definite of what it was, since it is 
no more, or the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future 
anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming. 6 
This notion of the subject as something that can only relate to itself in terms of an essential 
contretemps, as that which "will have been, " is ineluctably tied to Lacan's often 
4 It is from within this context that we must understand the "later' Lacan's otherwise 
perplexing fascination with mathematics and topology. Namely, that what we refer to 
as the subject is, in the last instance, nothing but an impasse in formalisation. In 
Lacan "Ie reel" - the real of *ouissance - "ne saurait s'inscire que d'une impasse de la 
formalisation" - can be discerned only by way of the deadlocks of its formalization. In 
short, the status of the real is thoroughly non-substantial: it is a product of failed 
attempts to integrate it into the Symbolic. In his effort to grasp how both the subject 
and the symbolic order are inherently split from within, Lacan also sought to reveal 
how theories of linear determinism characteristically elide a radical ambiguity that 
pertains to every Cause. Herein resides the significance of Lacan's epigrammatic 
account of the unconscious: "there is cause only in something that doesn't work. " 
Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. ed. Jacques- 
Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1994) p. 23. 
5 Jacques Lacan, "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud" 
in. Ecrits: A Selection pp. 146-79, p. 1 66. 
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misunderstood definition of the signifier as "that which represents the subject for another 
signifier. " In other words, what Lacan refers to as the "subject" can only appear in the 
signifying chain as a kind of anamorphic stain (what Ernest Jones refers to as the site of a 
certain al2hanisis or "fading"); i. e. as something that is an "effect" of the signifier but 
which does not imply, let alone "represent, " the wealth of any substantial content. 
It is precisely on account of this fact that, for Lacan, every formation of identity is closely 
umbilicated to a certain formlesness, or even a radical deformi1y that persists as the 
immanent necessity of every identity tout court. 7 If, as Lacan argues, the "meaning" of a 
signifying chain always runs behind the signifying production itself, it is on account of 
this retroversion effect that the subject becomes at each stage what he was before, and 
announces himself - he will have been - only in the future perfect sense. Moreover, for 
Lacan, it is precisely this ambiguous point of tension between delay and anticipation that 
"is essential to knowing myself (un meconnaitre essentiel au me connaitre) [ ... ] For, in 
this 'rear view' (Letrovisee), all that the subject can be certain of is the anticipated image 
coming to meet him that he catches of himself in the mirror. "8 
If the subject is unable finally ever to fully coincide with itself, this unbearable fact is 
embodied by that unreflected remainder (Lacan's object g) which haunts the symbolic 
order from within. This, of course, is the substantive point of Lacan's extraordinary 
15 Md., P. 86. 
7 According to an excellent analysis by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe of 
"identity" in another context, it is here precisely that deformity generally acquires a 
truly subversive and constitutive force: "This presence of the contingent in the 
necessary is what we earlier called subversion and it manifests itself as 
symbolization, metaphorization, paradox, which deform and question the literal 
character of every identity. " Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Toward a New Democratic Politics (London, 1993), p. 1 14. 
8 Jacques Lacan, "The subversion of the subject, " p. 306. 
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account of anamorphosis in his seminar on the gaze. Here, Lacan maintains that this 
anamorphoic blot is strictly homologous to the gaze -qua object a 
insofar as it embodies the 
(impossible) point of view from which the blot can be perceived in its "true meaning, " i. e. 
the virtual point from which, instead of the anamorphic distortion, it would be possible for 
the subject to grasp without remainder the contours of a formless stain. 9 
While anamorphosis is the favoured Lacanian motif for the analysis of the retroactive 
dynamic of desire (i. e. the subject) in the Real, what may be called a temporal 
anamorphosis also provides the topological model for the Symbolic. Indeed, as early as 
1953 Lacan argued that: 
The past and the future correspond precisely to one another. And not any old 
how - not in the sense that you might believe that analysis indicates, namely 
from the past to the future. On the contrary, precisely in analysis because its 
technique works, it happens in the right order - from the future to the past. 10 
By reading events "backward, " so to speak, Lacan is concerned to theorise the structural 
implications of this anamorphic entity that gains its consistency only in retrospect, when it 
is viewed (belatedly) from within what is always, ultimately, a contingent field of meaning 
and sense. Effectively, the very emergence of the symbolic order opens up a beance that 
can never be wholly accounted for by meaning: "sense" is never all S(ý), it is always 
truncated, marked by some phallic detail that "does not fit" and as a consequence comes to 
denature the field of so-called "reality. " 
9 And it is for this reason that anamorphosis is ultimately a reminder of castration: it is 
precisely on account of this void in the symbolic order that the subject comes to find 
the unbearable truth of his being. 
The Objr, -0 
22 
Difficult Births 
From this brief overview of Lacan's analysis of the relationship between temporality, 
subjectivity and the Real, we are in a better position to understand how subjectivity and 
meaning emerge only ambiguously at a dislocating and decentred point of anamorphic 
tension: "normal" reality (i. e. the Real pacified by the symbolic order) is perceptible only 
at a point where "it thinks" remains a formless stain. II By drawing upon the theoretical 
problematic yielded by Lacan's investigation of anamorphosis, and how it relates to the 
cognate psychoanalytical domains of repetition, the uncanny and the gaze, this chapter 
argues that, in its ostensible production of history, Shakespeare's Richard III is besieged 
by similar problems that centre crucially around the "deformed" figure of Richard himself. 
We might "begin" then by considering the ways that the text routinely makes Richard's 
mis-shapen body the symptom of a certain imbalance or disturbance in the symbolic order 
itself If being "sent into the world in a less than finished state"12 indicates for Freud how 
prematurity is a founding condition of subjectivity, Richard's bitter declaration that he was 
"sent before my time/Into this breathing world, scarce half made up" (I. i. 20-21), is also not 
the only occasion in the text where deformity becomes aligned with anxieties of 
origination. In III Henry VI Richard is referred to as "an indigested and deformed lump" 
10 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar Qf Jacques Lacan Book One: Freud's Papers on 
Technique, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. John Forrester (Cambridge, 1988), p. 157. 
11 Lacan's point, then, is not that self-consciousness is impossible since something 
always eludes the grasp of the conscious ego. Rather, it is the far more radical thesis 
that this decentred hard kernel which eludes the grasp of the subject is ultimately self- 
consciousness itself. It is here, pre-eminently, that psychoanalysis becomes 
unbearable in the eyes of philosophy. 
12 Moreover, in a comment that would appear to have a particular bearing upon this 
constitutive tension of delay and precipitousness throughout the play that is 
condensed in the figure of Richard, Lacan also argues that "generic prematuration of 
birth [is] the dynamic origin of specular capture. " Lacan, "Subversion of the subject, " 
p. 308. 
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(V. vi. 5 1) by the King, a description that is later echoed in Clifford's description of 
Richard as a "foul indigested lump" (11.157-58). This characterisation of Richard as 
something akin to an object that is "lodged" in the gullet of the symbolic order, is further 
complicated by the contradictory reports of his birth. The precise nature of Richard's 
deformity indeed becomes a confused affair when it is recalled that he had "Teeth..... in 
thy head when thou wast born" (11.54), an image that is also recalled by Queen Margaret in 
her vituperative outburst in Richard III: 
From forth the kennel of thy womb hath crept 
A hell-hound that doth hunt us all to death: 
That dog, that had his teeth before his eyes, 
To worry lambs and lap their gentle blood; 
(IV. iv. 47-50) 
As a "lump of foul deformity" (I. ii. 58), Richard is also imbued with this peculiar 
morphology of lack and surplus in John Rous's history, written in 1492, which relates how 
the royal birth was complicated by the extraordinary claim that Richard remained in his 
mother's womb for five years and was born with teeth and hair down to his shoulders. 13 
Even the account provided by Thomas More, who frequently disputes the veracity of such 
mythologizing tales of Richard's birth, provides the seemingly significant detail that 
Richard, apparently a breech birth, was born upside down: "It is reported that the Duchess 
his mother had so much ado in her travail that she could not be delivered of him uncut, and 
that he came into the world with the feet forward. " 14 
13 For a useful, although brief, summary of this mythologizing of Richard see Retha M. 
Warwicke, '7he Physical Deformities of Ann Boleyn and Richard III: Myth and Reality, " 
Parergon, 4 (1988) pp. 135-53. 
14 Quoted in Desmond Seward, Richard III: England's Black Legend (London, 
1983), p. 23. Indeed, in III King Hen[y VI Richard himself refers to this account in a 
way that also suggests a degree of ironical self-distance from the narratives of his own 
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As facilitator to the Tudor succession, Richard is not the only "monster" in Elizabethan 
tracts to have his epochal significance distinguished by a "birth" that was, simultaneously, 
both too early and too late. For example, an account from 1600 relates how "A Strange 
and miraculous accident happened in the Cittie of Purmenent, on New Yeare's even last 
past 1599, of a young child which was heard to cry in the Mothers wombe before it was 
borne. "15 Temporally, the monster appears here to be a proxy for some formal disturbance 
in the symbolic order: arriving either too early or too late it can more properly be figured 
as that which Jacques Derrida has called an arrivant: a "singularity" that is nevertheless 
also anticipated. Indeed, this strange preparedness toward the future also informs the work 
of James Gardiner, an eminent historian of the nineteenth-century, who claims that 
"Richard left such a reputation behind him that even before him, at his birth, it was said 
that he was proclaimed a monster" (emphasis added). 16 Insofar as we are able to detect 
here a problematical complicity between singularity and repetition, we can refer to the 
work of Jacques Derrida who similarly argues that "all of history has shown that each time 
an event has been produced [ ... ] it took the form of the unacceptable, or even of the 
intolerable, of the incomprehensible, that is, of a certain monstrosity. " 17 
As a paradox of causation, then, the designation of Richard as a "monster, " I would like to 
suggest, also attests to pervasive anxieties in the text's representation of history. Although 
frequently attributed to divine will, this proliferation in narratives of the "monstrous" in 
the sixteenth-century, as Katherine Park and Lorraine J. Daston have argued, inevitably 
symbolic crystallization; namely, in his recollection that "I have often heard my 
mother say/I came into the world with my legs forward" (I I I. H. 56). 
15 "A Strange and miraculous accident, " 1599, STC 20551. 
16 James Gardiner, History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third (Cambridge, 
1898), p. 5. 
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circulated around the difficult question of "how [to] tell which monsters arise in the course 
of nature and which are expressly produced as signs by God. "18 Elevated to the status of 
a cultural milieu following the upheavals of the reformation, this study of monsters 
cathected, rather, a crisis of authority in narratives of linear historical progress. The 
doctrine of Aristotle, which provides the discursive frame of reference for most early 
modem accounts, characterises the monster as a paradox of causation that also 
accomplishes an erasure of filiation: "anyone who does not take after his parents is really 
17 Jacques Derrida, "Passages - from Traumatism to Promise" in Points ... Interviews. 1974-1994, ed. Elizabeth Weber (California, 1995), pp. 372-95, p. 387. 
18 Lorraine J Datson and Katherine Park, "Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of 
Monsters in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century France and England, " Past and 
Present 92 (1982) pp. 20-54, p. 34. A more recent study by Kathryn M. Brammall has 
identified a trend in the way that the appellation of "monster"was increasingly 
employed as a rhetorical trope from 1570. Kathryn M Brammell, "Monstrous 
Metamorphosis: Nature, Morality and the Rhetoric of Monstrosity in Tudor England, " 
Sixteenth CentuI)j Journal, 27,1 (1996), pp. 3-21. See also the extraordinary study by 
David Williams that makes several important points about how the monstrous comes 
to occupy the site of a certain formal disturbance in narratives of 'linear progress. 
Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Mediaeval Thought and 
Literature (Exeter, 1996), pp. 40-48. 
As will become clear, what I am principally attempting to elaborate here is an account 
of the monstrous which makes use of Lacan's complex association between spatial 
and temporal anamorphoses; that is, the way that the monster indexes the intrusion of 
a stain of non-sense in the signifying chain. In this respect, perhaps surprisingly, 
Michel Foucault makes some characteristically subtle and apposite comments in his 
analysis of the emergence of the study of monsters in the human sciences. Critiquing 
theories of evolutionism Foucault argues that 
[ ... ] continuity is not the visible wake of a fundamental history in which one same living principle struggles with a variable environment. For continuity 
precedes time. It is its condition ...... First, the necessity of introducing monsters into the scheme .... The monster ensures in time, and for our theoretical knowledge, a continuity that, for our everyday experience, floods, volcanoes, 
and subsiding continents confuse in space. The other consequence is that the 
signs of continuity throughout such a history can no longer be of any order 
other than that of resemblance .... On the basis of the power of the continuum held by nature, the monster ensures the emergence of difference. This 
difference is still without law and without any well-defined structure; the 
monster is the root stock of specification, but it is only a sub-species itself in 
the stubbornly slow stream of history. 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences 
(New York, 1990), pp. 155-6. 
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in a way a monstrosity. " Later in the text Aristotle similarly avers that "monstrosities 
come under the class of offspring which is unlike its parents. "19 
This somewhat perplexing preoccupation with the question of Richard's "origins" has even 
found its way into the text's critical history; most notably so in E. M. W. Tillyard's 
somewhat anxious consideration of the proper "place" that Richard III should be assigned 
in the Shakespeare canon. In Shakespeare's Histojy PlUs Tillyard's attempts to adduce 
what should be considered "historical" in the context of the play invariably confronts the 
issue of Richard's deviant morphology. The monster, -qua 
diegetic form, is revealed 
ultimately to be an agency within the text that disorders the formal balance of its 
hegemonizing fictions. Initially, Tillyard considers the question of authority in ternis of an 
overarching telos of the artistic development of the author. It soon becomes clear, 
however, that if Richard is indeed the victim of arrested development, this is merely a 
dissimulated effect (and symptom) of his literary genitor's immaturity: 
He [Shakespeare] was to do better when he matured, but in Richard III he 
delivered himself of what he was good for at that time. Not being the fully 
accomplished artist he had to labour prodigiousl and could not conceal the 
effort (emphasis added). 20 
In a text that Coppelia Kahn has correctly identified as suggesting "the importance of the 
mother, rather than the father, in the formation of masculine identity"21 Tillyard's 
metaphors here reveal a highly vexed relationship towards the question of authority that, 
ultimately, is negotiated around the thorny issue of paternity and filial piety. Indeed, 
19 Aristotle, Generation of Animals, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 402,405. 
20 E. M. W. Tillyard, Shakespeare's Histo[y Plays (London, 1981), p. 205. 
21 Coppelia Kahn, Man's Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare (London, 1981), 
p. 63. 
, Stjhjadivýy FrjdArp. n-, rrp17r,!: ic- it-, fff 
27 
Tillyard's implicit claim that the text somehow fails to conceal the traces of its production 
not only encodes artistic impropriety as a peculiarly feminine vice, 22 the putative failure 
of Richard III to demarcate successfully a space between the author and his work also 
displaces a gnawing dissatisfaction about the text's representation of history onto a 
consideration of the masculinization of Shakespeare himself. If Aristotle is correct in his 
argument, i. e. what makes the monster truly monstrous is that it serves as too conspicuous 
a reminder that paternity can never really be proven, then Tillyard's analysis is similarly 
concerned with this need to recover the father's image. 23 Moreover, such anxieties acquire 
22 Marilyn Francis has argued in another context that such a strategy is concerned"to 
contain the imagination [ ... ] relying on the attribution of deformed, sterile progeny, 
which functions as a sign of the deviant female mind and of the corruption of biological 
and literary maternity. " "The Monstrous Mother: Reproductive Anxiety in Swift and 
Pope, " English Litera[y Histo! y, 61 (1994) pp. 826-51, p. 840. It is also relevant to note 
here that for Aristotle the monster's origin is also, not coincidentally, related to the 
feminine in terms of their shared dissimilarity to the father: "The first beginning of this 
deviation is when a female is formed instead of a male, though this indeed is a 
necessity required by Nature, since the race of creatures which are separated into 
male and female has got to be kept in being. " Aristotle, Qp, cit., p. 402. The ja: 
appropriately named Alain Grosrichard's analysis of the relationship between the 
monstrous and filiation similarly argues that"the child runs the risk of monstrosity both 
if the father does not play his proper role in the original structuring language of the 
maternal imagination, and if his role is excessive. " "The Case of Polyphemus, or, a 
Monster and its Mother"in Cogito and the Unconsciouri, ed. Slavoj Zizek (London, 
1998), pp. 117-48, p. 137. 
231 am particularly indebted here to Marie-Helene Huet who, in a brilliant essay, has 
argued that "if resemblance creates a visible connection between father and child, it 
also conceals the questionable character of all paternities. At the same time that it 
suggests filiation, by instituting a "natural, " visible link between the genitor and his 
child, resemblance, used as a criterion for establishing paternity, elides the fact that 
this filiation can never be certain. Thus, resemblance masks a fundamental, primordial 
disorder. And what resemblance conceals, the monster unmasks. " Marie-Helene 
Huet, "Monstrous Imagination: Progeny as Art in French Classicism, " Critical Inquiry, 
17 (1991) pp. 131-159, p. 142. This question of Richard's self-proclaimed auto- 
genesis finds a wider resonance in the way that early modern culture sought to 
create an identity for the nebulous processes of literary production itself. In a 
comment that inevitably recalls Richard, both in its choice of metaphor and in its 
aggressive claims of autonomy, Thomas Nashe contests his status as an 'outsider' to 
"proudly boast [ ... ] that the vaine which I have (be it median vaine or a madde man) is 
of my owne begetting, and cals no man father in England but my selfe. " Quoted in 
David Scott Kastan, "'His semblable is his mirror': Hamlet and the Imitation of 
Revenge, " Shakespeare Studies (1994) pp. 52-78, p. 63. 
It is Philip Sidney, however, who provides a more complex example of how questions 
of literary creativity inevitably confront the issue of masculine identity. In a prefatory 
letter which dedicates The Countess Of Pembroke's Arcadia to his (then pregnant) 
sister, Sidney offers a disclaimer that deploys multivalent levels of displacement as he 
seeks to negotiate the claims of literary patrimony under the aspect of the prodigious: 
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added ironical force when one considers the text's bibliographical history. A speech by 
Richard that appears in QI of III HeM VI., and that is frequently offered as an apology 
for his subsequent villainy, is in fact prefixed with a line that is not contained in the Folio 
text: 
I had no father, I am like no father 
I have no Brother, I am like no Brother: 
And this word (love) which Gray-beards call pure, 
Be resident in men like one another 
And not in me. 
Tillyard's contention then, that Shakespeare was "to do better, " also attempts to fantasize a 
paternal presence on behalf of a character who is particularly notable for eloquent 
pronouncements upon his own perceived alienation, I am myself alone" III HenjX VI 
V. vi. 83). 24 In other words, Tillyard's suggestion that, redeemed retroactively, the text 
will come to recognis its origins, is also an attempt to occlude textual difference in a 
rhetorical manoeuvre that, as Jacques Derrida argues in another context, involves a 
restitution of paternal rights where none other than Shakespeare himself is invoked as "a 
father that is present, standing near it, behind it, within it, sustaining it with his rectitude, 
attending it in person in his own name. 1125 
I hope, for the father's sake, it will be pardoned, perchance made much of, 
though in itself it have deformities... In sum, a young head not so well stayed 
as I would it were ... having many fancies begotten in it, if it had not been in some way delivered, would have grown a monster, and more sorry might I be 
that they came in than that they gat out. But his chief safety shall be the not 
walking abroad; and his chief protection the bearing the livery of your name. 
Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia, ed. Katherine Duncan Jones 
(Oxford, 1985), p-4- 
24 Desmond Seward has argued that "It is unlikely that little Richard ever saw much of 
his father. We may guess that his childhood was as painful as his birth [ ... I We know that he spent a good part of his early years at Fotheringay with his sister Margaret 
It has been fancifully suggested that Margaret'played mother to him' but it is more 
likely that nurses performed this role. " Desmond Seward, Richard III: England's Black 
Legend (London, 1981), p. 28. 
25 Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy"in A Derrida Reader: Between The Blinds, 
ed. Peggy Kamuf (London, 1991), pp. 1 12-143, p. 1 18. 
Sub vpliac-h: ir, fff 
29 
It is, however, a more persistent failure of the text to satisfactorily recognise its origins 
that leads Tillyard to comment upon what he calls the "confused" place that Richard III 
occupies in the tetralogy. Positioned within a temporal frame that is simultaneously 
proleptic and retrospective, Tillyard negotiates this paradox of the text in terms of an 
ostensible "working out" of the traumatic civil war as merely a mechanical exercise in 
preparation for the Tudor succession: "the main business of the play is to complete the 
national tetralogy and to display the working out of God's plan to restore England to 
prosperity. " 26 What threatens to disrupt the fantasmatic consistency of this Elizabethan 
world picture on display, however, are points of discontinuity throughout the text that 
betray a potentially troublesome mark of over-proximity to the site of the play's own 
contingent position of enunciation: "Richard III inevitably suffers as a detached unit ... the 
play can never come into its own till acted as a sequel to the other three plays. 1127 This 
foreclosure of self-reference, the putative failure of the text to "come into its own, " also 
(fortuitously) provides the title of an essay by Derrida 28 which locates the "monstrous, " 
precisely, at this site of tension between past and future. 
"History" and "anamorphosis" co-operate in Richard III in terms of this radical 
asymmetry: unable to occlude fully the traces of its own historicity, the text shares a 
26 Tillyard, Shakespeare's Histo[y Playa, p. 205. 
27 Ibid., p. 206. It is also possible to read this aspect of the text as an example of the 
insistence of its self-reflexivity in the signifying chain, conforming to a movement that 
Shoshana Felman has described as that"which passing through the Other, returns to 
itself without quite being able to rejoin itself; a reflexivity which is thus untotalizable, 
that is, irreducibly dialogic. " Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Inaw (London, 
1987), p. 60. 
28 Arguing how "every speculation implies the frightening possibility of the Hysteron 
Proteron of the generations, " Derrida undertakes a brilliant re-reading of the Freudian 
account of repetition that includes biographical details of how neither Freud or his wife 
11got over the monstrous fact of children dying before their parents. m Jacques Derrida, 
"Coming Into One's Own" in Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text. ed. 
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peculiar affinity with its protagonist in that both are, in the words of Linda Chames, a 
"product of their own belatedness. 1129 Indeed, Derek Traversi also discusses the text in 
terms that can only be described as prenatal, arguing that Richard III is a "new type of 
drama at once the necessary conclusion of all that has gone before and the expression of a 
new conception of what the chronicle play implieS. 1130 
Similarly, returning to Tillyard, not only is Richard III presented as something of a misfit 
that prevents the symbolic order from fully constituting itself, in an attempt to rescue the 
play's reputation Tillyard confers what he somewhat anxiously refers to as "shape" on the 
play. Effectively, what ensues is an invocation of the monologic authority of Shakespeare 
as the expedient through which contingency can successfully, if not seamlessly, be 
reconstituted as necessity: 
... at the end of the play Shakespeare comes out with his full declaration of the principle of order, thus giving final and 
unmistakable shape to what, though largely implicit, had been all 
along the animating principle of the tetralogy. 31 
Geoffrey Hartman (London, 1978), pp. 1 14-149, p. 1 44. 
29 Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity: Materializing the Sub'ect in Shakespeare 
ondon, 1993), p. 340. 
Derek Traversi, An Approach to Shakespeare: I Hency VI to Twelfth Nj= (London, 
1968), p. 46. The notion that Richard III can be considered a "seminal" moment in the 
artistic maturity of Shakespeare can still be found in more recent discussions of the 
text. Elizabeth Pearlman, for example, argues that "The differentiation of Richard from 
the comparatively colourless orators and warriors who populate the Henry VI plays 
marks a turning point - perhaps the turning point - in Shakespeare's development into 
a dramatist of more than ordinary excellence. " Elizabeth Pearlman, "The Invention of 
Richard of Gloucester, " Shakespeare Quarterly, 43,4 (1992) pp. 411-31, p. 41 1. 
31 Tillyard, p. 207. 
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Crucially, this totalizing procedure unwittingly engages the text, and more particularly the 
figure of Richard, as a kind of "vanishing mediator, "32 a structural-dialectical paradox that 
v .4 Slavoj Zizek formulates as "an effect which exists only in order to efface the causes of its 
existence. 1133 This temporal loop, which implicitly acknowledges the non-coincidence of 
the text with itself, is also the enabling condition for the putative working ou of 
England's traumatic past in terms of the text's retroactive inscription within providential 
determinism. Crucially, concluding his analysis of the play, Tillyard reinvokes Richard 
III's function as a "working ouf 'of the history plays so as to harmonize the contradictory 
vectors of the text's signification: "Whereas the sins of other men had merely bred more 
sins, Richard's are so vast that they are absorptive, not contagious. 1134 
In short, structural antagonisms which may contradict the historical design that Tillyard is 
attempting to adduce are obviated by the re-introduction of the character of Richard: 
thereby effecting a displacement of this preternatural excess onto a figure who is already 
conveniently encoded as deviant. The attempt to retain an origin of meaning from which 
history can be measured is Possible only if the process of "working out" is coterminous 
with a movement of "absorption, " of coming back. In this respect, the recursive trajectory 
of the text's significations is more redolent of what Jacques Derrida has called an 
uncomfortable athesis that is also "contagious" precisely insofar as it exceeds the vigilance 
of teleology. As Derrida has argued, what the construction of a "tradition" amounts to is 
32 According to Fredric Jameson, in an argument where the analogies to Lacan's 
defintion of the Real are almost too obvious to miss, a system reaches its equilibrium, 
i. e. it establishes itself as a synchronous totality, when it "posits" its external 
presuppositions as its inherent moments and thus obliterates the traces of its 
traumatic origins. See Fredric Jameson, ýThe Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as 
Storytelleý"jn The Ideologies of Theory: Volume 2 (Minneapolis, 1988), pp. 32-64. 
33 Slavoj Zizek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor 
ý London, 1994), p. 204. 
Tillyard, 
-op. -cit., p. 
216. 
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an attempt to negotiate a "pathway out of tension between protensions and retentions, 
projections forward, and retainings of the past. 1135 
"The King Is A Thing" 
To recount our discussion so far: as both symptom and cause of all that has gone before, 
Richard is "within the limits of the play, " as Tillyard remarks significantly in the context 
of a discussion on the credibility of character, "both possible and impossible. " 36 It is 
tempting here to read this invocation of "limits" as a species of the kind of Hegelian 
problematic discussed by Slavoj Zizek; i. e. as a "reflection-into-itself'of the boundary 
which "emerges when the determinatedness which defines the identity of an object is 
reflected into this object itself and assumes the shape of its own unattainable limit, of what 
the object can never fully become. " 37 The figure of Richard, I am suggesting, materialises 
throughout the text this strangely embodied condition of possibility that is, 
simultaneously, a condition of impossibility . In other words, it is precisely because. 
Richard is the embodiment of society's meaningless excess ("a foul deformed lump") that 
he is also the locus for its perceived return to an idealised (and ultimately spurious) vision 
of harmonious consistency. 38 
35 Quoted in Marian Hobson, "History Traces" in Poststructuralism and the Question 
of Histocy, ed. Derek Attridge et. a[. (London, 1988), pp 42-68, p. 51. 
36"Qllyard, Shakespeare's Histojýt Play% p. 216. 
37 Zizek, p. 1 00. 
38 It is in this more radical sense that we should understand the following remark by 
M. M. Reese, (which typifies a prominent strain of thought in the criticism of the play): 
"Gloucester concentrates within himself all the evil and suffering which the country has 
borne since the Lancastrian usurpation, and all the causes that flowed from it. " M. M. 
Reese, The Cease of Ma'esty: A Study of Shakespeare's Histo[y Plays (London, 
1961), p. 209. Again we can see here how Richard is located ambivalently as both 
"cause" and "effect" of the trauma of the civil wars. 
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Crucially, this vacillation between lack and surplus is also implicit in many of the 
contemporary debates which sought to identify the obligations of the Absolute Monarch. 
In a sermon preached in 1594 the Jesuit Robert Parsons employs a familiar trope when he 
asserts that the community is beautified by the presence of the monarch, without whom it 
"would be but ... A masse of confusion, an ugly and deformed Monster. 1139 Indeed, both 
the function and the "person" of the monarch came increasingly to be regarded in terms 
that can only be described as phantasmatic: i. e. as a bulwark between a fragile social order 
and the chaos that remains its immanent necessity. The observation of one commentator 
that "there is an impression or rude character of dreadful Maiestie stampt in the very 
visage of a King"40 suggests that, while ostensibly committed to the regulation of excess, 
the monarch is also marked by an over-determined relationship between the seemingly 
competing categories of waste and transcendent value. 
The "invisible" body of the monarch is sublime in the Lacanian sense, insofar as it 
presents the paradox of an object that is able to subsist only in shadow. Indeed, Slavoj 
11 4 Zizek discusses this point in a way that inevitably returns our attention to the pre-natal 
'I 
associations of Richard. For Ziz"ek the Lacanian sublime object is similarly pre- 
ontological, it is something that can be conceived only in an "intermediary, half-born 
state, as something latent, implicit, evoked: as soon as we try to cast away the de-forming 
shadow to reveal the substance, the object itself dissolves. 1141 We similarly find that the 
39 Quoted in Robert Eccleshall, Order and Reason in Politics: Theories of Absolute 
and Limited Monarchy in Early Modern EngLand (London, 1978), p. 34. 
40 Ibid., 1ý9ýp. 
41 Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacaues Lacan Throuah PoDular 
Culture (London, 1996), pp. 83-4. 
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figure of the monarch simultaneously guards against and threatens to dissolve into the 
excremental dross that is the last phantasmatic support of his sublime body. 
For example, anticipating that the recently crowned Queen was destined to have a slightly 
less than glorious reign, in 1558 the former Bishop of Westminster opined that Elizabeth's 
England would be comparable to how "as a sowe comyng in to a faire garden, roteth up all 
the faire and sweet flowers and holesome simples, leaving nothing behinde, but her owne 
filthye dirte. 1142 It is, however, Edward Forset who provides what is perhaps the most 
vivid description of the function of the Queen in terms of this negative magnitud ; i. e. as 
the embodiment of the excremental dross or "filthye dirte" that renders the social edifice 
thinkable in the first place: 
Who seeth not, that it belongs to the office of Soveraigntie, to provide for the 
nourishing and mainteining of the state with necessaries, to amplifie the 
dominions [ ... ] to spread abroad the encrease of the people by Colonie, in the 
nature of generating or propagating, to cherish in the subjects an appetite of 
acquiring of commodities, to grant to them places of Mart and market for the 
digesting of the same unto all parts of the realme, and so change forme and 
assimilate them to their most behoofe: to give order for the holding and retaining 
of that which is become their well agreeing and naturall sustenance, and for the 
expelling as well of the hurtfull overcharge, as the unprofitable excrements of the 
weal publique. 43 
In short, from a Lacanian perspective, what may be discerned in this remarkable passage - 
where, to be blunt, society becomes a condensation of the rights to eat, fuck and shit - is 
an understanding of the monarch as nothing less than the particular agency that maintains 
society's access to the materia prima of enjoyment itself. Crucially, as Jacques-Alain 
Miller has so persuasively argued, the ethnic moment conceived as nation is, strictly 
42 Eccleshall, =si-t., p. 25. 
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speaking, possessed of no positive content and it is for this reason that the social edifice 
attains its identi1y only in some shared access to enjoyment (jouissanc ). In fact, the 
monarch here is located at the site of a surplus enjoymen (sometimes referred to by 
Lacan in the term plus de jouir which he made structurally homologous with the function 
of object a). What the monarch "amounts" to is, precisely, a surplus that escapes the 
network of universal exchange that, paradoxically, he is also called upon to crystallize. 
From within the context of our discussion of Richard's "deformity" then, we can see here 
how the monarch discloses that symbolic intersubjectivity is not the ultimate horizon 
behind which one cannot reach: what precedes it is not some "monadic" subjectivity, but 
a pre-symbolic impossible relation to jouissanc . 44 
Insofar as the monarch embodies a non-subjectivizing stain or "smear of enjoyment, " can 
we not also detect here a strangely articulate comment on the "pathological" disposition 
of Richard? Arraigned time and again as a character that is rendered implausible on 
account of his "motiveless malignity, " a Lacanian gloss permits the rejoinder that 
Richard's role in the play is distinguished by the fact that he is, pre-eminently, someone 
who enjoy . 45 For Charles Lamb it is precisely this aspect of Richard that singles him out 
for special attention as a figure of "habitual jocularity, buoyant spirits and [an] elastic 
43 Edward Forset, The Frame of Order, ed. James Winoy (London, 1957), pp. 93-4. 
44 It would be particularly useful to refer here to Slavoj Ziz"'6k's discussion of the role 
of the King in the Jacobinical universe which similarly occupies the focus of a certain 
surplus of enjoyment: 
The Jacobins effectuated a kind of anamorphotic reversal: what appeared in 
the traditional perspective as the charismatic embodiment of the People, as the 
point at which the People's 'life-substance' acquired immediate existence, 
changes now, when viewed from another perspective, into a, ýRpcerous 
protuberance contaminating the body of the people. " Slavoj Zizek, For They 
Know Not What They Do, p. 254. 
45 In a way that, hopefully, will become clearer as both this and subsequent chapters 
develop, my point is that the element which holds a given community cannot be 
reduced to the point of symbolic identification: the bond linking together its members 
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mind that rejoices in the success of its machinations. 1146 Moreover, the New Cambridge 
editor of the text cautions the reader that any pleasure gleaned from the play is also 
compromised by a certain displeasure (this, we should note, is also the most basic 
formulation of Lacanian enjoyment: the ambivalent conjunction of pleasure and 
disPleasure47), and that it is "only by realizing that Shakespeare expects us at once to 
enjoy and detest the monstrous Richard can we fully appreciate the play he wrote about 
v %# him. "48 There is, indeed, as Slavoj Zizek suggests, a curious structural complicity that 
v inheres between enjoyment and deformity. In the following analysis of what Zillek calls 
44ugly jouissanc " it is possible to discern a particularly eloquent summary of how 
Richard's own deformity is, as I am arguing, the last phantasmatic support of every 
symbolization: 
The ugly object is an object that is in the wrong place, that 'shouldn't be 
there. ' This does not mean that the ugly object is no longer ugly the 
moment we relocate it to its proper place; rather, an ugly 'deformed' object 
is 'in itself' out of place, on account of the distorted balance between its 
6 representation' (the symbolic features we perceive) and 'existence' - 
being ugly, out of place, is the excess of existence over representation. 
Ugliness is thus a topologica category; it designates an object that is in a 
way 'larger than itself, ' whose existence is larger than its representation. 49 
always implies a shared relationship toward what Lacan calls theJ "in , toward Enjoyment incarnated. 
46 Quoted in Wilson ed., William Shakespeare, King Richard III (Cambridge, 1958), 
xxxviiii. Moreover, it is this capacity for enjoyment that, perhaps surprisingly, also 
links Richard to Falstaff as another "larger-than-life" figure who operates as a kind of 
vanishing mediator of modern subjectivity. That is, both figures may be thought of as 
mediators between a hierarchized medieval society and the calculating utilitarian 
attitude of the modern "disenchanted" world. In this precise sense, Richard is the 
Renaissance figure par excellence. 
47 According to Lacan, enjoyment (j2. ujiaý is not to be equated with pleasure 
(Lust): enjoyment is precisely "Lust im Unlust"; it designates the paradoxical 
satisfaction procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the equilibrium 
of the "pleasure principle. " In other words, enjoyment is located "beyond the pleasure 
principle. " 
48 
, 
Ibid., xvýi, 
49 Slavoj Zizek, F. W. J. Von Schelling, The Abyss of Freedom/Aaes of the World, 
Judith Norman trans. (London, 1998), p. 21. 
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So too it is in the deformed figure of Richard that we find perhaps the most disarming 
example of how lack comes to function as an excess: a necessarily "de-formed" excess or 
as yet not fully realized "matter" that is in search of a real, or in Richard's words, "proper" 
body. In many ways, Richard is the most radical expression of the truth of the pre- 
bourgeois monarch: for the king to be the rationalizing principle of society, then, he must 
also embody secretly that element of radical negativity which, according to Hegel, renders 
the king such a "strange body within the fabric of the state. "50 In other words, the 
monarch has much in common with what Lacan also referred to as the "pure signifier": 
although s/he remains unaccounted for by rational mediation, it is precisely this opacity 
that renders the monarch the element through which society comes to recognize itself in 
the moment of its impossible unity. It is possible then to bring a properly Lacanian twist 
here to Hamlet's scurrilous observation that "The King is a thing ... of nothing": the 
monarch not only indexes the site of a formal disturbance in the symbolic order, s/he is, in 
a very radical sense, an optical illusion. Like the anamorphic stain that assumes its 
contours only when it is viewed from a prescribed angle, the figure of Richard intuitively 
bears witness to the suspicion that the King is indeed a Thing: he is nothing but this 
strange materialization of a hole in the Other, a protuberant excess of enjoyment that is the 
last support of the socio-symbolic edifice itself. 51 
4 50 Quoted in Slavoj Ziz"fek, For They Know Not What They Do, p. 228. 
51 Perhaps it is useful to recall here that in 1560 the Queen's palace at Whitehall 
contained a series of paintings that claimed to represent a genealogy of the Kings of 
England, some of which "represented at first sight something quite deformed, till, by 
looking through a small hole in the cover, which is put over it, you see it in its true 
poportions. " Quoted in The Public Processions Of Queen Elizabeth 1: Volume I ed. 
John Nichols (London, 1823), p. 25. While this "peephole" form of tromp l'oeil was 
fashionable at the time, it offers itself as a useful analogy here for our suggestion that 
the monarch is a semblance that is similarly "incarnated" around a hole in the symbolic 
order. 
-h P, ýar. p r, - P. r ei a r, GI 3j *rf TI) * 11 
38 
In what follows, I would like to develop further some of the Lacanian implications of 
these issues; partly in the service of what we may refer to cautiously as an ideologica 
analysis of the text. Working upon Ernesto Laclau's provocative hypothesis that "there is 
ideology whenever a particular content shows itself as more than itself, "52 the structural 
antagonisms cathected by the character of Richard can be read not merely as symptomatic 
of ideology so much as the ideological effect strictu sensu. Arguing that the "dialectics 
between necessity and impossibility gives ideology its terrain of emergence" Laclau's 
account of ideology, at least at a heuristic level, is remarkably similar to the dialectical 
production of the object that we find in Lacan's model of anamorphosis: 
On the one hand closure as such, being an impossible operation, cannot have 
a content of its own and only shows itself through its projection in an object 
which at some point assumes the role of incarnating the closure of an 
ideological horizon, will be deformed as a result of that incarnating function. 
Between the particularity of the object which attempts to fulfil the operation 
of closure and this operation, there is a relationship of mutual dependency in 
which each of the two poles is required, and at the same time, each partially 
limits the effects of the other. 53 
Similar to the anamorphic stain in a picture, where consistency is conferred only as a 
retroactive product brought about by a change in point of view, Laclau's discussion of 
ideology implicates this structural interdependence of meaning and non-meaning as 
analogous to the way that the frame of view of so-called reality is always-already framed 
by a part of its content. 54 
52 Ernesto Laclau, "The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology, " Modern 
Language Notes 112 (1997) pp. 297-321, p. 303. 
53 Ibid., P. 303. 
54 We may refer profitably here to Lacan's assertion that the anamorphic blot, the 
51aih of senseless contingency that gapes in the midst of the symbolic order, 
exemplifies a "marking [of] the pre-existence to the seen of a given-to-be-seen. " 
Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. David 
Macey (London, 1994) p. 74. For Lacan this invaginated topology is the most 
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It is at this anomalous juncture of the traumatic Real that Richard most assiduously solicits 
the gaze of his audience, retroactively redeeming past crimes only by paradoxically 
manifesting cause as remainder. What the Real encodes is the radical impossibility of 
teleology: "cause" is always produced, al2res cou , in the symbolic space. 
55 As an 
"indigested lump" Richard shares a morphology similar to Lacan's definition of the Real 
as "the object that cannot be swallowed, as it were, which remains stuck in the gullet of 
the signifier. 1156 That is, both Richard and the Real pertain to a certain limit that is always 
missed: they are either too early or too late. Taking seriously Derek Traversi's suggestion 
that Richard succeeds in "gathering into his person the savagery which everywhere 
prevails around hiM, 1157 then it is precisely at this level of a metaphorical surplus- 
signification upon which the symbolic coherence of the text's representation of history 
crucially depends. Retroactively sealing meaning from a point in futurity the monster is 
truly portentous. In a comment that perhaps encapsulates even more succinctly the 
paradoxical deixis of contingency and necessity that accompanies any discussion of 
monsters, we can proceed with our discussion in the light of Aristotle's claim that "The 
monstrosity though not necessary in regard of a final cause and an end, yet is necessary 
accidentall . 1158 
Written By Prophecy 
articulate illustration of the constitutive split between the eye and the gaze that is 
characterized by the scopic drive. 
55 For Lacan the relationship of the unconscious to the "cause" may be summarized 
as "the prohibition that brings to being an existent in spite of its non advent, it is a 
function of the impossible on which a certainty is based. " Ibid., pp. 128-9. 
56 Jacques Lacan, "Subversion of the subject, " p. 270. 
57 Traversi, pp. cit., p. 54. 
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As recent critics have noted, both Richard III and Richard 11 disclose at a more obvious 
level a paradox that threatens to unmask the teleological project of the history plays: the 
"first tetralogy" was written earlier but chronicles events that occur in time after the events 
of the "second. " Both texts appear to evince a paradoxical temporality that actively 
contests a notion of history in which events are serially disposed. Occupying contradictory 
and seemingly antagonistic polarities that frame the histories, the "two Richards" 
constitute a doppelganger logic which operates more properly at the level of Freud's model 
of traumatic memory, neatly described by Jean Francois Lyotard as "a first moment of 
shock without affect and a second moment of affect without shock. "59 
Throughout the text more generally it is the very possibility of a "first time" that is 
routinely called into question. Indeed, something that renders the play unique in the 
context of the history plays, we might bear in mind that the title of Richard III announces 
in advance that Gloucester is in fact destined to be king. It is not only in this sense that the 
text can be said to reach its destination even before it begins. Time and again Richard III 
appears to conform to a paradoxical logic that has much in common with Maurice 
Blanchot's account of narration, described as something moving 
towards a point ... that 
is strange but such that it seems to have no prior 
reality apart from this movement, yet is so compulsive that the 
narration's appeal depends on it to the extent that it cannot 'begin' 
before it has reached it. 60 
58 Aristotle, 
_Qp-&-it., p. 
20. 
59 Jean-Francois Lyotard, Heideager and the Jews (Minneapolis, 1990), p. 1 2. 
60 Maurice Blanchot, The Siren's Song: Selected Essays by Maurice Blanchot, ed. 
Gabriel Josopovici, trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (Brighton, 1982), p. 62. 
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Analogously, Richard III is marked throughout by this compulsion to repeat, referred to in 
suitably theatrical terms by Freud in "The Question of Lay Analysis" where he describes 
the analysand's relation to his past as one in which he "is obliged to stage a revival of an 
old piece, as though it were actually happening, instead of remembering it. 1161 Freud's 
metaphor here is not entirely fortuitous. A well known entry in John Manningham's diary 
dated 13 March 1601 relates how an audience member was so enam6ured of Burbage's 
portrayal of Richard that the actor arranged to meet her for what was, presumably, a secret 
liaison. The entry in the diary further recalls how 
Shakespeare overhearing their conclusion went before, was intertained, 
and at his game ere Burbidge came. Then message being brought that 
Rich. the Id was at the dore, Shakespeare caused returne to be made that 
William the Conqueror was before Rich. the 3.62 
Although frequently cited, what this entry ironically discloses is how the putative 
"duping" of Burbage is inexorably tied to the problematic relation between history and 
repetition that is one of the issues negotiated by the text itself. That is to say, Richard III 
regularly imparts a self-consciousness of its own theatricality in terms of its uncanny 
inhabitation of a space of repetition that is, like Burbage's rival, alwqys already there. 
Indeed, as soon as the text can properly be said to "begin, " Richard outlines the "plots I 
have laid" (1133) and provides what in fact amounts literally to a synopsis of subsequent 
plot developments: 
Plots have I laid, inductions dangerous, 
By drunken prophecies, libels and dreams, 
61 Sigmund Freud, "The Question of Lay Analysis" in The Standard Edition of th-Q 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud: Volume 12, ed. David Strachey 
ondon, 1964), p. 149. 
Quoted in E. K. Chambers, William Shakesgeare: A Studv f Facts and Problems 
(Oxford, 1930), p. 212. 
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To set my brother Clarence and the king 
In deadly hate the one against the other: 
And if King Edward be as true and just 
As I am subtle, false and treacherous, 
This day should Clarence closely be mewed up, 
About a prophecy, which says that G 
Of Edward's heirs the murderer shall be. 
( I. i. 33-41) 
It is here, pre-eminently, that both the text and its protagonist engage in a preposterous 
logic that even elicits from Richard the self reproach that he must not "run before my 
horse to market" (I. ii. 160). If, as I am arguing, Richard occupies a traumatic place within 
the text then it is largely because the text itself proffers what Geoffrey Hartman refers to in 
another context as a "paraprophetic discourse, as prophecy after the event - an event 
constituted or reconstituted by it, and haunted by the idea of traumatic causation. 1163 
One particularly resonant example of this discourse may be discerned in an episode which, 
significantly, also gestures toward an acknowledgement of the text's own derivative and 
supplementary identity. Announcing the indictment of Hastings, the scrivener is 
suspicious of the document's authenticity and invites the audience to 
... mark how well the sequel hangs together: Eleven hours I have spent to write it over, 
For yesternight by Catesby was it sent me; 
The precedent was full as long a-doing: 
And yet within these five hours Hastings lived, 
Untainted, unexamined, free, at liberty. 
(III. vi. 5-10) 
63 Geoffrey Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness (London, 1980), p. 40. 
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In More's account of Richard's reign, a putative "source" of Richard III, the publication of 
this defamatory proclamation moves one citizen to comment upon the sequence of events 
with the sardonic observation that "it was written by prophecy. "64 Indeed, the uncanny 
aspect of this scene is compounded further by the fact that Hastings, in a much remarked 
upon encounter, meets his own double in the person of the pursuivant who is also called 
Hastings. From a specifically psychoanalytical perspective, however, the fate of the 
appropriately named "Hastings" may be read as a kind of allegory for the recursive 
temporal dynamic that is such a prevalent feature of the text. That is to say, it is because 
the subject's symbolic identification always has an anticipatory, indeed "hastening" 
character that this bizarre textual intromission also recalls Richard's anticipatory 
recognition of self in the mirror: the paradigmatic case where the subject is, in a sense, 
already preceded by its "double. 1165 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that it is the character of Richard who is most frequently 
identified as the site of this traumatic causation, locating him at a contestatory position in 
relation to questions of "sequence" and "history" that compete for legitimacy throughout 
the text. Indeed, at one point Richard interrupts Queen Margaret and appoints himself not 
64 Thomas More, History of King Richard the Third, ed. J. R. Lumby (London, 1953), 
ý. 53. 
Bearing in mind my suggestion that Richard III is a text where the consistency of 
the symbolic order is compromised through the inclusion of the objecta in the person 
of Richard, it is tempting to pursue this particular analysis even further. According to 
Mladen Dolar's radical reworking of the uncanny as symptomatic of this proximity of 
the Real, the figure of the double is read as evidence that the objecta has not been 
evacuated from the field of "reality": "We can now see the trouble with the double: the 
double is that mirror image in which the objecta is included. So the imaginary starts 
to coincide with the real, provoking a shattering anxiety. The double is the same as me 
plus the object _4, 
that invisible part of being added to my image. " It is precisely to this 
extent, Dolar argues, that"the double is always the figure of jouissance. " Mladen 
Dolar, "'I Shall Be with You On Your Wedding Night': Lacan and the Uncanny, " 
October, 1991(58), pp. 5-23, p. 13. 
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only the adjudicator of matters relating to historical verisimilitude, but, more radically, as 
the very figure around which the collective memory should reconstruct itself- 
Let me put in your minds, if you forget, 
What you have been ere this, and what you are; 
Withal, what I have been, and what I am. 
(I. iii. 131-133) 
Effectively, what Richard does here is to question the notion that memory is a strictly 
symbolic function by implying that subjectivity inheres in a network of signifiers that 
constitute a certain relationship toward the Real. We may refer here briefly to Laplanche 
and Leclaire who have argued that the so called "return of the repressed" should not be 
understood in terms of an element which, once recovered, will reactivate continuity, but as 
66an interpretative elaboration or working through whose role is to weave around a 
rememorated element an entire network of meaningful relations that integrate it into the 
subject's explicit apprehension of himself. " 66 Indeed, as the accomplished actor, 
Richard's diabolic force resides precisely in this talent for reinterpreting the relationship 
between subjectivity and memory in terms of improvisation: 
Elizabeth: Shall I be tempted of the devil thus? 
Richard: Ay, if the devil tempt you to do good. 
Elizabeth: Shall I forget myself to be myself? 
Richard: Ay, if yourself s remembrance 
wrong yourself. 
66 Jean Laplanche and Serge Leclaire, 'The Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Study, " 
Yale French Studies, 48 (1972), pp. 111-141, p. 128. Moreover, it is in this precise 
sense that Richard reveals himself to be a subject that is defined by his "historicity. " 
According to Lacan this may be read as a "limit [that] represents the past in its real 
form, that is to say, not the physical past whose existence is abolished; nor the epic 
past as it has become perfected in the work of memory, nor the historic past in which 
man finds the guarantor of his future, but the past which reveals itself reversed in 
repetition. " Jacques Lacan, 'The function and field of speech and language in 
psychoanalysis" in Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 30-113, p. 1 03. 
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(IV. iv. 419-423) 
Richard's theatrical conception of selfbood is demonstrated frequently in the application of 
his improvisational skills to successive writings and re-writings of history. Nowhere is 
this facility more deftly deployed than in his "seduction" of Lady Anne. Presenting 
himself as "the plain devil and dissembling looks" Richard exclaims 
And yet to win her! all the world to nothing! 
Ha? 
Hath she for2ot alread that brave prince, 
Edward, her lord, whom I, some three months since, 
Stabbed in my angry mood at Tewkesbury? 
(I. ii. 230-235) 
Commenting upon his own performance, especially as one who is committed to 
resurrecting events that are "In the deep ocean buried" (I. i. iv), Richard becomes the 
conduit through which the text, in this strange sense, regularly encounters its own 
forgetfulness. That is, it is precisely through his function as an agent of repetition 
throughout the text that he also discloses the unheimliche effects of "something which is 
secretly familiar ... which has undergone repression and then returned from it. 1167 Richard, 
in fact, regularly invokes his double, whether it is by becoming a spectator to his own 
"shadow" (1.1.26; I. ii. 23 0), or by christening Buckingham "my other self' (III. iii. 48). 
The double is not only the initial repetition, the first repetition of the same, but also that 
which, for Lacan, is a species of the object a insofar as it signals that remainder or trace of 
jouissance which escapes the otherwise "totalizing" function of the mirror stage. It is in 
this precise sense that Richard's capacity for doubling also operates as a harbinger of 
67 Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny" in Art and Literature (London, 1974), pp. 342-68, 
p. 354. 
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death: as a little piece of the real that bears witness to something that persists (and insists) 
"beyond the pleasure principle. " Indeed, commenting specifically on Freud's frequent 
association of the diabolical with repetition, Jacques Derrida argues persuasively that this 
appropriately titled "limping devil" is 
The figure of the diabolical [which] simultaneously looks in the 
direction of Beyon ... and 
in the direction of Das Unheimliche ... it 
upsets the appeasing order of representation. However, it does so not 
by reducing double effects but, on the contrary, by expanding them, by 
expanding the effect of duplicity without an original, which perhaps is 
what the diabolical consists of. 68 
So too it is the case that Richard, who is variously identified throughout the tetralogy as a 
"limping devil, " is equipped with a truly diabolical force precisely insofar as he indexes a 
potentially lethal surplus of radical alterity that, simultaneously, both thwarts and gives 
rise to the hegemonizing fictions of the text's putatively historical project. Crucially, it is 
also the case that the text's deeply ambivalent rhetoric of forgetting is invoked in 
contradictory ways that serve, at times, to contest the protocols of linearity and tradition 
that legitimise absolutist ideology. For example, Buckingham's protracted exhortation to 
Richard to become king is rendered doubly ironic: meticulously rehearsed in advance it 
also serves to implicate the iterability of theatre itself in a deeply ironic politics of 
memory: 
The noble isle doth want her proper limbs; 
Her face defaced with scars of infamy, 
Her royal stock graffed with ignoble plants, 
And almost should'red in the swallowing gulf 
Of dark forgetfulness and deep oblivion. 
(III. vii. 125-129) 
68 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan 
Bass (London, 1987), p. 270. 
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Once again, not only does Richard become the somewhat unlikely element through which 
the "nation" itself comes to acquire ontological consistency; simultaneously venerating 
Richard as both the congellation of England's memory and the embodiment of her identity, 
Buckingham's rhetoric here is all the more remarkable for its morphological frame of 
reference. In short, the erstwhile deformed Richard now becomes the phantasmatic 
support for what is envisaged as a reformation of national identity and historical 
continuity: 
If not to bless us and the land withal, 
Yet to draw forth your noble ancestry 
From the corruption of abusing times 
Unto a lineal true-derived course. 
(11.197-200) 
Ultimately, this speech occupies a deeply contradictory space in the repertoire of 
representations associated with Richard throughout the text: to recall our earlier argument, 
the formless is now converted into the sublime moment of national identity, and the 
previously orphaned Richard is the exemplar of linearity and a "true-derived course. " 
How are we to understand this paradox, especially in relation to Richard's problematic 
position in the text's putatively "historical" narrative? 
"I call thee not" 
At one level, we can once again approach what is, quite literally, this radical reorientation 
of perspective in terms of Lacan's account of anamorphosis: i. e. how an otherwise 
protuberant excess or stain of jouissanc that appears initially to denature the field of 
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meaning and sense becomes, ultimately, its last phantasmatic support. For Lacan 
anamorphosis became a particularly useful heuristic device to illuminate how, in the logic 
of the signifier, meaning and non-meaning always collide at a point of structural, 
anamorl2hous tension. 
Lacan's theoretical elaboration of this dynamic is perhaps best exemplified by his notion 
of the point de cal2iton. Just as the anamorphic stain only comes to acquire some measure 
of consistency through an always implicitly temporal dislocation and alteration in 
perspective, similarly no signifier is itself isolatable until a point is reached in the 
signifying chain which then confers symbolic consistency on preceding events 
retroactively. Lacan identifies the locus of this "quitting" as the point de capiton, a 
44pure" signifier that is, in itself, meaningless but which gains its privilege only belatedly 
as the signifier through which other signifiers come to recognize themselves in their 
"unity": "A signifying unit presupposes the completion of a certain circle that resituates 
its different elements. 1169 Sense emerges from nonsense only at a point which retroactively 
and provisionally seals the meaning of a sentence, such that notions of "before" and 
"after" co-operate in terms of a structural, anamorphic tension. 
In relation to Richard III 's troubled encounter with its own teleological project, it is no 
surprise to find then that it is Richard who most frequently reveals this contingent aspect 
69 Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Bo)k 1111955. 
. 
120, ed. Jacque-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (London, 1993), p. 263. 
Interestingly, both here and elsewhere in his work Lacan adduces Shakespeare as 
the most articulate spokesperson for this effect. Implicitly concerned to demonstrate 
how the subject can only found his very 'being' at the point of a certain formal 
disturbance in the signifying chain, it is also here, precisely, that subjectivization takes 
place: "What does one start with? [ ... ]I go about 
looking for a sentence, a bit like this 
pseudo-Shakespeare stuck for improvisation, who paces up and down, repeating - To be or not ... to be or not.... again - To be or -no-1. _. -In-Le. 
" Ibid., p. 262. As I have 
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in the construction of meaning and subjectivity. Significantly, it is precisely when his own 
identity is under the most sustained assault that Richard discloses the radical implications 
of Lacan's thesis: that what we refer to as identity emerges only at a point which, quite 
literally, "sews" meaning into the signifier: 
Queen Margaret: Thou elvish-marked, abortive, rooting hog! 
Thou that wast sealed in thy nativity 
The slave of nature and the son of hell! 
Thou slander of thy heavy mother's womb! 
Thou loathed issue of thy father's loins! 
Thou rag of honour! thou detested 
Gloucester: Margaret. 
Queen Margaret: Richard! 
Gloucester: Ha? 
Queen Margaret: I call thee not. 
(I. iii. 228-237) 
In many ways it is possible to read this encounter as offering nothing less than a critique of 
the performative dimension that underpins every gesture of ideological interpellation tout 
court. That is to say, in the domain proper to ideology interpellation consists in the 
subject's acceding to the "call" of the Other in a way that simultaneously occlude the 
strictly performative nature of this seemingly "spontaneous" accession to the address of 
the Other. 70 In contrast, Richard's intervention just before his name is to become the 
argued, in the case of Richard we find a figure who is, in fact, considerably adept at 
"improvisation. " 
70 See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and 
Philosophy. and Other Esaays (London, 1991), pp. 52-91. Despite Althusser's much 
remarked upon 'indebtedness' to Lacan here, on the question of interpellation there 
remains a quite considerable distance between the two thinkers. Crucially, the point of 
disagreement appears to rest upon Althusser's understanding of the Real in a way that 
is in fact quite foreign to Lacan's use of this terrtý J3y far the most important 
commentary on this issue is provided by Slavoj Zizek: 'What is missing from the 
Althusserian account of this gesture of symbolic identification, of recognizing oneself in 
a symbolic mandate, is that it is a move aimed at resolving the deadlock of the 
subject's radical uncertainty as to its status (what am I qua object for the Other? ). The 
first thing to do apropos of interpellation in a Lacanian approach is therefore to reverse 
Althusser's formula of ideology which 'interpellates individuals into subjects": it is 
Tb* 013jr, -0 
50 
"quilting point" of Margaret's speech serves partly to unmask the way that signification 
seeks to produce identity apres coup. In other words, Richard demystifies the illusion 
necessary to the conferring of a symbolic mandate; where, for it to be effective, the 
subject must misrecognize that it is the very act of recognition that in fact makes him what 
he has recognised himself as. 
The subversive aspect of Richard's interruption, then, achieves its impact precisely 
because Richard discloses the structural conditions under which he successively becomes 
pinned to signifiers that "represent" him for the other and assign him a place in the 
intersubjective network. Disclosing the arbitrary nature of every mandate, Richard 
ultimately refuses to accede to the call: "I cry thee mercy then, for I did think/Thou hadst 
called me all these bitter names" (11.238-239). 71 Indeed, read as an example of his much 
noted skill at improvisation throughout the play, Richard comes perilously close here to an 
understanding of theLacanian "Big Other" as something that, strictly speaking, does not 
exist (4): like the subject (1), the symbolic order is constitutively split from within. In 
other words, Richard discloses how symbolization is always a retroactive illusion, a 
never the individual which is interpellated as subject, into subject; it is on the contrary 
the subject itself who is interpellated as x (some specific subjpv-position, symbolic 
identity or mandate), thereby eluding the abyss of ý. " Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying With The 
Negative: Kant. Hegel. and the Critique of Ideolog (Durham, 1993), pp. 73-4. It is 
precisely this kind of reversal that, I am arguing, is also revealed through Richard's 
interventions. Therein consists the anti-Althusserian gist of both Richard and Lacan: 
subject aua t is not an effect of interpellation, of the recognition in an ideological call; 
it rather stands for the very gesture of calling into question the identity conferred on 
the subject by way of interpellation. 
71 Again, Lacan offers a particularly eloquent summary of the structural co-ordinates 
of this "speech": "What I seek in speech is the response of the other. What 
constitutes me as a subject is my question. In order to be recognized by the other, I 
utter what was only in view of what will be. In order to find him, I call him by a name 
that he must assume or refuse in order to reply to me. " Jacques Lacan, "The function 
and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis" in Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 30-113, 
p. 86. In other words, desire finds its meaning here in the desire of the other, not so 
much because the other holds the key to the object of desire, as because the first 
object of desire, according to Lacan, is to be recognized by the other. 
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compromise formation produced around an antagonism that gapes in the midst of 
&4meaning. 1172 
Indeed, as John Drakakis points out, this very question of Richard's symbolic mandate, of 
what name he is to be called, has in fact been the source of sustained editorial dispute. 
Briefly, in Q the speech-prefix of "Glo" is used until Richard becomes King, after which 
the prefix changes to "King"; in F, however, the speech-prefix of "Rich. " is used 
throughout. Drakakis avers that 
The instability in Q encourages the conjecture that in this version of the 
printed text the allegorical and non-individuated mode of the dramatic 
characterisation of Richard predominated, emphasising its fundamentall ýy 
interactive nature. F reduces this fluidity to a coherent identity, a practice 
which modem editions have been reluctant to give up. (emphasis added)73 
It is precisely this dramatic characterisation of Richard as performing, in the most radical 
sense, an "interactive" function in the text that I am trying to insist upon here. 
Throughout the play, in fact, the efficacy of certain symbolic titles routinely become the 
focus of some anxiety. For example, in an attempt to persuade Elizabeth that "The king, 
that calls your beauteous daughter wife, /Familiarly shall call thy Dorset brother" 
(IV. iv. 316-17), Elizabeth subsequently teases Richard with the question "Under what title 
72 Richard appears to bear out Mark Poster's contention that when an individual is 
addressed by an interpellation, she/he is "invited to play a role in such a way that the 
invitation appears to have already been answered by the subject before it was 
proposed, but at the same time the invitation could be refused. " Mark Poster, The 
Second Med"A 
-e- 
(Cambridge, 1995), p. 81. 
73 John Drakakis (ed) Shakespearean Originals: First Editions- The Tragedy of King 
Richard the Third (London, 1996), pp. 31-2. Drakakis offers a brief overview of the 
kind of confusion that this has caused in modern editions of the play: "[ ... ]the New Arden edition-combines 'Rich. ' For much of the text, and then uses 'K. Rich. ' In 
Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (eds), William Shakespeare: The Coml2lete Works. An 
Original Old-spelling Edition, the puzzling combination of 'RICHARD GLOCESTER' 
and'KING RICHARD" is used, while in their modern spelling edition the combination 
'RICHARD GLOUCESTER' and 'KING RICHARD'is used. In all these cases there is 
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shall I woo for thee..? " (IV. iv. 341). Similarly, Richard's vow that he will love 
Elizabeth's daughter "everlastingly", is greeted with the punning retort of "how long shall 
that title/ 'ever' last? " (IV. iv. 51-2). 
If there is a persistent anxiety throughout the text about the stability of certain titles, it is 
partly on account of the fact that subjectivity is shown to depend less upon any question of 
individuated identity, than upon the very movement of the signifier itself In this respect 
Richard III demonstrates considerable difficulties in every effort to "attend the sequel" 
(III. vii. 232) and is more inclined to gravitate toward the time of interruption, toward that 
which is simultaneously "determined, not concluded yet" (I. iii. 15). Indeed, it is 
discontinuity that comes increasingly to colour the rhetorical stratagems of numerous 
speakers throughout the text, all of which to some extent exemplify Lacan's thesis that "it 
is in the chain of the signifier that meaning 'insists' but where none of its elements 
6consists' in the signification of which it is at that moment capable. 1174 Time and again the 
text elevates to an idiomatic principle this propensity to "Murder breath in middle of a 
word, / And then again begin, and stop again, " (Ill. v. 3-4). Buckingham, for example, 
actually recommends this as a rhetorical strategy designed to ensnare Hastings: 
Encourage him, and tell him all our reasons: 
If he be leaden, icy-cold, unwilling, 
Be thou so too; and so break off the talk, 
And give us notice of his inclination. 
(III. i. 175-8) 
an editorial reluctance to relinquish the coherence of individual identity. " ItAd., pp. 36- 
7, n. 43. 
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Throughout the text it is this fundamental anomaly that it falls to speech not to reduce but 
to convey, even if it does so without saying it or signifying it. Surprising Richard at 
prayer, Buckingham apologises for the "interruption/Of thy devotion" (II. vii. 102-3); 
Richard is enraged that the Duchess of York "intercepts me in my expedition" (IV. iv. 13 6) 
and compares Buckingham's repeated interruptions to a clock which "keep'st the 
stroke/Betwixt thy begging and my meditation" (IV. ii. 1 12-13). Effecting what is soon 
revealed to be a spurious concord among his court's competing factions, King Edward 
intones that "There wanteth now our brother Gloucester here, /To make the blessed period 
of our peace" (II. i. 44-5). Bearing in mind here that Richard characterises himself as one 
that "halts and am misshapen thus" (I. ii. 250), 75 in a more radical sense he comes to 
function, quite literally, as a "period"76: reshaping the meaning of the signifying chain in 
the ambivalent role of a "shifter, " described by Lacan as that moment when 
[ ... ] the sentence is interrupted at the point at which the group of words that 
one might call index-terms ends, the terms being either those designated by 
their function in the signifier, [ ... ] as shifters, or precisely the terms which, in 
74 Jacques Lacan, "Agency of the letter in the unconscious, " p. 153. 
75 In other words, Richard to some., extent is the embodied representative of the kind 
of "error of perspective" that Slavoj 2ivZek perceives as a paradox that seqr5tly 
supports every ideological edifice. Discussing Lacan's point do capiton, Zizek argues 
that "we could denote this 'error of perspective' as ideological anamorphosis. Lacan 
often refers to Holbein's 'Ambassadors': if we look at what appears from the frontal 
view as an extended, 'erected' meaningless spot, from the right perspective we notice 
the contours of a skull. The criticism of ideology must perform a somewhat 
homologous operation: if we look at the element which hold together the ideological 
edifice, at this 'phallic', erected Guarantee of Meaning, from the right perspective, we 
are able to recognise in it the embodiment ofA lack, of a chasm of non-sense gaping 
in the midst of ideological meaning, " Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of IdeQLQgY 
(London, 1992), pp. 99-100. Analogously, I am arguing that Richard is also 
homologous to this congellation of non-sense, the traumatic stain of jouissance that 
disturbs the coherence of the text's symbolic fictions. 
76 There are several examples to be found which implicitly confirm this view of 
Richard as an "interactive" function in the text. For example, interrupting a conference 
that is in fact contrived to urge his accession to the throne, Richard languidly remarks 
"I trust/My absence doth not neglect no great design, /Which by my presence might 
have been concluded, " to which Buckingham responds "Had you not come upon your 
cue, /my lord, /William Lord Hastings had pronounced your part " (III. iv. 24-8). 
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the code, indicate the position of the subject on the basis of the message 
itself. 77 
Time and again Richard confers on speech what, following Lacan, we might refer to as its 
dialectical punctuation. To this extent, he is less a "character" in the play than a kind of 
empty integer which becomes a focal point for "effects" produced by the signifier. 78 The 
most common rhetorical gesture in this regard is Richard's tendency to interrupt the flow 
of discourse: fastening upon a particular word, he then makes it compel a meaning fatally 
at odds with the one we assume that the speaker had originally intended. For example, in 
the midst of Richard's inveighing against Queen Maragret's witchcraft ( which he blames 
for his deformity), Hastings volunteers the suggestion that 
Hastings: If they have done this deed, my 
Noble lord, - 
Gloucester: If! Thou protector of this damned strumpet, 
Talk'st thou to me of 'ifs'? Thou art a traitor: 
Off with his head! 
(11.72-6) 
Alternatively, we might recall Richard's exasperation at Rivers' attempts to rescue 
Elizabeth from the charge that she is responsible for Hastings' imprisonment: 
77 Jacques Lacan, "On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis" 
in Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 1 79-225, p. 1 86. Lacan borrows his use of the term shifter 
from the work of Roman Jakobson. Jakobson defines shifters as "a special class of 
grammatical units" whose general meaning "cannot be defined without reference to 
the message (namely, in Lacanian terms, to the signifying sequence). Quoted in 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe The Title of the Letter: A Reading of 
Lacan, trans. David Pettigrew (Albany, 1992), p. 69. 
78 To this extent, Richard becomes a kind of literalization of what Lacan refers to as 
, the subject of the signifier': i. e., an empty place without support in imaginary or 
symbolic identification. Ironically it is in fact quite accurate to claim than that Richard 
is the embodiment of pure "demonic" evil, precisely insofar as he also embodies the 
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Gloucester: You may deny that you were not 
The mean 
Of my Lord Hastings' late imprisonment. 
Rivers: She may, my lord, for - 
Gloucester: She may, Lord Rivers! Why, who 
Knows not so? 
She may do more, sir, than denying that: 
She may help you to many fair preferments 
And then deny her aiding hand therein, 
And lay those honours on your high desert. 
What may she not? She may - ay, marry, may she - 
Rivers: What, marry, may she? 
Gloucester: What marry, may she! Marry with a king [ ... ]79 
(i. iii. 90-100) 
In a sense operating as a kind of distorting mirror for the speech of the other characters, 
Richard bears more than a passing resemblance to the function of the analyst in 
psychoanalysis: he is less concerned with "intention" than with "true speech, " with the 
surplus of what is effectively said over the intended meaning. Indeed, Richard's perceived 
66villainy" is often proportionate to his expertise at manipulating the dialectical structure of 
communication, most famously defined by Lacan as that moment when the subject gets back 
from the other his own message in its inverted, true form. If for Lacan it is here that every 
letter arrives at its true destination, this is also the implied context for Edward's horror at the 
death of Clarence: 
King Edward: Is Clarence dead? The order 
pure spirituality of a will that is delivered from every "pathological" motivation. 
Richard's ability to "render blessings for curses" is strangely eloquent in this respect. 
79 Again, this exchange may be read, avant la lettre, as an illustration of Lacan's 
claim that"the signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates meaning by unfolding its 
dimension before it. As is seen at the level of the sentence when it is interrupted 
before the significant term: 'I shall never...., ' 'All the same it is...., ' 'And yet there may 
be..., ' Such sentences are not without meaning, a meaning all the more oppressive in 
that it is content to make us wait for it. " Jacques Lacan, "Agency of the letter in the 
unconscious, " p-1 53. 
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Was reversed. 
Gloucester: But he, poor man, by your first order died, 
And that a winged Mercury did appear; 
Some tardy cripple bare the countermand 
That came too lag to see him buried. 
(111.86-91) 
Moreover, later in the play Buckingham is similarly horrified when he eventually falls 
victim to the villainy that he so strongly urged in Richard. Getting back from Richard his 
own message in what is represented, quite literally, as its inverted form, Buckingham 
laments how 
That high All-Seer which I dallied with 
Hath turned my feigned prayer on my head, 
And given in earnest what I begged in jest. 
Thus doth He force the swords of wicked men 
To turn their own points in their Master's bosom. 
(VA. 20-24) 
In several other respects certain rhetorical set pieces in the text are characterised by a 
contrapuntal "question-and-answer" structure that, in fact, illustrate Lacan's insistence that 
speech always subjectively includes its own reply. Indeed, this effect is nowhere more 
conspicuously in evidence than in Richard's protracted exchange with Queen Elizabeth. 
Trying to convince the Queen of his fitness as a suitor to her daughter, what ensues is as 
eloquent an illustration as we are likely to find of Lacan's thesis: 
King Richard: Sweetly in force unto her fair 
life's end. 
Queen Elizabeth: But how long fairly shall her sweet 
life last? 
King Richard: As long as heaven and nature 
Lengthens it. 
Queen Elizabeth: As long as hell and Richard likes 
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Of it. 
King Richard: Say, 1, her sovereign, am her 
Subject love. 
Queen Elizabeth: But she, your subject, loathes 
Such sovereignty. 
King Richard: Be eloquent in my behalf to her. 
Queen Elizabeth: An honest tale speeds best being 
Plainly told. 
King Richard: Then plainly to her tell my 
Loving tale. 
Queen Elizabeth: Plain and not honest is too harsh 
A style. 
King Richard: Your reasons are too shallow and 
Too quick. 
Queen Elizabeth: 0 no, my reasons are too deep 
and dead. 
(IV. iv. 353-78) 
The purpose of the preceding argument, where I have been concerned to pursue the 
implications of Lacan's notion of the point de cal2ito , is to suggest that Richard III is 
unable finally to occlude the traces of a textual difference that remains the immanent 
necessity of its signifying practices. Insofar as the text (particularly in the figure of its 
protagonist) frequently bears witness to a constitutive power of repetition, or what 
Marjorie Garber terms as "uncanny causality, 1180 it also unsettles the appeasing power of 
representation as something that privileges linearity, succession and sequentiality. Most 
significant in this respect, I have argued, is what amounts to a kind of "failed 
interpellation" that occurs in Richard's exchange with Queen Margaret. 
80 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare's Ghost Writers (London, 1985). While, ultimately, 
her concerns are more thematic in this respect, Patricia Parker also makes some 
interesting points about the play in terms of its capacity to initiate reversals in the 
appeasing logic of linearity and sequentiality. Patricia Parker, "Preposterous Estates, 
Preposterous Events: From Late to Early Shakespeare, " in Shakespeare From The 
Margins: Language. Culture. Context (London, 1996), pp. 20-56. 
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Indeed, Queen Margaret is, we should recall, the only character to appear throughout the 
entire first tetralogy. At least at an exegetic level, her function in Richard III conforms 
precisely to the discourse of the Other which according to Lacan "is not the discourse of 
the abstract other, of the other in the dyad, of my correspondent, nor even of my slave, it is 
the discourse of the circuit in which the subject is integrated. "81 Indeed, earlier in the 
scene Richard elicits from Margaret a comment that would appear to support this view of 
her function in the text: 
Gloucester: Foul wrinkled witch, what mak'st thou 
in my sight? 
Margaret: But rel2etitio of what thou hast marred; 
That will I make before I let thee go 
(11.164-168) 
"The meaning of repetition, " Lacan argues "has all to do with the intrusion of the 
symbolic register. 1182 The failed capitonnag that is disclosed through Richard's 
interventions also reveals that it is through repetition that the symbolic order tries to "hail" 
the individual into a space that is, in a sense, always already there. This is also the effect, 
irreducibly theatrical, that Lacan discerns in the story of Oedipus, where the oracle also 
comes to embody the discourse of the Other83: 
Oedipus' unconscious is nothing other than this fundamental discourse 
whereby, long since, for all time, Oedipus' history is out there - written, 
and we know it, but Oedipus is ignorant of it, even as he is played out by it 
since the beginning ... Everything takes place in the function of the Oracle 
81 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book 11: The Ego in Freud's 
Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. 1954-1955. ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, 
trans. John Forrester (London, 1989), p. 89-90. Moreover, Lacan argued that "The 
Other is, therefore, the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks to him who 
hears, that which is said by the one being already the reply, the other deciding to hear 
it whether the one has or has not spoken. " Jacques Lacan, "The Freudian Thing" in 
Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 1 14-46, p. 141. 
82 IlYid., P. 88. 
83 Margaret, we should recall, is explicitly referred to as "a prophetess" (W. 27). 
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and of the fact that Oedipus is truly other than what he realizes as his 
history 
... 
The whole pulsation of the drama of his destiny, from the 
beginning to the end, hinges on the veiling of this discourse, which is his 
reality without his knowing it. 84 
Richard's "history", like that of Oedipus, is "played out" only insofar as the text 
"embodies its own forgetting. 1185 One particularly notable case of amnesia occurs when 
the young Duke of York repeats the mythic account of his uncle's birth where Richard 
"could gnaw a crust at two hours old" (Il. iii. 36). The inquiry as to how the Duke came to 
be in possession of this knowledge is the cause of some dispute: 
Duchess: His nurse! Why, she was dead ere thou 
wast born. 
York: If 'twere not she, I cannot tell who told me. 
(II. iv. 27-35) 
What this quite bizarre exchange highlights is precisely the Oedipal maxim that 
"knowledge" is nothing other than the crystallization of symbolical activity which is 
subsequently forgotten once constituted. Again, though in a slightly displaced form, 
Richard stands in an antagonistic relationship to the text's traumatic return to the question 
of birth. If history at its most radical level conforms to a future anterior of that which only 
ever "will have been, " i. e. as something that eschews recourse to an act of simple 
remembrance, through its eponymous anti-hero Richard III alludes to an awareness of its 
own inscription within a symbolic horizon that contradicts and anamorphically disfigures 
its status as merely a "chronicle" or non-problematic repository of past events. Indeed, 
another curious episode that we might wish to read as an index of the uncanny, centres 
around a dialogue on the origins of the Tower of London. Crucially, the exchange serves 
84 lbid, p. 245. 
85 Felman, 
-Qp, -Qftt., p. 
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to contest explicitly the idea of memory as that which is concerned merely with the 
presencing of something that is absent: 
Prince: Did Julius Caesar build that place, my lord? 
Buckingham: He did my gracious lord, begin 
that place; 
Which, since, succeeding ages have re-edified. 
Prince: Is it upon record, or else reported 
Successively from age to age, he built it? 
Buckingham: Upon record, my gracious lord. 
Prince: But say, my lord, it were not registred, 
Methinks the truth should live from age to age, 
As 'twere retailed to all posterity, 
Even to the general all-ending day. 
(Ill. i. 69-79) 
What the Prince refers to here is nothing other than the logic of repetition that 
characterizes the intersubjective network, an "always-already-there" which, in Derrida's 
words, "no reactivation of the origin could fully master and awaken to presence. " What I 
also want to suggest is that it is possible to read the Prince's comments here in the light of 
the Elizabethan theatre's own complicity in, literally, "retailing" and "retelling" truths in 
such a way that iterability becomes the modus operandi of symbolic exchange. This 
connection is made explicit in The Gull's Hombook, Dekker's parodic consumer guide to 
London life, where the author identifies "The theatre as the poets' Royal Exchange .... when 
your groundling and gallery commoner buys his sports by the penny and like a haggler is 
glad to utter it again by retailin . 1186 Indeed, what the theatre reveals is the essential 
impossibility of any absolute synchronization tout court. In a passage that has manifold 
implications for any discussion of the history plays, Jacques Derrida argues that theatre 
itself is unthinkable outside a consideration of repetition: 
86 Thomas Dekker, Thomas Dekker: Selected Writinas, ed. E. D. Pendy (Oxford, 
1967), p. 98. 
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Disjunction, dislocation, separation of places, deployment of spacing of a 
story ... could there be any theatre without that? The survival of a 
theatrical work implies that, theatrically, it is saying something about 
theatre itself, about its essential possibility. And that it does so, 
theatrically, then, through the play of uniqueness and repetition ... 87 
It is precisely this "play of uniqueness and repetition" that has so perturbed critics: either 
the text is arraigned for not letting the "audience know enough soon enough"88 or, 
alternatively, it is accused of being "possessed of a much too anticipatable conclusion. 1189 
Rather, what the text's non coincidence with itself amounts to is a drama of dispossession: 
an expropriation of the text by itself as it seeks to integrate the radically non-historical 
kernel that simultaneously gives rise its own "historical" project. With its cast of 
monsters, dreams, ghosts and prophecies, Richard III resembles a psychoanalytic case 
study, yet what also emerges is how this phantasmatic space traces its trajectory in 
explicitly theatrical terms. A consideration of how the scopic register of the text 
participates in what I have been discussing as an anamorphous logic of repetition relies 
upon Lacan's account of the gaze as that other impossible object which is similarly tied to 
the domination of the subject by the symbolic order. The last section will focus upon 
these theoretical issues by expanding upon Lacan's crucial argument that "it is within the 
explanation of repetition that ... the scopic 
function is situated. "90 
Fatal Attractions 
87 Jacques Derrida, "Aphorism, Countertime" in Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature, 
ed. Derek Attridge (London, 1992), pp. 414-35, p. 419. 
88 Tom F. Driver, The Sense of Histo[y in Greek and Shakespearean Drama 
ý London, 1967), p-88. 
9 Louis Auchincloss, Motiveless Malignity (London, 1970), p. 46. 
90 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 79. 
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In many respects Richard 11 can be said to articulate a relationship between theatre and 
history in terms of a repeated encounter with its own "blind" spots. A particularly 
resonant example can be found in the insistent anxieties relating to blindness recounted in 
Clarence's dream, although on this occasion it is associated with a surplus visuality: 
"What dreadful noise of waters in mine ears! /What sights of ugly death within mine eyes! " 
(I. iv. 22-23). This figurative alignment of drowning with an over abundance of vision 
becomes increasingly complex as Clarence relates the details of his nightmare: 
Methought I saw a thousand fearful wracks; 
A thousand men that fishes gnawed upon; 
Wedges of gold, great ingots, heaps of pearl, 
Inestimable stones, unvalued jewels, 
All scattred in the bottom of the sea. 
Some lay in dead men's skulls; and in the holes 
Where eyes did once inhabit these were crept, 
As'twere in scorn of eyes, reflecting gems, 
That wooed the slimy bottom of the deep, 
And mocked the dead bones that lay scatt'red by. 
(I. iv. 24-33) 
If, as Christopher Pye has suggested, Clarence indicates his awareness that he exists in the 
play solely in order to die, 91 this speech is the most explicit example of how the play 
"shows itself showing itself'by returning its gaze upon the audience. At a 
psychoanalytical level, the speech itself indexes this radical alterity of the gaze in a way 
that conforms to Lacan's account of the scopic register of the dream. "In the so called 
waking state, " Lacan argues, "there is an elision of the gaze, and an elision of the fact that 
not only does it look it also shows. In the field of the dream, on the other hand, what 
91 Christopher Pye, The Regal Phantasm: Shakespeare and the Politics of Spectacle 
(London, 1992), p. 80.. 
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characterises the images is that it shows. 1192 A field of pure monstrance, the exhibitionist 
dimension of dreams, for Lacan, acts as a compelling example, 12ace Descartes, of the 
subject's inability to master the field of vision. Indeed, Clarence responds to Brakenbury's 
teasing enquiry as to whether he had time "To gaze upon the secrets of the deep, " by 
insisting that 
Methoughts I had, and often did I strive 
To yield the ghost: but still the envious flood 
Stopped in my soul, and would not let it forth 
To find the empty, vast, and wand'ring air. 
(11.35-39) 
Similarly, according to Lacan, the dream involves submission to an excessive and 
oppressive visuality so that "the subject does not see where it is leading, he follows. " 
Blindness and vision regularly supplant each other in Clarence's dream, climaxing in the 
image of the jewels which act as prosthetic eyes of "dead men's skulls. " It is no 
coincidence that, for Lacan, the jewel acts as a metaphor for the disarming proximity of 
the gaze of the Other insofar as: "The point of the gaze participates in the ambiguity of the 
jewel. "93 The diffuse irradiating power of the jewel's reflection lures the viewing subject 
and transfixes him as an object in the sight of the world. This surplus visuality is 
comparable to drowning in the overflowing and inapprehensible function of the gaze 
where "Light may travel in a straight line, but it is refracted, diffused, it floods, it fills - the 
eye is a sort of bowl - it flows over too. " Similar to that other favoured Lacanian motif 
for the annihilating power of the gaze, Holbein's Ambassadors, the skull in Clarence's 
dream finds mortality inextricably linked to entrapment within a scopic field that cannot 
92 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 75. 
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be mastered. Just as anamorphosis reveals how the subject is both inscribed into and at the 
mercy of a scopic field that exceeds the subject's mastery, so Clarence's portentous dream 
also evokes an uncanny sense of his own inscription within the larger symbolic space of 
the text. When it inevitably comes, Clarence's death not only involves his drowning in a 
"malmsey-butt, " in a bitterly ironic gesture, his demise is hastened by a naive faith in the 
power of perception: 
Clarence: My friend, [to 2 Murderer] I spy some pity in thy looks 
O, if thine eye be not a flatterer, 
Come thou on my side, and entreat for me. 
A begging prince what beggar pities not? 
2 Murderer: Look behind you, my lord 
I Murderer: ['stabs him'] 
(I. iv.. 264-269) 
Although to a modem audience the warning to "Look behind you" is a refrain more 
commonly associated with pantomime, it also serves here as a comment on the fate of the 
subject caught in the "trap" of the gaze that "circumscribes us,.. makes us beings who are 
looked at, but without showing this. 1194 According to Lacan this emergence of the gaze is 
always potentially lethal: precisely insofar as it indexes the incursion into reality of 
something that must remain implicit if the subject is to- retain any degree of ontological 
consistency. That is to say, for Lacan the gaze -qua object a 
is that "thing" which is the 
objective correlative of the subject in the guise of a radical negativity. 
This complex relationship between death and the scopic drive is most commonly 
associated with Richard who, we should recall, is frequently aligned with the myth of "the 
93 Ibid., P. 96. 
94 jjýid., p. 75. 
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evil eye. " In III Henry VI he commits himself to "slaying more gazers than the 
Basiliskes. " In Richard III he is similarly endowed with a deadly power of fascination: the 
possessor of a "deadly eye" (I. iii. 225) he is also, for the Duchess, a "cockatrice.. whose 
unavoided eye is murderous" (IV. i. 56). For Lacan, what the ubiquity of this myth alludes 
to is a "fatal function" that resides in its "power to separate, "95 a "power" that is strictly 
correlative to a reproduction of the split between the eye and the gaze that hastens the 
death of Clarence. In the scopic field, Lacan argues, "The subject is strictly speaking 
determined by the very separation that determines the break of the a, that is to say, the 
fascinatory element introduced by the gaze. 1196 The evil eye is what Lacan calls the 
fascinum, the dimension in which the power of the gaze is exercised directly, acting as the 
fatal lure which has a mortifying effect on the subject through its "captivation" in the sight 
of the Other. Initially, Richard's description of Anne's beauty proceeds in terms of an 
encounter with her look, producing a feeling of shame to the extent that he is caught out 
by the gaze of the other: 
For now they kill me with a living death. 
Those eyes of thine from mine have drawn salt tears, 
Shamed their aspects with store of childish drops: 
These eyes, which never shed remorseful tear, 
No, when my father York and Edward wept, 
To hear the piteous moan that Rutland made 
When black-faced Clifford shook his sword at him; 
Nor when thy warlike father, like a child, 
Told the sad story of my father's death, 
And twenty times made pause to sob and weep 
That all the standers-by had wet their cheeks 
Like trees bedashed with rain - in that sad time 
My manly eyes did scorn an humble tear. 
(I. ii. 153-164) 
95 Ibid., P. 1 15. 
96 Ibid., P-1 18. 
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This lament, which offers a complex juxtaposition of masculine aggression with the death 
dealing effect of female beauty, repositions Anne as the bearer of the 'evil eye'. In a 
comment that inevitably recalls Richard's speech in III Henry VI, Anne tries to repel 
Richard's advances by wishing that her eyes "were basilisks to strike thee dead! " (11.150). 
The 'evil eye', in its role as "that which has the effect of arresting movement and, literally, 
of killing life, "97 introduces the death drive into the scopic field. 
This scene, however, elaborates a more complicated relationship between death, 
subjectivity and the scopic drive, foregrounding a dialectic of desire between Richard and 
Anne that locates "hell" and the "bed-chamber" as its discursive frame. In a discussion 
that makes no direct reference to the scopic politics of the text, but which, nevertheless, 
addresses some of the epistemological problems that arise from the question of his 
deformity, Marjorie Garber argues that "the very fascination exerted by Richard seems to 
grow in direct Proportion to an increase in emphasis on his deformity (emphasis added). " 
98 What Garber gestures toward is a structural complicity between the text's strange 
circuit of desire and the seductive appeal of Richard. The fascinating, if albeit 
disconcerting, eroticism of this scene is negotiated around the deformed Richard's success 
in surmounting his initial unsuitability as the object of desire, precisely through hinting at 
the fragile border that separates beauty from disgust. Perhaps appropriately, Anne and 
Richard literally change places: 
Anne: Out of my sight! thou dost infect mine eyes. 
Gloucester: Thine eyes, sweet lady, have infected mine. 
Anne: Would they were basilisks to strike thee dead! 
97 lb4d., p. 118. 
98 Marjorie Garber, "'Descanting on Deformity': Richard III and the Shape of History" 
in The Historical Renaissance: New Essays in Tudor and Stuart Literature and 
Culture ed. Heather Dubrow et. al. (London, 1988), p. 81. 
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Gloucester: I would they were, that I might die 
at once; 
(I. ii. 148-152) 
To an Elizabethan audience, this displacement of diabolic power from Richard to Anne 
would not have gone unnoticed. According to the accepted Renaissance physiology of 
vision, the eye operates as the organ by which "infected" spirits are transmitted from the 
body of the harlot to that of the observer. As the agent of infection or bewitchment, the 
eye forms the point at which sight transforms from passivity to activity, and where subject 
and object literally exchange places. An entire pathology of an erotics of vision were in 
part indebted to the influence of Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love. In 
1588 Valleriola developed a thesis on the origins of erotic love in Observationum 
medicinalium libri sex which discusses love-sickness in tenns of a fascination that enters 
through the eye, as an alien vapour that spreads contagion throughout the body. 99 By the 
seventeenth-century Robert Burton remained persuaded by this specular pathogenesis 
which made the fascinatio crucial to seduction: 
the manner of the fascination, as Ficinus declares it, is this: Mortal 
men are then especially bewitched, when as by often gazing one to 
the other, they direct sight to sight, join eye to eye, and so drink and 
suck in Love between them; for the beginning of this disease is the 
Eye. 100 
99 Donald Beecher, "'The Lover's Body: The Somatogenesis of Love in Renaissance 
Medical Treatises, " Renaissance and Reformation 24,1, pp. 1 -11. 
100 Ibid., p. 9. 
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The libidinal economy of the scene also locates the monstrous at that point where knowing 
and desiring'reach a traumatic point of deadlock. The entire seduction is played out in a 
scopic register which serves to block desire and, paradoxically, opens desire to circumvent 
the blockage. Richard captivates Anne at precisely this site of antagonism: 
Anne: I wish I knew thy heart 
Gloucester: Tis figured in my tongue 
Anne: I fear me both are false 
(I. ii. 192-194) 
Here, desire is produced not as a striving for something, but only for something else or 
something more: having no determinate object that is not, as Richard punningly suggests, 
"dis-figured. " The apparent opacity of Richard's language is perceived by Anne as a veil 
which cuts off from view a reality that is other than what the subject is allowed to see. 
Desire, here, pertains precisely to the Lacanian formulation that 'desire is the desire of the 
Other": the subject may fashion itself in the image of the Other's desire, but only at a point 
of lack as there is, strictly speaking, no determinate image of this desire. Indeed, the 
Lacanian point to be made here is that an object is not worthy of desire because of its 
manifest "positive" symbolic properties: rather, what renders an object worthy of desire is 
the positio that it comes to occupy in a particular fantasy space. To this extent every 
object of desire undergoes a kind of "deformity, " precisely because every object of desire 
is at some level a forma category. Richard's strategy of counter-identification, of 
64render[ing] good for bad, blessings for curses" (I. ii. 69), is seductive precisely because it 
relies upon the fact that truth is not de-monstrable and implicitly positions his monstrous 
body as something that also acts at the level of failed phenomenalization. Contesting the 
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pronounced scopophilia of the scene Richard parodies the interiorizing subject of 
modernity: Here "depth" is literally generated by the monstrous distortion of the 
surface. 101 The frontier separating the two "substances, " separating the thing that appears 
clearly in an objective view from the "substance of enjoyment" that can be Perceived only 
by looking awry is precisely what maintains the consistency both of the subject and the 
symbolic order itself. 102 
Indeed, it is around the wounds of Henry's corpse that the most insistent exhortations to 
see are made and where desire is shown to circulate literally around a void in the symbolic 
order. The eyes of Henry's corpse present a hole in the Other which Anne, 
metaphorically, seeks to occupy: 
Lo, in these windows that let forth thy life 
I pour the helpless balm of my poor eyes. 
0 cursed be the hand that made these holes! 
(I. ii. 12-14) 
A site of pure monstrance, the holes encode the corpse as an object that cannot look back 
but which, nevertheless, provokes the gaze of its spectators. Anne's substitution of the 
eyes for the holes locates a lack in the Other, a split between eye and gaze in terms of a 
failed encounter: "You never look at me from the place from which I see yau. " If the 
101 Here we find another variation of what I argue to be Richard's "interactive" 
function in the text: in this example we are dealing with a being whose entire 
consistency resides in the phantasmatic surface, as a constellation of pure events- 
effects devoid of any substantial support. 
102 Insofar as this encounter between Richard and Anne reticulates the myth of 
beauty and beast, we might bear in mind that the gap which separates beauty from 
ugliness is the very gap that separates reality from the Real: what constitutes reality is 
the minimum of idealisation the subject needs in order to be able to sustain the horror 
of the Real. 
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gaze indexes a rent in the symbolic order, Anne's subsequent figuration of the holes as 
"mouths" emphasizes how the scopic drive itself is produced around some constitutive 
impasse or deadlock where symbolization fails: 
If thou delight to view thy heinous deeds, 
Behold this patterns of thy butcheries. 
0, gentleman, see, see! dead Henry's wounds 
Open their congealed mouths and bleed afresh. 
(I. ii. 54-57) 
It is, then, from within the context of this libidinal economy that Richard orchestrates his 
entire seduction of Anne. Unable to elicit a confession that he murdered Henry and 
Edward, Anne accuses Richard of being "the cause of that accursed effect. " Richard's 
response, characteristically, is to complicate such a causal logic. He does so, however, by 
relocating death on an axis of desire where it is the power of fascination exerted by the 
sublime image of Anne that assumes a lethal dimension: 
Your beauty was the cause of that effect; 
Your beauty, that did haunt me in my sleep 
To undertake the death of all the world, 
So I might live one hour in your sweet bosom. 
(I. ii. 117-125) 
The scene's seemingly incongruous engagement with the central motifs of courtly love has 
long been greeted with incredulity by critics who tend to view Richard's unlikely role as 
courtier solely in terms of pastiche. For Lacan, however, the encounter between beauty 
and the beast is paradigmatic of the libidinal economy of courtly love. It is precisely a 
crisis in symbolic authority, manifested in what Lacan defines as the Thing, which leads to 
an irruption of the monstrous in the feminine: 
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The poetry of courtly love, in effect, tends to locate in the place of the Thing 
certain discontents of the culture. And it does so at a time when the historical 
circumstances bear witness to a disparity between the especially harsh 
conditions of reality and certain fundamental demands. By means of a form 
of sublimation specific to art, poetic creation consists in positing an object I 
can only describe as terrifying, an inhuman partner. 103 
Richard rehearses the Lacanian thesis that the power of fascination exerted by a sublime 
image always announces the proximity of the death drive. The haunting image of a dream, 
sublimation in Richard's account has nothing to do with the object of desire but, rather, 
with the primordial void around which the drive circulates. Both Richard's aggression and 
the question of his culpability become inseparable, as he claims, from "the beauty that 
provoked me" (11.180). In his increasingly rhapsodic meditations he represents Anne as 
this sublime object, the "angel" that is a "divine perfection of a woman" (11.75). Offering 
a definition of the sublime as "an object elevated to the level of the Thing, " Lacan again 
relies on anamorphosis to demonstrate how the conventions of courtly love attempt to 
inscribe the Real of desire. It is in relation to Lacan's contention that "If beyond 
appearance there is nothing in itself, there is the gaze" that this idealization of the woman 
is situated. It is, of course, a narcissistic move, but it is precisely because vision stumbles 
upon a certain opacity that desire itself is possible: 
It is only by chance that beyond the mirror in question the subject's ideal is 
projected. The mirror may on occasion imply the mechanisms of narcissism, and 
especially the diminution of destruction or aggression that we will encounter 
subsequently. But it also fulfills another role, a role as limit. it is that which 
cannot be crossed. And the only organization in which it participates is that of the 
inaccessibility of the object. 104 
103 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. 
Russell Grigg (London, 1993), p. 1 50. 
104 bid., p. 151. 
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If the anamorphic glance teaches that an object is discernible only by viewing it awry - 
that is, that a disinterested gaze reveals a void - so too in the conventions of courtly love 
the object is revealed as something graspable only at the site of its own erasure. This is 
the "vacuole" whose positive substance consists solely in the network of "detours and 
obstacles which are organized so as to make the domain of the vacuole stand out as 
such. "105 The ring that Richard gives to Anne may be read as the most radical expression 
of how the 'gift' functions in this exchange as an attempted embodiment of this impossible 
Thing: i. e. as materialized Nothingness. 
To begin again. Su6ectivity is ultimately a question of this non-substantial self-relating, 
where self-consciousness is literally decentred in an anamorphic stain. That archetypal 
scene of Richard's infantile "jubilation" captures fleetingly what kind of specular 
seduction is involved: 
Upon my life, she finds, although I cannot, 
Myself to be a marv'llous proper man. 
I'll be at charges for a looking glass, 
And entertain a score or two of tailors, 
To study fashions to adorn my body: 
(I. ii. 252-258) 
By presenting himself as the negative image of his monstrous body, as a "proper man, " I 
have argued that the text also discloses how the deformed Thing is nothing other than the 
subject's impossible equivalent, the very negativity that defines the subject. As the 
105 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 142. 
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phantasmatic expression of the text's own inequality of form to itself, 106 Richard's de- 
formity pertains to that other paradoxical object Lacan called the objet 12etit ; that 
remainder of matter which bears witness to the fact that form is not yet fully realized, that 
it remains a mere anticipation of itself. Temporally, it is an object which exists only as that 
which is either too early or too late, implying a temporal loop that short circuits from the 
"not yet" to the "always already. "107 In the light of the text's ambivalent relationship 
towards its teleological project, Richard is nothing other than this anamorphic expression 
of the constitutive antagonism between "incarnation and deformation" that Ernesto Laclau 
maintains "is at the root of all ideological process. " 108 In this respect, it is not simply that 
Richard's formal excess stages the inherent inconsistencies of the depicted content of the 
text; rather he functions as "a return of the repressed" of the depicted content (Le 
Richard's formal excess is a negative expression of a hole that yawns in the very space of 
the play's depicted content). The anamorphic logic of the gaze not only implies how an 
106. As Derrida has argued, "An object is 'prodigious' when, by its size, it annihilates 
and reduces to nothing the end which constitutes its concept. The prodigious exceeds 
the final limit, and puts an end to it. It overflows its end and its concept. Prodigious, or 
monstrous - let us pay close attention to this is the characteristic of an -Qbj-Qgt, and of an object in its relation to its end and to its concept. " "Parergon, " in The Truth in 
Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (London, 1987), pp. 17-147, p. 125. 
107 In a discussion that alscýatteml)ts to analyse the relations between the monster 
and anamorphosis, Slavoj Zilek has characterised the emergence of the monster as 
signalling nothing less than the passage to modernity itself: 
This empty form, this black stain in the very heart of reality, is ultimately 
the "objective correlative" of the subject himself .... by means of 
anamorphotic stains. "reality" indexes the presence of the subject. The 
emergence of the empty surface on which phantasmagorical monsters 
appear is therefore strictly correlative to what Heidegger calls 'the advent 
of the Modern-Age subjectivity, ' i. e., to the epoch in which the symbolic 
"substance" (the 'big Other'-qua texture of symbolic tradition) can no 
longer contain the subject, can no longer bind him to his symbolic 
mandate ... the monster is the subject of the Enlightenment, that is to say, the mode in which the subject of the Enlightenment acquires his 
impossible positive existence (emphasis added). 
q 't Slavoj Zizek, Enioy Your Symptom: Jacques Lacan in HOII)Mood and Out (London, 
1996), p. 134. 
108 Ernesto Laclau, "The Death and Ressurection of the Theory of Ideology, " Modern 
Language Notes (1994) 112, pp. 297-321, p. 317. 
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object can become the retroactive product of its own effects, but also how without this 
deformed residue of matter the formal consistency of every field of so called "reality" itself 
collapses. ' 09 1 will develop further some of the implications of this thesis in the next 
chapter. Tuming more explicitly to the work of Jacques Derrida, I will argue that Richard 
Il is a text that opens onto a similarly problematic encounter with temporality, subjectivity 
and the gaze. Focusing on problems that are more obviously associated with the question 
of textuality, I argue that Richard 11 also finds its historical project both imperiled and 
generated by the incursion of a radical alterity that, ultimately, the play itself is powerless 
to occlude. 
109 It is in this precise sense that Richard may be considered the 'phallic' element in 
Richard III: there is no structure without this 'phallic' moment of the crossing point of 
the short circuit at which - as Lacan insists -'the signifier falls into the signified. ' The 
point of non-sense within the field of Sense is the point at which the signifier's cause is 
inscribed into the field of Sense. 
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Chapter Two 
"'Tis In Reversion That I Do Possess"': 
Speculation and Destination in RichardH 
"Writing is the birthplace of 'usurpation. "" 
"Looking Awry" 
On the afternoon of Saturday February 7 1601, the eve of the abortive Essex rising, eleven 
close associates of the Earl attended what most critics now believe to be a specially 
commissioned performance of Shakespeare's Richard II at the Globe theatre. 2 Six months 
after the rebellion, while perusing documents in the Tower of London, Queen Elizabeth 
chanced upon a file entitled "Richard IP before remarking famously "I am Richard 11. know 
ye not that? '93 
While attempts to establish the veracity of any causal relationship between Shakespeare's 
play and the Essex rebellion have been an enduring area of critical debate, 4 in more recent 
years the connection between both narratives appears to have crystallized into historical 
I Jacques Derrida, "Of Grammatology"In A Derrida Reader: Between The Blindsl, ed. Peggy Kamuf 
(New York, 1991), pp. 34-58, p. 42. 
2 E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage: Volume 1 (Oxford, 1923), pp. 368-9. 
I John Nichols (ed) The Progresses and Public Processions of Queen Elizabeth: Volume 3 
(London, 1823), p-552. 
I Much of the controversy extends back to the exchanges between E. M. Albright, "Shakespeare's 
Richard 11 and the Essex Conspiracy, " PMLA, 42 (1927) pp. 686-728, and Ray Heffner, 
"Shakespeare, Hayward and Essex, " PMLA, 45 (1930) pp. 745-80. An overview of subsequent 
developments in this debate is provided by Leeds Barroll, "A New History for Shakespeare and his 
Time, " Shakespeare Quarterly, 39,4, Winter (1988), pp. 441-64. 
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fact. In the hands of Stephen Greenblatt and Jonathan Dollimore, for example, both 
narratives are adduced as evidence of nothing less than the counter-hegemonic potential of 
the Elizabethan theatre. If contemporary scholarship remains blaze about the political threat 
posed by Richard 11 a reproachful Greenblatt claims that "in 1601 neither Queen Elizabeth 
nor the Earl of Essex were so sure: after all, someone on the eve of a rebellion thought the 
play sufficiently seditious to warrant squandering two pounds on the players [ ... ] and the 
Queen understood the performance as a threat. "5 Similarly, in Political Shakespear 
Jonathan Dollimore is quite unequivocal in reading the performance of Shakespeare's play as 
"a famous attempt to use the theatre to subvert authority" arguing that "Queen Elizabeth 
afterwards anxiously acknowledged the implied identification between her and Richard 11.956 
In short, even though Essex's rebellion fell short of the mark, the subversive import of 
Shakespeare's play ultimately found its true addressee. What I would like to suggest, 
however, is that Richard II is itself a text that repeatedly finds itself caught up in the very 
problems of the address, of forwarding, of the destination and, ultimately, of the thrust or 
project of history itself. 
Whither is writing destined? What kind of speculation accompanies the idea that a text 
(however circuitously) arrives somewhere? Perhaps surprisingly, this is the kind of 
detective work encouraged by Fulke Greville in the conclusion to his Life of Sidney. In a 
text that, significantly, also includes a paean to the wayward Earl of Essex, Greville exhorts 
his rcader to 
I Stephen J. Greenblatt, The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance (Oklahoma, 1982), p. 4. 
6 Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (eds) Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism, 
Second Edition (Manchester, 1994), p. 8. 
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[ ... ] behold these Acts upon their true stage, 
let him look on that stage wherein 
himself is an actor, even the state he lives in, and for every part he may 
perchance find a player, and for every line (it may be) an instance of life, beyon 
the author's intention or application. the vices of former ages being so like to 
these of this age as it will be easy to find out some affinity or resemblance 
between them. (emphasis added) 7 
These remarks are concerned with something more than the theatrum mundi motif that was 
already commonplace in Elizabethan England. Rather, Greville appears to indicate a surplus 
of meaning, that which is "beyond the author's intention or application, " as the most 
promising site of readerly speculation. In other words, any "identification" that takes place 
here achieves its formative power only on the basis of a suspensive delay that invokes 
retroactively the text's symbolic content. History, Greville appears to suggest, occurs on 
credit. 
In a way that Shakespeare's history plays repeatedly disclose, and Richard 11 in particular, 
'history' increasingly comes to be negotiated at this speculative threshold which complicates 
assumptions about any pure loss or expense. In his earliest published text Jacques Derrida 
argues that this strange temporal modality describes the pure form of every historical 
experience as such, insofar as history involves "postal and epistolary reference or resonance 
of a communication from a distance [ ... ] so that a return inquiry is asked on the basis of a 
first posting. "8 'History, ' then, is not a sedimentation of acquired experiences so much as 
an openness to receiving and placing calls, to taking up and sending on. While Catherine 
Quoted in Selected Writings of Fulke Greville, ed. Joan Rees (London, 1973), p. 152. 
I Quoted in Marian Hobson, Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines (London, 1998), p. 181. 
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Belsey avers that the term "'history play' is something of an oxymoron, " 9 we might hazard 
the suggestion that Shakespeare's 'history' plays frequently become the site where history 
playýs, a scene of supplementation and deferred overlapping that, according to Derrida, opens 
onto the original modality of the speculative itself. As I have already suggested in 
connection with Richard III, history and textuality cooperate here in the precise sense that 
"instead of [history] being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which 
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. "' 0 The "play" that is at issue here must not 
be understood merely in terms of the "ludic" 11 but as that non-dialectizable movement or 
trace that gives rise to the very possibility of history tout court. As Derrida argues, 
the tension between play and history.. is also the tension between play and 
presence. Play is the disruption of presence [ ... ] 
but if it is to be thought 
radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and 
absence. " 12 
In this crucial respect the retroactive constitution of a text's sense not only bears upon the 
way that a text, in its historical necessity, is always modified, transformed, traversed, 
separated from itself. and returned to its outside by all those works that might seem only to 
come after it. 13 Maurice Blanchot goes further in his suggestion that every text 
Catherine Belsey, "Making Histories" in Graham Holderness (ed. ) Shakespeare's Histo[y Pla= 
Richard 11 to Henry V (London, 1992), pp. 1 03-21, p. 1 03. 
10 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London, 1978), p. 289. 
11 What I have in mind here should be distinguished from the kind of "culturalist" concept of play 
that is advanced so routinely in putatively "new historicist" accounts of Shakespearean drama. See, 
for example, Leonard Tennenhouse, "Playing and Power" in Staging The Renaissance: 
Reinterpretations of Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama, ed. David Scott Kastan and Peter Stallybrass 
(London, 1991), pp. 27-40. 
11 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, p. 292. 
13 Along with Derrida I am concerned to retain a notion of retroactivity or Freudian "deferred action" 
"that is not limited [ ... ] to NachtraglichkiLit. It deconstructs; that too, going toward what exceeds it and 
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constitutively is an Qpen space of deferred reciprocity between reading and writing. That is 
to say, a text is always "open, " "its sense always open both in arrival, to come and in a 
process of retroactive constitution by the accidents of its 'future. "' 14 
Let us hold these issues in suspense for the moment to consider a crucial exchange that 
actually takes place in Shakespeare's Richard II, where questions of speculation and 
destination, of temporality and alterity, are in fact submitted to a sustained critical 
commentary. In an effort to console the Queen's grief at her husband's recent departure for 
Ireland, Bushy initiates discussion of a logico-formal paradox that is also specifically 
concerned with the gaze. Famously, Bushy adapts the popular Renaissance motif of 
anamorphosis which, heuristically at least, appears to offer itself as a particularly useful 
allegory for the Queen's predicament: 
Each substance of a grief hath twenty shadows, 
Which shows like grief itself, but is not so. 
For sorrow's eye, glazed with blinding tears, 
Divides one thing entire to many objects, 
Like perspectives, which, rightly gaz'd upon, 
Show nothing but confusion; ey'd awry, 
Distinguish form. So your sweet Majesty, 
Looking awry upon your lord's departure, 
Find shapes of grief more than himself to wail, 
Which, look'd on as it is, is nought but shadows 
Of what it is not. 
(II. H. 14-23) 
carries beyond it oraf-tff it. " Jacques Derrida, "Afterw. rds or, at least, less than a letter about a letter 
less! 'in Afterwards ed. Nicholas Royle (Finland, 1991), pp. 1 97-203, p. 201. 
11 Quoted in Timothy Clark, Derrida. Heideager. Blanchot: Sources of Derrida's notion and practice 
of literature (Cambridge, 1992), p. 1 34. Perhaps it is here that we find a suggestive context for 
Elizabeth's anxious recollection that Shakespeare's play was performed, specifically, in "Dpm streets 
and houses. " Indeed, Dollimore argues that "what made Elizabeth I so anxious was not so much a 
retrospectively and clearly ascertained effect of the staging of Richard 11 [ ... ] but the fact of the play having been appropriated - been given significance for a particular cause and in certain 'open' 
contexts. " Dollimore, -Qp-. cit., p. 
9. 
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Reading the anamorphic gaze as emblematic of how the Queen's view of events is lacking 
proper perspective, Bushy's somewhat infelicitous aside becomes entangled in the logical 
confusions that he is ostensibly at pains to clarify. Initially, he compares the elusive source 
of the Queen's presentiments of woe to the troml2e-l'oeil of a sharpened perspective glass 
(11.16-17) which, because of its uneven surface, multiplies and disproportions the thing that 
it reflects. Labouring the analogy, Bushy argues that only when it is looked at from a 
prescribed angle ("ey'd awry") is it possible for the Queen to discern the equally phantasmal 
quality of her grief., 
Almost imperceptibly, however, Bushy implies another reading of anamorphosis that seems 
to dispute this logic. While the anamorphic gaze maintains that an object can "distinguish 
form, " i. e. be grasped visually, only if it is viewed from aside; Bushy appears to depa 
from his own thesis in his subsequent advice to the Queen that her "looking awry upon your 
lord's departure, /Finds shapes of grief more than himself to wail" (11.21-2). In other words, 
Bushy's argument itself becomes split and redoubled here in his paradoxical suggestion that 
the Queen is "looking awry" at Richard's departure precisely because she fails to "look 
awry. " Ironically, in an argument that seeks to establish the primacy of the "thing-in-itself' 
over the vagaries of how it is reflected (or rendered meaningful to the subject in the symbolic 
order), this very point of ol2aci1y in what Bushy is trying to say demonstrates how meaning 
itself is apt to go "awry" from any ostensibly self-regulating ordinance. 
It is not, however, until the Queen's response that we find a much more pithy account of the 
logical paradoxes that are exposed in this (non) figure of anamorphosis. Impassive to 
Bushy's suggestion that her grief is in fact without foundation, the Queen develops the 
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exhortation to "look awry" into the strange time of another detour, that of the future 
anterior: 
[ ... ]nothing hath begot my something grief, Or something hath the nothing that I grieve - 
'Tis in reversion that I do possess - 
But what it is that is not yet known what, 
I cannot name; 'tis a nameless woe, I wot. 
(II. ii. 36-40) 
This idea that "nothing" can beget something is also, of course, central to Jacques Lacan's 
extended consideration of anamorphosis which, as we argued in the previous chapter, 
illuminates the necessarily retroactive dynamic of desire in the constitution of subjectivity. 15 
For Lacan, the anamorphic stain that appears to distort and temporarily disaggregate the 
consistency of so-called "reality" is analogous to the function of what he calls "the gaze as 
object a. " What is peculiar about this "object" is the fact that it is, strictly speaking, a 
semblance; a "nothing" which takes the form of "something" only when it is apprehended 
by a sideways glance that constitutively produce it, al2res coup as the (belated) "cause" of 
desire. 16 Crucially, for Lacan this object is also "nameless"; it eludes any appropriable 
identity precisely insofar as it expedites a temporal short-circuit from the "not-yef' to the 
"always already" that is peculiar to the signifying chain (which, we should recall, 
constitutively defers any contact between the signifier and the signified in a moment of 
undivided presence). 
15 See the section entitled "Anamorphosis" in Jacques Lacan, The Four FWndamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1994), pp. 79-90. Slavoj 2izek, in typically anecdotal 
fashion, also discusses briefly, týe exchange between the Ouben and Bushy as a species of this 
Lacanian problematic. Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through 
Popular Culture (London, 1997), pp. 9-12 . 
16 This much should alert us to the necessarily ambivalent and paradoxical resonance of the term 
64cause" in Lacan's repeated assertions that the objecta is the "object cause of desire. " 
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Lacan's object a, then, may be approached as nothing but this materialized distortion or 
embodiment of the radically non-synchronous character of the symbolic order. Deprived of 
any specular identity, the anamorphic blot registers the incursion of a radical alterity into the 
symbolic order that is domiciled not in the dyadic structure of the Imaginary (as Bushy 
suggests, II. ii. 27) but in the category that Lacan refers to as the Real. Indeed, the Queen's 
suspicion that "'Tis in reversion that I do possess" (11.38) provides a strangely eloquent 
gloss on Bushy's bungled excursus on anamorphosis: for it is precisely in this difficult sense 
of "reversion" as "a past that is yet to come, " only in the furtive glance of an impossible 
encounter which eclipses the "subject" as such, that the subject ( $) finds the mark of its 
desire. What ostensibly is coming back then, the Queen appears to imply in a logic not 
dissimilar to Lacan's definition of the Real, 17 has never in fact left the place that it already 
occupies. 
The "speculation" implicit in this dialogue, then, complicates any notion of self-reflection as 
that which comes to repose in a moment of self-adequation. Strictly speaking, there is 
nothing that precedes the movement of reflection since this movement itself "posits its 
presuppositions"; produces the retroactive illusion according to which its object was given 
in advance. The destination that is speculated upon here, rather, is one that is contingent 
upon a subject that (constitutively) lacks its own place: "As though on thinking on no 
thought I think, /Makes me with heavy nothing faint and shrink" (II. ii. 31-3). In other words, 
subjectivity finds itself inscribed here in a movement of some disjointing, disjunction or 
disproportion: as a "cause" that eschews any nostalgia for the security of a point of 
17 1 am referring here, of course, to Lacan's well worn dictum that"the real always returns to the same 
place. " 
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departure. Opining to Bushy that she is unable to determine a "cause" (II. ii. 6) of her grief, 
the Queen can only articulate her predicament through reference to the anachronism of how, 
in some strange sense, she perceives herself to be late with respect to that which has already 
happened to her in the future: 
methinks 
Some unborn sorrow ripe in Fortune's womb 
Is coming towards me, and my inward soul 
With nothing trembles; at some thing it grieves; 
(ILii. 9- 12) 
Simultaneously anticipated and summoned from a single coming that exceeds figuration, the 
Queen appears to be in thrall here to a strange kind of telepathy which, according to Jacques 
Derrida, is also the constitutive ground of (im)possibility that haunts every tele- 
communication system whatever its content, form or medium. 18 In a speech that, like the 
play itself, gains its rhetorical force by adopting what can only be described as "an 
apocalyptic tone, " throughout Richard II this essentially ambivalent aspect of that which is 
to "come" also becomes (and keeps on coming as) the tonal figure of a radical non-sense or 
otherness that, for Derrida, derives "only from the other, from nothing that may be an origin 
or a verifiable, decidable, presentable, appropriable, identity. "19 "Come" disseminateS. 20 
18 Insofar as the Queen's ruminations can be described as prophetic, her ensuing exchange with 
Bushy also reveals how prophecy, which "returns to itself from the future of its own to-come, " 
renders any "position" of enunciation deeply problematic. See Jacques Derrida, "Telepathy, " 
Oxford Litera[y Review, vol. 10 (1988) pp. 3-43, pA 
19 Jacques Derrida, "Of an Apocalyptic Tone recently Adopted in Philosophy, " trans. John P Leavey 
Jr., Oxford Literary Review, 6: 2,1984, pp. 3-37, p. 34. For Lacan the unconscious, insofar as it can 
be said to "mean" anything, is apprehensible only under this tonal figure of that which is to come: 
"The unconscious is neither being, nor non-being, but the unrealized. " Jacques Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 30. 
20 "Come I appellant to this princely presence" (1134); "Jet him not come there" (I. ii. 71); "say ... why thou comest-Against what man thou com'sf'(1-iii-1 1-13); 'Who hither come ingaged by my oath" 
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Without deferral, nothing begins. As its more familiar legal 12rovenanc implies, "reversion" 
is concerned with inheritance in prospect: it yields, it brings back and comes back in a way 
that violates the very idea of an initial investment. 21 Including the two mentions it receives 
in Richard II the term "reversion" occurs only three times in Shakespeare's plays. 
Significantly, the third reference is to be found in I HenU IV where, doubtful of any 
improvement in their political fortunes, Hotspur is reassured by Douglas that there 
[ ... ] now remains A sweet reversion - we may boldly spend 
(11.18); ".. why he cometh hither" (11.28); "wherefore thou com'st hither-Against whom comest thou? " 
(11.31-3); "imagine it/to lie that way thou goest, not whence thou comest"(11.287); "Come, come, my 
son" (11.304); "if that come short.. " (I. iv. 47); "Come, gentleman ... Pray God we may make haste and 
come too late 1"(11.63-4); "Will the king come ... ?" (II. I. i); "The king is come" (11.69); "Come on, our 
queen" (11.222); "here comes the Duke of YorW'(Il. ii. 73); ".. others come to make him lose at home" 
(11.81); ".. a tide of woes/Comes rushing on this woeful land at once" (11.98-9); "Come, sister" (11.105); 
"who comes here? " (II. iii. 20); "Here come the Lords of Ross and Willoughby" (11.57; "But who comes 
here? " (11.67); "1 come to seek that name in England" (11.71); "To you, my lord, I come" (11.76); "Here 
comes his grace in person" (11.82); "Com'st thou because the anointed king is hence? " (11.95); 
"Thou.. art come/Before the expiration of thy time" (11.109-10); "as I come, I come for Lancaster" 
(11.113); "But in this kind to come" (11.142); " The Noble Duke hath sworn his coming" (11.147); 
'Witnessing storms to come, woe and unresf'(1l. iv. 22); "Come, lords, away" (Ill. i. 42); 'Ihither come 
again" (Ill. ii. 78); "But who comes here? " (11.89-90); "comes at the last" (11.169); "no worse can come to 
fight" (11.183); "But who comes here? " (Ill. iii. 1 9); ".. hither come/Even at his feet to lay my arms and 
power" (11.39); "Ais coming hither.. "(11.1 12); "Northumberland comes back from Bolingbroke" 
(11.142); "may it please you to come down? " (11.177); "Down, down I come ... To come at traitors' 
calls .... Come down? ... 
Yet he is come" (11.177-8; 81 -2; 186); "1 come but for mine own" (11.196); "But 
stay, here come the gardeners" (Ill. iv. 24); "Come, ladies, go" (11.96); "Great Duke of Lancaster, I come 
to thee" (IV. i. 1 06); "Read o'er this paper while the glass doth come"PlFiend, thou torments me ere I 
come to hell" (11.269-70); "The woe's to come" (11.322); "Come home with me to supper' (11.333); "This 
way the king will come" (V. I. i); ".. tell the rest ... Of our cousins' coming into London" (V. ii. 1,3); "Here 
comes my son Aumerle" (11.41); "lest you be cropped before you come to prime" (11.51); "But who 
comes here? " (V. iii. 21); "Come, my old son"(11.144); "Come, let's go" (V. v. 1 0); "'Come, little 
ones"and then againf It is hard to come as for a camel/To thread the postern of a small needle's eye... 
(11.15-17); ".. how comest thou hither, /Where no man never comes? " (11.69-70); "Come mourn with me 
for what I do lamenf'(V. vi. 47). 
21 As an institution which made strategies of in-version and re-version part of its own signifying 
practice, it is no surprise to find that critics of the Elizabethan theatre were eager to fasten upon the 
social consequences of this fact. Stephen Gosson is characteristically forthright in this regard: 
"Overlashing in apparel is so common a fault, that the very hyerlings of some of our players, 
which stand at reversion of us, by the week, yet under gentlemen's noses in suites of silke, 
excercising themselves to prating on the stage, & common scoffing when they come abroade, 
where they look askance over the shoulder at every man, of whom the Sunday before they 
begged an almes. " Stephen Gosson, Plays Confuted in Five Actions (London, 1972), p. 64. 
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Upon the hope of what is to come in. 
(I He= IV IVA. 53) 
Denoting at the same time that which is still to come and, in a more difficult sense, 
something that ostensibly "remains" as the retroactive product of this speculation, 
"reversion" here seems to imply an understanding of the remainder as that which precede 
its own temporal genesis. Moreover, in Douglas' faintly gastronomic reference to a "sweet" 
reversion we are also able to glimpse these paradoxical "remains" in a now obsolete use of 
the term that was still current in the sixteenth century. According to the SOED, 
"reversion" could also refer to "the remains, that which is left over, of any dish, drink, or 
meal .... The rest, residue, or remainder ....... 
22 What may be discerned here is a slippage in 
meaning between "reversion" in the politico-legal sense of surplus value and "reversion' 'as 
the convocation of another kind of surplus: that of the fantasmatic "stuff' of enjoyment 
(jouissance) itself . 
23 
Indeed, what this etymological aside further illuminates is the fundamental ambiguity implied 
by the Lacanian Real -qua object a as 
that which both "precedes" symbolization as a mere 
anticipation of itself, and that which also designates a left-over that is somehow posited or 
"produced" by symbolization. In his development of the object a into a central theoretical 
concept, Lacan regularly insisted upon this homology between surplus-value and surplus- 
enjoyment as the expression of a constitutive antagonism in the temporal harmony of the 
22 Lesley Brown (ed) The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionaly Volume Two (Oxford, 1993), p. 
2581. 
11 We should bear in mind here that in French plus-de-ioui plays punningly between the two notions 
of "excess of enjoyment" as well as "no longer any enjoyment. " 
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symbolic order: there is no substance of enjoyment without, prior to, its surplus. 24 The 
recursive trajectory announced in the term "reversion" returns us inevitably (and 
appropriately) to Queen Isobel's account of the anamorphic gaze, whose object is similarly 
revealed to be a mirage retroactively invoked by a surplus that forever exceeds the 
determination of presence as "presence to itself. " 
Considered within the context of a play like Richard II, which both interrogates and 
ultimately becomes ensnared by the logical confusions that arise when the law of "fair 
sequence and succession" (111199) is placed in jeopardy, this apparently dialectical (and 
invisible) sleight of hand also constitutes the dramatic and, I would like to argue, traumatic 
conditions of its putatively "historical" narrative. 25 In a text that, as several critics have 
noted, is remarkable for the way that it so consistently invokes a metaphorics of vision that 
it is finally unable to master, 26 my concern in this chapter is to relate this aporia not so much 
to the specular, as to a constellation of figures announced in Derrida's discussion of 
24 For a thorough exposition of this aspect of Lacanian thinking see chapter one of Slavoj Zizek, The 
Sublime Object of IdeologY (London, 1989) pp. 1 1-53. 
15 According to Michel do Certeau, by the late Renaissance what was formerly regarded as a 
"cyclical" view of history was giving way to a discourse of history where the p= itself became that 
which remained to be thought; in other words, "history" became ineluctably tied to a growing 
understanding of Adtag., as a prior past that is, paradoxically, still to come : "The formerly living 
organization of a society invested within their point of view is changed into a p= that can be placed 
under observation. Its status is transformed: no longer being present within authors as the frame of 
reference of their thought, it is now situated within the object that we, as new authors, have to render 
thinkable. " Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History (Oxford, 1988), p. 34. For a more extended 
consideration of these issues see J. R. Hale, The Evolution of British Historiography: From Bacon to 
Naimer (London, 1967); Herschel Baker, The Race of Time: Three Lectures on Renaissance 
HistoriograpU (Toronto, 1967); Ricardo Quinones, The Renaissance Discove[y of Time 
(Cambridge, 1972); David Scott Kastan, "Shakespeare and the Shapes of Time, " Comparative 
Drama, 7,1973-4, pp. 259-77; Ronald R. MacDonald "Uneasy Lies: Language and History in 
Shakespeare's Lancastrian Tetralogy, " Shakespeare Quarterly, 35,1 (1984) pp. 22-39. 
26 According to Scott MacMillan the most absorbing writing in Richard 11 "outweighs theatrical 
manifestation and gravitates toward the unseen. At the heart of loss there is nothing for the theatrical 
eye to see. " 
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,, 27 "speculation 
. Insofar as this term marks for Derrida an excess in the dialectics of the 
presence of the present, Richard II also opens onto this other economy: as a drama of de- 
position that consistently defies the logic of every "position" as such (bearing within itself 
the recursive trajectory of that which is both rejected and witheld) the text's historical 
project is impelled under the aspect of a curious auto-affection whose integrity cannot 
escape the necessity of a certain fort: da. Richard 11,1 argue, is a text that speculates on 
itself, comes back to itself, modifies itself, delegates itself, represents itself without ever 
leaving a scene of inheritance that is, ultimately, also a scene of writing. Along with Joel 
Fineman, then, I am interested primarily with those creases of textuality or aporias within 
the text- what Deffida calls ecriture what Lacan calls the Real - in order to exarnine the very 
Shakespearean enigma of how that which can be neither specularized nor represented 
nevertheless marks "the condition and consequence of both specularity and 
,, 28 representation. Ostensibly 'looking awry' upon Bolingbroke's "courtship of the 
common people" (Liv. 24), Richard also reveals himself to be possessed of some telepathic 
insight, espying that it is "As were our England in reversion his" (Liv. 35). Richard I, I 
maintain, never ceases to speculate on the basis of this strange anamorphous return; 
speculations that inevitably place its (re)versions of history in circulation with a lexicon of 
27 In this respect I will be making frequent reference throughout this chapter to Derrida's The Post 
Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, Alan Bass trans., (London, 1987) [hereafter cited as The 
Post Cardl. Addressing a number of problems that find extraordinary resonance in Richard 11, 
especially insofar as the play is crucially concerned with the putatively "Freudian" questions of 
succession, geneaology and inheritance, Derrida's avowedly corrupt use of the term "speculation" 
broadens onto an analysis of speculative structure "in the senses of specular reflection ... of the production of surplus value, of calculations and bets on the Exchange.. in the sense of that which 
overflows the (given) presence of the present, the given of the gift. I am doing this ... in order to gain access to that which is played out beyond the 'given, ' to that which is rejected, withheld, taken 
back.. " The Post Card, p. 284. 
28 Joel Fineman, "Shakespeare's Ear, " Representations, 28 ( Fall, 1989) pp. 6-13, p. 9. 
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sending, forwarding and destining that turn (indefatigably) on the "hope of what is to 
CoMe.,, 29 
46post" 
It is little or no surprise to discover that Richard 11 seems always to have an eye turned 
toward the future. With an air of resignation that is quite disarming given that his fate is far 
from decided, Richard somewhat precipitously invites his audience to "sit upon the 
ground/And tell sad stories of the death of kings" (Ill. ii. 155-6). Similarly, after the 
deposition Richard's concern once again is with posterity, requesting to the Queen that 
In winter's tedious nights sit by the fire 
With good old folks, and let them tell thee tales 
Of woeful ages long ago betid; 
And ere thou bid good night, to quite their griefs 
Tell thou the lamentable tale of me 
I ... I 
... the senseless 
brands will sympathize 
And in compassion weep the fire out, 
And some will mourn in ashes, some coal-black, 
For the deposing of a rightful king. 
(V. i. 40-44; 46-50) 
In terms of what I argue to be the text's persistent difficulties in trying situate itself in 
relation to any date or destination (insofar as they are shown to implicate simultaneouLly the 
21 Even though she fails adequately to deal with the question of differance that she so routinely 
invokes throughout her argument, I am in agreement with Catherine Belsey's contention that 
Shakespeare's so-called "history" plays "compel their audience towards the as-yet unpresentable 
[ ... ] they tell of political struggle and of the difference within the signifier. " Catherine Belsey, "Making Histories" in Shakespeare's Histo! y Plays: Richard 11 to Hen[y V, ed. Graham Holderness (London, 
1992), pp. 103-21, p. 118. 
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strange exigence of a singularity-gad repetition), the culminating metaphor here of 
commemoration and loss, of a gathering together and a dispersal is of particular significance. 
Arguing how every "date gets carried away, transported [ ... I and thus effaces itself in its 
very readability, " at least figuratively, the scene of Richard's commemoration is redolent of 
Derrida's claim that "what must be commemorated, at once gathered together and repeated, 
is, at the same time, the date's annihilation, a kind of nothing, or ash. Ash awaits US.,, 30 
Indeed, frequently telling its tale through the telling of tales that somehow post-date it, 
historical verisimilitude in. Richard 11 is concemed less with a strategy of re-writing than of 
overwritin a text that increasingly comes to convey the impression that it is prior as well as 
posterior to any singular "event. " 31 Perhaps the most striking example of this effect is to 
be found at Act V, scene II, which ostensibly "begins" with the Duchess of York's rebuke to 
her husband for delaying his account of Richard's ignominious passage through London: 
Duch: My lord, you told me you would tell the rest, 
When weeping made you break the story off, 
Of our two cousins' coming into London. 
York: Where did I leave? 
Duch: At that sad stop, my lord, 
Where rude misbegoverned hands from windows' tops 
Threw dust and rubbish on King Richard's head. 
(V. ii. 1-5) 
30 Jacques Derrida, "Shibboleth: For Paul Celan" in Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature, ed. Derek 
Attridge (Routledge, 1992) pp. 370-413, p. 396. 
31 Graham Holderness has recently argued that a familiar strategy in Richard if is to have "characters 
manufacturing history before it happens, preconfiguring the event in line with their own interpretative 
strategies, " in Shakespeare: The Histories (London, 2000), p. 183. For an argument that also 
addresses the question of history and temporality in Shakespeare from an avowedly (if somewhat 
tentative) Derridean perspective, see Marjorie Garber, "'What's Past is Prologue': Temporality and 
Prophecy in Shakespeare's History Plays" in Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theou. Histgz. and 
Interpretation, ed. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski (London, 1986), pp. 301-31. 
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In many respects quite appropriate to a play that finds its own tale(s) enfolded at the scene 
of an interminably repeated supplementation, what this "interruption" encodes is the 
paradoxical time of an event that is, precisely, "recalled" on the one hand and "anticipated" 
on the other. Phyllis Rackin, however, argues that we read this bizarre intromission as a 
dramaturgical "detour, " as something contrived by Shakespeare himself in an effort to 
relocate the text in the historical "presenf 'of his Elizabethan audience. 32 Rackin's 
suggestion that the entire exchange secretly addresses itself to the theatrical spectator does 
not, however, contend with the troubling fact that even this implied destination is figured 
explicitly as the site of an ongoing displacement: "As in a theatre the eyes of men, /After a 
well-grac'd actor leaves the stage, /Are idly bent on him that enters nexf'(V. ii. 23-5). Indeed, 
not only does the scene begin with an interruption, the ensuing dialogue is also routinely 
interrupted by asides that dwell upon the figure of digression. Ironically, the properly 
dramatic focus of the scene itself centres upon what is potentially a more egregious detour: 
the interception of Aurnerle's letter. 
What this enigmatic exchange begins to make legible is how, in the text more generally, 
signification becomes routed in differential pathways that in fact constitutively fail to arrive 
at a "stop" (V. ii. 4). In a doubly resonant connection that the text itself makes explicit on 
more than one occasion, we may suggest that the "plot" entertains a certain over-proximity 
to the traces of a "blot"; a surplus textuality or overwriting that compels the text repeatedly 
to bend back on itself in a way that imperils every effort of self-adequation. Indeed, Ernest 
Gilman's contention that, viewed from within the context of the history plays, Richard II is 
32 Phyllis Rackin, "Temporality, Anachrony and Presence in Shakespeare's English Histories, " 
Renaissance Drama, 17 (1986), pp-1 01 -123. 
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more akin to a "wedged contrariety, , 33 offers a particularly resonant metaphor for the way 
that the text so consistently speculates on a destination that is not in some sense always 
already produced at the scene of its own description. Simultaneously gathering itself 
together only to disperse itself again, 34 the "contrariety" of Richard 11 shares much in 
common with a more contemporary myth of filiation and symbolization; the Freudian 
double fort/da "which conjugates into the same genealogical (and conjugal) writing the 
narrated and the narrating of narrative. , 35 That is to say, in topological terms Richard 11 is 
in many ways a sort of constitutive self-impediment, a "wedged contrariety' insofar as it is 
comprised of a deferred overlapping with the scene of its own constituting fictions. Again, 
Lacan's comments on anamorphosis are of some help here. If the blot is such a frequent 
leitmotif in the text, it is redolent of the anamorphic blot as that which also embodies this 
failure in dialectization: i. e., a stain that bears witness to the way that the frame of every 
text is, paradoxically, always already framed (re-marked) by a part of its content. 36 
33 Ernest B. Gilman, "Richard 11 and the Perspectives of History, " Renaissance Drama, 7 (1976) 
pp. 85-115, P. 92. 
34 Not, perhaps, entirely coincidentally Richard 11 is frequently given to metaphors that have an 
explicit bearing on this disseminating movement: The Duchess of Gloucester compares the death of 
Edward to how "One flourishing branch of his most royal root, /Is cracWd, and all the precious liquor 
spir (1.1.18-19); Worcester has "Broken the staff of office and dispers'ed/The household of the king" 
(Ii. iii. 27-8); Richard's Welsh supporters resolve to "disperse ourselves" (11. iv. 4); Salisbury informs the 
beleagured king that most of his retinue have "dispers'd and fled" (Ill. ii. 74); Bolingbroke is anxious 
that king's followers be "dispers'd" (Ill. iii. iv). Indeed, in an argument that would appear to be 
particularly suggestive of Derrida, Harry Berger Jr. maintains that "The succession of kings in the 
Henriad is a genealogy of guilt which, seeded in Richard's own self-division, transmits itself with 
increasing virulence. " "Richard 11,3: 2: An Exercise in Imaginary Audition, " English Litera[y History, 
55,4 (1988), pp-755-97, p. 757. 
11 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 303. 
36 To the extent that this chapter is implicitly concerned to analyse Richard tl ýp the light of the relationship 
that might be said to inhere between a "letter' and its "destination, " Slavoj 2izek also argues that this kind 
of topological inversion is best exemplified via Lacan's dialectic of view and gaze: "in what I see, in what is 
open to my view, there is always a point where'l see nothing, ' a point which 'makes no sense, ' l. e which 
functions as the picture's stain - this is the point from which the very picture returns the gaze, looks back 
at me. "A letter arrives at its destination' precisely in this point of the picture: hereý Vcounter myself, my 
own objective correlative - here I am, so to speak, inscribed in the picture. " Slavoj Zizek, En'oy You 
Symptom: Jacques Lacan in Holloood and Out (London, 1992), p. 1 5. In other words, the anamorphic 
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This invaginated topology is most conspicuously disclosed, however, through the surfeit of 
doubling in the text, 37 where Richard II bends itself even to the vertiginous and unfathomable 
limits of that which is "doubly redoubled" (I. iii. 80). Famously, not only does the king himself 
come to engage in a dialogue with his own shadow, castles too are "doubly portcullis'd" 
(II. ii. 65), Bolingbroke is charged with a "double wrong" (III. ii. 215), Richard is on the lookout 
for "double tongues" (11.2 1), the bows of soldiers are possessed of "double-fatal yew" (11.117) 
and, in parting from Anne, Richard laments how he is "doubly divorc'd" (V. i. 72). 
Bearing in mind James Calderwood's observation that Richard II is "a divorcing play, "" it is 
also the case that the text itself moves forward by doubling back through the detour provided by 
an original exclusion. In a connection that will be given further emphasis in the ensuing 
argument, we might suggest here that Richard 11 increasingly comes to pose itself as it deposes 
itself, insofar as depositioning becomes, strictly speaking, something that the text itself 
performs If doubling raises the troubling suggestion that there can only ever be an essential 
duplicity without an original, bibliographical efforts to negotiate an authentic version of the text 
largely come to rest, appropriately, on the "deposition scene. , 39 Critical debate over the origins 
"blot" corrects the standard subjective idealism by rendering the gap between the eye and the gaze: the 
perceiving subject is always-already gazed at from a point that eludes his eyes. 
11 We might refer here, for example, to the now classic study of the play by Ernst Kantarowicz who 
singles out for attention"the varieties of 'duplications' which Shakespeare has unfolded in the three 
bewildering central scenes [which] intersect and overlap and interfere with each other continuousLy" 
(emphasis added). "The Kings Two Bodies" in Richard [I: Critical Essays, ed. Jeanne T. Newlin 
(London, 1984), pp. 73-93, p. 75. 
38 James Calderwood, Shakespearean Metadrama (Minneapolis, 1971), p. 84. 
39 Graham Holderness has argued that Richard 11 poses a particular problem for the bibliographical 
historian: "no other historical drama of Shakespeare's has proved more difficult to understand and 
interpret without the aid of external authorities. Richard 11 seems to depend to an unusual degree on 
open questions. " "Shakespeare's History: Richard ll, " Literature and HistolY, 7,1 (Spring 1981), 
pp. 2-26, p. 2. 
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of the scene in the light of its reappearance in the fourth quarto of 1608, inevitably turn upon the 
unacknowledged suspicion that the origin is always already an addition. Either the scene is 
assumed to be a "later" addition to the teXt40 or something that already existed in performance. 41 
Despite John Jones' confident assertion that "the fourth quarto merely restores what was there 
at the start, 5942 the deposition scene is already the site of an overwritten erasure, de-positioning 
the origin as an effect that is produced ex-pos by an originary substitution that actually falls 
short of itself from the start. In other words, what is simultaneously at issue and disavowed in 
these editorial disputes - with its stockpiling of additions and subtractions (both of which 
amount to the same thing in a differential order) - is that, in Derrida's words, any temptation to 
go "back from the supplement to the source must recognize that there is a supplement at the 
,, 43 source. 
According to Jean-Luc Nancy every nostalgia for a primal scene is coterminous with a 
66storytelling" that tries to remain innocent of another scene: that of writing itself. In an 
argument that is strangely evocative of the metaleptic scenography of Richard 11 itself, 
Nancy argues : "We know the scene: there are men gathered around, and someone telling 
them a story ... They were not gathered before the story, it is the telling that gathers them ... It 
40 This is a still widely held view that was first put forward by David Bergeron, "The Deposition Scene 
in Richard ll, " Renaissance Papers (1974), pp. 31-7, p. 35. 
41 For a summary of the main arguments in support of this claim see Janet Clare, "Biýgghýarll and the 
Deposition Scene, " Review of English Studies, 16 (1990) pp. 89-94, p. 94. 
41 John Jones, Shakespeare at Work (Oxford, 1999), p. 41. 
43 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Gayatri Spivak trans., (London, 1980), p. 304. In a pithy essay 
that also reconsiders the relationship between the Shakespearean text and the question of source, 
Jonathan Goldberg maintains that "there is no ... source of the text except through a relay of 
mediations ... even the supposed ultimate source - the author - must be considered within a heterogeneous dispersal. " "Speculations: Macbeth and Source" in Shakespeare Reproduced: 
The Text in Histo[y and Ideology, eds. Jean E. Howard and Marion O, Connor (London, 1990), 
pp. 242-64, p. 242. 
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is the story of their origin. 5144 There is a subtle yet crucial displacement at work here: the 
origin of the "nation" cannot be sought in stories, it is the very act of narration that 
constitutes an origin aporetically in an impossible moment of foundation and legitimation. 
In the beginning there was the "post. " That is to say, it is precisely insofar as the founding 
moment, thepre-, is always already inhabited by thisýpost that the nation narrates and 
produces its effects of legitimacy through repetition. Insofar as we can consider Richard 11 a 
text that, in this crucial respect, is uniquely concerned with the institutional politics of the 
Nation, both at a diegetic level and as the traumatic narrative "origirf 'of Shakespeare's 
history plays, it is also the case that it can only acquit this task problematically: through 
certain postal effects that challenge any view of history as a narrative where events conform 
to a tidy seriality. Indeed, in an argument that would grant exemplary significance to the 
occasion of Aumerle's purloined letter, Geoffrey Bennington argues that if the nation 
was not troubled by the necessary possibility of the letter's not arriving, then the 
state would be absolute and have no relation to any outside: it could not strictly 
speaking be a natio , Jt would have no 
history, and thus no narration. 45 
In short, my point is that throughout Richard 11 it is the very idea of an initial point of 
departure that the text simultaneously invokes and renders most enigmatic. It is in Gaunt's 
elegiac speech where both the nation and narration most obviously and ineluctably come into 
contact with a certain postal effect. In Gaunt's famous evocation of England as "This other 
Eden, demi-paradise" (11140-68; 42) nothing less than a myth of national origins appears to 
be endangered by Richard's financial mismanagement. Venerating England as the product of 
44 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor (London, 1996), p. 43. 
45 Geoffrey Bennington, Legislations: The Politics of Deconstruction (London, 1994), p. 246. 
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a strange kind of auto-genesis, "This fortress built by Nature for herself/Against infection" 
(Il. i. 43-4) Gaunt's metaphors also repeatedly make appeal to a logic of the boundary in an 
attempt to quarantine the nation from any relation to an outside, as "in the office of a 
walljor as a moat defensive to a house" (11.46-7). 
It is, however, precisely this erosion of the boundary that clandestinely renders possible 
any movement of a "return" to origins. The very idea of a retreat before the boundary, of 
that which England must ambivalently "beat back", is also secretly called for by the very 
institution that patrols it. Crucially, it is in his peroration that Gaunt's speculations upon 
the multiple senses of the term "boundary" ultimately come into proximity with the scene of 
writing itself: 
England, bound in with the triumphant sea, 
Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege 
Of wat'ry Neptune, is now bound in with shame, 
With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds; 
(II. i. 6 1-4) 
The threatened erasure of the boundary here gives rise to another kind of insolvency; that of 
a bond which simultaneously binds and detaches (dispatches) identity from itself in an 
athetic movement that, for Derrida, is unthinkable outside consideration of what he calls the 
"postal principle. " In The Post Card Deffida discusses the strange topology at work in the 
lexicon of the boundary as, precisely, "collapses of the coastline"; an essential divisibility 
that is accompanied by "strategies of approach and overflow, strictures of attachment, 
, A6 places of reversion, strangulation, or double bin . Indeed, Richard II is variously 
46 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 261. 
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concerned with a metaphorics of what Derrida terms a bindinal economy. 47 In one episode 
that has a more explicit bearing on writing, the Duke of York urges his son to show him the 
contents of a letter dismissed by his wife as "nothing but some band that he is ent'red into": 
Bound to himself'? What doth he with a bond 
That he is bound to? Wife, thou art a fool. 
Boy, let me see the writing. 
(V. ii. 65; 67-9) 
It is precisely this enigmatic syntax of binding/unbinding - as a movement that does not have 
at its disposal the unified space of a figure - that also concerns Gaunt. Asphyxiating itself 
on the economy of its own reserves, Gaunt's conviction that England "Hath made a 
shameful conquest of itself' (111.66) and that the "state of law is bondslave to the 
law"(11.113) indicates what kind of double bind is involved when difference infiltrates the 
origin48 : England's identity is so indebted to itself ("leas'd out" 11.59) that any return 
(owed) to itself merely amounts to a further expropriation of itself. Mortgaged to the 
perfidies of the signifier, in the image of "inky blots" we find a striking suggestion of how, 
turning away from itself, Richard's England now occupies a relation of belonging that is 
without interiority: like writing, it is bound to (for) itself only by acceding to the threat of 
its own erasure. 
41 Richard inquires who would "dissolve the bands of life" (Ill. ii. 65); Mowbray wishes to "cast off his 
chains of bondage" (I. iii. 89); Fitzwater offers Bolingbroke his "bond of faith" (IV. i. 76); the Gardener 
instructs his assistant to "bind thou up your dangling/apricots" (111. iv. 29). For an expert analysis of 
deconstruction as concerned with the problem of binding in general, see Rodolphe Gasche, "Strictly 
Bonded" in Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida (London, 1995), pp. 1 71-99. 
48 Derrida's neologism of a "bidinal economy" appears especially appropriate here Ibid., p. 368. 
Moreoever we may also usefully recall some comments by Peter Brooks who maintains that "To 
speak of "binding" in a literary text is thus to speak of any of the formalizations (which, like binding, 
may be painful, retarding) that force us to recognize sameness within difference. " "Freud's 
Masterplot" in Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading Otherwise, ed. Shoshana 
Felman (London, 1982), pp. 280-300, p. 290. 
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Long before Richard's formal deposition, then, Gaunt draws attention to an originary 
violence of writing as the agent of a "usurpation [that] has always already begun. , 49 This 
suggestion that writing alienates identity from essence, that it eats away at the entire scene 
of inheritance with its "rotten parchment bonds" (11.64) is especially ironic in a play which, 
as Jonathan Goldberg argues, repeatedly discloses its "relationship to an emerging 
textuality. "50 Indeed, if writing provisionally sustains sequentiality, Derrida's reading of 
the paradigmatic scene of Freud's fort: da (with its own interminable movement of 
binding/unbinding) also argues that questions of "inheritance ... of genealogy, of the paradoxes 
of nomination, of the king" are tied to a telematics of the post that constitutively unmoors 
51 identity from every assured destination. 
would also like to suggest that this movement of self-division that is the focus of censure 
both produces and negates the "myth of origins" so conspicuously staged throughout the 
scene. Closer examination reveals how Gaunt's narrative is remarkable precisely in the way 
that it so often violates the genealogical axioms of continuity, tradition and providentialism 
that some critics have read unproblematically as a redaction of Elizabethan ideology. 52 For 
example, in a particularly sinuous contamination of present and past tenses Gaunt 
admonishes Richard that 
49 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammato! 4y, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London, 1980), p. 37. 
50 Jonathan Goldberg, "Rebel Letters: Postal Effects from Richard 11 to Hen! Y IV, Renaissance 
Drama, 19 (1988) , pp. 3-29, p. 6. 
51 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 222. 
52 This is the view advanced by E. M. W. Tillyard in Shakespeare's Histo[y Playa (London, 1969), 
p. 244. 
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Aad thy grandsire with a prophet's eye 
Seen how his son's son should destroy his sons, 
From forth thy reach he would have laid thy shame, 
Deposin thee before thou wert possess' , Which art 12ossess'd now to depos thyself. 
(II. i. 104-8) 
In Gaunt's fantasy the scene of inheritance once again gives way to a complex pattern of 
forward and recursive loops. The image of the grandfather as one who comes "forth, " who, 
through a teleological paradox, is simultaneously posed both before and after his grandson, 
bears a striking resemblance to Derrida's analysis of the Freudian scene of inheritance. 
According to Derrida, Ernst's "calling himself back" and Freud's "posting" himself, writing 
to himself from a position not yet existing, point not beyond the pleasure principle so much 
as to a "postal principle" that both disorders and gives rise to every genealogical model 
whatever its content or medium. So too in Gaunt's speech we find this double conjugation 
of annulment and return - of posing and deposing, possession and dispossession - that 
confounds the very logic of positionality as such. Already something of a revenant himself, 
even Gaunt's solicitation of a "beyond" in the guise of a prophet is caught up in this 
contradictory movement of a "coming back" that annuls its own ostensible position of 
possibility; of that which has barely come to leave when it is going to come back: 
"Methinks I am a prophet new inspir'd, /And thus expiring do fortell of him" (II. i. 31-2). 
Moreover, in Gaunt's description of Richard as "my brother Edward's son, " and in his 
lament that Edward's "son's son should destroy his sons" (II. L. 105) we find an equivocal 
syntax of the possessive and the genitive function that is not merely an artifact of grammar. 
This dissemination or threatened erasure of filiation is hinted at throughout the text: the 
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Duchess of Gloucester relates to Gaunt as "thy sometimes brother's wife" (I. ii. 54), speaking 
to Mowbray Richard refers to Bolingbroke as "our cousin, cousin" (Liv. 20) and addresses 
Gaunt as "brother to great Edward's son" (ILL 12 1). Harry Berger Jr. 's astute observation 
that Richard Il repeatedly comes up against "a structural flaw in the very notion of mimesis, 
,, 53 [that] is magnified by confusion in the paternal deployment of the genealogical principle, 
may be glossed with the further suggestion that the text's ascending and descending 
tra ectories inscribes this capacity for dissemination as the very thrust of its historical i 
project. According to Derrida, it is this very lexicon of doubling, binding and reversion that 
gives rise to history in a way that would not be possible "if the place of the letter were not 
divisible from the start. , 54 
The sheer ubiquity of the term "post" in Richard 1155 is notable in that it 
condenses into itself perhaps most felicitously this entire enigma of what to come, to come 
before, to come after, to come back all mean: "post" as the tonal figure for that which 
unleashes every speculation. Indeed, the fiduciary rhetoric of Gaunt's speech also 
characterizes the opening scene of the text in a way that implies more than simply a 
thematic settling of accounts. Richard II in fact "begins" problematically at the site of a 
susPensive delay, as a beginning that lacks any fixed and calculable domicile that would 
53 Harry Berger Jr., "Psychoanalyzing the Shakespeare Text: the first three scenes of the Henriad' 
in Shakespeare and the Question of TheoU, eds. Geoffrey Hartman and Patricia Parker (London, 
1985), pp. 210-30, p. 121. 
54 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 324. 
55 Mowbary promises to "post until it had return'dfThese terms of treason doubled down 
(Bolinbroke's) throat' (I. i. 55-6); Gaunt "hath sent post-haste/To intreat your majesty to visit him" 
(I. iv. 55-6); Nothumberland invites Richard's followers to "Away with me in post to Ravenspurgh" 
(111296); York inquires if there are "posts dispatch'd for Ireland? " (II. H. 1 03); the gardener exhorts the 
queen to "post you to London" (Ill. iv. 90); the Duchess urges her son to "Spur post" and get before 
his father to the king (V. ii. 1 12); Richard laments how his time "Runs posting on in Bolingbroke's 
proud joy" (V. v. 59). 
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properly confer the power to begin. That is to say, the text quite literally moves forward 
under the obligation to acquit itself of a debt: it begins by coming back. " As Richard 
makes clear in his opening remarks, the ensuing confrontation between Mowbray and 
Bolingbroke is, in fact, an encounter that had previously been postponed from a time 
"Which then our leisure would not let us hear" (I. i. 5). Significantly, the fact that Holinshed 
offers no account of this postponement leads a perplexed Arden editor to conclude that 
"Shakespeare invented it.,, 57 
What this seemingly inexplicable deferral offers, rather, is another gloss on the way that the 
text comes back to itself in a way that eludes the determination of any initiating point of 
departure. Beginning with the promise "to make good the boist'rous late appeal" (IJA) of 
the two appellants, Richard If begins with the necessity to yield to a certain calling that in 
fact precedes the text. We might recall here that, deriving from the French "to call, " the term 
"appellant" comprises both the singularity of one who calls and the neutrality of that which 
calls, an essential ambivalence hinted at in Bolingbroke's announcement that "Come I 
appellant to this princely presence" (11.33). It is precisely this enigmatic association 
between calling and presence that is also of interest to us here. For Derrida any power to 
begin is related to a certain 12rior coming (prevenance), a strange power of reversion which, 
while it is foreign to and precedes every event, also calls forth every event as such: "The 
56 "It is thus the delay which is in the beginning. Without which, differance would be the lapse which 
a consciousness, a self-presence of the present, accords itself. To defer (differe ) thus cannot mean 
to retard a present possibility, to postpone an act, to put off a perception already now possible. That 
possibility is possible only through a differance which must be conceived of in other terms than those 
of a calculus or mechanics of decision. To say that differance is originary is simultaneously to erase 
the myth of a present origin. Which is why 'originary' must be understood as having been crossed 
out, without which differance would be derived from an original plenitude. It is a non-origin which is 
originary. " Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London, 1978), p. 203. 
11 Richard 11, ed. Peter Ure (London, 1996), p. 4, n. 5. 
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event of this 'Come' [ ... ] would be that starting from which there is any event, the coming, 
the to-come of the event that cannot be thought under the given category of the event. , 58 In 
the following sections I will be concerned to develop further the implications of this paradox, 
especially insofar as Richard 11 constitutively fails to occlude the traces of this double 
determination; perhaps most explicitly so in the text's inveterate strategies of reversion and 
de-positioning that come to overflow the logic of every "position" as such. 
The Step (not) Beyond 
Whither, then, are we led by such speculations? Let us risk a leap forward to I Henry I 
where Hal's delinquent behaviour is compared, significantly, to Richard who is described as 
"The skipping King, [who] ambled up and down, /With shallow jesters, and rash bavin wits" 
(III. ii. 60-1). This idea of a degenerate and tottering monarch is developed further in an image 
that presents Richard as someone who was, quite literally, a "pushover, " who would "stand 
the push/Of every beardless vain comparative" (11.66-7). In a footnoted reference to this 
appellation of "The skipping King" the Arden editor of the play remarks somewhat 
imperiously that "There is nothing like this behaviour in Richard 11.,, 59 
" Jacques Derrida, "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy, " trans. John P Leavy Jr. 
in Derrida and Negative Theg%gy, ed. Harold Coward (Albany, 1992), pp. 25-73, p. 64. Elsewhere 
Derrida remarks that Being "accedes to itself only on the basis of the Call (d-eBuf), a call which has 
come from afar, which does not necessarily use words, and which, in a certain way, does not say 
anything. " Jacques Derrida, "Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce, " trans. Tina Kendall in A 
Derrida Reader: Between The Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf (New York, 1991), pp. 569-601, p. 573. In an 
argument that would also appear particularly apposite for any consideration of Richard 11, Jean-Luc 
Nancy avers that "presence, as the present of its presence, depends on nothing that founds or 
produces it [ ... ] it proceeds from a 'coming' that is itself not temporal, neither in the sense that it would 
come in time, nor in the sense that the duration of its procedure would there present itself (in this 
sense, it is not even a 'coming' - it does not properly come, but it perhaps comes forth, comes up, 
comes back. " The Experience of Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (California, 1993), p. 1 12. 
19 King Hen! 3ý IV Part 1, ed. A. R. Humphries (London, 1978), p. 103, n. 60ff. 
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Let us take a step back. If Richard II discloses a certain recursive and a-thetic trajectory that I 
we have been discussing in terms of the problematic of the "postal principle, " the text is no 
less emphatically caught up (possibly even ensnared) in the thernatics and the lexicon of the 
step, a rhetoric of ggLng or aller that Derrida discusses under the rubric "of the way or the a- 
way, of the near and the far, of all the frameworks in tele-, of the adestination [ ... y, 
60 Time 
and again Richard 11 advances a rhetoric of the "step" as that which simultaneously registers 
and then hollows out the very distance that it is ostensibly called upon to measure. This 
curious epithet of "the skipping King" then, to borrow a formulation from Jean-Luc Nancy, 
more properly encodes the strange temporality of every text where "time skips, and skips 
itself; suspension, pulsation, continuity broken off and started up again on its very 
disjunction, thus the same (the same time) and never the same (neve the same time). q16l 
Perhaps most memorably so in the scene of Richard's protracted parting from Anne, the 
recently deposed king instigates a fantasy of "leaving, " of "two together" that seeks both to 
allay and delay the trauma of departure itself- 
Richard: So two together weeping, makes one woe 
Weep thou from me in France, I for thee here; 
Better far off than, near, be ne'er the near. 
Go count thy way with sighs; I mine with 
groans[ ... ]. 
Queen: So longest way shall have the longest moans. 
Twice for one step I'll groan, the way being short, 
And piece the way out with a heavy heart. 
(V. i. 87-92) 
10 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 268. 
11 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, eds. Werner Hamacher and David Wellerby, trans. Peggy Kamuf 
(California, 1996), p-66. 
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What this eminently divisible step amounts to here is, in fact, less a departure than a 
"doubling back" that comes to arrest the very movement that the step itself renders possible. 
In fact, the entire scene becomes an extended meditation on the ontological vicissitudes of 
"parting" itself: Northumberland's exhortation that the couple "Take leave and part, for 
you must part forthwith" (V. i. 70) is taken up by Richard's invitation to "part us' (11.76). 
Responding to her inquiry of "must we be divided? must we part? " (11.81) even Richard's 
determination that both should "dumbly part" (11.95) becomes the focus of some wordplay 
in Anne's remark that "'twere no good part/To take on me to keep and kill thy heart" (11.97- 
8). In a text that demonstrates considerable difficulties in making any point of departure 
conform to the intangibility of an edge, the scene calls attention to the essential ambivalence 
that we also find in Derrida's use of the French term 12artage: "a word which names 
difference, the line of demarcation, scission, cesura as well as participation, that which is 
divided because it is shared or held in common, imparted and partaken of . g162 
Simultaneously engaged and divided, giving and taking in the same gesture, 12artag perhaps 
most effectively conveys the strange sense of that which, in Richard's words, is "doubly 
divorc'd" (V-i-7 1). 63 
61 Jacques Derrida, "Shibboleth" in Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London, 
1992), pp. 370-414, p. 411. 
63 Indeed the text is comprised of an entire metaphorics of breaking that originates with the 
appropriately named Bolingbroke. Richard is described as "a broken man" (11.1.257); Bolingbroke is 
"late broke from the Duke of Exeter"(11.2811); Northumberland appeals to Richard's followers to "imp 
out our country's broken wing" (11.292); the Duchess of Gloucester hopes that Mowbray's sins "may 
break his foaming courser's back" (I. ii. 51); Ross wishes confesses that his heart "must break with 
silence" (11.1.228); the Earl of Worcester "Hath broken his staff" (II. ii. 59; II. M. 27); Northumberland 
promises that Bolingbroke will not "break [his] oath" (Il. iii. 150); York is "loath to break our country's 
laws" (11.168); Richard's courtiers are accused of having "Broke the possession of a royal bed" 
(111111); Aumerle somewhat portentously inquires of Richard how he fares after his "late tossing on 
the breaking seas? " (Ill. ii. 3); Richard inveighs against his faction as those who "break their faith to 
God as well as us" (11.101); at his deposition Richard implores that "God pardon all oaths that are broke 
to me, /God keep all vows unbroke are made to thee! " (Mi. 214-15); York promises to "break open" 
(V. iii. 45) the door when Aumerle and Henry are in conference; Richard warns that the sins of his 
deposition "shall break into corruption" (V. 1.59); an incarcerated Richard muses on the way to "check 
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Richard 11 carries within it, is impelled forward by, a force of breaking from itself that also 
comes to organize the very scene of its inscription; a "force of breaking, " which we might 
read along with Derrida as something that "is not an accidental predicate, but the very 
structure of the written. "64 Indeed, the entire text may be read as an extended allegory for 
this strange separating movement that frequently finds itself on the curvature of a return, 
ponderous steps that are as much retentional as they are protentional. As Richard's 
vacillation in the deposition scene, his re-signing, perhaps demonstrates most vividly - "Ay, 
no; no, ay" (IV. i. 201) - to say the word "not" (pas) of anything is still to speak and to leave 
in language that trace or footprint (12as) of one's approach (through negation) to the other. 
Holding together the double movement of approach and distancing that skews and displaces 
the determination of any presence a soi, 12as in both Derrida and Blanchot is, rather, a 
composite term - simultaneously an adverb ("not") or a noun ("step") - whose overall 
movement exceeds the simple opposition either of affirmation or negation. 
This strangely recursive trajectory whereby a step forward is somehow coterminous with a 
movement back is, we should recall, also the focus of Gaunt's conceit at the beginning of the 
play when he attempts to reinscribe Bolingbroke's exile into the appeasing words of a poetic 
fancy: 
The sullen passage of thy wearyjIUs 
Esteem as foil wherein thou art set 
The precious jewel of thy home return. 
time broke in a disordered string" which he renders equivalent to "my true time broke" (V. v. 46; 48) 
before wishing that his horse did "break the neck/Of that proud man that did usurp his back" (11.88-9). 
(, 4 Jacques Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context" in A Derrida Reader: Between The Blinds, ed. 
Peggy Kamuf (New York, 1991), pp. 81-112, p. 93. 
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(I. iii. 265-67: emphasis added) 
Do we not find here, in the necessarily ambivalent image of the "foil", an explicit association 
between the idea of "speculation" as a venturing forth and as that which is constitutively 
allayed and delayed through the detour of a (specular) return? Implying, in other words, 
that a slippage occurs between identity and destination, Gaunt's metaphor encapsulates 
neatly both senses of "foil" as that which impedes self-reflection and also that which 
becomes the surface for a relayed appropriation of identity. 
Specifically, this speech also obliges us to consider Jacques Lacan's seminal account of the 
way that the ego erects itself (stand by itself) only by anticipatin itself on the basis of an 
irreducible "stepping" behind itself. In a text that never ceases to complicate the dialectical 
rigours that subtend every attempt to "pose-oneself-before- oneself '19 
65 as Richard's de- 
position scene illustrates perhaps most dramatically, we should bear in mind Lacan's 
assertions that the subject learns to hold itself straight, upright, by spatially identifying 
with the specular image. According to Lacan the specular "dialectic" of subjectivity more 
properly consists of an "ortho-dramatization of the subjectivity of the subject" insofar as 
this subject assigns itself the task of optical erection. 66 
Indeed, it is this very movement of aufbebung that informs a dominant strain of imagery 
throughout the text: Richard speaks of "High blood's royalty" (I. i. 58) and teases 
Bolingbroke about "how high a pitch his resolution soars" (11.109) and his "sky-aspiring and 
65 Quoted in Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan: The Absolute Mastqr (California, 1994), p. 60. 
66 Ibid., p. 64. 
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ambitious thoughts" (l. iii. 130); Bolingbroke, also referred to as "high Hereford" (Liv. 2), 
wishes that his father's presence before Richard will "with a twofold vigour lift me up" 
(I. iii. 71). Alternatively, Mowbray flatters Richard as an "upright gentleman" (I. iii. 87) while 
Bolingbroke regards himself as "strong as a tower in hope" (I. iii. 102), a conceit that contrasts 
ironically with the "ill-erected tower" (VJ. 2) that later seals Richard's fate. In this list, 
which is far from exhaustive, such "sky-aspiring" metaphors enter into an increasingly 
complex alteration in the text between the high and the low, the near and the distant, with 
the fort: da as the double conjugation of annulment and return. 
Indeed, in a text that is manifestly concerned with the re-establishing of rights and property, 
Richard II makes legible a certain preoccupation with the feet as procuring the necessary 
space(s) for such restitution, a term which, according to Derrida, also implies "placing the 
,, 67 subject upright again, in its stance, in its institution. We may go so far as to claim that 
Richar also evidences a certain "orthopaedic anxiety" in that it so consistently assumes 
this necessity of establishing the subject in an upright position. 68 In fact, early in the text 
Mowbray sues for his rights to the King by invoking a term that is crucially concerned with 
the question of the subject's optical erection. Refuting Bolingbroke's charges Mowbray 
claims that "I am disgrac'd, impeach'd, and baffi'd here" (I. i. 170). In (appropriately) a 
61 Jacques Derrida "Restitutions of the truth in pointing fpointure " in The Truth in Paintina, trans. 
Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod (London, 1987), pp. 257-382, p. 286. 68 From beginning to end the text appears to be obsessed with the contrasting postures of 
stooping and standing. Ina list that is far from exhaustive we might consider the following examples: 
Richard refers to the "unstooping firmness of my upright soul" Q1.021); Bolingbroke deposes 
himself as one that does "stand in arms" (I. iii. 36); Bolingbroke "stands here, for God, his sovereign, 
and himself" (11-105) while Mowbray"standeth ... On pain to be found false and recreant" (11.110-11); Greene expresses concern for the troops that "stand out in Ireland" (I. iv. 38); Richard seizes the 
"moveables/Wehereof our uncle Gaunt did stand possess'd" (1.1.161-2); Bolingbroke thanks Ross for 
his support'Which, till my infant fortune comes to years, /Stands for my bounty.. " (II. iii. 66-7); 
arraigned by York for having his "banish'd and forbidden legs/Dar'd once to touch a dust of England's 
ground, " Bolingbroke inquires of his "fault" "On what condition stands it and wherein? " (Ii. iii. 89-90; 
105-6); Richard fantasizes that his plotters will "Stand bare and naked, trembling at themselves" 
(Ill. ii. 46). 
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footnoted reference the Arden editor glosses the term "baffl'd" as a chivalric custom which, 
according to Hall, "is used when a man is openly perjured, and then they make of him an 
Image paynted reverted with his heles ul2warde '(emphasis added). 69 Indeed, from 
Richard's initial inquiry into whether there is "some known groun of treachery" (I. i. 2) in 
Bolingbroke's appeal, the entire scene encodes a syntax of throwing down and taking up so 
that any grounds for appeal rests, quite literally, on whether the combatants are in full 
possession of their feet: Mowbray agrees to meet Bolingbroke "were I tied to run 
afoot ..... Where ever Englishmen durst set his foof ' (I. i. 53,66), a challenge that is later 
modified in his promise to "hurl down my gage/Upon this overweening traitor's foot" 
(11.146-7). Even the king's intervention is implicitly punned upon as a reference to footwear: 
Richard: Norfolk, throw down we bid, there is no boot 
Mow: Myself I throw, dread sovereign, at thy foot. 
(I. i. 164-5) 
From Bolingbroke's initial (and ultimately specious) "farewell" to "England's ground" as a 
"mother" and "nurse that bears me yet! " (I. iii. 306-7) we can discern an increasing 
preoccupation in the text with what Derrida calls " [a] fundamental subjectivity of the 
ground along with this pas de contact (this 12as de suje ) which rhythmically raises the 
,, 70 adhesion of a march/walk/step. 
69 King Richard 11, ed. Peter Ure (London, 1996), p. 14, n. 170. 
70 Jacques Derrida, "Restitutions, " p. 284. 
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Insofar as it may be said to inscribe a complex metaphor for Richard's "deposition, " the text 
itself is preoccupied with various figures of "treading" which, borrowing a useful 
formulation from Paul de Man, also serve to "mimic the suspended gravity between rising 
and falling"71 that, in a strange sense, is performed býy the text. The Duchess of York, for 
example, warns of the dangers to be found at the "untrodden stones" at Plashy (I. ii. 69); 
Richard decrees that Bolingbroke is to "tread the stranger paths of banishment" (I. iii. 143); 
Gaunt urges the 'banished' Bolingbroke to imagine the "The grass whereon thou tread'st the 
presence/strew'd with flowers" (I. iii.. 289-90); significantly, Bolingbroke even refers to his 
ignominy at the hands of Richard as one who has been "trod down" (I. iii. 125). 
In other words, the sheer ubiquity of this "treading" becomes perhaps the figure in Richard 
11 that most obviously discloses the text's ambivalent relationship toward an experience of a 
ground that could root (and route) identity to destination. "Look not to the ground, " 
Richard at one point intones to his dwindling band of supporters, "Yea favourites of a king, 
are we not high? " (III. ii. 87-8). By contrast, when he is later imprisoned in the Tower, the 
recently deposed king is enraged by reports that his horse has conveyed Bolingbroke to the 
coronation "So proudly as if he disdain'd the ground": "Would he not stumble? would he 
not fall down, /Since pride must have a fall, and break the neck/Of that proud man that did 
usurp his back? " (V. v. 83; 87-9). The incidence of the "fall" here not only involves an 
alternation between high and low, the very threat of usurpation itself is also connected with 
an implied threat to the very availability of a "ground. 9972 Bearing in mind Richard's 
11 Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of RomanticisM (New York, 1984), p. 1 11. 
72 Not coincidentally Richard accepts the certainty of his"fall" quite literally in an image of 
debasement that is also ( implicitly) a fall into writing: "Let us sit upon the "r u-nffAnd tell sad stories 
of the death of kings. " Hoping that his captors will "Save our deposed bodies to the ground" 
(III. H. 1150), it is this very difference in altitude (between sitting and standing) that is further elaborated 
in Richard's conceit that "within the hollow crown/That rounds the mortal temples of a king/Keeps 
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instruction that Northumberland "Tell Bolingbroke, for yon methinks he stands, /That every 
stride he makes upon my land/Is dangerous treason" (III. iii. 91-3), the figure of the "ground" 
again appears to be something that is instituted rather than simply revealed through its 
adhesion to a certain step. 
If Richard Il variously implies a certain necessity of the step, of that which is closest to the 
ground, this step also threatens the very institutional stability of the ground as such: i. e., as 
something that is, in a radical sense, always already in the process of being "usurped. " So it 
is that we find an embattled Richard trying to resist attack on his kingdom by enlisting the 
help of "heavy-gaited toads" that will "lie in their way, /Doing annoyance to the treacherous 
feet/Which with usurping steps do trample thee" (III. ii. 15-17). 73 Again, it is around this 
question of the step, of the gait 74 _ especially in a text where "forbidden legs" that have 
"dared to touch a dust of England's ground" (II. iii. 89-90) kicks of the tragedy proper - that 
Richard's "fall" comes to be implicated, quite literally, in what is simultaneojiLly both a 
strange and pedestrian kind of movement: "shoes are what you let fall. Particularly old 
shoes. The instance of the fall, the fallen, or the downfallen [ ... ] You let something fall like 
,, 75 an old shoe The remainder is also this lowness. 
death his court, and there the antic sits" (11.187). Moreover, we might also recall de Man's suggestion 
that treading cooperates with the movement of writing insofar as the "availability of a surface that 
could stiffen into solidity" becomes a problem. Paul de Man op. cit., p. 1 11. 
73 11[ ... ] differance instigates the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening 
and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presence of a 
kingdom. " Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Brighton, 1982), p. 22. 
74 According to Derrida it is "the question of the step, the gait, the pace, the rhythm, the passage, or 
the traversal" that simultaneously gives rise to and threatens to terminate all determination and every 
destination. " Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (California, 1993), p. 7, p. 1 0. 
75 Derrida, "Resitutions, " p. 305. 
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It is, then, precisely this step, this pis-that poses as it deposes in a negating and debasing 
movement, that also marks in the text a certain facility to deal with "being underneath, with 
ground and below ground" which, as Derrida argues, is inseparable from any consideration of 
institutional authority as also "'the great question' of the thing as subjecturn. " 76 Indeed, 
we may like to recall here that, in a term that is not found elsewhere in Shakespeare, 
Bolingbroke's advance toward the throne is described as a "patient underbearing of his 
fortune" (Liv. 29); and even York laments his role of having to "underprop" Richard's land 
(II. ii. 82-4). Yet this very question of the underneath itself comes, quite literally, to "rest" 
[restanc ]77 on a rhetoric of the step (12as) as that which exceeds the dialectics of presence 
and absence, or the implied distance between the high and the low. This step whose very 
destination is imperiled by an essential divisibility, 78 according to Derrida, also opens onto 
another relation, a relation without relation: 
76 Ibid., p. 285. 
11 This is a term that is used throughout Derrida's work. Restance is the noun derived from the 
present participle of rester, to remain. Derrida's notion of the trace returns repeatedly to this 
question of restance: as the reversion or remains that remain in excess of presence. The complex 
resonance of this term is in fact hinted at throughout the text; most notably in the somewhat 
infelicitous conceit that signals York's determination to thwart Aumerle's "conspiracy": "This fest'red 
joint cut off, the rest rest sound; /This, let alone, will all the rest confound" (V. iii. 83-4). Throughout 
the text the ubiquitous use of the term "rest" variously turns upon this dual association between that 
which remains and also that which is conserved as a remainder. Bushy inquires why Greene has "not 
proclaim'd North umberland/And all the rest revolted faction traitors? " (Il. ii. 56-7); a servingman warns 
York that I shall grieve you to report the rest" (Il. ii-95); Salisbury predicts "unrest" (Il. iv. 22); Bagot 
refers sarcastically to "the restful English court" (IV. 1.1 2); Bolingbroke ordains that "differences shall 
all rest under gage" (IV. 1.86,105); turning his eyes upon himself Richard finds himself "a traitor with 
the rest" (IV. i. 248); preparing to watch Bolingbroke's procession through London the Queen invites 
her attendants to "rest, if this rebellious earth/Have any resting for her true king's queen" (V. 1.5-6); 
the Duchess urges her husband to "tell the rest, /When weeping made you break the story off, " 
(V. ii. 1-2). 
11 Derrida himself invites us to read the "shoe" as that which, like the letter, problematizes the 
certainty of every destination. "In 'The Purveyor of Truth, ' replace the literal 'letter' by a 'shoe' and 
you will read: 'This is what loses and risks, without guarantee of return, the restance of anything 
whatsoever: a shoe does not always arrive at its destination, and once that belongs to its structure, 
one can say that it never truly arrives there, that when it does arrive, its possibility-of-not-arriving 
torments it with an internal drift. "' Derrida, 'Restitutions, ' p. 364. 
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The crossing of borders always announces itself according to the movement of a 
certain step [Vasj- and of the step that crosses a line. An indivisible line - the 
institution of such an indivisibility [is related to] the institution of the 
step ... whether the step crosses 
it or not. 79 
Richard I similarly gestures toward a limit that is never crossed. Or, more accurately, it 
retreats before a limit that the very approach of the step itself renders possible. We should 
recall here that Mowbray's initial challenge to Bolingbroke is to assign a meeting place that, 
on further reflection, proves to be uninhabitable. Mowbray promises to pursue 
Bolingbroke 
Even to the frozen rLdges of the Alps, 
Or any other ground inhabitable 
Where ever Englishmen durst set his foot. 
(I. i. 63-6) 
Seeking not to be wrong-footed by this rhetoric of overtaking, the rendezvous subsequently 
wagered by Bolingbroke gestures toward what is, strictly speaking, an "elsewhere" that 
exceeds the bounds of any assignable topology: "here, or elsewhere to the furthest 
verge/That was ever survey'd by English eye" (11.93-4). Indeed, the text frequently discloses 
a certain preoccupation with the security of borders that are variously negotiated around this 
vacillating relation between the visible and the invisible. Northumberland, for example, tries 
to reassure Richard that Bolingbroke's "coming hither hath no further scop /Than for his 
lineal royalties" (Ill. iii. 112-113). Commenting upon his own "proud heart" Richard 
immediately plays upon this term in his determination to "give thee scope to beat, /Since foes 
have scope to beat both thee and me' (11.140- 1). 
79 Derrida, The Post Card, p. 254. 
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Even more ambitiously, perhaps, the text sometimes evokes a "destination" that seeks to 
out-distance distance itself. as something that "lingers in extremity" (Il. ii. 71) or which 
threatens to exceed even "the extremest point" (IV. i. 47). What, crucially, may be discerned 
here is the solicitation of a radical "beyond" that is nevertheless inscribed within the text 
itself. an implied step (12as) beyond that is also not (12as) beyond. That is to say, the 
question of the step in Richard 11 rigorously concerns this speculative threshold, the 
separation or interval that speculation properly crosses over: "It passes over, it is beyond 
measure. It goes beyond the observable and the visible. , 80 And is this not also the 
"beyond" that Maurice Blanchot characterizes as le pas au-dela endemic to all writing? For 
Blanchot writing is this strange power of reversion, this step (pas) toward the not (p-as) that 
is forever beyond (au del ), 81 precisely in so far as writing exposes the decision of a lack that 
marks itself only by a surplus without place, that is impossible to assign to a place. 
10 Derrida, The Post Card, p. 380. Indeed, Richard 11 appears to be uncommonly preoccupied with 
the word "measure": the Duchess accuses Gaunt that he does "consent/In some large measure to 
thy father's death" (I. H. 25-6); Gaunt consoles his son by imagining exile as "no more/Than a delightful 
measure or a dance" (I. iii. 290-1); Richard arraigns his followers for allowing Bolingbroke to "Measure 
our confines with such peaceful steps" (Ill. ii. 125); refusing the invitation to dance Anne confesses 
that her "legs can keep no measure in delight, /When my poor heart no measure keeps in grief" 
(Ill. iv. 7-8). 
81 1 am referring here to Maurice Blanchot's essay entitled The Step Not Beyond which never ceases 
to interrogate the scene of writing as that which at once traces and effaces, where the the M is at 
once prohibition and transgression. For Blanchot the "a must be read simultaneously as negation 
and the trace or movement of an advance. We might risk a summation of Blanchot's concerns in the 
suggestion that the step beyond is never completed, or, if it is completed, is never really beyond. 
Transgression never really transgresses, but only calls for another limit: 
The circle of the law is this: there must be a crossing in order for there to be a limit, 
but only the limit, in as much as uncrossable, summons to cross, affirms the desire 
(the false step) that has always already, through an unforseeable movement, 
crossed the line. 
Maurice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, trans. Lycette Nelson (New York, 1992), p. 24. 
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With the step/not - the possible identification of an intangible edge - the crossing of the line 
becomes a proble . 
82 Nowhere is this more evident than in the inconclusive "trial" between 
Mowbray and Bolingbroke. Poised to "set forward" into combat, Richard, inexplicably, 
commands that the appellants "return back to their chairs again" (I. iii. 117; 120). Once again, 
the destination that this implied step renders possible has a form of advance that does not 
consist in passing, traversing or transiting, 83 but rather which "sets forward" in a movement 
of negation that the step (12as) is obliged to take back at the next step. 
"Return Back" 
82 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (California, 1993), p. 3. 
83 According to a superb analysis by Samuel Weber, the problematic of "writing" (of the trace, the 
mark and iterability) inevitably comes down to this question of the spectral pas which haunts internally 
every consideration of the "past, " the "pass" and "passing" as terms that would imply a modified 
relation to the presen : "a certain coming after emerges here as also the condition under which 
anything can come to be in the first place. If, however, what comes to be only does so by coming 
after, the most precise way to describe this paradoxical kind of event is as a coming-to-12ass. 
Deconstruction does not simply take place. It does not simply come, stay a while and then depart. It 
comes to l2ass. It arrives only in passing, or inversely, it is only in passing that it arrives. " Samuel 
Weber, "After Deconstruction" in Alan Cholodenko ed., Mass Mediauras: Form. Technics. Media 
(California, 1996), pp. 1 29-52, p. 1 40. Moreover Roger Laporte argues that Pas' has or should have 
at least four senses, the pas understood as 'step, ' M as in ne pas, 'not', or ne pas encore, 'not yet', 
the pg--s of passive [ ... ] the M of the past; four meanings then, but which communicate with each 
other in and by writing. " Roger Laporte, Maurice Blanchot: Lancien. 1'effroyablement ancien (Paris, 
1987), P. 44.1 am indebted to Michael Sharp for his assistance in this translation. 
I would also like to suggest here that Richard I is a text that discloses a somewhat conspicuous 
concern with transiting, and traversal, with the question of (pas)saae in general: Mowbray accuses 
Bolingbroke that "'Through the false passage of thy throat thou liest" (1.025); Gaunt organizes an 
entire conceit around "The sullen passage" of his son's "weary steps" who recoils from the idea of "a 
long apprenticehood/To foreign passages" (I. iii. 265; 271-2); upon seeing the disgraced king 
Bolinbroke comments on how"the envious clouds are bent/To dim his glory and to stain the trace/Of 
his bright passage to the occident" (Ill. iii. 65-7); Bolingbroke laments York's digressing son who 
'through muddy passages, /Hath held his current and defil'd himself" (V. iii. 60-1); an incarcerated 
Richard muses on how he "May tear a passage through the flinty ribs/Of this hard world" (V. v. 20-1). 
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We will permit ourselves a slight detour at this point in order to suggest that the word 
"back7 is disseminated throughout Richard 11 as a kind of tonal figure for this problem of 
what, precisely, it might mean either to take back, or to come back. As that which both 
threatens and inscribes the possibility of every arrival, Derrida discusses this strange 
complicity between the word "back" and the question of the destination in his claim that 
"There is only the back, seen from the back, in what is written [... ] Everything is played out 
,, 84 in retro. In Richard 11 the word "back" also assumes the burden of this equivocal spacing, 
of that which writes/is written. Like the step (12as), "back" signals a certain trace of alterity 
whose movement is no longer determinable according to a linear and indivisible line. If, as 
Nicholas Royle so patiently argues, there is "the incursion and recursion of the word 'back' 
whenever the prefix 're-' is in operation, "85 "back7 becomes the (postal) signature of the 
question of the "re-" in general: of a turning "back" that has no reality that is signiflable prior 
to this very turn in re-turning. 
Perhaps most strikingly, it is the aborted contest between Mowbray and Bolingbroke that 
gestures toward this spacing. Instructing the combatants to "return back to their chairs 
again7' (I. iii. 120), Richard's use of "back" here appears to be placed in a strangely 
superfluous kind of relation to "return. " Simultaneously coming-and-going, moving literally 
"from one side to the other turning" (VAL 18), the supplementary twists and turns of 
Richard's language are only further compounded by the neutralising syntax of his request 
that the combatants "Withdraw with us ... While we return these dukes what we decree" 
(I. iii. 121-2). 
84 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 48. 
11 Nicholas Royle, "Back, " Oxford Litera[y Review, 18 (1996), pp. 145-58, p. 147. 
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"Return, " "back, " "again, " "withdraW': all of these terms clear an undecidable path that 
,, 86 opens onto nothing other than the moment of de-cision itself, to "what we decree. 
Indeed, the entire scene "returns back" to nothing apart from further effractions that serve 
only to expose the very enigma of the "return" itself. Commanding Mowbray to "Return 
again" (I. iii. 178) after having decreed the "hopeless word of 'never to return"' (11.152), this 
ambivalence also comes to contaminate the very sense of Mowbray's leave-taking: 
"Farewell, my liege. No way can I stray/Save back to England all the world's my way" (11. 
206-7). How are we to understand (indeed, to Lb-llo3y) this recursive syntax? A perplexed 
Arden editor of the play heroically glosses the meaning as "I can never go astray now, 
except in returning to England; I am free to wander anywhere in the world. " 87 In other 
words, what coming back amounts to here is, paradoxically, an affival at the departure, an 
arrival that departs essentially from itself. That is to say, the equivocal syntax bears within 
itself the strange logic of an essential "straying" or detour that would seek the origin in the 
very distance that holds it from, or "saves" it from the origin. 
It is in this strange sense, then, that the term "back" in Richard II comes increasingly to 
provide the tonal figure for what Nicholas Royle describes as "the essentially 
supplementary, the ghostly return of or r-evenance of writing as such .,, 
88 "Back, " in other 
words, can only "return" to what cannot, strictly speaking, either take place or "give place" 
11 1 am concerned here to bear in mind Derrida's numerous remarks regarding how every decision can 
occur only under the exposure to a necessary dehiscence. For example, Derrida argues that "It is 
from the moment one surrenders to the necessity of divisibility and the undecidable that the 
question of decision can be posed ... A decision that would be taken otherwise than on the border of this undecidable would not be a decision. " "Dialanguages" in Points-, pp. 1 32-55, p. 1 47. 
97 King Richard 11, ed. Peter Ure (London, 1991), p. 33, n. 206-7. 
11 Nicholas Royle, "Back, "p. 154. 
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(V. v. 95). Rather, writing implies the indefatigable detour of the step (12as) as that which 
inscribes itself in a non-unified system of relations that cross paths, but without any point 
of crossing that might affirm their coincidence. Crucially, we might recall here how "York 
thrives to beat back Bolingbroke" (II. H. 143), or Gaunt's description of England's shores as 
that which "beats back the envious siege" (Il. i. 62); and, in what is perhaps the most 
strangely articulate comment on this double movement, the Queen's lament that hope is "a 
keeper bac of death" (II. ii. 70). 
Simultaneously dispatching and saving, keeping and sending on, it is once again around (or 
behind) this problematical taxonomy of the near and the far that "back" comes to inscribe 
itself What is announced in the very disposition of that which "keeps back" or "beats 
back" is a movement where what is "near" is not only repelled and held apart, it is in a more 
troubling sense taken "back" into the very separation of the distant. For Maurice Blanchot, 
it is precisely this deferred overlapping (through which proximity might be said to distance 
itself) that most explicitly returns the question of "presence" (of that which is proximate) to 
a consideration of writing: 
The distant calls to the near, repelling it, not to define itself in it by 
opposition, nor to form a couple with it [ ... ] but in such a way that the 
separation between the two still belong to the distant. 89 
Ina text that frequently sets "the word itself against the word" (V. iii. 120; V. v. 13-14), this 
disjunctive overlapping announces the very space of writingitself. responding to the call of 
an other which it cannot represent, Richard 11 also approaches alterity only in a movement 
of self-dislocation that inscribes this "double step of approach as distancing [where] the 
19 Maurice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond (New York, 1993), p. 69-70. 
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other dislocates the opposition of the near and the far, without however confounding 
them. "90 
Fearing that Bolingbroke's appeal might pose a secret danger, Richard is reassured by Gaunt 
that "As near as I could sift him on that argument/ On some apparent danger seen in 
him, /Aim'd at your Highness, no inveterate malice" (I. i. 12-14), an anxiety that is later 
echoed in the king's reference to Bolingbroke's "neighbour nearness to our sacred blood" 
(I. i. 119). The text's preoccupation with distancing is signaled ironically in the second 
encounter between Bolingbroke and Mowbray where Richard invites the combatants to 
"draw near" just before he decrees their exile from the kingdom (I. iii. 123). Indeed, the text 
variously positions the figure of the king as the index of this pulsating economy of retreat 
and approach. Northumberland confesses that he "dare not say/How near the tidings of our 
comfort is" (II. i. 271-2), while a fearful Greene is mindful of "our nearness to the king in 
love/Is near the hate of those love not the king, " prompting Bushy to remark how "we ever 
have been near the king" (II. ii. 126-7; 133). In an observation that is also, implicitly, a bid 
for the throne, Bolingbroke reminds his detractors how he is "Near to the king in blood, and 
near in love" (III. i. 17). In other words, as the conspiracy to depose Richard gathers strength, 
so the very question of the near and the far comes to enter into a much more equivocal 
relation. Demanding a report of his dwindling military support, for example, "how far off 
lies our power? ", Salisbury's evasive response to the king is that it is "Nor near nor farther 
`0 Quoted in Timothy Clark, Derrida. Heidegger. Blanchot: Sources of Derrida's notion and practice 
of _riterature 
(Cambridge, 1992), p. 1 37. Derrida, particularly in his work on Heidegger, repeatedly 
discusses the question of 'presence' as that which exceeds any simple opposition between the near 
and the far. For Derrida, rather, it is the movement of differance that remains to be thought here: 
"The near and the far are before the opposition of space and time, according to the opening of a 
spacing which belongs neither to time nor to space, and which dislocates, while producing it, any 
presence of the present. " "The Ends of Man" in The Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass 
(Brighton, 1982), pp. 109-36, p. 132-3. 
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off'(III. ii. 63-4). It is, however, in Richard's efforts to mollify his "separation" from Anne 
- "weep thou for me in France, I for thee here; / Better far off than, near, be Wer the neat" 
(V. i. 87-8) - that we find what is perhaps the most strangely eloquent figure for the text's 
complex taxonomy of the near and the distant. 91 
I adduce this list of examples, which is far from exhaustive, in order to suggest that Richard 
11' s uncommonly frequent evocations of the "king-as-presence', 92 is negotiated, quite 
literally, in terms of a taxonomy of retreat and approach wherein "presence" becomes less a 
countervailing determination of this movement than one of its effects. Richard 11 is not 
merely concerned with the question of the king's deposition, then: the king is that which 
must be thought in terms of a radical de-positioning that has always already contaminated 
the scene of presence. Within the text's lexicon of distancing, the king is implicated in a 
certain problematic of the post: a figure that insists at a point of perpetual non-insertion, 
the "king" calibrates a taxonomy of retreat and approach where "presence" comes literally to 
depend upon the very hollowing out of distance itself. 93 While guarding against an appeal 
to any naive thernaticism, do not the following remarks by Derrida on what he calls the 
91 According to Hent do Vries what we call "textuality" elaborates a figural language of "nearness in a 
space that exceeds all ontic determinations [ ... ] signaling itself through and in the concepts and figures of what it surpasses and calls forth. " Hent de vries, "Theotopographies; Nancy, Holderlin, 
Heidegger, ' Modern Language Notes, 109 (1994), pp. 445-77, p. 462. 
12 Richard calls Mowbray and Bolingbroke "to our presence; face to face" (1.1.15); Bolingbroke comes 
"appellant to this princely presence' (11.34); after his fateful return to England Ross remarks to 
Bolingbroke that it is "your presence makes us rich" (I I. M. 63); Richard arraigns York for the fact that his 
"joints forget/To pay their awful duty to our presence" (Ill. iii. 75-6); preparing to defend himself against 
Fitzwater's accusations, Aumerle flatters Bolingbroke by confiding that "Excepting one, I would he 
were the best/In all this presence that hath mov'd me so" (IV. i. 31-2); Carlisle remarks upon 
Bolingbroke's "royal presence" (IVJ. 1 15); York warns King Henry that he "hast a traitor in thy 
presence" (V. iii. 38). 
93 Michel Foucault also offers a particularly compelling account of the king as this impossible 
'proximate outside" in "Distance, Aspect, Origin" in The Tel Quel Reader, eds. Patrick ff rench and 
Roland-Francois Lack (London, 1998), pp. 97-109. 
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"postal principle" also offer a succinct commentary on the strategies of reversion to be 
found in Richard 11? For Derrida, the postal principle is ineluctably tied to 
the vocabulary of going-coming, of the step, of the way or the a-way, of the 
near and the far, of all the frameworks in tele-, of the destination, of the 
adestination, of the address and the maladdress, ... of the inheritance and of 
the genealogy, of the paradoxes of the nomination, of the king ... 
94 
What appears to be at issue throughout the text, then, no longer concerns a distancing 
rendering this or that absent, and then a rapprochement rendering this or that into presence. 
Rather, the distant and the near collapse into a more mysterious kind of spacing, an overlap 
without equivalence that confounds every positional logic. 
Perhaps appropriately, it is in Richard's fable of deposition, the conceit of the "two 
buckets, " that we find the paradoxical suggestion of how movement is in fact contingent 
upon a certain invisible reserve or holding back: 
filling one another 
The emptier ever dancing in the air, 
The other down, unseen, and full of water. 
That bucket down and full of tears am I, 
Drinking my griefs, whilst you mount up on high 
(IV. i. 185-9) 
De-position here is less a question simply of gravitational pull than a more enigmatic 
impingement of force where there is neither contact or an absolute break between strata. 
Rather, the kind of displacement that appears to be at issue involves a reserve that is 
simultaneously compensatory and vicarious. In other words, both rhetorically and 
94 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 222. 
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idiomatically, Richard's conceit here is uncannily reminiscent of Derrida's account of 
supplementarity: 
[ ... ] the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of-, if it fills, it is as one fills a void [ ... ] the 
supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance which takes-(the)-place. As 
substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no 
relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. 
Somewhere something can be filled up of itself, can accomplish itself, only by 
allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy. 95 
We may suggest that, as a drama of seemingly interminable supplementary twists and turns, 
Richard I comes to implicate writing in an essential de-positioning that, for Derrida, is also 
the original modality of the speculative itself. As a 12as de these that increasingly gives the 
impression of advance without advancing, the "play" appears never to advance anything 
that it does not immediately take back, "without ever positing anything which remains in its 
position[. .. ]ii% Most notably with 
its endless meditations upon appeals, requests, 
seductions, exhortations and supplications, Richard 11 advances only on the condition of an 
irreducible falling behind itself. In fact, in a suitably orthopaedic metaphor, York laments 
how this alienation of self-identity is now endemic to a nation which hearing "Report of 
fashions in proud Italy/ .... our tardy-apish nation/Limps after in base imitation" (II. i. 21-2). 
Crucially, Derrida also discusses limping as the essential movement of repetition more 
generally: as that which never permits the conclusion of a last step. For Derrida "limping" 
announces a "diabolical" agency that upsets the appeasing order of representation and self- 
" Jacques Derrida, "That Dangerous Supplement... " in Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature, ed. 
Derek Attridge (London, 1992), pp. 76-109, p. 83. 
96 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 284 
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identity through, precisely, an equivocal spacing and "tardy-apish" posture that "expand(s) 
the effect of duplicity without an original ...... 
97 
Before The Law 
Admittedly, several critics of the play have already noted how the text's vacillating structure 
threatens to dispel the illusion of any dialectical progress or regress. E. M. W. Tillyard, for 
example, is particularly critical of Richard II as a play "where means matter more than ends, " 
and recounts a series of "missed encounters" which he regards as impoverishing the dramatic 
force of the play: 
There is all the pomp of a tournament without the physical meeting of the two 
armed knights. There is a great army of Welshman assembled to support Richard, 
but they never fight. Bolingbroke before Flint Castle speaks of the terrible clash 
there should be when he and Richard meet - But instead of a clash there is a highly 
ceremonious encounter leading to the effortless submission of Richard. 98 
Tillyard's view of the play to be what he calls 46static" is echoed in a more recent criticism. 
For Phyllis Rackin, for example, it is principally Richard's "inaction that prevents [ ... ] the 
conflicts that the audience is repeatedly led to anticipate and is repeatedly prevented from 
seeing. "99 
97 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 270. 
91 E. M. W. Tillyard, Shakespeare's Histo1y Playa (London, 1991), p. 251-2. 
" Phyllis Rackin, "The Role of the Audience in Shakespeare's Richard IV Shakesl2eare Quarterly, 
36,3 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 262-82. Rackin returns to this question in a later article that, despite its title, 
is even more evasive, "Temporality, Anachrony and Presence in Shakespeare's English Histories, " 
Renaissance Drama, 17 (1986) , pp. 101-23, p. 105-6. 
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Time and again, it seems, Richard II cultivates a rhetoric of advance that in fact risks 
advancing nowhere. Gaunt implores his son to think of the "steps" of his journey into 
banishment as "no more/Than a delightful measure or a dance" (I. iii. 290-1)100 ; Scroope 
attempts to delay the news of Bolingbroke's return to England by playing "the torturerby 
small and small/To lengthen out the worst that must be spoken" (III. H. 198-9); similarly, 
learning of Richard's deposition, the Queen arraigns "Nimble mischance, that art so light of 
foot, /Doth not thy embassage belong to me, /And I am last that knows it? " (III. iv. 92-4); 
departing from the Queen Richard resolves that "Twice for one step I'll groan, the way being 
short, /And piece the way out with a heavy heart" (V. i. 91-2). 
Advancing "by small and small, " we might bear in mind here Joseph Porter's classic analysis 
of how the speech action in Richard II also "distinctively tends toward the umnarked non- 
specific direction of address, "101 and that Richard in particular is frequently given to "saying 
what he does as he does it. " 102 That is to say, the unusally large number of performative 
speech acts in Richard 11 also gravitate implicitly around this tension of the fort: da as that 
which is similarly always in the process of describing in advance the scene of its own 
description. Always at some level "attending but the signal to begin" (I. iii. 116), following 
100 Significantly, Alan Brissenden remarks that"the use of 'measure'and 'dance' is tautological, since 
a measure ja a dance. " Shakespeare and the Dance (London, 1981), p-26. Apart from deeming it 
appropriate to the "non-combatant quality of the play, " Brissenden adduces no further significance to 
the fact that "Richard 11 contains more references to dance than any of the histories, ' p. 25. Ratherwe 
might aver along with Derrida that even the most innocent dance thwarts "the assignation a 
residence .... the dance changes place and above all changes places. " Jacques Derrida, Points: Interviews, 1974-1994 (California, 1995), p. 94. 
101 Joseph A. Porter, The Drama of Speech Acts: - 
ShakespeaWs Lancastrian Tetralogy (London, 
1979), p. 40. 
102 Ibid., p. 32. 
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Heidegger we could say, at a stretch, that the text draws attention to a certain tautology at 
work insofar as "the 'whither' to which its steps directs us, develops and shows itself only 
in the execution of the step. " 103 Simultaneously posing and deposing, positing and 
depositing itself in the a-way of increasingly diminished returns, 104 Tillyard's view of the 
text as "static" may now be read not merely in terms of neutralization, but as a movement 
immanent to the text - performed by the text - that is more complex than either affirmation 
or negation [&s]. 105 In other words, what is at issue here is a certain marking' 06 that 
vitiates itself through dividing itself, a re-signin that no dialectic of presence and absence can 
master: "Ay, no; no, ay; for I must nothing be. /Therefore no "no", for I resign to thee" 
(IV. i. 201-2). 
101 Quoted in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "Obliteration" in The Subiect of Philosophy, ed. Thomas 
Trezise (London, 1993), pp. 57-99, p. 68. 
104 This metaphor is not entirely fortuitous. John Blanpied, for example, argues that the text 
reaches a "cul-de-sac" with Richard so that "it [is] finally impossible to say whether Richard reveals an 
inner emptiness or the play itself can simply go no further in its self-consuming momentum. " John 
Blanpied, Time and the Artist in Shakespeare's Histo[y Plays (Newark, 1983), p. 1 39. 
105 'Writing goes beyond whatever declining negativity might accompany a dialectical opposition. 
What counts in the final accounting and beyond what can be counted is a certain step beyond. " 
Jacques Derrida, "Otobiographies" in The Ear of the Other: Texts and Discussions with Jacques 
Derrida, ed. Christine McDonald (London, 1988), pp. 1-41, p. 19. 
106 We should bear in mind here that Derrida often plays upon the series "mark-march-margin" 
[margue. marche. marge : "the structure of the mark ... is the same word as marche, as limit, and as 
marain. " Jacques Derrida, 'Tympan" in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Brighton, 1982), ix- 
xxix, xxiv. Indeed, we are able to detect a similar kind of semiosis throughout Richard 11, perhaps most 
explicitly in Bolingbroke's claims of restitution that are to be conveyed to Richard: 
Go, signify as much, while here we march 
Upon the grassy carpet of this plain. 
Let's march without the noise of threatning drum, 
That from this castle's tottered battlements 
Our fair appointments may be well perus'd 
March on, and mark King Richard how he looks. 
(Ill. iii. 49-53; 61) 
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Perhaps not entirely fortuitously a complicity between marking and this strange movement 
(what Derrida calls sl2acin )107 may be glimpsed in the ubiquitous use of the term "spur" in 
Richard II, which occurs more often than in any other Shakespeare text. Mowbray, for 
example, laments how the king's presence "curbs me/From giving reins and spurs to my free 
speech" (I. i. 55-6); the Duchess of Gloucester inquires of Gaunt whether "brotherhood 
[finds] in thee no sharper spur? " (I. ii. 9); Gaunt upbraids Richard's impulsiveness by 
observing that "He tires betimes that spurs too fast betimes" (II. i. 36); Northumberland 
reports the advance of Ross and Willoughby who are "Bloody with spurring, fiery-red with 
haste" (II. iii. 58); a Lord taunts Aumerle that he will "spur thee on with full as many lies/As 
may be hollowed in thy treacherous ear, " whereupon Fitzwater teases "How fondly dost 
thou spur a forward horse! " (IV. i. 53-4; 72); in a race with his father to reach Bolingbroke, 
the Duchess of York implores Aumerle to "Spur post, and get before him to the king" 
(VAL 112) and Richard reflects bitterly on how he was "Spurr'd, gall'd, and tir'd by jauncing 
Bolingbroke" (V. v. 94). 
I adduce this list of examples in order to suggest that the term "spur" condenses the enigma 
of that which is hastened, incited or impelled forward only in terms of a certain pre-emptive 
inscription or "marking. " Along with Derrida I would like to draw attention here to the 
"fascinating homonymy" of the English wordal2ur which "is the 'same word' as the German 
S12ur: trace, wake, indication, mark. " 108 It is in this sense that the scene of presence is 
shadowed by the paradoxical spacing of that which cannot accede to presence as such, 
107 "An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but 
this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, 
thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the 
present ... this interval is what might be called spacing. " Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 
trans. Alan Bass (Brighton, 1982), p. 1 3. 
101 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow (London, 1978), p. 23. 
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marked as it is both protensionally and retentionally- "spur post" - by the irreducibility of 
the after-effect, of that which comes only in reversion, in the "wake" of presence. 
More capriciously, however, this seemingly immobilizing drift of Richard 11 inevitably 
comes to question the very status of the Law itself. That is, the Law as the site of a 
problematic spacing or dis-position that has everything to do with the question of the feet, 
with a certain step [pas] that secretly "insitutes" the Law. We might bear in mind here that 
the "orthopaedic anxiety" of which we spoke earlier finds what is perhaps its most explicit 
expression in the various figures of paralysis to be found in the text. For example, 
Mowbray's fantasy of being "tied to run afoot' (I. i. 62) is implicitly referred to in 
Bolingbroke's appeal that his accuser be freed from "the clogging burthen of a guilty soul" 
(I. iii. 200) -a figure that resurfaces later in Percy's reference to the Abbot's "clog of 
conscience" (V. vi. 20); a metaphor which, as the Arden editor also observes, derives 
specifically from the wooden weight used to keep animals from straying. 
It is, preeminently, in the much neglected sub-plot concerning York, the Duchess and 
Aumerle that the text most emphatically discloses a bizarre preoccupation both with the feet 
and this implied threat to their mobility. Aumerle's "conspiracy" having been disclosed, a 
race then ensues to see who will be the first to communicate this information to the king. 
Crucially, the specifically comical aspect of the scene is punctuated by York's frustrated 
efforts to locate his boots, which only serves to diminish the apparent urgency of the 
situation: "Give me my boots, I say! " (V. ii. 77); "Bring me my boots: I will unto the 
king"(11.85); "Give me my boots, I say" (11.88). Even when the three supplicants are finally 
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before the king, the entire dialogue is centred upon Bolingbroke's unsuccessful requests for 
the Duchess to "stand up": 
Bol: Rise up, good aunt. 
Duch: Not yet, I thee beseech: 
Forever will I walk upon my knees. 
[ ... I Our knees still kneel to the ground they grow; 
I ... I Bol: Good aunt, stand up. 
Duch: Nay, do not say 'stand up'; 
Say 'pardon' first, and afterwards 'stand up. ' 
[ ... I Bol: Good aunt, stand up. 
Duch I do not sue to stand. 
(V. iii. 89-91; 104; 108-10; 126-7) 
After Aumerle has finally been granted pardon the Duchess reflects somewhat superfluously 
upon the "happy vantage of a kneeling knee" (V. iii. 13 0). 
That is to say, what this scene ironically brings into focus is a certain anxiety and hesitancy 
in the text more generally that pertains precisely to the (dis)position or posture that should 
be assumed by subjects that, especially in this text, are so routinely placed "before" the law. 
Although Aumerle avers meekly that "Unto my mother's prayers I bend my knee" 
(V. iii. 95), elsewhere in the text the very efficacy of the Law itself is shown to depend 
crucially upon a necessary spatial equivocation, one that Maurice Blanchot has elsewhere 
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somewhat appositely referred to as the "knee of the law. "109 Indeed, Richard's indignation 
toward Bolingbroke's deputy as one who omits "the fearful bending of thy knee" and whose 
"joints forget/To pay their awful duty to our presence" (III. iii. 73; 75-6) is met with 
Northumberland's reassurance that Bolingbroke's case is made "immediate on his knees" 
(Ill. iii. 114). Even so, Richard's subsequent ruminations upon what is, in all other respects, 
calculated as an "invisible" transfer of power, are concerned to ironize the very posture of a 
rectilinear attitude. Apparently resolved to the substitution of "My sceptre for a palmer's 
walking staff' (11.15 1) Richard nevertheless repeatedly makes deposition homologous to an 
inverted correspondence between the high and the low; a specifically orthomorphic (and 
anamorphic) displacement whereby "subjects' feet/may hourly trample on their sovereign's 
head' (11.156-7). Drawing attention to how even the making of "a leg" now signifies that 
"Bolingbroke says C ay"' (11.175), this equivocal power of the knee is developed further in the 
next scene as the most salient reminder of Richard's impoverished status: as a subject who 
is now placed implacably before the law: 
Fair cousin you debase your princely knee 
To make the base earth proud with kissing it. 
I ... I Up, cousin, up; your heart is up, I know, 
Thus high at least, although your knee below. 
(III. iv. 190-1; 194-5) 
In other words, these examples inevitably return us to a consideration of a certain spacing or 
radical de-positioning implied by Deffida's discussion of the step (12as) as that (non)figure 
which bears crucially upon the enigma of every institution tout court. More specifically, 
109 Quoted in Jacques Derrida, "Before The Law" in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (London, 
1992), pp. 181-221, p. 207. 
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for Derrida this step (12as) can only be thought in tenns of an essential vacillation, a non- 
dialectizable movement that "does not belong to position (thesi ) or to deposition 
(privation, subtraction, negation). "' 10 By so consistently drawing attention to the way that 
any "relation" to the Law is both contingent upon and produced by a step that in fact 
institutes the Law, Richard Il also urges the suspicion that "the Law [does] not stand up, 
which is perhaps again why it would be difficult to place oneself before it. "' 11 
If, in fact, the text is itself so frequently bent upon consideration of the "vantage of a 
kneeling knee" (V. iii. 130) it also illuminates how there is no unmediated access to the Law 
that is not already implicated in this restless equivocation of the step (pas), what Derrida 
describes as a" looming dominance or difference in height, which gradually alters itself [] 
within the polarity of high and low, far and near (Lort/da), now and later. " 112 Moreover, is 
not Derrida's "literal" reading of Kafka's short story "Before The Law, " where the entire 
sceneography inscribes "a drama of standing and sitting"' 13 strangely reminiscent of the 
increasingly sedentary positioning of Richard as a movement that, also quite literally, mimes 
his de-position? 114 Gaunt, for example, warns Richard that "A thousand flatterers sit 
within thy crown" (II. i. 100); Northumberland somewhat portentously remarks that "We 
see the wind sit sore upon our sails" (II. i. 265); Richard predicts that Bolingbroke's 
110 Jacques Derrida, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials" trans. John P. Leavy Jr. in Derrida and 
Negative Theology (New York, 1992), pp. 73-143, p. 99. 
"I Jacques Derrida, "Before The Law" in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge pp. 181-220, p. 207. 
112 Ibid, p. 208. 
113 Ibid., p. 207. 
114 We may also bear in mind here the Duchess of Gloucester's wish that "sit my husband's wrong on 
Hereford's spear'(I. ii. 47) and Gaunt's advice to his son that"Woe doth the heavier sit/Where it 
perceives it is but faintly borne" (I. iii. 281). 
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"treasons will sit blushing in his face" (III. ii. 5 1); resigned to his fate Richard invites his 
followers to "sit upon the ground/And tell sad stories of the death of kings, " while referring 
to his crown as the place where "the antic sits"; while Carlisle remonstrates that "wise men 
ne'er sit and wail their woes" (Ill. ii. 155-6; 162; 178). In this same vein, Carlisle later invites 
the conspirators to ponder "who sits here that is not Richard's subject? " before the deposed 
king sarcastically invites Bolingbroke "in Richard's seat to sit" (IV. i. 122; 218). Richard asks 
that his queen "In winter's tedious nights sit by the fire" to tell tales that mourn the 
"deposing of a rightful king" (V. i. 40; 50). And, in what is perhaps the most dramatic image 
of his debasement, the former king compares himself to those who "sitting in the stocks, 
refuge their shame, /That many have and others must sit there" (V. v. 26-7). 
Arguing that "writing is nothing other than the continued demand of meaning for itself, " 
Jean-Luc Nancy offers the succinct observation that "differance is bidding. "' 15 In this dual 
sense of speculation and supplication Richard II may also be said to make repeated demands 
upon itself precisely insofar as any reference to presence gives way to bidding as a 
"repetition and supplication of presence coming. "' 16 In a suitably tautologous statement 
early in the text Gaunt tries to becalm his son by imploring that "Obedience bids I should 
not bid again" (l. i. 163) and is later echoed in Richard's command to the combatants to 
"Throw down we bid" (11.164); the Duchess bids Gaunt that he "bid" York to meet her at 
Plashy (I. ii. 65); Gaunt appeals to Richard that he be permitted to "Bid like a father" 
"' jean-Luc Nancy, "Elliptical Sense" in 
, 
Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. David Wood (Oxford, 1992), 
pp. 36-51, p. 38,39. Moreover, Derrida argues that at the scene of writing 'There will always have 
been something to bet. It gives to be rendered. To be put back/put off, " "Restitutions, " p. 382. 
116 Ibid., p. 42. We may also refer profitably here to Maurice Blanchot's reminder that"the proper 
sense of the Greek word that we translate by "suppliant" is "he who comes. ". The suppliant is thus 
the man who is coming, always on the move because without a place and of whom one must 
therefore ask the most mysterious of questions, that of the origin. " Maurice Blanchot, "Measure, the 
Suppliant, " trans. Susan Hanson in The Infinite Conversation (Minneapolis, 1993), pp. 93-5, p. 94. 
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(I. iii. 238) whereupon Richard requests that Gaunt "bid" farewell to his son (11.252); Richard 
"bids" Bushy to repair to Ely house (II. ii. 13 6); the Queen ponders whether her grief is a 
result of "bidding farewell" to Richard (II. ii. 8); York "bids" his wife to send him a thousand 
pounds (11.91) before characterising his conflicting loyalties between Richard and 
Bolingbroke as a contest in bidding: "Both are my kinsmen: /The one is my sovereign... And 
duty bids defend; th' other again/Is my kinsman ... Whom conscience and my 
kindred bids to 
right" (11.111-15); for Richard news of the rebellion, "Bids me speak of nothing but 
despair ... Oh call back yesterday, bid time return" (IIIJ. 66; 69) and promises to 
hate 
everlastingly anyone who "bids me be of comfort anymore" (11.267-8). 
In a text where the Law is so frequently incarnated around an entire scenography of coming 
and going, of that which is placed before it, such bidding also registers this very gap that 
postpones any return of the identical to itself. "Bidding, " that is, as a species of the 
differa , of that which announces 
"there will have been something to bet.. [which] gives 
itself to be rendered. To be put back/put off.,, 117 It is in this precise sense that Richard 11 
also routinely destines itself only in so far as it enters into a contract with itself, to the 
extent that, somewhat more enigmatically, it might be said to reckon and speculate with 
itself, with its own metastasis. 
"Throwing Up" 
117 Jacques Derrida, "Restitutions, " p. 382. 
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This vacillating movement of coming-and-going, the alternating distance between the high 
and the low, is also echoed in the bizarre choreography of "throwing down and taking up" 
that is such a prominent feature of the play. Indeed, the examples of "throwing" in the text 
do not so much amount to an activity or initiative than as a sort of leitmotif for the equivocal 
syntax, or what we may now call an immanent force of reversion and de-positioning, that 
comes to contaminate the text's signifying structures. Not only is Richard referred to as one 
who has been "quite thrown down" (III. iv. 66), the recently deposed king (who has had 
"dust thrown upon his sacred head" [V. ii. 30]) also departs from Anne with the conceit that 
"Our holy lives must win a new world's crown/Which our profane hours here have thrown 
down" (V. i. 24-5). In fact Richard himself, playing characteristically with the negating 
power of speech, at one point invites his enemies to "throw away respect, /Tradition, form, 
and ceremonious duty" (III. ii. 172). ' 18 How are we to account for this strange though no 
less urgent preoccupation of the text? 
According to Derrida every accession to presence depends upon a "throw" that, 
paradoxically, not only exceeds the very bounds of figurality, but also the alternatives of 
activity or passivity, of presence and absence. In this respect, the very surfeit of examples 
of throwing and being thrown in Richard ll would appear particularly apposite for a text that 
so consistently speculates on the basis of a strange return (revenanc ), on the departure of 
that which owes itself to return (fort: da . Crucially, for Derrida there is no writing that 
does not suppose such a disserninal "throw, " the Da of Dasein as something that is thrown. 
Thrown, that is, before all the modes of throwing that will later determine it: 
"I Other examples include the Duchess of Gloucester's hope that Mowbray's horse will "throw the 
rider headlong in the lists" (I. H. 52) or Richard's criticism of Bolingbroke for the "reverence he did throw 
away on slaves" (Liv. 27). 
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project, subject, object, abject, trajectory [ ... ] There is a being-thrown of Dasein 
even 'before' the appearance a1212ear - in other words, 'before' the advent for 
it there - of any thought amounting to an operation ... And that being-thrown is 
not a throw in space, in what is already a spatial element. The original 
spatiality of Dasein depends on the throw. 119 
The disserninal and disjunctive da of both the fort: da and Da-sein then, inscribes a 
movement or "throw" whose destination is entangled (engage ) in a recursive trajectory that 
both posits and deposits simultaneously. 
It would have to do, once again it seems, with the nature of that toward which, in the step 
back, one must retrocede. Most explicitly so in the scenes of royal appeal, Richard 11 
persistently draws attention to this dual movement of "throwing" and "engaging"- a throw 
that engages, and an engagement that finds its condition of possibility in a moment of 
dispersal. 120 In the quarrel between Aumerle and Fitzwaters, for example, Aumerle throws 
down "my gage" while Bolingbroke commands that Bagot "shalt not take it up" (IV. i. 25; 
30). Undeterred, Fitzwaters then offers "my gage, Aumerle, in gage to thine, " prompting 
Percy to "throw my gage" (11.33; 46), whereupon two bystanders also become entangled in 
the dispute, twice urging Aurnerle to "ingage it to the trial if thou darest" (11.56; 71). 
This movement of the fort: da - of throwing-down-and-taking-up, of engaging and dis- 
engaging - is no less difficult to follow in the text's initial dispute between Bolingbroke and 
Mowbray. Having "thrown my gage" (I. i. 69), Gaunt appeals to Bolingbroke to "throw 
"I Jacques Derrida, "Geschlect: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference" in A Derrida Reader: 
Between The Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf (New York, 1991), pp. 380-402, p. 396. 
120 For some particularly apposite comments by Derrida on this question of the "gage" and 
"engagement" see "Signsponge" in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge pp. 347-9 and Archive 
Fever: A Freudian Impression, tans. Eric Prenowitz (London, 1996), pp. 15-19. 
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down" and that Mowbray "throw down his" who subsequently "throws" it at Richard's 
feet (11.161-2; 165). It is, however, in Richard's request that Bolingbroke "throw up [his] 
gage" (I. i.. 186) that we encounter a more problematic spatial torsion, one that moves the 
Arden editor of the play to speculate that ... throw up' might mean 'relinquish, ' and might 
,, 121 indicate that this new connotation for 'throw up' was current before 1678. 
While perhaps compounding further the risk of anachronism, a more contemporary if 
unsavoury gloss on this phrase invites consideration of how a certain "throwing up" or 
failed interiorization remains the immanent necessity of every accession to presence. 
According to Derrida differance pulsates around the figure of that which "never letting itself 
be swallowed must therefore cause itself to be vomitted" (author's emphasis). 122 Indeed, 
is not the entire confrontation between Bolingbroke and Mowbray variously negotiated 
around this threat? Bolingbroke's charge that "with a foul traitor's name stuff I thy throat" 
(I. i. 44), is just as swiftly countered by Mowbray's confession that, were it not for the 
presence of Richard, he "would post until it had retum'd/These terms of treason doubled 
down his throat" (11.55-7). Even at the close of the scene a recalcitrant Bolingbroke claims 
that "my teeth shall tear/ The slavish motive of recanting fear) And spit it bleeding in his 
high disgrace" (11.192-4). In other words, we could say that the text's paralyzing syntax of 
throwing down and taking up cannot avoid confronting the necessity of a certain "throwing 
"I Richard 11, ed. Peter Ure , p. 1 5 n. 1 86. 
"I Jacques Derrida, "Economimesis, " trans. Richard Klein , Diacritics, (1981)11,2, pp. 3-25, p. 21. 
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up": that which encodes, perhaps most succinctly, how the text's ambivalent spacing (de) 
posits exteriority as something that is never completely outside. 123 
Give and Take 
The step (12as) has to bear an essential equivocation within itself-, a kind of transcendental 
disequilibrium that, precisely insofar as it escapes the surveillance of dialectics and 
ontological decidability, also gives rise to the possibility of every destination and to 
"positionality" in general. It is in this respect that we may wish to consider, as several 
commentators have pointed out, the unusually large number of negative or privative terms in 
the text: of that which is "given" in the very gesture of being taken back. Gaunt wishes to 
6'undeaf ' the ear of Richard (IIJ. 16); Bolingbroke accuses Bushy and Green of causing 
Richard's marriage to be "unhappied" (III. i. 10); Scroope counsels Richard to "uncurse" the 
souls of defectors (III. ii. 137); Richard is referred to as one who has been "unking'd" 
(IV. i. 220) and whose vows are "unbroke" (11.215) and Richard wishes to "unkiss" the oath 
that he made with Northumberland. Indeed, John Jones has drawn explicit attention to the 
infelicitous use of the word "not" in the text. Drawing attention to the clumsy grammatical 
constructions in the text, Jones (in a metaphor of debasement that should not go 
unremarked) contends that they "drive [Shakespeare's] syntax into the mud of awkward 
and ugly negative constructions. " 124 
123 While these issues will be developed further in the next chapter, a superlative analysis of this 
aspect of Derrida's thinking is provided by Mark Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction: 
Derrida's Haunt (London, 1995), pp. 123-49. 
124 John Jones, Shakespeare At Work (Oxford, 1999), p. 40. 
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Indeed, throughout the text there is a surfeit of figures which bear upon the strange syntax 
involved here as one that inscribes a grasping movement of denegation. Most emphatically 
in the text's numerous references to "plucking" "seizing" and "gripping"125 the power of 
detachment that is at issue here, like the exemplary moment of the fort da, do not have at 
their disposal the unified space of a figure: they inscribe a movement that is not, strictly 
speaking, detachable from their very detaching operation. This enigma is perhaps most 
powerfully condensed in Richard's ironic invitation to Bolingbroke: "Here, cousin, seize the 
crown" (IV. i. 181) where, as Harry Berger Jr. points out, "Richard ... offers a gift and then 
immediately retracts it.. " 126 Does not this essential ambivalence illuminate how the text is 
itself similarly impelled toward a destination whose possibility inheres in this secret 
obligation of a retraction or detour that is implied by the step? That is, the enigmatic 
spacing of that which gives and takes in the same gesture, positing and depositing itself in 
terms of what we have been discussing as the immobile emplacement of the 12as? As Derrida 
argues, "the very idea of the retreat (proper to destination), the idea of the halt, and the idea 
of the epoch in which Being holds itself back, suspends, withdraws, etc., all these ideas are 
immediately homogenous with postal discourse. "127 Crucially, it is in the deposition scene 
proper that Richard's rhetorical strategy implicitly turns upon a meditation on the logic of 
the gift: 
125 Not entirely coincidentally, Richard 11 contains more references to the idea of plucking than any 
other Shakespearean play. See for example Liii. 21 1; 11.228; 111205; 11-iii. 121; Il. iii. 167; Ill. ii. 10; lll. ii. 45; 
Ill. iv. 52; V. i. 65; V. ii. 92; V. iii. 17. York counsels Richard against the temptation to "seize and gripe into 
your hands" the property of Bolingbroke (11.1.189); abandoning the the principle of "fair seqence and 
succession, " York reminds the King that he would "wrongfully seize Hereford's rights" (11.201); later 
in the play Richard also reminds Bolingbroke of the damnable offence of trying to "gripe the sacred 
handle of our sceptre" (Ill. iii. 80). 
126 Harry Berger Jr., "Richard U: An Exercise in Imaginary Audition, " English Litera[y Histo[y, 55,4 
(1988), pp. 755-797, p. 759. 
127 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 65. 
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Bol: Part of your cares you give me with your crown. 
Rich: Your cares set up do not pluck my cares down. 
My care is loss of care, by old care done; 
Your care is gain of care, by new care won. 
The cares I give, I have, though given away, 
They 'tend the crown, yet still with me they stay. 
Bol: Are you contented to resign the crown? 
Rich: Ay, no; no, ay; for I must nothing be. 
Therefore no "no", for I resign to thee. 
(IV. i. 194-202) 
What we find in this vertiginous circuit of negation is not so much an oppositional logic of 
presence and absence as an exigency of profit and loss, proximity and distance that 
confounds the very logic of positio as such. De-position here is inextricably tied to a 
problematic of giving and taking precisely insofar as language carries within itself (counting 
and discounting) the process of its own erasure and annulation, while at the same time 
marking what "remains" of this erasure: 
I give this heavy weight from off my head, 
And this unwieldy sceptre from my hand, 
The pride of kingly sway from out my heart, 
With mine own tears I wash away my balm, 
With mine own hands I give away my crown, 
With mine own tongue deny my sacred state, 
With mine own breath release all duteous oaths; 
What more remains? 
(IV. i. 204-10; 222) 
As Jonathan Goldberg has argued, the entire speech is so characterised by an immanent 
textual duplicity that the word "resign" is used as though it "meant both to give away and to 
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write again. " 128 More particularly it is possible to discern in Richard's speech, both 
rhetorically and idiomatically, an expression of how 
giving-taking in general a priori folds back on language and writing as giving- 
taking. Giving would come back, come down to taking and taking to giving, 
but this would also come back to fold itself over not only a language or 
writing but toward the text in general. 129 
Bearing in mind Derrida's frequent assertions that the question of the gift is "indissociable 
[from the] motifs of speculation and destination, " 130 Richard's speech also appears to be 
impelled by a displacement that is not, curiously, assignable to the simplicity of a place. 
Still less can we say that Richard's determination to "resign" takes place in writing: rather, 
"this dislocation (is what) writes/is written. " 131 
If, for Derrida, the opposition of to giv and to take, of to posses and to be possessed is 
nothing more than a kind of transcendental snare that is an effect of writing, the much 
remarked upon solar metaphors 132 in the text have a more immediate bearing on this enigma. 
As both Derrida and Bataille argue, the sun is, preeminently, that which both gives and takes 
in the same gesture: the aneconomic, self-consuming figure par excellence, the sun 
constitutively eats away at the scene of its own inheritance : "The very opposition of 
128 Jonathan Goldberg, "Rebel Letters, " p. 5. 
129 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London, 1994), p. 81. 
130 Ibid., x. 
131 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, p. 134. 
132 We should remain vigilant about this strain of imagery in the play which, receiving its first 
sustained commentary by Oscar Wilde, has long been the focus of critical discussion. See Peter 
Ure's introduction to the Arden edition of the play, pp. lxxi-ii. According to Derrida, however, the sun, 
strictly speaking, is not so much a "metaphor"as that which announces a certain plus de metaphore 
that which betokens simultaneously "more metaphor" and "no more metaphor. " 
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appearing and disappearing, the entire lexicon of the 12hainesthai, of aletheia, etc., of day and 
night, of the visible and the invisible, of giving and taking, of the present and the absent - all 
this is possible only under the sun. "133 Richard's well-known epithet as the "Sun King" is 
strangely appropriate then for a character who demonstrates considerable expertise at this 
level of hyper-phenomenology, as one who will "undo myself. " 
Moreoever, it is precisely this constitutive tension between identity and obliteration, this 
paradox of something that is "disfigur'd clean" (III. i. 8), which also announces the "general 
economy"134 of writing as a (non)place where production stands in necessary relation to the 
energy of its erasure. Indeed, Richard's exhortation to "mark me how I will undo myself' 
(IV. i. 203) demonstrates how every erasure is contingent upon the expedient of a "mark" in 
this Derridean sense: an exigent that, paradoxically, must insinuate itself minimally in-the- 
place-of an absence in order to make it legible. That is, the very assumption of identity 
occupies a necessary relation to the ignominy of being "Mark'd with a blot" (IV. i. 236) 
precisely insofar as every identity constitutively inheres in this accession to the period of its 
own erasure. 
"I Jaccques Derrida, 'White Mythology" in Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass trans., (Sussex, 1982), 
pp. 207-71, p. 251. For a now classic "dialogue" between Derrida and Bataille on the question of 
expenditure, see Jacques Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without 
Reserve" in Alan Bass trans., Writing and Difference (London, 1978), pp. 251-77. I am similarly 
concerned to analyse those ways in which Richard 11 might be said to conform to a "general economy" 
insofar as it so consistently takes into account the non-reserve, of how, if we can say such a thing, the 
text somehow keeps in reserve the non-reserve. 
134 For a now classic discussion of these issues see Jacques Derrida, WrWng and Difference, trans. 
Alan Bass (London, 1978), pp. 251-278. 
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Ultimately, these speculations should alert us to the crucial significance of the so-called 
"deposition scene" in a way that has hitherto largely been ignored in criticism of the play. 135 
While, classically, the term "position" announces a form of constitution whereby something 
comes to be what it is through its relation to something other, according to Rodolphe Gasche 
deconstruction (and Richard 11 it seems) announces "a (non) relation to an alterity that is 
itself the ground of possibility of positing itself. " 136 Supplementing Marjorie Garber's 
insight that Richard finds himself in the bizarre predicament of "deposing at his own 
deposition, " 137 we could say that the text also repeatedly imposes the necessity of de- 
position as something that both gives rise to and is caught, irreducibly, in the paradoxes of 
the "postal principle. " This is also the concern of Paul de Man who asks "How a positional 
act, which relates to nothing that comes before or after, becomes inscribed in a sequential 
135 We might refer here, for example, to a recent article by Barbara Hodgdon. While commenting 
ostensibly on the dis-position of identity as it is performed in the deposition scene, Hodgdon 
simultaneously intuits and then fails adequately to address the very rhetoric of positionality that the 
scene in fact foregrounds: "[Richard's] self-dispossesion primarily is in relation to Bolinbroke's still, 
silent figure -a sign of power around which Richard stages a series of posturings or positionalities 
[ ... ]the motive for 
interiority is most at risk [ ... ] when the subject position of the king has been, or is 
being, both un-personed and re-personed. " (emphasis added). Barbara Hogdon, "Early Modern 
Subjects, Shakespearean Performances, and (Post)Modern Spectators, " Critical Survey, 9,3 
(1997), pp. 1-11, pA 
136 Rodolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (London, 
1986), p. 158. For Derrida, crucially, 'position' is not simply something addressed by discourse but is 
a dissimulation produced ýy discourse. To rethink position is therefore to rethink discourse: "Asyou 
know, deconstruction means, among other things, the questioning of what synthesis is, what thesis 
is, what a position is, what composition is, not only in terms of rhetoric, but what position what 
positing means. Deconstruction questions the Lhe_$_Iia, the theme, the positionality of everything 
[ ... ], " Jacques Derrida, 
"Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: A Conversation, " Journal o 
Advanced Composition, 19 (1990) pp. 1 -21, p. 8. "The very idea of a thetic presentation, of Setzung 
or Stellung .... was one of the essential parts of the system that [is] under deconstructive 
questioning. " Jacques Derrida, "The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations, " trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, 
in Philosophy in France Today, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 34-50, p. 42. One last 
example should suffice: "[ ... ] the deconstructive jetty in itself is no more propositional than 
l2ositional; it deconstructs precisely the thesis, both as philosophical thesis and as theme. " Jacques 
Derrida, "Some Statements and Truisms about Neo-logisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and 
Other Small Seismisms'[aMi trans. Anne Tomiche in The States of 'Theory': Histo[y. Art and Critical 
Discourse, ed. David Carroll (New York, 1990), pp. 63-94, p. 86. 
137 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare's Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causality (London, 1986), 
P. 8. 
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narrative? " 138 For Derrida every attempt to adduce history as a synonym of sequentiality 
inevitably provokes this "question of the position, the question of positionality in general, 
of Positional (oppositional or juxtapositional) logic. " 139 These repetitive erasures, by 
means of which Richard 11 performs the erasure of its own position , is precisely what is 
referred to by Paul de Man as "disfiguration. "140 In the concluding section I wish to pursue 
these associations in the text a little further, especially in the light of de Man's claim that the 
very "positing" power of language is inseparable from the way that it "irrevocably loses the 
contour of its own face or shape. " 141 In this respect, we will consider how the text's 
alternating polarities of the high and the low come to organize the movement of quite an 
other category of the "fall" - that of the fall into writing itself. 
"Disfigur'd Clean" 
Richard's determination to locate a glass "where all my sins are writ" (IV. i. 275) culminates 
in a rhetorical set piece that locates the mirror less as a medium of self-reflection than the 
very figure of prosopopeia. What Richard in fact sees can no longer be named "present" 
except through indirect discourse, in the implied quotation marks of a citation: 
"I Paul de Man, "Shelley Disfigured" in The Rhetoric of RomanticisM (New York, 1984), pp. 93-123, 
p. 1 17. 
139 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 259. 
" De Man's concern here appears particularly apposite in the light of our discussion of Richard 11 
insofar as he addresses the paradox where "The positing power of language is both entirely arbitrary, 
in having a strength that cannot be reduced to necessity, and entirely inexorable in that there is no 
alternative to it. " Paul de Man -Qp. cit., p. 
1 16. 
141 lb'ld., p. 119. 
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[ ... ]Was this face the face 
that every day under his household roof 
Did keep ten thousand men? Was this the face 
That like the sun did make beholders wink? 
Is this the face which fac'd so many follies, 
That was at last out-fac'd by Bolingbroke? 
(IV. i. 281-86) 
Insofar as prosopopeia involves the fiction of an apostrophe to a voiceless entity that 
66posits the possibility of the latter's reply and confers upon it the power of speech, " 142 
Richard's speech also bears out de Man's definition of prosopopeia as that which "deals 
with the giving and taking away of faces, with face and deface, fmure, figuration and 
disfiguration. " 143 Inviting Bolingbroke to "Mark ... How soon my sorrow 
hath destroy'd my 
face" (11.290-91), the face here becomes not so much the locus of presence as something that 
(re)marks the site of "a double face, an overwritten erasure. " 144 In other words, Richard 
discloses how the reflective interplay of apparently identical images is based on an inevitable 
disunity that already defines the first image: what is reflected is split in itself and not only 
as an addition to itself of its image. Richard's double, as it were, splits what it doubles so 
that, according to Derrida, the very "origin of speculation becomes a difference. " 145 
Conflating the king's glorious face and its effacement, sovereignty and its negation, the 
142 Paul De Man, "Autobiography As De-Facement, " in The Rhetoric Of Romanticism (New York, 
1984) pp. 67-83, p. 76. We may also wish to bear in mind here Gregory Ulmer's reminder that 'Ihe 
apostrophe .... is the mark of possession in English, representing thus the gap that both requires and 
makes possible self-reflection, the gap of the postal relay. " Gregory L. Ulmer, Applied Grammatology*. 
Post(e)-Pedaaogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys (London, 1992), p. 1 30. Arguing how the 
etymological root of prosopopeia derives from that which seeks to "gives a face, " Paul de Man 
describes the "function" of the face "as the relentless undoer of its own claims; " that is, as something 
that cannot be reconciled with "the meaning of the face, with its promise of sense and of filial 
preservation. " Paul de Man -Qp-. &-it., p. 
92. 
143 lbid, p. 76. 
144 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, p. 13. 
145 Jacques Derrida, Of GrammatoLoW, p. 36. 
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radically indeterminate glass reflects back from the outset nothing more than Richard's 
marking of it. 
Richard I 's frequent references to the face, 146 as that which might act as a scene of presence, 
are particularly ironic in a text whose own disseminating 12as de contact threatens to 
eliminate the availability of any surface that could act as a site of filial preservation. Indeed, 
despite its frequent references to the breath as a diaphanous medium of presence, the 
question of authority in Richard Il increasingly comes to invoke the earth as the element 
which most competently retains the mark of inscription. Following Derrida we could say 
that, in this precise sense, it is the earth that the text comes to privilege as the elemental 
condition of history itself : "heavy, serious, solid earth. The earth that is worked upon, 
scratched, written upon. The ... universal element in which meaning is engraved so that it will 
last. ""' Time and again in Richard II it is the earth that implicitly becomes a scene of both 
inscription and violence, of force and signification. Bolingbroke, for example, warns that if 
his lands are not restored he will 
146 Richard calls Mowbray and Bolingbroke "face to face" (I. i. 14); Mowbray bids that Richard "turn 
away his face" (11.111) while Bolingbroke accuses that "shame doth harbour, even in Mowbray's face" 
(11.195); Richard instructs the appellants to "never look upon each others face" (I. iii. 185); Aumerle 
relates that on his parting from Bolingbroke the wind "blew bitterly against our faces" (I. iv. 7); York 
remarks on his reluctance to "bend one wrinkle on my sovereign's face" (11.1.170); Richardpredicts 
that Bolingbroke's "treasons will sit blushing in his face" (Ill. ii. 51) and is fearful of the prospect of how 
"the blood of twenty thousand men/Did triumph in my face" (11.76-7); Richard counsels 
Northumberland that "Ten thousand bloody crowns of mother's sons/Shall ill become the flower of 
England's face" (Ill. iii. 96-7); Bagot demands that Aumerle be "set before my face" (IV. 1.6); Richard 
asks for a mirror so that "it may show me what face I have" (11.266); York describes Richard's deposition 
as a 'lace still combating with tears and smiles" (V. 1i. 32); York demands of his son whether in his visit 
to the king he will "speak treason to thy face? " (V. iii. 44) whereupon the Duchess implores 
Bolingbroke to "Look upon his face" (11.98); Richard's groom confesses joy "To look upon my 
sometime royal master's face" (V. v. 75). 
147 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London, 1979), p. 9, n. 23. 
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use the advantage of my power 
And lay the summer's dust with showers of blood 
Rain'd from the wounds of slaughtered Englishmen - 
... such crimson tempest should bedrench The fresh green lap of fair King Richard's land 
(Ill. iii. 42-4; 46-7) 
It is, however, in Scroope's reassurance to Richard that his enemies will soon "lie full low, 
grav'd in the hollow ground" (Ill. ii. 140) that the play most explicitly opens onto the scene 
of writing itself. Bearing in mind that the term "grav'd" is not to be found elsewhere in 
Shakespeare, Derrida's description of the earth is also notable for this kind of linguistic 
over-determination. For Derrida, the heaviness of the earth is associated with the word 
"grave" which, apart from its abstract and moral sense, also retains the older resonance of 
something that is "weighty" and "heavy. " 148 Indeed, what we find here is a slippage 
between "grave" and the verb "graver" which (as Derrida argues) depicts the action of 
inscription upon the earth. The grave "en-graves" precisely insofar as both terms 
communicate a weighty earthward movement of force that Derrida makes synonymous with 
the scene of writing. These associations are perhaps made most explicit in Richard's 
148 The Duchess of Gloucester characterises her grief as that which is "Not with empty hollowness, 
but weight" (I. H. 59); the gardener observes how the apricocks "Stoop with oppression of their 
prodigal weight" (IlLiv. 31); removing his crown, Richard invites Bolingbroke to observe how I give 
this heavy weight from off my head" (IV. i. 204). Even more ubiquitous, however, are the references 
to heaviness throughout the text. The Duchess of York hopes that "Be Mowbray's sins so heavy in 
his bosom/That they may break his foaming courser's back" (I. H. 50-1); Mowbray laments Richard's 
"heavy sentence" (I. H. 154); the queen admits to feeling "heavy sad" (I Lii. 30) which "Makes me with 
heavy nothing faint and shrinW' (11.32); Salisbury reflects on Richard's fortunes "with the eyes of 
heavy mind" (ll. iv. 1 8); Richard fantasizes that "heavy-gaited toads" (III. H. 1 5) will obstruct the path of 
his enemies; reporting Richard's dwindling military fortunes, Scroope remarks that it is with a "dull and 
heavy eye/My tongue hath but a heavier tale to say" (11.196-7); York laments the "heavy day" (Ill. iii. 8) 
of Richard's fall from grace; the queen inquires of her ladies how she can "drive away the heavy 
thought of care" (Ill. iv. 2); disputing Aumerle's charges of treason, Surrey responds "That lie shall lie 
so heavy on my sword" (IV. 1.66); Richard bemoans the "heavy day" (11.257) of his deposition; Richard 
recommends the "heavy accent of thy moving tongue" (W. 47) in the queen's accounts of his 
deposition; Richard describes his departure from Anne as an effort to "piece the way out with a 
heavy heart" (W. 92). 
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determination to "talk of graves .... Make dust our paper, and with rainy eyes/Write sorrow 
on the bosom of the earth" (III. ii. 145-7). The closing pages of Derrida's essay on "Force 
and Signification" also rest precisely upon these associations between the homonymous 
"grave-grave(r)" and the conceptual relations (gravity, heaviness, descent, inscription) which 
derive from such verbal play. The grave is the true destination of every inscription: it is 
gravity (gLav tas, weight) that occasions the fall to earth (inscription). As the more L 
commonplace understanding of the term implies, the grave is a site both of mourning and 
memorization the grave as something that maintains the scene of Presence as the simulation 
of life's preserved inscription. Indeed, this is precisely the focus of Mowbray's fear of 
disgrace at the hands of Bolingbroke: 
Myself I throw, dread sovereign, at thy foot; 
My life thou shalt command, but not my shame: 
The one my duty owes, but my fair name, 
Despite of death, that lives upon my grave, 
To dark dishonour's use thou shalt not have. 
(I. i. 165-9) 
It is, quite literally, only through the agent of the "fall" that history is begun. Responding to 
the enquiry of whether the king has in fact been deposed, the Gardener muses that 
"Depress'd he is already, and depos'd/'Tis doubt he will be" (III. iv. 68-9). The notion that 
the king is "depress'd" here condenses the image of both that which is brought down by 
force, Bolingbroke literally "weighs King Richard down" (11.89), and also that which becomes 
suggestive of a dynamic relief of force. The Gardener's remark, then, plays upon the dual 
sense of "deposition" as that which "falls" and also that which testifies to or bears witness 
to the "mark" of this fall. In other words, it is possible to detect here how the moment of 
the "fall" entertains a certain proximity to the scene of writing as that which condenses 
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simultaneously the "incidence and insistence of inscription. " 149 Resolved, for example, to 
exchanging "my large kingdom for a little grave, " Richard also requests that it be "a little 
little grave, an obscure grave" (Ill. iii. 153-4). In short, what the grave amounts to here is, 
quite literally, a trace that simultaneously registers and threatens to annul even the most 
impoverished mark of authority. Indeed, Richard's use of "rainy eyes" as the agent of 
inscription implicitly relates depth and dynamic relief to the pressure of liquidity force as a 
flow. More particularly it is the force of tears that accompanies this fall into writing. 
VvIere the Queen did "fall a tear" the Gardener plants a bank of rue "In the remembrance of a 
weeping queen" (III. iv. 104; 107) and Richard muses whether he will "play the wanton with 
our woes, " 
And make some pretty match with shedding tears? 
As thus to drop them still upon one place, 
Till they have fretted us a pair of graves 
Within the earth, and therein laid - there lies 
Two kinsmen digg'd their graves with weeping eyes! 
(Ill. iii. 164-9) 
Mark and loss, memory and erasure: a scene of inscription and divisibility where "one 
place" becomes a "pair of graves. " Water both here and elsewhere in the text articulates 
rhythmically what is in fact a dis-articulation. It is, pre-eminently, this enigmatic pulsion 
that Richard 11 encodes most memorably as the paradoxical moment of that which is 
149 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 30. See also Maurice Blanchot who argues that 
"Everything must fall, and everything that falls must drag into the fall, by indefinite expansion, all that 
means to remain. " 'The Fall: Flight, " trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg in Friendship ed. Werner 
Hamacher and David E. Wellerby (California, 1997), pp. 201-8, p. 208. 
We might also recall profitably here a curious metaphor employed by the Duchess of York in her early 
exchange with Gaunt. Comparing her words to the gravitational force of a ball, for the Duchess 
meaning literally gains its impact through the weighty descent of force that renders possible "yet one 
word more - grief boundeth where it falls, /Not with empty hollowness, but weight" (I. ii. 58-9). 
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"disfigured clean". "0 This seemingly implausible collusion between water and marking, of a 
force of inscription that is rendered possible only at the site of its threatened erasure, is 
perhaps appropriate to a text that routinely discloses how signification is constitutively 
indebted to this step (12as), this "double force of repetition and erasure, of legibility and 
illegibility. "' 51 
While Bolingbroke seeks revenge on those who have "Rae'd out my imprese" (III. i. 25), 
according to Derrida a mark that resists erasure is not a mark. Indeed, from Bolingbroke's 
early conceit that "the more fair and crystal is the sky, /Tbe uglier seem the clouds that in it 
fly" (I. i. 41-2), Richard II increasingly comes to dwell upon numerous (non)figures of 
blotting, staining and spotting: Mowbray extols the virtues of a "spotless reputation" 
(11.178); Bolingbroke bemoans the "stain'd beauty of a fair queen's cheeks" (IIIJ. 14); 
Richard condemns the "spotted souls" of his adversaries (III. ii. 134); Yorkrespondsto 
Bolingbroke's threat that he will "stain the track" of Richard's glory with the plea that no 
harm "should stain so fair a show! " (III. iii. 66; 71); Aumerle is indignant at the prospect of 
"mine honour soil'd" and having to "stain the temper of my knightly sword" (IV. i. 23; 29). 
Insofar as we have been concerned to discuss the movement of "reversion" in Richard 11 with 
reference to the analytic of the fort: da as that which is charged with this double movement, 
the text's overarching dispute of property rights inevitably comes into contact with a certain 
150 Insofar as the text so frequently appears to be shaped by the undoing of shapes, Paul de Man 
also makes the point that this is the immanent necessity of all signification: 
'Water, which has no shape of itself, is moulded into shape by its contact with the earth, [... ] it 
generates the very possibility of structure, pattern, form or shape by way of the disappearance of 
shape into shapelesness. " Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism, p. 107. 
151 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 226. 
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axiornatics of the "proper" as that which, according to Derrida, "is itself founded on the 
value of properness or propea, and of the appropriation or reappropriation of self. It is 
the making proper (clean) of the proper itself propriation de propre meme), in as much as 
,, 152 the proper is opposed to the heterogeneity of the im-proper... That is to say, for 
Derrida the question of the proper is always implicated with the related questions of self- 
proximity and of self-possession. In French the propre is not merely proper but also clean, 
and for Derrida there exists a strange kinship between prol2riete (property, propriety) and 
12rol2rete (cleanliness). 153 Time and again in Richard 11 the relationship between the sign and 
presence is ineluctably tied to the paradoxical function of the signifier as that which is 
simultaneously both an agent of erasure and of cleanliness, that which maintains the scene of 
presence only insofar as it is "mark'd with a blot. " Eluding the very category of the "face- 
to-face" to which it so routinely aspires, the scene of presence in Richard 11 announces, 
rather, the site of an original torsion, a double conjugation of annulment and a (re)turn that 
turns only toward that from which it is obliged to turn away. Following Maurice Blanchot 
we could say that what is at issue here is less "writing" itself than a difference that writes 
through what Blanchot somewhat appositely describes as the clandestine operations of "in- 
version" and "re-version, ": "a turn of the turning, [a] 'version' that is always in the process 
of inverting itself and that in itself bears the back and forth of a divergence a vertigo 
wherein rest the leap and the fall. "' 54 
112 Jacques Derrida, Points..., p. 241. 
153 It is, of course, in Gaunt's playful meditation on his name that the text's anxious preoccupation 
with naming first enters into a play of textual inscription that confounds all standard ideas of a "proper' 
or proprietory name. 
154 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (London, 1993), p. 30. 
ho S T-/i; r, - 1,, r, -!: r, r-, a rr, - P, nG 13 jo of 
148 
If, like its tragic protagonist, the text can never successfully "ravel out/[its] weaved up 
follies" (IV. i. 228-9) it is perhaps because the text itself can arrive at itself, can destine itself 
only at the limit of a strange power of folding that enfolds it and which, ultimately, cannot 
be unfolded. Insofar as critical speculations about the subversive import of Richard 11 
perennially return to the occasion of Queen Elizabeth's exchange with William Lambarde, 
we might end here with Lambarde's particularly resonant description of how this discussion 
of Richard II was in fact initiated. Previously hidden from view at the "back" of a door, the 
Queen then chanced upon this file bearing the name of Richard II in the "Pandecta of all her 
rolls, bundells, membranes and parcells that be reposed in the Tower. "155 In a text that 
evidences such intractable difficulties in constituting a relationship to an exterior that is 
revealed never to be completely "outside, " it is perhaps strangely appropriate here that, at 
the very moment when Richard 11 might be said to open onto the very contexts of its own 
historical possibility, the intangibility of an edge once more becomes a problem. As I argue 
in the next chapter, Hamlet is a text that (perhaps more explicitly) comes to negotiate the 
question of subjectivity around a similar topological paradox, frequently displacing the issue 
of the play's "theatricality" onto the very problem of interiority itself. 
'-"'5 John Nichols (ed) The Progresses and Public-Processions of Queen Elizabeth Volume 3 (New 
York, 1823), pp. 552-53. 
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Chapter Three 
Rewriting The (S)crypt: 
Hamlet's Interiors 
The Purpose of Praying 
"The closet, " Angel Day wrote in 1599, is not only for the "reposement of secrets, " it also 
constitutes "the most secret place in the house. "' In Shakespeare's Hamlet, however, the 
closet also becomes the site at which secrets can be revealed, a place where Claudius can 
finally "confront the visage of offence" (III. iii. 47). Claudius' lengthy ruminations upon his 
fitness for prayer are, in fact, not untypical of a dilemma that was encountered frequently by 
the Reformation subject. For example, in one of the last of his sermons John Donne recalls 
the predicament of Claudius's "stubborn knees" (III. iii.. 70) as merely one of the difficulties 
in maintaining a spiritual regimen: 
I talke on, in the same posture of praying; Eyes lifted up; knees bowed down; as 
though I prayed to God; and if God, or his Angels should ask me when I thought 
last of that prayer, I cannot tell: Sometimes I find that I had forgot what I was 
about, but when I began to forget it, I cannot tell. 2 
1 Angel Day, The English Secreta! )t: Part Two (Gainesville, 1967), p. 103. 
2 Quoted in Horton Davies, Worship and Theology in England: 1603-1690 (Princeton, 
1975), p. 68. 
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Effectively, Donne (like Claudius) rehearses anxieties that are also to be found in the writings 
of Protestant divines who were particularly concerned with those prayers that for some 
reason go amiss: those occasions when words would fly up while thoughts remained below. 
Laurence Chaderton, for example, is especially critical of those who have "outward shewe" 
but are "voide of inward synceritie and true belief. 113 In fact, this rhetoric of surface and 
depth finds its most sustained treatment in Luther who, in "Secular Authority, " makes some 
remarks that have a particular bearing on Claudius's difficulties. Disdainful of those who 
"force people to do more than obey by word and outwarde deed, " for Luther there is little 
point in "trying to force people with weak consciences to lie, to perjure themselves, saying 
one thing while in their hearts they believe another. "4 
Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century debates on "the purpose of praying" are marked by a 
profound ambivalence as to the level of participation that is required by the supplicant. 
Whereas William Hardwicke, Anglican curate of Reigate, was of the opinion that he would 
"never be brought to believe a man seldom uncovering his head, seldomer bending the knee, 
or saucily lolling on his elboWS, 115 John Robinson, on the other hand, was typical of many 
Puritan apologists who were of the conviction that "We pray without any prompt to us, 
because we pray from the heart. 116 Similarly, William Perkins instructs against "babbling a 
few words either in morning or evening, without understanding or affection, 117 while others 
3 Quoted in R. T. Kendell, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford, 1979), p. 45. By 
far the most illuminating study of the intellectual context of Chaderton, s remarks is 
provided by Cynthia Garrett, "The Rhetoric of Supplication: Prayer Theory in 
Seventeenth- Century England, " Renaissance Quarterly (1993), XLVI, 2, pp. 328-357. 
4 Martin Luther, On Secular Authority, ed. Harro Hopfl (Cambridge, 1991), p. 26. 
5 Quoted in Moore p. 606. 
6 Quoted in Horton Davis, Worship and Theology in England: 1603 - 1690 (Princeton, 
1975), p-155. 
7 Ian Brennard (ed) The Works of William Perkins (Appleton, 1975), p. 322. 
Me 014ort 
151 
were to anticipate the arguments of Pascal in disputing the need for the praying subject's 
complete sincerity. As one writer puts it, reverent gestures can beget reverence on the part of 
even the half-attentive: "the affection of the heart antecedent to the doing of these gestures, 
by the doing of them gathers strength. 118 
Protestantism's often contradictory distinctions between an implied interiority and a 
putatively "external" authority were never satisfactorily resolved so that the praying subject 
was, in Claudius's words, irrevocably bound to "this twofold force" (III. iii. 48). To the extent 
that we can discern any "self-fashioning" of the Reformation subject here, it is played out 
precisely in terms of a conflict that involves "submission to an absolute power or authority 
situated at least partially outside the self' and "some effacement or undermining, some loss of 
self. " 9 The penitent, as Claudius's entire speech makes clear, is particularly adept at this 
rhetoric of self-relating disavowal, where "like a man to double business bound/I stand in 
pause where I shall first begin/And both neglect" (III. iii. 41-43). 
What I would now like to suggest is that this conflict, which has only briefly been sketched 
out here, presents a more complex dialectic of self and other, inside and outside, than can be 
accounted for solely in terms of Louis Althusser's influential account of religious ritual. In 
short, Althusser argues that "interpellation" consists in the way that the symbolic machine of 
ideology comes to be "internalised" as a seemingly spontaneous experience of meaning and 
8 Horton gl2L -cit., p. 
207. 
9 Stephen J. Greenblatt, Renaissance Self Fashioning: From More to Shakesgeare 
(London, 1984), p-9. 
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truth. 10 Indeed, we may consider the text's opening exchange as a strangely articulate 
comment on this dynamic: 
Bemardo: Who's there? 
Francisco: Nay, answer me: stand, and unfold yourself. 
Bemardo: Long live the King! 
Francisco: Bamardo? 
Bamardo: He. 
(I. i. 1-5) 
In other words, Hamlet itself begins with an encounter that appears to evoke the terms of 
Althusser's "highly concrete example" of interpellation: 
.. we all have 
friends who, when they knock on our door and we ask, 
through the door, the question 'Who's there?, ' answer (since it's obvious) 
'It's meV And we recognize that'it is him, 'or'her. ' We open the door, 
and 'it's true, it really was she who was there. " I 
What may be discerned in Claudius's predicament, however, is a dynamic where 
internalisation never fully succeeds: i. e. where the subject maintains a kind of ironical 
distance from the very rituals that seek to confer a symbolic mandate. We may refer here to 
Alan Sinfield who has argued that the Refonnation subject was involved in a "contradictory 
production of interiority, " which emerges "not in the accomplishment of domination or 
negation, but in the thwarting of harmony, cogency, common sense" (author's emphasis). 12 
Crucially, for Slavej klek this failure of the subject's complete submission to the Law 
indexes the incursion of the Lacanian real into the field of ideology, and in a way that is 
constitutive of subjectivity tout court. If the notion that the subject can, in a sense, pre-exist 
10 Louis Althusser, Essays on Ideology (London, 1984), p. 45. 
11 lbid, p. 46. 
12 Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident ReadiDg 
(Oxford, 1992), p-174. 
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its modes of subjectivization is a recurring motif in the debates between Protestant divines, it 
Vv 
also crucially informs Z zek's radical reworking of the relationship that obtains between 
*** V subjectivity and ideology. According to Zizek, in every so-called interpellation 
there is always a residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and 
senselessness sticking to it ... this leftover, far from hindering the full 
submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of 
it: it is precisely this non-integrated surplus.. which confers on the law its 
unconditional authority. 13 
Bearing in mind our discussion of Richard III, do we not again encounter here the intrusion 
of enjoymen into the socio-symbolic edifice; a traumatic stain of jouissang which both 
assists and ultimately impedes the subject's complete accession to the public Law? This 
seemingly idealist claim, that the subject maintains an "inner distance" towards the 
apparatuses and rituals in which ideology acquires material existence, finds a particularly 
succinct form of expression in the work of Fulke Greville. With a candour that is quite 
disarming given the politically charged nature of his topic, in his Treatise of Monarch 
Greville relates how it is certainly the monarch's role to have his subjects "kept in awe, " 
even if this strategy is productive of a certain disavowal on the part of a subject who "if not 
the inward, keepes the outward law. " 14 Here it is possible to read the interpellative gesture 
of authority as something that is closely umbilicated with Jacques Lacan's well worn dictum 
that "desire is the desire of the Other, " i. e. where the subject is nothing other than the radical 
perplexity that persists as to the Other's desire, " to what the Other sees (and finds worthy of 
13 Slavoj 4Zilzek, TheSublime Obiect of IdegLQ_qy- (London, 1992), p. 43. In an article 
which, ironically, invokes Hamlet as its initial point of departure, Judith Butler also makes 
reference to Zizek in a thorough review of current debates surrounding the Althusserian 
account of interpellation. Judith Butler, "Conscience Doth Make Subjects Of Us All, " Yale 
French Studies (1995), 88, pp. 6-26. 
14 Fulke Greville, The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and Relialon. ed. G. A. 
Wilkes (Oxford, 1965), p. 1 12. 
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desire) in me. " 15 Effectively, Claudius is confronted by this question (the Lacanian "Che 
vuoi? ") and his speech concludes with a deeply ambivalent confirmation of identity precisely 
to the extent that it cannot be answered: 
What then? What rests? 
Try what repentance can. What can it not? 
Yet what can it, when one cannot repent? 
0 wretched state! 0 bosom black as death! 
0 limed soul. that struggling to be free 
Art more engqgýd! 
(Ill. iii.. 64-69) 
The conflict that is at stake here is not so much concerned with conscience, than the slightly 
more menacing agency of the Lacanian superego as a senseless bearer of enjoyment. Insofar 
as Claudius "submits" to the law, it is articulated in terms of a constitutive self-hindrance, as 
a contradictory production of interiority insofar as subjectivity is irreducible to the materiality 
of the prayer ritual. 
That there is "something in the subject more than himself' is, of course, redolent of that 
unspecularizabIc "thing" which Hamlet alludes to famously as "that within which passes 
show" (I. ii. 85). Here too Hamlet refuses to internalise the symbolic determinations of 
"forms, moods, shapes of grief' in an affirmation of identity that cannot be accounted for 
solely in terms of what he is for others, in those "actions that a man might play"(I. ii. 84). 
While this remark has often been singled out as evidence of the text's inveterate 
"theatricality, " it is also in keeping with the text's no less frequent preoccupation with those 
things that escape capture in the intersubjective economy of self and other. Indeed, as in 
15 Slavoj Zizek, Metastasis and Enioyment: Six Essays on-Woman and Causality 
(London, 1994), p-60. 
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many ways the psychoanalytical archetype of the moumer who enfolds the lost object, 
Hamlet also offers here a strangely eloquent gloss on the structural paradox of Lacan's 
object a as an inclusion within the subject of the negation of what he is not or - to borrow 
Jacques-Alain Miller's formulation - an extimate16 relation of that within "Hamlet" which is 
not "Hamlet. " 
If, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues, the closet mediates "the relations of the known and the 
unknown, the explicit and the inexplicit, "17 My concern in this chapter is to suggest that the 
topological paradox of the closet is no less implicated with another secret treasure, a surplus 
kernel of being which Lacan makes homologous to the object a. Indeed, the critical history 
of -Hamlet, which 
has variously, if not always explicitly, been concerned with the text's 
ability to enclose or exclude, often turns upon this more convoluted relation between the 
visible and invisible, with the text's strategies of concealment. We need look no further here 
than the comments of A. C. Bradley who is particularly indignant toward those critics (among 
them Coleridge) who disputed the greatness of the play. Bradley's characteristically 
imperious objection is concise: "Seeing, they saw not. " 18 Not perhaps coincidentally we 
find another imputation of blindness in the remarks of one of the play's detractors. 
Famously, T. S. Eliot diagnoses Hamlet's problem as a certain opacity that haunts the text's 
efforts of representation: "Hamlet ... is full of some stuff that the writer could not drag to 
light. "19 For those who are familiar with Lacan, of course, it is impossible not to detect an 
16 Jacques-Alain Miller, in his unpublished seminar on "Extimite" (1985-1986), develops 
the term extimitie, which appears only a few times in Lacan, into a central theoretical 
concept. 
17 Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick, Epistemology of The Closet (London, 1991), p. 3. 
18 A. C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy (London, 1967), p. 91. 
19 T. S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood (London, 1974), p. 107. 
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echo of that other "stuff' which Lacan associates with the sublime object, the non 
specularizable substance of the object a. 20 
In short, Eliofs comments here, which locate the text's problems in some curiously 
unspecified agency that is caught between shadow and substance - of that which is in the text 
but which passes show - in a sense unwittingly colludes with the disjunctive relation between 
the eye and the gaze that is so often the theatrical focus of the text itself. time and again what 
Hamle shows is an unwillingness to show. Claudius and Polonius' recondite 
observation of Hamlet and Ophelia, Hamlet's bungled encounter with Claudius at prayer or 
Polonius' untimely demise behind the arras are only a few of the sites from which Hamlet 
regularly solicits the gaze of its audience. Confessionals, makeshift stages, bedchambers, 
veiled recesses, battlements and even gravesides cumulatively come to provide the 
topographical structure of the text. 
According to Sedgewick, secrecy, spectacle, truth, interiority, self-knowledge, space, and 
privacy are just some of the categories that are mobilised through a discussion of the closet's 
versatile, and deeply contradictory, epistemology. The remainder of this chapter offers a 
reading of -Hamlet 
that is concerned to pursue the often sinuous trajectory of these relations in 
an analysis of how the text variously seeks to negotiate the problems of authority and 
20 Famously, Lacan defines the object sl as that which has "no specular image, or, in 
other words, alterity. It is what enables it to be the 'stuff', or rather the lining, though not 
on any sense the reverse, of the very subject that one takes to be the subject of 
consciousness [ .... ]A substance caught in the net of the shadow, and which, robbed of its shadow swelling volume, holds out once again the tired lure of the shadow as if it were 
substance. " Jacques Lacan, "Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire" in EzLitL 
A Selection , ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977), pp. 292- 
326, p. 315-16. 
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interiority. 21 Drawing once again upon the work of Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida, I am 
concerned to suggest how the text engages with the question of epistemology at irresistible 
points of rupture that give rise to a much more problematical kind of savoir: the unconscious. 
22 In a way that is perhaps no more effectively illustrated than in the example provided by 
"The Murder of Gonzago, " Hamlet's interiors yield only to a cryptic accessibility. If they 
elude capture by the gaze, it is precisely because vision itself is routinely implicated in the 
catachrestic spacing of the signifier, where the space of every interior can only ever be 
contradictory. 
Inside/Out 
By the beginning of the seventeenth-century what came to be called the "closet prayer" was a 
formally recognized mode of worship for the Reformation subject. In an account of the 
arduous efforts employed by the then Lord Harrington to meet the demands of this 
discipline, one contemporary observer writes how 
after prayers Lord Harrington withdrew himself, and there in a book which 
he kept for the account of his life he set down what he had done all that day; 
how he had either offended or done good, and how he was tempted and 
withstood them, and according to his account he humbled himself. 23 
21 Without wishing to diminish the specificity of Sedgwick's very sophisticated arguments 
about the construction of sexual identity, I will take as axiomatic her assertion that "The 
epistemology of the closet has also been, however, on a far vaster scale and with a less 
honorific inflection, inexhaustibly productive. " Sedgewick, p. 68. 
22 in Lacanian psychoanalysis sayDý can be roughly translated as symbolic knowledge 
which is another name for the "unknown knowledge" that is the unconscious. In short, as 
Dylan Evans has defined it, "a 'knowledge' which the subject does not know that he 
knows. " An Introducto[y Dictiona! y of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London, 1996), p. 94. 
23 Quoted in Everett H. Emerson (ed) English Puritanism from John Hooper to John 
Milton (Durham, 1968), p. 1 96. 
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The emergence of the closet prayer is illustrative not only of Protestantism's efficacious 
impetus to internalize authority; the example of Lord Harrington here also discloses a set of 
over-determined relations which, I have argued, problematizes the very conditions under 
which this mandate could be met. In what is, effectively, a displacement of the praying 
subject by the writing subject, this incursion of textuality implicates the closet in a complex 
production of secrecy that Francis Barker identifies with "the Pepysian moment' 'of a 
specifically bourgeois subject, where "the text itself rehearses the situation it discloses as it 
inlays seclusion within seclusion. 1124 The closet is not only the site where Harrington 
meditates upon his transgressions, the act of writing is coterminous with quite another kind of 
transgression insofar as 
its epistemological principle grasps the outer world as an accessible 
transparency, recedes from that world towards an inner location where the 
soul - or, as the modem terminology has it, positionality in discourse - 
apparently comes to fill the space of meaning and desire [SiC]. 25 
If we turn our attention here to an explicitly "literary" example, we find that a similar 
conjunction of writing and transgression is the focus of a poem by George Herbert that is, 
appropriately, entitled "Confession. " As the following lines illustrate, Herbert's poem also 
"rehearses the situation it discloses" by locating the closet as the space for a literary 
excavation of the sinful subject: 
0 what a cunning guest 
Is this same grieP within my heart I made 
Closets; and in them many a chest; 
And like a master in my trade; 
In those chests, boxes; in each box a till: 
24 Francis Barker, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on- Sub*ection (London, 1984), 
lbid., p-9. 
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Yet grief knows all, and enters when he will. 
We are the earth; and they 
Like moles within us, heave and cast about: 
And till they foot and clutch their prey 
They never cool, much lesse give out. 
No smith can make such locks but they have keyes: 
Closets are halls to them; and hearts, high-wayes. 26 
In terms of the poem's metaphors and its subterranean networks of secrecy and depth, the 
similarities to Hamle are indeed striking. Here, the closet becomes the site at which the 
subject attempts to fortify itself against the inexorable advance of guilt: figured 
simultaneously as the site both of its containment and disclosure. Moreover, in figuring the 
agent of this guilt as the mole, the poem inevitably recalls how in Hamlet it is also the 
"Vicious mole of nature in men" which leads those who are "not guilty" to "take 
corruption/From that particular fault" (Liv. 24,25,35-36). Hamlet's subsequent reference to 
the ghost as the "old mole" explicitly relocates the function of his father as the agent through 
which the prince will also seek to compel a confession of guilt, not least from his mother in 
the closet. 
Near the close of Herbert's poem, however, the speaker also ventures into quite a different 
space: that of the literary work itself. Acknowledging that "Smooth open hearts no fastning 
have, " the speaker finds succour in the fact that "fiction/Doth give a hold and handle to 
affliction. " When the confession inevitably comes in the final stanza it does so only in the 
very public expression of, precisely, a "fiction" which, like the closet, ruptures the space of a 
26 F. E. Hutchison (ed) The Works of George Herbert (Oxford, 1964), p. 126. 
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pristine interiority that it can only provisionally "contain. 1127 In other words, Herbert 
encounters that border which, according to Blanchot, the specifically writing and "written" 
subject of modernity is destined to endlessly rediscover as "proximity, the errant intimacy of 
the outside from which he can not make an abode. "28 
Francis Barker, of course, argues that Hamlet is finally unable to yield up the mysteries of its 
interior because it is possessed of an incipient, not fully extant modemity that it can only 
anticipate through failure. 29 In Herbert's poem, however, Hamlet itself is interiorized at the 
very space of writing: as both the hiding of a secret and the hiding of that hiding. Sustaining 
the topography that it fractures, Hamlet "inhabits" Herbert's text in a way that disrupts the 
logic of inhabitation, both enfolding and enfolded by a text which can only locate the depth 
of subjectivity at the site of an uninhabitable outside on the inside. 
Indeed, not least axiomatically, Herbert's poem bears more than a passing resemblance to 
Jacques Derrida! s discussion of the literary object as a crypt, "a secret interior within the 
public sphere, but, by the same token, outside it, external to the interior. "30 In part adducing 
the paradoxical spacing of the crypt as a species of "writing, " Derrida develops the 
implications of the work of the post-Lacanians Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok whose 
46cryptonymy" is crucially concerned with this question of failed interiorization. Reworking 
27 As Patricia Fumerton has argued, the closet was never an entirely satisfactory 
guarantor of privacy so that even "within the'innermost' recesses of Elizabethan 
subjectivity ... further recesses, cabinets, or cases kept opening up. " Patricia Furnerton, Cultural Aesthetics: Renaissance Literature and the Practice of Social Ornament 
(London, 1991), p-69- 
28 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature- trans. Ann Smock (London, 1989), p. 24. 
29 Famously, Barker argues that "At the centre of Hamlet, in the interior of his mystery, 
there is, in short, nothing. " Barker, Wgjit., p. 37. 
30 Quoted in Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolf Man's Magic Word: A 
CMpjgny= (Minneapolis, 1986), p. 86. 
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the standard Freudian model of incorporation in mourning, Abraham and Torok argue that 
the refusal to mourn the lost object involves its "incorporation" precisely in order to preserve 
it: "It is to avoid 'swallowing' the loss, that one imagines swallowing, or having swallowed, 
what is lost, in the form of an object [SiC]. "31 
I would like to leave these issues in suspense for the moment to consider how Hamlet's 
complex interarticulation of identity, interiority and loss has also been the focus of textual 
bibliography. A crucial point of interest here has been the question of Q I's "authority" in 
terms of its putatively derivative representation of some primordial event: namely, as an 
ineluctable reminder of separation, defect and loss. If, like the primitive ego, Hamlet refuses 
to mourn - disavowing an originary plenitude that constitutes the grounds of its own 
precarious authority - the narrative relating to Q I's (re)discovery further implicates the text 
within both a drama of filial piety and this strange architecture of the crypt. 32 Soon to 
become what is now referred to as the Huntington copy, QI was in fact the result of a chance 
encounter by Sir Henry Bunbury who claimed that it was 
31 Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, I ntrojection-I ncorpo ration: Mourning or 
Melancholia" in Serge Lebovici (ed) Psychoanalysis in France (New York, 1980), pp. 3- 
16, P-5. 
32 Derrida's interest in cryptonymy is to a large extent motivated by a desire to 
reconsider the relationship between mourning and interiority which, Raga classical 
psychoanalysis, stresses"the impossibility of completing one's mourning ... this terrible fatality of mourning: semi-mourning or double mourning. The psychoanalytic discourse, 
despite its subtlety and necessity, does not go into this fatality, this necessity: the double 
constraint of mourning. " Jacques Derrida, "Dialanguages, " trans. Peggy Kamuf in 
Points ... fnterviews: 1974-1994, ed. 
Elizabeth Weber (California, l 995), pp. 1 32-56, 
p. 152. Cryptonymy like Derridean differance complicates classical assumptions about 
the relationship that obtains between the inside and the outide, and any notion of 
expenditure that posits the possibility of a pure loss or expense. Throughout much of his 
recent work Derrida returns to this constitutive paradox of mourning where the subject 
must and must not take the other into itself in an act of what he calls "ex-appropriation, " 
Points, p. 321. Although many discussions of Hamlet return to the question of mourning, 
the present chapter seeks to engage Derrida's heuristic concern with the crypt in a 
broader analysis of how the text is continually worked upon by its own exteriority. 
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found by me in a closet at Barton, 1823 .... It probably was picked up by my 
grandfather, Sir William Bunbury, who was an ardent collector of old dramas. 33 
Leaving aside for the moment the serniotic inflection that both Bunbury and Huntin on 
bring to the archaeological event of Q I's disclosure, at one level this serendipitous "outing" 
of QI offers an example of the strange phenomenality of presence without a present that, for 
Deffida, is peculiar to the literary object. Indeed, Bunbury's discovery was to initiate a 
tradition of seemingly endless critical speculations surrounding the status that should be 
accorded to QI in the light of what ostensibly are its two antecedents: the Q2 and Folio 
copies. 34 It is from within this particular nexus that Hamlet most explicitly finds itself 
implicated in a cryptonymic topography J. Hillis Miller describes as that which "can only be 
reached in one or another of its embodiments in some copy of the text in question. 1135 The 
crypt, in other words, always encodes a phenomenality associated with the spectral space of 
the phantom: 
Tis here. 
Tis gone. 
Tis here. 
(I. i. 145-147) 
Insinuating itself on that similarly evanescent border that seeks to separate the model from 
the copy, simultaneously a repetition and a singularity, QI has become notoriously difficult 
to pin down in terms of adducing evidence of its primacy. Hamle , it seems, both 
33 Quoted in Thomas Clayton (ed) The Hamlet First Published (London, 1992), p. 21. 
34 Such is the sheer volume of work that has been generated, either directly or indirectly, 
through consideration of 01, that to give a comprehensive account of its critical history 
would merit a separate study. The contributions and the bibliography contained in the 
volume by Clayton do, however, serve to highlight how ubiquitous is the problem that Q1 
has posed for critics of the play. 
35 J. Hillis Miller, Topographies (California, 1995), p. 31 0. 
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internalizes and is haunted by the traces of its own primal scene. At one time regarded as an 
earlier version of the text that Shakespeare subsequently revised or rewrote, contemporary 
scholarly wisdom now maintains that, in the words of the Arden editor of the play, 
the opposite is the case: Ql is not a prior but a posterior version, not an 
original of Shakespeare's play but a reconstruction of it; and its great 
difference from the later-published texts is due not to their expansion but 
to its abridgement, not to their revision but to its corruption. 36 
What are we to make of this preposterous turn of events which argues that the putatively Ei: rst 
Quarto of the text is actually derivative, that, paradoxically, the simple precedes the model as 
a first time that is produced retroactively through its copies? 
Freud, memorably, argues that the "primal" scene encodes a search for origins that ultimately 
comes to problematize the very notion of primacy through a corrupting structural complicity 
between "explanation" and "description. " In other words, every primal scene can only ever 
be the product of an intertextual process, as an event that becomes graspable only at the site 
of its erasure. Indeed, the difficulties surrounding QI relocates both Hamlet and 
psychoanalysis within what Ned Lukacher, in another context, describes as the 
insurmountable 
dilemma into which the modem critic is invariably coerced. The task of 
accounting for a textual event demands that the critic venture, whether 
intentionally or not, into a zone between the conventional subject-object 
opposition, a zone where "truth" has become a differential notion that is 
constituted somewhere between pure construction and historiCity. 37 
36 Harold Jenkins (ed) Hamlet (London, 1995) p. 1 9. 
37 Ned Lukacher, Primal Scenes: Literature. Philosophy. Psychoanalysis (London, 
1988), p-31. 
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Nevertheless, we still find that Stanley Wells, a long-standing supremo of Shakespearean 
bibliography, encourages the nostalgia for "the text that gives us the play closest to the form 
in which it was acted in Shakespeare's time [as] preferable to one that represents it in less 
finished form. 1138 Bearing in mind that this claim is made in a study addressing itself to the 
question of "Revision in Shakespeare's Plays" it is worth commenting on the optical fantasy 
that inforin such "speculations. " More than mere nostalgia, the recuperation desired here is 
that of the theatrical genesis proper to the text's "production": i. e. authority is implicitly 
linked with the desire to revisit the scene of an original and originating creativity. Indeed, 
what is envisioned is a quite radical effort of re-vision that has much in common with what 
Slavoi Zvizqek calls a fantasy gaze: like the trauma of parental coitus, such a gaze seeks the 
impossible witnessing to some facturn bruturn of conception that is prior to symbolization 
itself. 39 Recalling Herbert's poem, the secret of Hamlet's mystery is once more articulated in 
terms of a disruption from within by that which the text can incorporate only partially, 
something whose "survival, " I would now like to argue, is in fact rendered thinkable through 
the haunting traces of the crypt. 
38 Stanley Wells, "Revision in Shakespeare's Plays" in Richard Landon (ed) Editing and 
Editors: A Retrospect (New York, 198ý), pp. 67-97, p. 95. 
391 am borrowing this term from Slavoj Zizvek who defines the fantasy gaze as that which 
1ýeduces [the subject] to an object-gaze observing reality from which he is missing. " For 
Zizek it is a fantasy equivalent to that represented by the Cartesianjc&gjLýLwhich "is also 
reduced to a non existing gaze acquiring distance frogijts own bodily presence, I. e., 
observing reality from'behind its own retina. " Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying Withae Negative 
(Durham, 1993), P-65. 
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Upon What Ground?: Hamlet's Indigestion 
To borrow a formulation that Jacques Lacan never tired of repeating, it is not so much 
alienation that constitutes the ego as it is the denial of that very process of alienation. 40 The 
only ground of identity, of meaning and representation, is in fact the non-ground of the play 
of difference (and differance) that constitutes the signifier. If the text's subterranean imagery 
of mining, burying, digging, burrowing, mousetraps and moles is so pervasive that Hamlet 
may literally be viewed in Lacan's terms as "a tragedy of the underworld"141 it is in fact the 
ghost who is the most frequent harbinger of an abyss, leading Hamlet to "the dreadful summit 
of the cliff' (Liv. 70). According to Freud the uncanny power of the haunted house resides, 
precisely, in an inability to "find ourselves on familiar ground. 1142 Moreover, at Elsinore, 
that most famous of haunted houses, the "ground" is also riddled with cavities. Here, it 
becomes almost a recreational pastime to "mine within" and "'tis the sport to have the 
enginer/Hoist with his own petard" (III. iv. 209-21 0). 
40 That is to say, insofar as the ego emerges in the process of imaginary identification 
with its mirror-double who is at the same time its rival and its potential paranoid 
persecutor, the frustration generated from the side of the mirror-double Is constitutive of 
the ego: what first appears as an external hindrance frustrating the ego's striving for 
satisfaction is thereupon experienced as the ultimate support of its being. 
41 Jacques Lacan, "Desire and the Interpretation of desire in Hamlet, " in Shoshana 
Felman (ed) Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise 
(London, 1982), pp. 1 1-53, p. 39. In fact, inl 609 Hamlet made a cameo appearance in 
Thomas Dekker's play of the Jacobean underworld, the suitably noiresque Lanthorne and 
Candle-Light. Paul S. Conklin, A History of Hamlet Criticism. 1601-1821 (London, 1957), 
p. 1 9. Indeed Ned Lukacher traces the use of the image of the mole in Hamlet to argue 
that the true underworld in the play is that of feminine desire: ".. the play itself seems to 
repress or bury precisely that which is necessary to its interpretation. The very dynamic 
of the play ... is caught in the structure of repression it sets out to analyze. " Later he makes the point that "One is always either burying or unburying things in Hamlet. " Lukacher, 
cit., p. 216,218. 
42 Quoted in Mark Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida's Haunt (London, 
1995), p. 251. 
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It is not so much that the ghost is merely an agent of repetition but that it is, in Jacques 
Derrida's account at least, always a revertant. If the ghost "revisits" (I. iv. 53), the text itself in 
this more complicated sense is also constitutively out ofjoint precisely insofar as it too 
"begins" by coming back. 43 The revertant not only disrupts presence as a ghostly effet de 
realite produced through repetition, this logic of doubling is further compounded by the title 
of the text it. self. That is to say, to perpetuate someone by calling a child after him, as Freud 
said, also makes the child a revertant, an ineluctable reminder of the spectral dimension of 
naming which essentially consists in this de-synchronizaton of time. In terms of Derrida's 
logic of the spectre then, the very question as to who or what Hamlet "names" (something 
that Freud was to speculate upon on more than one occasion) also takes the form of a 
paradoxical incorporation: "It becomes, rather, some 'thing' that remains difficult to name: 
neither soul nor body, and both one and the other. 1144 Derrida! s discussion of how this 
paradox of naming installs a duplicitous relation between the text and its title also has a 
particular bearing on Hamlet's ironic observation that "The body is with the King, but the 
King is not with/the body" (IV. iii. 26-27): 
43 Under the rubric of what he mischievously identifies as "hauntology, " Derrida also 
discusses the revenant in Hamlet as exemplary of the paradoxical logic that pertains to 
repetition and the event. See Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt. the Work of 
Mourning and the New International trans. Peggy Kamuf (London, 1994), ppl 0-13. 
Commenting more specifically on the semiotics of dramatic performance, Malcolm Eýans 
has compared Hamlet to "a Mobius strip in which end and beginning, 'inside' and 'outside' 
are not fully distinguishable. " Signifying Nothing: Truth's True Contents in Shakespeare's 
Text (London, 1986, ) p. 130. Similarly, Terence Hawkes also offers a suggestive, if 
slightly more generalised, reading of the recursive trajectory of the text in an article that is 
wittily entitled "Telmah" in Geoffrey Hartman and Patricia Parker (eds) Shakespeare and 
the Question of Theo! y (London, 1985), pp. 310-333. Also of relevance here is R. L. 
Kessler's discussion of 'Time and Causality in Renaissance Drama" where plot is 
discussed in terms of how the text "constructs a space between beginning and closing, 
through which the play exists, but exists primarily as a space. " Locating his discussion 
within wider historiographical concerns, Kessler makes the slightly more contentious 
argument that "Hamlet marks a crucial point in the function of Renaissance drama as a 
pedagogy of causality and time. " R. L. Kessler, "Time and Causality in Renaissance 
Drama, " The University of Toronto Quarterly (1990), 59,4, pp. 472 -501, p 489,490. 
44 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 6. 
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it is as if the text did nothing but play with its title - which would be its 
object; it is as if the body of the titled text became the title of the title that 
then becomes the true body, the false-true body, so to speak, of the text, its 
false-true corpus, its body as ghost of a fiduciary sign, a body on credit. 45 
Haunting, the crypt and the uncanny collaborate in this logic of supplementarity: of that 
which is expelled over the line in order to hold the line. We might recall here that it is at the 
battlemented platform, that most violent line of demarcation, where the text begins and that 
the ghost makes its initial haunt. Significantly, old Hamlet's homecoming is prefaced by a 
recounting of how he 
Did slay this Fortinbras, who by a seal'd compact 
Well ratified by law and heraldry 
Did forfeit, with his life, all those his lands 
Which he stood seiz'd of to the conqueror 
(I. i. 89-92) 
The interarticulation of writing, authority and spatiality here, which Derrida associates with 
the parasitic ruses of the crypt, also (dis)locates Elsinore as the very figure of the liminal, as 
that which variously seeks to institute 
the relation to a border, country, house, or threshold, as any site, any 
situation in general from within which, practically, pragmatically, 
alliances are formed, contracts, codes and conventions established ... 46 
Indeed, it is precisely such "codes and conventions" that are also a focus in the next scene 
when it is recalled how Fortinbras forfeited lands "with all bonds of law" (I. ii. 24), and where 
45 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money trans. Peggy Kamuf (London, 
1994), p. 97. 
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Claudius also writes to Norway, instructing his courtiers not to extend beyond "the scope/Of 
these dilated articles" (11.37-38). If this complex articulation of writing, space and authority 
implicitly relates the text's imperialist concerns to Derrida's claim that there is no space 
without violence, Derrida's discussion of the crypt also reveals how this violence is by the 
same token hidden by the space that it institutes, "buried, " so to speak, within the very sense 
that there is a space. If the question that Derrida, asks of institutional structures is "What do 
they desire to vomit? ..... The neither-swallowed-nor-rejected, that which remains stuck 
in the 
throat as other, 1147 in Hamlet the ghost is similarly vomited from a crypt that "Hath op'd his 
ponderous and marble jaws/To cast thee up again" (I. iv48-50). 
Even before the ghost makes its initial haunt, Horatio reassures an anxious Francisco that he 
is a "friend to this ground" (I. i. 16). Yet the ghost haunts precisely because it problematizes 
the very logic of grounding. It leads Hamlet either "to a more removed ground" (I. iv6l) or to 
"shift our ground" (I. v. 164), it "will not stand" (11144), it is exhorted to "stand and unfold" 
itself , 
it "stands dumb" (I. ii. 206). Indeed, concerned with the ghost's possible 
duplicitousness Hamlet resolves to seek "grounds/More relative than this" (II. ii. 599). 
Appropriately, it is by a graveside that this logic of grounding itself becomes the focus of a 
witty exchange between Hamlet and the gravedigger: 
Ham: How came he mad? 
Grave: Very strangely they say. 
Ham: How'strangely'? 
Grave: Faith, een with losing his wits 
Ham: Upon what ground? 
46 Jacques Derrida, "Shibboleth: For Paul Celan" in Derek Attridge (ed) Jacques 
k_Qla re (London, 1992), pp. 370-414, p. 407. _gf 
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- 47 Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. Leavy and Richard Rand (London, 1986), 
p. 214. 
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Grave: Why, herein Denmark. 
(V. i. 151-157) 
We might bear in mind here that, as an "old mole" that is both a household pest and a para- 
site, the ghost is bound to the notion that space is haunted by that which exceeds it, by that 
which is supplementary to the site. In fact, this association between haunting and parasitism 
is to be found in Claudius's determination that Hamlet 
Should have kept short, restrain'd and out of haunt 
................................. 
We would not understand what was most fit, 
But like the owner of a foul disease, 
To keep it from divulging, let it feed 
Even on the pith of life. 
(IV. i. 18-23) 
Indeed, according to Derrida, parasitism and the law of the phantom are both crucially 
concerned with the mystical "foundations" of authority, with how "the undecidable remains 
caught, lodged, at least as a ghoSt. 
1148 Freud's argument in Totem and Taboo that it is the 
cannibalistic gesture which grounds the tribal totem also informs Derrida's claim that it is 
66carnivorous sacrifice" which founds the law. In this respect, we might recall how Hamlet 
contains a surfeit of metaphors that have a particular bearing on this enigma. For example, 
Gertrude "feeds and battens" on Claudius (III. iv. 66-67), Claudius is reminded how Denmark 
"feeds upon your majesty" (Ill. iii. 10); Hamlet even taunts Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
about how they are exploited by Claudius, claiming that they are kept "like an/ape, in the 
comer of his jaw - first mouthed, to be/ last swallowed" (IV. i. 16-18). 
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In short: there is no official text or institutional practice that is not marked by the faint traces 
of both the folds that encrypt the indigestible and the way that "violent property fordoes 
itself' (II. i. 103). Everywhere, it seems, Hamlet suffers from a constitutive indigestion, that 
messy realm of confusion that produces the sense of an interior in the first place. Horatio, 
for example, characterizes the young Fortinbras's imperial ambitions as 
Jood and diet to some enterprise 
That hath a stomach in't, which is no other, 
As it doth well appear unto our state, 
But to recover of us by strong hand 
And terms compulsatory those foresaid lands 
So by his father lost. 
(I. i. 102-107) 
The text's economies of expulsion and consumption, which centre around the ghost's 
efficacious injunction to remember, frequently come to digest the problems of how "the sun 
breeds maggots in a dead dog" (II. ii. 18 1) or how "region kites" may be "fatted" with 
Claudius's offal (11.576). No inside is ever simply severed from an outside in Hamle ; space, 
rather, becomes an elaborate effect of the spacing that appears to haunt it, so that what we 
may call the "indigestible" is disseminated cryptically throughout the text. If what we call 
66structure, " as Mark Wigley has argued, is actually "forgetting and the crypt is nothing more 
than the structure of forgetting, the perverse structure of structure, 1149 Hamle also gestures 
toward this strangely carnivalesque discourse of internalization and memory. 
48 Jacues Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority, " trans. Mary 
Quaintance Cardozo Law Review, 11,5-6 (1990), pp-919-1046, p. 965. 
49 Wigley, p-1 56. 
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Indeed, in the Genealogy of Morals Nietszche adumbrates the fate of the modem subject of 
memory, a subject who can participate only in a camivalesque forgettin where those "things 
which are experienced or taken in are as unlikely to reach our consciousness . in the process of 
digestion as in the myriad processes by which physical nourishment, so called incorporation 
takes place. 1150 Although Hamlet makes his most emphatic claims to interiority by 
accommodating his father's injunction to remember within the "table of my memory" 
(I. v. 98), more often than not it is the food table which displaces the writing table in Hamle , 
providing an alternative metabolism for the function of memory through a recurrent 
metaphorics of digestion. Promising to abide by the ghost's commandment, this connection 
is suggested, at least homonymically, in Hamlet's return to "My tables. Meet it is I set it 
down/That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain" (I. v. 107-8). Earlier Hamlet makes 
the sardonic observation of how "the funeral bak'd meats/Did coldly furnish forth the 
marriage tables" (I. ii. 180-1). Indeed, a little later in the play the prince opines "Heaven and 
earth/Must I remember? Why, she would hang on him/As if increase of appetite had 
grown/By what it fed on" (I. v. 142-145). 
"The Murder of Gonzago" is not only the site of a cryptic accessibility which "comes near 
the circumstance" of the old King's death, the speech that is "inserted in't" (II-ii. 536) is also 
the locus of a phantasmatic act of magical ingestion in "an excellent play, well digested in/the 
scenes" (11.435-436). Hamlet extends the gastric metaphors even further to insist that there 
be "no sallets in the/lines to make the matter savoury" (11.437-438). Here, perhaps most 
powerfully, we find once again that at the very heart of the text is a seclusion of other texts, 
folding upon each other in a parasitical economy of "internal pockets larger than the whole. " 
50 Quoted in Helga Geyer-Ryan, Fables of Desire (London, 1994), p. 44. 
ffel al Irf , ý: In Ie rio v.; 
172 
In a strange disposition of space that we will have more to say about later, the interiorizing 
motif of the "play-within-the-play" announces this principle of a constitutive "excess" which 
comes to violate the very "boundary" it polices. 51 
Breaking Out 
In Hamle incorporation is not merely a contingent pathology of subjectivity, but its very 
possibility. This disruptive spatiality, which Abraham and Torok understand in terms of 
miming the offensive-defensive strategies of the ego, also relates to a more familiar narrative 
of how the text seeks to inscribe borders and identity within the field of vision. Hamlet, I 
would like to suggest, recalls the lamella, a myth which Lacan locates at the genesis of 
human desire as an amoeba-like state of Otherness that is prior to intersubjectivity: 
Whenever the membranes of the egg in which the foetus emerges on its way 
to becoming a new-born are broken, imagine for a moment that something 
flies off, and that one can do it with an egg as easily as with a man, namely 
the hommelette. 52 
Indeed, this is not the only occasion where Lacan exploits a similarity between the ego and 
the egg; elsewhere, for example, he argues that the ego moulds itself into the "protective 
shell" of the subject. 53 You cannot make a Hamlet or a hommelette, it seems, without 
breaking eggs. Not only, famously, is Hamlet "bounded in a nutshell, " the text regularly 
51 Jacques Derrida, "The Law of Genre, " trans. Avitall Rovell QJYM, 7, (1980), pp. 202- 
229, p. 206. 
52 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (London, 1997), p. 197. 
53 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan , trans. John Forrester (Cambridge, 
1988), p-17- 
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focuses on the notion of hatching54: Polonius tutors the departing Laertes on the dangers that 
arise from "new-hatch'd, unfledged courage" (I. iii. 65); Claudius fears that with Hamlet's 
impending madness "the hatch and the disclose/will be some danger" (1111.168-169); Laertes 
rages against his father's unceremonious internment, "No trophy, sword, nor hatchment o'er 
his bones" (Iv. vi. 21 1). Similarly, Hamlet seeks inspiration from the example of Fortinbras 
who exposes "what is mortal and unsure/To all that fortune, death, and danger dare, /Even for 
an eggshell" (IV. iv. 51-53); Hamlet even characterizes Osric's exit as similar to the way that a 
"lapwing runs away with the shell on his head" (VAL 183). In Hamlet a birth is in the offing, 
even though the text often appears to be "unpregnant of its cause" (Il. ii. 663). 
We might turn profitably here to Norbert Elias who, in his seminal study of the early modem 
psychogenesis of the ego, argues that subjectivity became linked to "the detachment of the 
thinking subject from his objects in the act of cognitive thought. 1155 Distancing was 
conceived as "an eternal condition of spatial separation between a mental apparatus 
apparently locked "inside" man ... and the objects "outside" and 
divided from it by an invisible 
wall. " Elias argues that "from the Renaissance onward" the individual ego was characterized 
as "a locked case, the "self' divided by an invisible wall from what happens outside. 1156 
Crucially, for Jacques Lacan imaginary captation similarly inscribes identity within a 
succession of increasingly aggressive phantasies that attempt to reinforce this spatial 
separation. Famously, Lacan claims that the "mirror stage" initiates a drama "that extends 
54 For a brilliant analysis of the figure of "hatching" more generally as implying a 
spaciosity or "eventness" that is ineluctably tied to writing, see Jean-Luc Nancy, Ibk 
Experience of Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (California, 1993), pp. 9-20. 
55 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The Histo[y of Manners (Oxford, 1978), p. 256. 
56 lVid., p. 257. 
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from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopedic - and, 
lastly, to the assumption of the annour of an alienating identity. " 57 
Remarking to Rosencrantz that "Denmark's a prison" (II. ii. 243) Hamlet defends the 
sovereign status of the gQg: ito, only to find that the threat of captivity arises from quite a 
different source: "I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite space - 
were it not that I have bad dreams" (11.254-256). 58 For both Lacan and Hamlet, however, it 
is a quite specific dream that comes to pose a threat for the imaginary ego: 
the formation of the I is symbolized in dreams by a fortress, or a stadium - 
its inner arena and enclosure, surrounded by marshes and rubbish-tips, 
dividing it into two opposed fields of contest where the subject flounders 
in quest of the lofty, remote inner castle. 59 
Dreams, fortresses, rubbish tips and castles: these sites also constitute much of the imaginary 
geography of Hamlet. Indeed, fortresses become particularly vulnerable to attack: Horatio's 
"cars that arc so fortified" (I. i. 34-35) are "assailed" by news of the ghost; Hamlet is accused 
by his mother of possessing "a heart unfortified" (I. ii. 96); at Elsinore even a mole can break 
down "the pales and forts of reason" (Liv. 28). It is even tempting to consider "Fort-in-bras" 
within this constellation of images. Although Hamlet characterizes himself as "a dull and 
muddy-mettled rascal" (Il. ii. 562), it is Fortinbras who acts as a projected site of identification 
for the prince, who seeks to emulate this warrior of "unimproved mettle" (I. i. 99). That is to 
57 Jacques Lacan, "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I" in Jacques 
Alain-Miller (ed) Ecrits: A Selection , trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977), pp. 1-8, 
4- 
Michele Le Doeuff has also given an account of how the Renaissance is marked by 
this drive toward individual containment. Particularly in Shakespeare, she argues, we 
discover examples of how "each individual becomes a closed space in relation to their 
fantasmagoria: their desires and dreams are their business. " Venus et Adonjis suivi de 
aenese d'une catastrophe (Paris, 1986), p. 83. 
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say, Fortinbras's name provides an ironic gloss on Lacan's notion of how an "armour of an 
alienating identity" contributes to this construction of the ego-ideal, where the subject 
spatially identifies with the specular image to "unite the I with the statue in which man 
projccts himsclf. 1160 
At a more general level, these spatializing dynamics may be read alongside an historical 
development beginning with the Renaissance that Teresa Brennan has called "the ego's era. " 
Brennan's influential argument, which like Lacan takes account of how the physis of space in 
the environment and the psyche are codependent, maintains that fantasy has a physical force 
in history. Central to Brennarf s argument here is her discussion of the development of what 
she calls the "aggressive territorial imperative" which 
involved making the other into a slave, or object, will lead to spatial 
expansion (territorial imperialism). This is because the objectification of the 
other depends on establishing a spatial boundary by which the other and the 
self are fixed. But this fixing of the other leads to the fear that the other will 
retaliate, which in turn leads to a feeling of spatial constriction. 61 
With its recurrent economies of expansion and constriction, we may also wish to consider 
how Hamle gestures towards this continuous labour of Gestalt and subjectivity that, for 
Brennan, is also the foundational fantasy of modemity itself. Indeed, the protracted 
territorial dispute between Derunark and Norway not only provides political intrigue in the 
text, at various points this crisis is reticulated within the text in ways that are strangely 
59 Lacan, pa-dilt., p. 5. 
60 ll: rid., p. 5. Indeed, 'The Mirror Stage' in part argues that the specular image is 
inextricably caught up in "the lure of spatial identification. * This relationship, which Lacan 
calls "orthopaedic, " relates to the subject's attempts at optical erection. Elsewhere Lacan 
insists that the "dialectic" of psychoanalysis is crucially concerned with this "ortho- 
dramatization of the subjectivity of the subject. " 
61 Teresa Brennan, Histo! y After Lacan (London, 1993), p. 8. 
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redolent of this Lacanian parabola of psychogenesis. For example, although Hamlet taunts 
Osric that he has procured the King's favour through being "spacious in the possession of 
dirt" (V. ii. 88-89), in Hamlet, as we have seen, dirt and space are possessed of a more 
phantasmatic measure of consistency. Perhaps the most bizarre example is to be found in the 
confrontation between Hamlet and Laertes that takes place over the corpse of Ophelia who 
becomes the focus for increasingly aggressive, and explicitly masculine, fantasies of 
territorial expansion. After Laertes invites the gravedigger to bury him "Till of this flat a 
mountain you have made/To o'ertop old Pelion or the skyish head/Of blue Olympus" 
(V. i. 247), Hamlet lays down a wager which once again deflects into the vertigo of the 
domination of space, that threatens to lead him to the point of his own annihilation: 
Be buried quick with her, and so will I. 
And if thou prate of mountains, let them throw 
Millions of acres on us, till our ground, 
Singeing his pate against the burning zone, 
Make Ossa like a wart. 
(V. i.. 274-278) 
It is not until later, when Hamlet apologizes for literally making mountains out of molehills, 
that the agency of the visible again becomes implicated in this aggressive relation: "For by 
the image of my cause I see/The portraiture of his ... /But sure the bravery of his grief did put 
me/Into a tow'ring passion" (V. ii. 77-80). Although he reassures Laertes that "his semblable 
is his mirror" (11.118), Hamlet's subsequent use of the foil metaphor (which, we might recall, 
simultaneously refers to an instrument of combat and a reflective medium of identity) 
encapsulates even more explicitly this essentially rivalrous structure of the specular: 
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I'll be your foil, Laertes. In mine ignorance 
Your skill shall like a star ith'darkest night 
Stick fiery off indeed. 
(V. ii. 252-254) 
In his seminar "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet" Lacan argues that the 
rivalry between Hamlet and Laertes is a paradigmatic example of the very "master-slave" 
dialectic that crucially informs his model of imaginary identification: 
The playwright situates the basis of aggressivity in this paroxysm of 
absorption in the imaginary register, formally expressed as a mirror 
relationship, a mirrored reaction. The one you fight is the one you 
admire the most. The ego ideal is also, according to Hegel's formula 
which says that coexistence is impossible, the one you have to kill. 62 
Where Truth Is Hid 
In the topology of the crypt, however, this relationship between spatiality and vision also 
secretes the disruptive spatiality of the signifier. Indeed, it is the very idea that there is an 
interior that encloses the secret. As I have argued, at Elsinore the most secure hiding place is 
the representation of an interior that is rendered possible by an ongoing repression. Indeed, 
Lacan argues that "The value of Freud's texts.. in which he is breaking new ground, is that 
like a good archaeologist, he leaves the work of the dig in place. 1163 Indeed, the 
archaeological metaphors associated with Hamle probably find their apotheosis in Freud's 
own typically immodest claim that "the conflict in Hamlet is so effectively concealed that it 
62 Jacques Lacan, "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet, " p. 31. 
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was left to me to unearthit. 1164 In the text itself, however, it is Polonius who arrogates to 
himself these excavatory powers of detection in his determination that "I will find/Where 
truth is hid, though it were hid indeed/Within the centre" (II. ii. 156-158). Inhisreadingof 
Poe's "Purloined Letter, " however, Lacan elaborates a far more paradoxical relation of truth 
and secrecy: 
In the real, the very idea of a hidden place is insane - however deep into the 
bowels of the earth someone may go bearing something, it isn't hidden 
there, since if it were, so can you. Only what belongs to the order of truth 
can be hidden. 65 
It is precisely by leaving "the work of the dig in place, " so to speak, that psychoanalysis 
argues that there can be no truth that is ontologically prior to the "search" that putatively aims 
at its disclosure. Indeed, the "play-within-the -play, " where the text constructs its most 
emphatic claims to interiority, provides a properly theatrical context for this notion that the 
repressed and the return of the repressed are the same thing. For it is precisely here where, if 
63 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 1 82. 
64 Quoted in Harold Bloom, "Freud: A Shakespearean Reading, " Yale Review, 82,3 
(1994), pp. 1-2l, p. 12. In "ArchiveFever: A Freudian Impression" Jacques Derrida offers 
an extended reading of the psychoanalytic "scene of excavation" in terms of Freud's 
ubiquitous use of "archaeological parables, " Diacritics, 25,2 (1995), pp. 9-65, p. 58. 
Moreover, in the light of the constellation of images with which we are concerned here, 
there is a point in "Freud and the Scene of Writing" where Derrida, Freud and the spatio- 
temporal enigmas of Hamlet implicity come into a strange kind of proximity: 
The metaphor of pathbreaking, so frequently used in Freud's descriptions, is 
always in communication with the theme of the supplementary delay and with 
the reconstitution of meaning through deferral, after the mole-like progression. 
after the subterranean toil of an impression. This impression has left behind a 
laborious trace which has never been perceived, whose meaning has never 
been lived in the present. 
Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference , trans. Alan Bass (London, 1978), p. 214. 65 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book Two: The Eao In Freud's 
Theo[y and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. John 
Forrester (Cambridge, 1988), p. 202. 
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we can say such a thing, that Hamlet is faced with its exterior at its own interior. 66 In fact, 
the Arden editor succinctly observes a peculiar fact of the text's strange topography which, as 
he puts it, centres upon "a crime which is already past when it begins but which is re-enacted 
in its central scene. 1167 In other words, what is ostensibly the text's "primal" scene only 
acquires its centrality in terms of its belated arrival as a secondary effect. In this respect the 
play-within-the-play conforms precisely to what Lacan calls the Vorstellungs-Reprasentanz, 
"the representative representative. 1168 In particular, the dumb show acts as a place holder in 
V4 
the symbolic which, quite literally, according to Zizek's reading of the Vorstellungs- 
Reprasentanz, "gives body to the 'unspeakable' - its inert presence testifies that we are in a 
domain where'words fail. 11169 In other words, the play-within-the-play represents precisely 
an attempt in Hamlet to integrate into the symbolic order its constitutive outside, the very 
surplus that eludes its field of representation. Indeed, the meta-theatrical dimension of this 
effect is inseparable from its constitutive disfiguration of the interiorizing exegetes of form 
and content, so that "The Murder of Gonzago" becomes in many respects 
the umbilical link by means of which the diegetic content functions as an 
allegory of its process of enunciation. The place of this figure [the 
Vorstellunas-Rel2rasentanz] is acousmatic: it never simply partakes in 
diegetic reality, but dwells in an intermediate space inherent to reality yet'out 
of place' in it. 70 
66 Alenka Zupancic has recently discussed the status of the play-within-a-play in terms of 
how"fiction is established through the disjunction regarding the Real, sustaining itself 
through something that it cannot show - with the essential postscript: that it can show 
only by duplicating itself (&iýVr's emphasis). "A Perfect Place to Die: Theatre in 
Hitchcock's Films" in Slavoj Zizek (ed) EveWhina You Always Wanted To Know About 
Lacan (But Were Afraid To Ask HitchoLjk (London, 1992), pp. 73-105, p. 82. Inother 
words, once again we encounter the paradox of the Real as that which is manifested as 
the retroactive product of its own effects. 
67 Jenkins, M-gjft., p. 1 23. 
w Jacqueý Lacan, The Folir Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 217. 
69 Slavoi Zil"ek, in Slavoj 2ilek (ed) EveWhing You Always Wanted To Know About 
Lacan (But Were Afraid To Ask Hitchcoc! q, p. 239. 
70 Ibid., p. 244. 
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The logic of the play-within-the-play itself as a theatrical device serves to reinscribe what 
Joan Copjec has called "deep space" as an effect of sutured space that consists of "a 
foregrounding display of the performative. 1171 Suture provides the logic of a paradoxical 
function whereby a supplementary element is added, or in Hamlefs words "inserted" 
(II. ii. 536), to the series of signifiers in order, precisely, to mark the lack of a signifier that 
could effect closure. 72 
It is, however, largely through a consideration of trauma that psychoanalysis affords 
paradigmatic significance to this strange dialectic of excess and lack, with its attendant 
paradox of a cause that does not pre-exist its effects. Indeed, at one point in Hamlet Polonius 
unwittingly encounters the logical confusions that arise when one blithely undertakes the task 
of locating "the cause of lunacy" (II. ii. 49). With all the audacity of an amateur Freudian 
Polonius announces confidently to the Queen that "Your noble son is mad" (II. ii. 92). His 
subsequent ruminations, however, are a little less assured: 
And now remains 
That we find out the cause of this effect, 
Or rather say the cause of this defect, 
For this effect defective comes by cause. 
Thus it remains; and the remainder thus. 
71 1 am positing a relationship between the Vorstelluncis-Reprasentanz and Miller's 
classic elaboration of suture at the level of a familiar Lacanian reflexive reversal: i. e. 
where the "lack of the signifier" becomes"the signifier of the lack. " in an inspired analysis 
of the paradoxical production of interiority in detective fiction, Copjec employs Miller's 
notion of suture to suggest a relationship between the symbolic and the real that is 
particularly illuminating in the context of a discussion of Hamlet: "If the locked room is 
always breached, this is not because every private space has always already been 
intruded upon by the public power of the symbolic, but because within the symbolic the 
real always intrudes, limiting the symbolic from within and producing its infinite 
commodiousness. " Joan Copjec, Read My Desire: -Lacan 
Against The Historicists 
ý London, 1994), p. 176. 
2 For a now classic analysis of this logic, see Jacques-Alain Miller, "Suture: Elements 
in the Logic of the Signifier, " Screen, (Winter 1977) pp. 8-39, p. 27. 
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(II. ii. 100-104) 
Unable to posit any remainderless demarcation between cause and effect, Polonius' rhetorical 
impasse also stumbles upon the antagonistic relationship that obtains between the cause and 
symbolic determination (which Lacan characterizes as the la3y). Indeed, Polonius' somewhat 
sinuous formulation that "effect defective comes by cause" comes very close to an awareness 
of the signifier's synchronic role in establishing this paradoxical coincidence between past 
and present. As we argued in relation to Richard 111, for Lacan causality is only possible 
through the operation of some "defective" agency: "Cause is to be distinguished from that 
which is determinate in a chain, in other words, the law ... there is cause only in something that 
doesWt work. 1173 Traditionally, the speech (if it is mentioned at all) is dismissed as yet 
another characteristic example of Polonius' bombastic self-importance. In a footnoted 
commentary the Arden editor offers the view that "He [Polonius] loses the thread of his 
argument and non-sensically repeats himself. 1174 In fact, for psychoanalysis, this is also the 
conclusion to be drawn from Polonius' futile search for the traumatic conditions of Hamlet's 
madness. For it is precisely through such "non-sensical repetition" that the cause 
retroactively becomes what it always-already was. In the symbolic domain it is always the 
case that, in Hamlet's words, "anticipation prevents discovery" (II. ii. 293-294). As John 
Forrester has argued, Lacanian psychoanalysis is crucially concerned with how "the 
traditional dialectical categories of temporality are organized around waiting/haste. 1175 The 
73 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 22. 
74 Harold Jenkins, pp-Qft., p. 241. 
75 John Forrester, The Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan and Derrida 
(Cambridge, 1990), p. 176. 
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symbolic order always has this anticipatory, hastening character (similar to the anticipatory 
recognition in the mirror stage). 
In Hamlet it is this temporal scission (organized around waiting and haste) which provides a 
convenient shorthand to characterize the prince's dilemma. 76 In fact, the protracted nature of 
Hamlet's much remarked upon delaying tactics becomes all the more remarkable in the light 
76 The implied notion here that the subject is a "virtual" image is the proper context within 
which to approach Lacan's reading of the future anterior where "What is realized in my 
history is not the past definite of what it is, since it is no more, or the present perfect of 
what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am 
in the process of becoming, " Eantts, p. 86. In fact, it is precisely the phenomenon of 
hesitation that most fully attests to this redoubling of reflection. This is the occurrence of 
what Lacan calls le mot me manque, "the word escapes me, " which Russell Grigg has 
translated as "I am missing the word, " Freud's Papers on Technique, p. 1 15, n. 20. 
Indeed, it is this kind of subreption which discloses, literally, how the subject constitutively 
lacks its own place. At a diegetic level much of the drama of Hamlet is propelled through 
a series of interruptions: two examples will suffice for the present discussion. Recall 
Polonius's advice to Reynaldo, where his long exhortation suffers an unexpected 
interruption: 
Pol: And then, sir, does a this -a does - what was I about 
to say? By the mass, I was about to say something. 
Where did I leave? 
Rey: At'close in the consequence. ' 
Pol: At'close in the consequence, ' ay, marry. (11150-54) 
Here, meaning is doubly articulated: as anticipated on the one hand, since its a question 
of its suspension, and as repeated on the other since Polonius refers it to an impression 
of having already heard it. A similar, though slightly more complicated example occurs 
when Hamlet tries to persuade the players to a recitation of Aneas' tale to Dido: 
If it live in your memory, 
Begin at this line - let me see, let me see - 
The rugged Pyrrhus. like th'Hyrcanian beast- 
Tis not so. It begins with Pyrrhus- 
The rugged Pyrrhus. he whose sable arms. 
(Il. ii. 444-448) 
In a remark that bears strikingly upon this ironic relation between theatre and memory, 
Lacan figures the hesitation as "an indirect discourse, isolated in quotation marks within 
the thread of narration, and, if the discourse is played out, it is on a stage implying the 
presence not only of the chorus, but also of spectators, " E2Lt. *, p. 47. Lacan's point here, 
as I understand it, is not simply the fact that hesitation testifies to the subject's domination 
by the symbolic, but that it is in the future anterior of the non-imaginary viewpoint of the 
Ego-Ideal, a symbolic determination that consists in the way that I see the others seeing 
me, that the subject is to be located. Much of the present chapter is largely concerned to 
show how Hamlet is haunted by precisely this kind of "virtual" space without which, and 
this is the most radical import of the Lacanian object, there can be no subject. 
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of the fact that the text is continually traversed by numerous references to the word "haste": 
Barnardo urges his Francisco to "make haste" (I. i. 12); Marcellus remarks upon the ghost's 
return in terms of "this sweaty haste" (11.80); Horatio refers to "post-haste and rummage in 
the land" (11.110) and, in recounting the ghost's appearance to Hamlet, he describes how "it 
shrunk in haste away" (I. ii. 219); enquiring after the duration of the ghost's stay Horatio 
responds that "one with moderate haste might/tell a hundred" (11.237); eager to hear the 
ghosfs tale Hamlet urges "haste me to know't" (I. v. 29); Rozencrantz and Guildenstem are 
victims of "hasty sending" (Il. ii. 4); the Queen diagnoses Hamlet's behaviour as concern 
about her "o'er hasty marriage" (II. ii. 57); Hamlet bids "the players make haste" (Ill. ii. 50); 
Rozencrantz reassures Claudius that "we will haste us" (III. iii. 27); sending them on another 
errand Claudius urges them "I pray you to haste in this" (IV. ii. 37), and offers similar advice 
to Laertes: "Pray you make haste" (IV. iv. 60). 
Indeed, in Polonius's lengthy exposition to Reynaldo, spying becomes not so much an 
undertaking that involves subterfuge or reconnaissance missions as a heightened sensitivity to 
this dual movement of delay and precipitation: to the subject's relation to the signifier. 
Tutoring him on how to arrive at a knowledge of Laertes' exploits by "drift of question, " 
Polonius posits a relationship between truth and misrecognition by which means the truth, 
literally, arises from misrecognition. At the level of pedagogy at least, his peroration is as 
eloquent a summary of transference as we are likely to find: 
Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth; 
And thus do we of wisdom and of reach, 
With windlasses and with assays of bias 
By indirections find directions out. 
So by my former lecture and advice 
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Shall you my son. 
(II. i. 63-68) 
In Lacan's seminar on transference, the transferential encounter with truth is described in 
similarly eccentric terms as "inadequate modes of operation, taken by indirect and 
roundabout ways. 1177 As Demnark's state-appointed confidant who is very adept at 
interposing himself "in the ear /Of all ... conference" (IIIJ. 186-7) Polonius shares with the 
psychoanalyst an awareness that, in the register of speech, Truth inheres not at the level of 
fact but at the level of meaning as something that is an effect of intersubjective relations. In 
this sense, the secretary is the arch-cryptonomist who embodies the fact that the secret, in a 
Derridean schema, "is not a deprived interiority that one would have to reveal, confess, 
announce ... the secret 
is not phenomenalizable. 1178 In fact, in the end, Polonius' demise is 
occasioned by overlooking the fact that this "third place" is a strictly symbolic 
determination. 
For Lacan, it is the Big Other which designates the fact that in non-psychotic speech the 
addressee is always beyond the imaginary relation. Truth finds its consecration in speech by 
presupposing recognition by a third term, the symbolic order, where the subject is recognised 
by it only because it is recognised first. In the transference, it is what Lacan has called "the 
subject supposed to knoNV' that occupies this place marked for a third. That is to say, truth is 
always the truth of the symbolic "big Other, " it does not occur in the intimacy of self- 
experience, but results from the way that the subject's activity is inscribed in the field of 
77 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. p. 147. 
78 Jacques Derrida, On The Name (California, 1996), p. 25. 
Tbe 11-hr, 1, r, -: 7pr. -Pro;! an Objr--rf 
185 
intersubjective relations. Similarly, Claudius reminds Rozencrantz and Guildenstem that 
their inquiries into Hamlet's madness must be conducted through "drift of conference" (III. i. 
21). In the case of Ophelia, who bears "A document in madness: thoughts and remembrance 
fitted" (IV. V. 176), such vicissitudes attending signification also become the cause of political 
anxiety. Exhorting the Queen to talk to her, one courtier advises that 
Her speech is nothing, 
Yet the unshaped use of it doth move 
The hearers to collection. They aim at it, 
And botch the words up fit to their own thoughts 
(IV. v. 7-10) 
Indeed, we might recall here Robert Weimann's account of the way that Protestantism 
rearticulated the relationship between truth and representation so that authority was "no 
longer given, as it were, before the writing and reading began, the act of representation was 
turned into a site on which authority could be negotiated, disputed, or reconstituted. 1179 
Protestant divines regularly meditated on this matter. Jeremy Taylor, for example, in a 
metaphor that finds some resonance in Hamle , argues in Ductor Dubitantium that there is 
greater moral value in the search for truth than in its discovery, therefore "it is not necessary 
it should be searched for. It may be, it cannot be hit, but it must be aimed at. "80 
Hamle 's traumatic searching out of the place where truth is hid extends beyond the prince's 
wistful commentary on the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, " employing variously 
inflected metaphors of aiming and shooting which substitute a topology of curved space for a 
79 Robert Weimann, Authority and Representation in EarlY Modern Discoum% ed. David 
Hillman (Baltimore, 1978), p. 5. 
80 Quoted in Meg Lota Brown, 'The Politics of Conscience in Reformation England, " 
Renaissance and Reformation 15(1991), pp. 101-114, p. 105n. 24. 
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model of subject-centred linear determinism. While Laertes counsels Ophelia that in her 
dealings with Hamlet she "keep in the rear of your affection/Out of the shot and danger of 
desire" (I. iii. 33-34), Polonius is similarly perplexed by Hamlet's perspicacious reply "that 
often madness hits orf'(II. ii. 208-210). Claudius seeks to ensure that the rumours of political 
instability "may miss our name/And hit the woundless air" (IV. ii. 40-44). Later he agonizes 
that his "arrows.. have reverted to my bow again, /But not where I had aimd them" (IV. vii. 2 I- 
24). At one point Hamlet even laments to Laertes that "I have shot my arrow o'er the house/ 
And hurt my brother" (V. ii. 238-239). 
In the context of a discussion on apophatic theologernes Derrida has discussed the movement 
of deferred action in terms of, precisely, this recursive trajectory: 
But an arrow is only an arrow; it is never an end in itself It is 
everything save what it aims for, save what it strikes, even, indeed, save 
what it wounds; this is what makes the arrow miss even that which it 
touches, which thereby remains safe. 81 
Indeed, Lacan's obsession with topological models of "curved space, " those occasions where 
"the arrow always comes back toward the subjeCt, 1182 in part argues that subjectivity is a 
structural effect of the convoluted folds of the signifying chain. To be a subject is always to 
read the message that that returns in its inverted form; where knowledge is, like Hamlet's 
letter, "folded up in the form of th'other" (V. ii. 51). Hamle'staleof "accidental judgements" 
and "purposes mistook/Fall'n on th' inventors heads" (V. ii. 3 87,3 89-90) may be read as 
almost an epigrammatic account of Lacan's insistence that the letter always arrives at its 
destination precisely on account of this surplus of result over intention. That is to say, it is 
81 Jacques Derrida. 0o i, trans. Thomas Dutoit (California, 1994), p. 36. 
. 
? riý, p 
82 Quoted in Slavoj zizek, Tarrying With The Negative, p. 196. 
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part of the malevolent sport of the signifier to involve the subject in this perpetual drama of 
self-undermining. "[T]o have the enginer/Hoist with his own petard" (III. iv. 208-209) 
encapsulates the structural antagonism that is a consequence of the non-coincidence between 
the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. Lacan's theory of curved space 
which, Moebius-like, loops back around to its source does so only because of this breach 
which, constitutively, is the subject. In other words, what we refer to as subjectivity is this 
structural paradox, a missing link in the signifying chain (S) or cryptic effect of the signifier 
which Lacan has appropriately defined as "an object that cannot be swallowed, as it were, 
which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier. "83 As we shall see in the concluding 
section, Lacan's choice of metaphor here is not altogether inappropriate for a text like 
Hamlet. 
Object Voice 
Awaiting the disclosure of Claudius's hitherto "occulted guilt" during the play-within-the- 
play, Hamlet promises to "observe his looks; /I'll tent him to the quick. If a do blench) I 
know my course" (II. ii. 592-594). As the Arden editor points out "a tent was an instrument 
for examining or cleansing a wound. 1184 Not only does the original meaning of "trauma" 
itself, of course, mean "wound, " Cathy Caruth draws attention to the apocryphal tale of 
Tancred in Freud's Beyond The Pleasure Pring: iple . Here, Freud relates trauma to a voice 
that is, quite literally, released through the wound: 
83 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, p. 207. 
84 Harold Jenkins, 0. -cit., p. 
214, n. 1 8. 
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The figure of Tancred addressed by the speaking wound constitutes, in 
other words, not only a parable of trauma and its uncanny repetition but, 
more generally, a parable of psychoanalytic theory itself as it listens to a 
voice that it cannot fully know but to which it nevertheless bears 
witness. 85 
I would also like to argue that in Hamlet the "voice" increasingly comes to be articulated 
around a certain void in the text's intersubjective relations. 
The dislocating telephony of the ghost's disembodied cries from "under the stage" (I. v. 157 
S. D. ) is, perhaps, most redolent of the text's cryptic topology of a "no place or non-place 
within space, a place as no-place" that enables the "ghost" to "haunt with all kinds of 
ventriloquism. 1186 Indeed, this is not the only example of the text's ghostly ventriloquism. If, 
as I have argued, space is but an elaborate effect of the spacing that appears to haunt it, the 
voice also "haunts" Hamlet by encrypting itself in those spaces from which it appears to 
withdraw. That is to say, the status of the "voice" in the text more properly conforms to its 
role as the Lacanian object: as something that cannot itself be present, although the whole 
notion of presence and unalloyed interiority is constructed around it and can be established 
only by its elision. To establish itself as separate, the subject has to have something to be 
separate from: this much is foreshadowed by Lacan's object -a. 
Indeed, we may even suggest 
here that the decidedly "paranoid" atmosphere of Elsinore is accountable partly to the fact 
that, to recall Lacan's definition of paranoia, this constituting lack has ceased to remain 
66virtual, " that is, the object a appears to be included within the frame of reality itself Time 
85 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma. Narrative. and Hist= (London, 
1996), p. 6. 
86 Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolf Man's Magic Wo - WtonyMy 
(Minneapolis, 1986), x1viii. 
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and again at Elsinore speech is regulated through the presumed presence of some imaginary 
auditor who is located "in the ear/Of all conference" (IIIJ. 186-187). 87 
This suspicion, of course, also underlies the deployment of Hamlet's improvisational skills 
with regard to The Murder of Gonzag when he instructs an actor to "study a speech of some 
dozen or sixteen lines, which I would set down and insert in't" (II. ii. 535-536). "Authority in 
the Shakespearean text, " Jonathan Goldberg has argued, "is a matter not of having a voice but 
of voicing. 1188 Similarly, in Hamlet the status of the voice becomes less a marker for the 
plenitude of an unalloyed interiority so much as a certain trace of alterity that has always 
already dislocated the origin. Although Hamlet uses the conceit of the recorder to confound 
attempts to "pluck out the heart of my mystery" (III. ii. 356-357) and Reynaldo is instructed 
by Polonius to "sound" Laertes (Il. i. 43), Horatio is also characterized as "a pipe for Fortune's 
finger/To sound what stops she pleases" (11.70-71). Moreover, not only does the prince 
deliver a long excursus on how the players should "mouth" their play, he also teases Ophelia 
by suggesting that he could supply the verbal accompaniment to the dumb show "if I/Could 
see the puppets dallying" (Ill. ii. 241-2). 
87 indeed, Elsinore becomes a particularly resonant example of the great houses of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries which, as Lawrence Stone has argued, were largely 
"constructed of interlocking suites of rooms without corridors, so that the only way of 
moving about was by passing through other people's chambers ... Always, at all times of day or night, servants were spying through cracks in the wainscoting, peering through 
keyholes, listening at doors to hear the rhythmic creaking of beds, and carefully 
inspecting the bed-linen for tell-tale stain. " Lawrence Stone, The Family. Sex and 
Marriage in England. 1500-1800 (New York, 1979), pp. 1 69-70. For an exemplary 
reading of contemporary theoretical elaborations of Lacanian "paranoia" see Jerry Anne 
Flieger, "Postmodern Perspective: The Paranoid Eye, " New Litera[y History, 28 (1997), 
p. 87-109. 
Johnathan Goldberg, Voice. Terminal. Echo: Postmode 
Texts (London, 1985), p. 1 19. 
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This notion of the voice as object, which cannot be attributed to any subject and thus hovers 
in some indefinite interspace, is an example of what Michel Chion has called ]a voix 
acousmatiqu . 
89 Old Hamlet becomes the most conspicuous marker in the text of the way 
that the relationship between voice and the body is always at some level spectral. From 
Horatio's first anxious inquiry as to whether the ghost "has any sound or use of voice" 
(I. i. 13 1) the text dwells obsessively upon this "phantornization"90 of the voice; that is to say, 
a voice that is without support in a subject that serves as its source: Claudius reassures 
Laertes that his departure from Denmark will not lose him his voice (I. ii. 45); Laertes urges 
Ophelia not to succumb to Hamlet whom "the main voice of Denmark goes withal" (I. ii. 28); 
Polonius tutors Laertes to "give every man thy ear, but few thy voice" (I. iii. 68); Hamlet 
offers advice on the actor's use of voice (Il. ii423/550); Rozencrantz tries to persuade Hamlet 
that he has the voice of the king (III. ii. 332); Laertes seeks "a voice and precedent of peace" 
(V. ii. 245); Hamlet nominates Fortinbras as the one who has his "dying voice" (V. ii. 361). At 
the graveside Hamlet broods over a skull that "had a tongue in it, and could sing once" 
(VA. 74) and fantasizes how it might have belonged to a courtier "which could say 'Good 
morrow, sweet lord. How dost thou, sweet lord? "'(11.80-8 1). 
Indeed, the text ends, as it begins, with another example of prosopopeia, the master trope 
which Paul de Man has described as the solicitation of a "voice-from-beyond-the-grave, "91 
89 Michel Chion, La Voix au cinema (Paris, 1982), p. 12. In a more recent elaboration of 
this concept, Chion explicitly relates this effect to the phenomenality of the ghost: "A 
ghost is traditionally one who went unburied or was badly buried. Precisely the same is 
true of the acousmetre, when the voice of a person not yet seen is involved, for here too 
there is something which can neither enter the frame in order to attach itself to one of the 
bodies which revolve there ... and is therefore doomed to wander on the surface"(Chion 1992,195). 
90 Derrida has argued that the voice "makes itself heard because its place of emission is 
not fixed - phantornization occurs when it has no assignable place" (Derrida 1994,135). 
91 Paul do Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticiso2 (New York, 1984), p. 77. 
Tho Objr. -O 
191 
when the suitably named (H)oratio becomes the repository of Hamlet's voice by appointing 
himself ventriloquist to the prince's corpse: "I shall have also cause to speak/And from his 
mouth whose voice will draw [on]more" (V. ii. 392). 92 In an act which links explicitly the 
proccss of interiorization with commmoration, what is hintcd at herc is a macabrc 
encrypting of Hamlet as the "living dead" that will "continue to lodge ... like something other 
and to ventrilocate through the 'living. " 93 The "voice can betray the body to which it is 
lent, it can make it ventriloquize as if the body were no longer anything more than the actor 
or the double of another voice, of the voice of the other.. "94 In Elsinore, the possibility that 
the voice can become attached to the wrong body can have fatal consequences. It is precisely 
because Hamlet takes him "for thy better" (III. iv. 32) - in other words Claudius - that the 
disembodied cries of Polonius from behind the arras are the cause of his demise. 
In Lacan' s "graph of desire" the voice is the remainder of the signifying operation, that is, the 
meaningless piece of the real which stays behind once the operation of quilting [ 
is performed. It is this cut in the signifying chain that, for Lacan, "verifies the structure of 
the subject as discontinuity in the real, 1195 and argues that it is precisely because of a 
constitutive impossibility of embodiment that the object -a 
is strictly homologous to the void 
92 Adopting a more rigorously Freudian approach which focuses almost exclusively upon 
the prince's exchanges with his father, Marjorie Garber's discussion of Hamlet makes 
reference to prosopopeia as an Oedipalised structure of memory and mourning. Marjorie 
Garber, Shakespeare's Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causalit (London, 1987), 
p. 1 45. 
93 Jacques Derrida, "Roundtable on Autobiography, " Peggy Kamuf trans., in Christie 
McDonald et. al. eds., The Ear of the Other: Texts and Discussions with Jacques 
Derrida (London, 1988), pp. 41-93, p. 57-8. 
94 Jacques Derrida, "Voice I I, " Andermatt Conley trans,, in Elizabeth Weber ed., 
Jacques Derrida: Points .... Interviews. 1974-1994 (California, 1995), pp. 156-71, p. 161. 95 Jacques Lacan, "The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire, " in EgILt, % 
A Selection, p-299- 
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of the subject: it is the object cause of desire insofar as the failure of symbolization opens up 
the "nothing" within which the very process of symbolization takes place: 
[objectal status] is applicable not because they represent only partially the 
function that produces them ... These objects have one common feature in my 
elaboration of them - they have no specular image, or, in other words, alterity. It 
is what enables them to be the 'stuff, ' or rather the lining, though not in any sense 
the reverse, of the very subject that one takes to be the subject of consciousness. 
For this subject, who thinks he can accede to himself by designating himself in 
the statement, is no more than such an object (emphasis added). 96 
V 
Indeed, Slavoj ZiZek has described the voice as something which "acquires a spectral 
autonomy, it never quite belongs to the body we see, so that even when we see a living 
person talking, there is always some degree of ventriloquism at work. " 97 "Speak, I am 
bound to hear" (l. v. 6) is Hamlet's response to the ghost's request that he "lend thy serious 
hearing/To what I shall unfold" (11.4-5). "To listen to words, " Lacan insists, "is already more 
or less to obey them. 1198 Also arguing how the commanding authority of the voice is always 
already inscribed in the very posture of listening, Mladen Dolar makes the important point 
that 
96 ibid., p. 915. 
97 SlavoJ Z*%' k, "'I Hear You With My Eyes"; or, The Invisible Master' in Renata Salecl 
. 
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and SlavoJ Zi2ek (eds) Gaze and Voice as Love OWNAt (London, 1996), pp. 90-129, p. 92. 
While I am attempting to posit some kind of similarity betmýeqn Lacan and Derrida in terms 
of their understanding of the spectral nature of the voice, Zizek is correct to emphasize 
how this intrusion of the Real also marks significant differences between the two thinkers: 
"in the antagonistic tension between signifier and object, voice is thus on the side of the 
object: voice in its fundamental dimension, is not the ideal (totally transparent, pliant, 
self-effacing) signifier, but its exact opposite, the opaque inertia of an objectal 
remainder ..... Perhaps therein resides the abyss that forever separates the Real of an 
antagonism from Derrida's differance: differance points towards the constant and 
constitutive deferral of impossible self-identity, whereas in Lacan, what the movement of 
symbolic deferral-subsý$ution forever fails to attain is not Identity but the Real of an 
antagonism. " Slavoj Zizek, The Indivisible Remainder (London, 1996), p. 1 00. 
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The verb to obey stems from French obeir, which in turn stems from Latin 
oboedire, to listen. One can find the same etymological connection in 
German, where Gehorsam, obedience, comes from horen, to listen, and in a 
considerable number of other languages. 99 
Indeed, if Hamlet is in many respects the articulated confrontation between "two fathers, " 
this very doubling in the text is transposed into the psychoanalytical split between the father 
as the agent of the Law and the "(un)dead" father as the bearer of a surplus enjoyment that 
Lacan associates with the obscene superego. In this respect the difference between Law and 
superego coincides with that between writing (Claudius) and voice (Old Hamlet) in the play. 
As Slavoj Zilek argues, public law is essentially writte - precisely and only because "it is 
written, " our ignorance of Law cannot serve as an excuse; it does not exculpate us in the eyes 
of the Law. The status of the superego, in contrast, is that of a traumatic voice, an intruder 
persecuting us and disturbing our psychic balance. "' 00 What we call the "Law, " in its pure 
form, before commanding anything specific, is epitomized by a voice that "commands" 
although it is senseless in itself - being that remnant of the dead Father who is not quite 
dead. 101 Ultimately, in terms of Hamlet's paradoxical interiors, this object voice bears 
witness to the primal father's terrible jouissanc that cannot be absorbed by the Law but is 
that which encrypts itself within the Law: haunting it, quite literally, as its unacknowledged 
98 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book III: The Psychoses, trans. 
Russell Grigg (London, 1993), p. 137. 
99 Mladen Dolar "The Object Voice" in Gaze and Voice as Love Oblegta (London, 1997), 
%. 7-32, p. Z8,, n2. 
Slavoj Zizek, The Metast ses of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Caus" 
London, 1994), p. 57. 
01 For an expert account of the ambivalent relationship between 'voice' and 'authority' in 
sixteenth-century England, see Bruce R. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early-Modern 
England: Attending To The O-Facto (London, 1999), pp. 222-45. 
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obscene support. It is this paradoxical relationship between subjectivity, the Law and 
enjoyment that will be given more extensive consideration in the concluding two chapters. 
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Chapter Five 
"Strange Forms": 
Subjectivity and Metastasis in Antony and Cleopatra 
"We base the assurance of the subject in 
his encounter with the filth that may support him"' 
"Vilest Things" 
Returning from a second exploration to the Hudson Straits in 1576, Martin Frobisher relates 
an event that took place soon after completing his voyage. Having witnessed the death of 
five of his crew members, Frobisher then chanced upon a "piece of doung" that appeared 
initially to be a "thing of no account. " Upon his return home this strange object was thrown 
accidentally by his wife onto a fire that, miraculously, revealed it to be "a bright marquesite 
of gold. " Taking advantage of this apparent discovery, Frobisher then embarked upon a 
third voyage and returned home with 1,700 tons of his secret treasure. Upon closer 
inspection of this strange substance, however, and much to Frobisher's despair, the haul was 
revealed to be nothing other than what Julia Briggs politely refers to as "fool's gold. 112 
I Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, 
trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1994), p. 258. 
2 Quoted in Julia Briggs, This Stage-Play World: Texts and Contexts. 1580-im (Oxford, 1997), 
p. 85-6. 
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In many ways, Frobisher's experience here may be read as a particularly vivid illustration of 
the way that early modem "writers and travellers grappled with ways of making use of the 
foreign materia 'produced' by colonialiSM.,, 
34 Many contemporary accounts of the New 
World are marked by the gnawing anxiety that, as one commentator puts it, the "rich Stuffell 
imported from the colonies were possessed of a strange materiality that threatened either to 
66vanish away in smoake, or be consumed and brought (as it were) unto doung. "5 
Frequently referred to in terms of an oscillating dialectic between surplus and lack, the 
dispositif of anamorphosis provided a particularly serviceable metaphor for the way that the 
colonial encounter threatened to exceed the cognitive grasp of early modem writers. In the 
epistle to MicrocosmuS, for example, Peter Heylyn reminds readers that his narrative should 
,, 6 be viewed "as in some magical perspective. Similarly, John Fletcher's account of the 
exotic wonders to be found on The Purple Island cautions that the nature of his subject 
matter calls for a dual perspective to be assumed by the reader: 
As some optick-glasses, if we looke one way, increase the object; if the 
other, lesser the quantity: such an Eye that looks through Affection it 
doubles any good, and extreminates what is amisse - such is that eye 
whereby you must view these wonders. 7 
3 Kim Hall, Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England. (London, 
1995), p-4- 
5 Quoted in Patricia Fumerton, Cultural Aesthetics: Renaissance Literature and the Practice of Social 
Ornament (London, 1996), p. 174. According to Roland Barthes while the visible evidence of 
colonial expansion was to be found in an 'empire of things, ' it also ushered in an entirely new 
relationship between the object and matter insofar as there occurred a "real transformation of the 
object which no longer has an essence, but takes refuge entirely within its attributes. " "le Monde- 
object, " in Calliaram: Essays in New Art Histo[y from France ed. Richard Howard and Norman 
Bryson, (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 107-15, p. 110. 
6 Peter Heylyn, Microcosmus, (1598) STC No. 13276 
7 John Fletcher, The Purple Island, (1602) STC No. 11543 
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Indeed, it is this lack of any unmediated access to the New World that prompts John Gillies 
to remark that alongside colonial exploration was the persistent anxiety that "if the New 
A World was there, it was [so] only in an arbitrary and phantasmal way. In his Atlas of 
1595, Gerard Mercator even confesses that, far from reconstituting the world into an object 
of rational comprehension, the "globe" as it was disclosed through colonial exploration "is 
rather an object of the secret conception of humane understanding, than of the sharp- 
sightedness of our eyes. "9 
Frobisher's predicament then may be read as a paradigmatic example of a certain excess that 
clings to the colonial scene: a radically "foreign" remainder that, I would like to argue, 
simultaneously opens access to desire and also that which persists as the excremental dross 
that exceeds symbolic mediation. Lacanian psychoanalysis argues that in the passage to 
modernity proper there evolved two ways of coping with this excess: Humanism avoided 
confrontation with it through its gentrification or idealization in fantasy; on the other hand, 
paradoxically, an emergent capitalist economy put it into to use, manipulating it in order to 
keep its productive machinery in perpetual motion. In short, I would like to suggest here 
that the fate of Frobisher's secret treasure encapsulates neatly what kind of 
"transubstantiation" underpins both desiring subjectivity and colonial discourse in particular. 
We might begin then by considering the last scene of Antony and Cleopatra, a text where 
subjectivity is routinely negotiated around a similar incursion of alterity. Apparently 
resigned to her fate at the hands of Caesar, the queen of Egypt prepares for suicide in a 
John Gillies, Shakespeare and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, 1996), p. 42. 
Ibid., P. 63. 
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speech that has proved to be both perplexing and disturbing for modem editors of the play. 
Famously, Cleopatra remarks that she is looking forward to a time "Which sleeps, and never 
palates more the dung, /The beggar's nurse, and Caesar's" (V. ii. 7-8). M. R. Ridley has 
argued that Cleopatra's reference to "dung" here is so "repulsive to modem refinement" that 
many editors have chosen "to read d for dung. "10 Even the most recent editor of the play LU-9 
urges that these lines be read merely as 'expressing a contempt for earthly life. "' 1 What 
such editorial glosses are powerless to evade, however, are those other occasions in the text 
which, to varying degrees, are similarly connotative of what Ridley refers to obliquely as an 
"unpleasant idea. " 12 More specifically, in the light of Cleopatra's metaphor how are we to 
read Antony's seemingly innocent observation that "our dungy earth alike/Feeds beast as 
man" (I. i. 35-6)? Indeed, things become even more problematical when Caesar celebrates his 
general's former manly prowess by recalling how Antony "didst drink/the stale of horses, 
and the gilded puddle/Which beasts would cough at. " (Liv. 61-3). To be blunt: in a text that, 
I will argue, repeatedly questions the economics of any pure loss or expense, this dilemma of 
what to do with shit variously becomes the focus of some anxiety. 13 
In a way that would no doubt prove equally offensive to modern refinement, psychoanalysis 
offers a productive point of departure for negotiating this problem. At one level, according 
to Lacan, coprophagy may be called a perversio insofar as it disorders the relationship 
10 Antony and Cleopatra, ed. M. R. Ridley (London, 1971), p. 194, n. 7-8. 
11 Antony and Cleopatra, ed. John Wilders (London 1998), p. 276, n. 7. 
12 11 Ul. 
13 In this precise sense objecta is the anal object. Prior to its symbolic status as a "gift" to the Other 
as Freud remarks, the excrement is objecta in the sense of the non-symbolizable surplus that 
remains after the body is symbolized, inscribed into the symbolic network: the problem of the anal 
stage resides precisely in how the subject is to dispose of this leftover. 
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between desire and drive. 14 The pervert, rather than accepting the fundamental 
objectlessness of the drive, seeks to fill in the lack, uncovered in the erogenous zone of the 
mouth, with a real object. Coprophagy, in other words, implies a confusion between a real 
object and the object of the real (the object a); the latter, as we know, being necessary as a 
66cause" of desire. The potentially traumatic consequences of coprophagy, however, turns 
upon the seemingly elementary observation that once the subject consumes something it is 
not there for the subject to have a relationship with it. 
For there to be any relationship tout court something has to be left over, something must not 
be consumed. What must not be consumed is, for Lacan, precisely those "objects" that he 
refers to as the object q: the breast, faeces, urine, all the waste products and discharge that 
fall from the body. It is through this primal separation that the subject constitutes itself 
through a rejection of the Thing, i. e. by way of assuming a minimal distance toward the 
excremental substance of enjoyment itself. Coprophagy, in other words, is a perversion in 
the clinical sense precisely insofar as it attempts a reversal of this process: one way for the 
subject to be sure that it has the "lost" faeces back is to ingest them again., 5 Even more 
pointedly, for Lacan "shit" is the object par excellence: the subject exchanges his being 
(condensed in the object a) in return for a place in symbolic exchange; i. e. for a signifier 
which represents him for another signifier. 16 According to Lacan this object is phantasmal 
14 See Jacques Lacan, Joan Copjec ed., Television, Denis Holier et. al. trans., (New York, 1990), 
p. 56- 
15 Freud, of course, argued that faecal matter is something from which the child separates itself out of 
love for the other and which subsequently comes to acquire a phantasmatic "value" in compensation 
for the sheer exorbitance of thisjoss. 
16 This is how the subject -Ua 
4 emerges from the structure of exchange: it emerges when 
"something is exchanged for nothing, " that is to say, it is the very "nothing" the subject gets from the 
symbolic structure, from the Other, in exchange for sacrificing its pathological particularity, this kernel 
of being which Lacan refers to as the objecta. It is from within this context that we should 
e- 
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insofar as it is possessed of no "positive" properties as such: its role, rather, is to fill out a 
void in the symbolic order that constitutively is the subject qua S (J). 
Indeed, we might recall here one critic's revealing summary of Antony and Cleol2atr as "a 
hypostasis which at one moment shall seem to be compounded of mere dross and at another 
of purest gold; a hypostasis where the dross shall be miraculously transformed. " 17 It is, in a 
slightly more problematical sense, precisely this power of "miraculous transformation" that 
is also hinted at in Cleopatra's outraged response to the news of Antony's impending 
marriage to Octavia. In what is, effectively, another example where a precious object is 
about to find its way back to the mouth, Cleopatra wams the messenger that "The gold I 
give thee I will melt and pour/Down thy ill-uttering throat" (Il. v. 34-5). There is, I would 
argue, a form of oral displacement at work here that is not unconnected to the coprophagic 
imagery of the text. The punishment fantasized by Cleopatra is perhaps the most vivid 
illustration of how the boundary that inheres between waste and transcendent value 
throughout the play is, ultimately, a purely formal one: the object-Thing generates its value 
phantasmatically in accordance with the position it comes to occupy in a particular fantasy 
space. In other words, "mere dross and purest gold" are intimately related to each other qua 
the object a as that which acquires consistency only when it is invested with desire: i. e. as 
an element that simultaneously opens up a void that it ostensibly tries to replenish. 
Antony and Cleopatra variously recalls this psychoanalytical association between the 
primordial "interest in gold and of defecation" which Freud claimed to "be the most 
understand Lacan's repeated assertions that there is no subjectivity without the reduction of the 
subject's positive-substantial being to a disposable piece of shit. 
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extensive of all" in the phantasies that regulate the psychic life of the subject. 18 For 
example in an image that ironically recalls the "gilded puddle" from which Antony did drink 
the stale of horses" (Liv. 62), a messenger is greeted by Cleopatra with the remark that her 
lover "hath/with his tinct gilded thee" (l. v. 36-7). The use of both "tincture" and "gilded" 
here again implies a power of transubstantiation that remains ambiguous. While the term 
"gilded" earlier referred to a surface that is made iridescent by accumulated scum, "tincture, " 
as M. R. Ridley notes, is also a Renaissance term that "was supposed to turn the basest 
metal into gold. "19 Having "transform'd" Antony into a "strumpet's fool" (118) Egypt 
appears to be possessed of a strange power of transformation. 20 In many respects the text 
locates Egypt as the archetypal colonial phantasm: suffused with an aura of unreal wealth 
the colonial scene can only be glimpsed obliquely in a fetishizing dialectic of surplus and 
lack. 21 In a text that has often been praised for the plasticity of its poetic invention, 22 
17 Robert Speaight, Nature in Shakespearean Tragedy (London, 1964), p. 56. 
18 Sigmund Freud, "Character and Anal Eroticism" in On Sexuality: Three Essays on the TheQnLgI 
Sexuality and Other Works, ed. Angela Richards ed. (London, 1991), p. 213. In "Anxiety and 
Instinctual Life" Freud argues that "faeces were the first gift that an infant could make, something he 
could part with out of love for whoever was looking after him ... this ancient interest in the faeces is transformed into the high valuation of g-Q-1d and money. " New Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis, ed. James Strachey (London, 1997), pp. 1 13-144, p. 1 34. 
19 M. R. Ridley, gp-. &-it., p. 40, n. 37. 
20 Grieving the loss of Fulvia, for example, Antony is reassured by Enobarbus that "your old smock 
brings/forth a new petticoat" (I. ii. 166-7). 
21 Contemporary accounts of the Orient frequently alight upon this unreal wealth. Thomas Herbert, 
for example, finds the dress of the natives "loathsome and abominable" which "for all their lustre 
thwarting the face makes that which is an ornament to them to us seem very deformed. " Quoted in 
Early Modern Tales of Orient: A Critical Anthology, ed. Kenneth Parker (London, 1999), p. 1 98. 
Similarly John Cartwright remarks upon how "The walls glitter with red marble, and pargetting of many 
colours. Yea, all the place is paved with chequered and tesselled work; and on the same is spread 
carpets wrought with silk and gold, the windows of alabaster. White marble, and much other spotted 
marble, the posts and wickets of massy ivory checked with glittering black ebony, so curiously 
wrought in winding knots, as may easier stay than satisfie the eyes of the wondering beholder. " jbi-d., 
P. 1 15. 
22 According to F. E. Halliday, for example, the text is evidence of Shakespeare's artistic maturity 
insofar as its language comes to resemble "a plastic substance to be modeled into forms of any 
shape or size. " The Poet[y of Shakespeare's Plays (London, 1954), p. 78. 
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Norman Holland also observes how Antony and Cleopatra is variously concerned with 
"working precious metals, burnishing them, beating them, forming them into tissue, precious 
,, 23 metals in the presence of fire and water, as they might be in a goldsmith's shop. In fact 
gold is mentioned twelve times in the play, always associated with Egypt, and nine times 
out of the twelve with Cleopatra herself. Far from crystallizing the animating 
"pathological" source of her pleasure, however, the cumulative effect is one of an excessive 
iridescence that in fact renders any access to Cleopatra increasingly opaque. 24 Indeed, 
Enobarbus's conviction that "vilest things become themselves in her" situates Cleopatra as 
the very principle of transformative activity itself where, through a kind of logical inversion, 
the wealth of her substantial content can only be grasped through those things that 
ostensibly merely "represent" her. Whether she is referred to by Rome either as Antony's 
"precious queen" (I. iii. 32) or as "this foul Egyptian" (IV. xii. 10) Cleopatra stubbornly 
remains a superfluity that is either too little or too much. Is it not also here, precisely, that 
we encounter the Freudian/Lacanian paradox of a jouissanc "beyond the pleasure 
principle, " whose contours can be discerned only negatively, as the contours of an invisible 
void? In other words, Cleopatra increasingly comes to be negotiated in the text at the level 
of what Lacan punningly calls 12lus-de-jouir (surplus enjoyment), which in French is a 
phrase that plays between the two notions of "excess of enjoyment" as well as "no longer 
any enjoyment. " 
23 Norman N. Holland, "'The Barge She Sat In': Psychoanalysis and Syntactic Choices, " 
httl2: //w. w. w. clas. ufl. edu/users/nnh/-barae. htm, pp. 1-13, p. 8. 
24 This feature of surplus visuality has not gone unnoticed by critics of the play. Charles Knight 
remarks of the play that "we cannot gaze upon it steadily, " Studies of Shakespeare (New York, 
1971), p. 320; and M. R. Ridley also cautions that for all Cleopatra's "splendour, " "we should not 
allow our eyes to be so dazzled by it. " M. R. Ridley Mc -, 
it., x1ii. 
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This rhetoric of transubstantiation in the text, with its incessant foregrounding of the 
permeability and labile quality of substance, locates matter less as a brute positivity than 
pure potentiality: as the very "stuff' of enjoyment itself. 25 Time and again Antony an 
Cleopatr hints that the most original enjoyment would be that of the fusion of the human 
with the non-human, or even more primal, that of matter with matter itself. the realm of 
matter enjoying itself with matter is, according to Lacan, the ultimate deadly pleasure. 
Indeed, Lacan argues that this is the scene proper to an eroticism that poses a threat to every 
effort of rational mediation: "transformation of matter into another matter, which engenders 
itself, [so] that traditionally this perpetuity of matter has become the site of evil. qiM 
Throughout Antony and Cleopatra it is, of course, the Nile which becomes this mythical 
source of generation that constitutively "overflows" every measure. Antony, for example, 
observes of the Nile that "Much is breeding, /Which like the courser's hair, hath yet but life" 
(I. ii. 190-1). The Nile is, simultaneously, an agent of both life and death that persists, rather, 
as an undea Thing that nothing can resist. Referred to as the vivifying source of the 
25 We might bear in mind here Elias Crooke's contention that "All bodies are Transpirable and 
transfluxible ... so open to the ayre that it may passe and repasse through them. " Quoted in Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern Engjan-d (New 
York, 1993), p. 9. This is also precisely what Cleopatra imagines will be her fate at the hands of her 
Roman captors, within whose"thick breaths, /Rank of gross diet, shall we be enclouded, /And forced 
to drink their vapour" (V. ii. 210-12). 
26 Jacques Lacan. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 122. Not perhaps entirely coincidentally, Antony 
and Cleopatra contains more references to the word "matter"than any other play by Shakespeare: 
unimpressed by reports of Antony's alliance with Caesar, Pompey witheringly remarks that "I could 
have given less matter/A better ear" (11132-3); assessing the political impact of Antony's speech 
Caesar remarks that I do not much like the matter" (I. H. 1 2); Charmian asks the soothsayer to provide 
a "matter/of more weight" (II. H. 65); praising Antony and Caesar's reconciliation, Maceneas confesses 
he is "glad that matters are so well digested" (Il. ii. 176); Cleopatra invites a Roman messenger to "Pour 
out the pack of matter to mine ear" (11. v. 54); feigning indifference to the news Antony's marriage, 
Cleopatra exclaims that tis no matter" (Il. v. 1 11) and later silences Charmian's description of Octavia 
with the same remark (111. iii. 45); resigned to his military defeat, Antony dismisses it as "No matter" 
(III. xi. 39-40); incredulous of a plot of political insurrection Pompey responds I think th'art mad. The 
matter? " (I Lvii. 55); when she is asked by Dolabella if she knows him, Cleopatra respond "No matter, 
sir, what I have heard or known" (V. ii. 72). 
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serpent of Egypt that is "bred now of your mud by/the operation of your sun" (II. vii. 26-7), 
Cleopatra also decides that her grave should be "a ditch in Egypt" or "rather on Nilus' 
mudALay me stark-nak'd, and let the water-flies/Blow me into abhorring" (V. ii. 58-60). 
Egypt's festive predisposition to gender-bending finds its proper phantasmatic support in a 
Nile which, as a Thing that exceeds the laws of biological generation and corruption, 
operates, rather, as a mute witness to some primal condition of non-differentiation. Both 
fecund and phallic, a place of bounty and dearth, the Nile is the bearer of that lethal 
jouissanc Lacan refers to in his myth of the lamella: i. e. a pure life force that is deprived of 
support in the symbolic order. 27 As the site of an acephelous movement of pure auto- 
affection where matter reforms itself, the Nile is redolent of that asexual organ-without-body 
28 
that, in Lacanian terms, retains access to lost enjoyment. Indeed, we might recall here that 
the only "clue" to the cause of Cleopatra's death is condensed in fig-leaves that "Have slime 
upon them, such as the aspic leaves/Upon the caves of the Nile" (V. ii. 349-51). Isnotthe 
obscure erotic charge of this image at some level evoked by reference to that similarly 
66slimy" substance which (in Lacanese) also represents the congealed leftover of a mythical, 
primordial enjoyment? Variously referred to in terms of a palpitating life substance, that 
which "swells" and "as it ebbs, the seedsman/Upon the slime and ooze scatters his 
27 Alternatively, we could say that the Nile is that which remains of reality after reality is deprived of its 
support in fantasy. The Nile belongs to the category of the Sublime here precisely insofar as it 
designates a purposeless energy, an expenditure of force that does not serve anything: the Nile is 
that in "nature" which "doesn't know" and where "it doesn't know, " Lacan argues, ft also enloys. 
And, as I will argue in greater detail later, do we not also find a strange kind of homology with 
Cleopatra here insofar as she is so frequently arraigned for her "useless" expenditure of energy? For 
example, criticized by Antony for her "idleness" Cleopatra responds in a way that contradicts the 
economics of any pure loss or expense: "'Tis sweating labour, /To bear such idleness so near the 
heart/As Cleopatra this" (I. iii. 93-5). 
28 Lacan explicitly refers to the lamella as a monstrous undead object-libido that "represents part of a 
living being that is lost when that being is produced through the straits of sex. " "Position of the 
Unconscious" in Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Bruce fink et. al. (New York, 1994), pp-221-248, p. 234. 
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grain, /And shortly comes to harvest" (II. vii. 20-24), the Nile becomes perhaps the most 
conspicuous example in the text of how this excremental dross of jouissanc bears a power 
of "transubstantiation" that simultaneously gives rise to and threatens to overflow the text's 
strategies of representation. 
In the following pages I would like to develop further some of these questions in order to 
suggest that the dialectics of excess and lack in Antony and Cleol2atr enter into a 
relationship that is much more enigmatic than, traditionally, the criticism of the text would 
appear to suggest. Focusing particularly on those temporal and spatial metastases in the 
play that are productive of its invincibly "strange forms, " my analysis will again make use of 
Lacan and Derrida to argue that Antony and Cleopatra is repeatedly and variously impelled 
forward under the obligation to acquit itself of a remainder, a foreign kernel of jouissanc that 
both sustains and threatens to suspend the internal consistency of the 
symbolic Law itself 
"Behold and See" 
The word "behold, " as Barbara Freedman has observed, "occurs more in Antony an 
,, 29 Cleopatr than in any other of the tragedies. While this fact is certainly related to the 
text's overtly "theatrical" quality, the sheer ubiquity of the term's use also suggests a 
persistent anxiety in the play about the very limits of vision as that which impels the 
Gestalten of Rome's imperial enterprise. Commenting upon Caesar's sadness at Antony's 
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death, for example, Maecenas remarks that "When such a spacious mirror's set before 
himýHe needs must see himself '(V. i. 33-4). Indeed, with its numerous figures of immobile 
statues and hieratic forms, AntoLiy and Cleopatra is uncannily reminiscent of the 
scenography of the 'ego- world' Lacan associates with the 'alienating armour' that is 
assumed by the subject of mirror stage. Insofar as the "mirror stage" involves the 
anticipation of bodily unity and mastery in an image whose stature or commanding presence 
fascinates the subject, the emergence of empire, what Antony refers to as "the wide arch/Of 
the rang'd empire" (I. i. 33-4), is also implicitly made homologous in the text to the erection of 
the phallic "I": the colonizer undergoes a passage through an historical/cultural mirror stage 
which also confers the illusory image of autonomy, unity, integrity and identity. 30 Grieved 
by Cleopatra as a colossus whose "legs bestrid the ocean" (V. ii. 82), Antony is variously 
described as "The triple pillar of the world" (I. i. 12), a "Herculean Roman" (l. iii. 84) or 
"demi-Atlas of this earth" (l. v. 23) whose "pine ... overtopp'd" (IV. xii. 23-4) his political 
enemies. Similarly, Lepidius is referred as "the third part of the world" (II. vii. 89) while 
Octavia is described to Cleopatra as more "A statue than a breather" (III. iii. 2 1) and even 
Enobarbus is somewhat incongruously referred to as "considerate stone" (II. H. I 10). 
In contrast to the "discandying" images routinely associated with Egypt, then, Rome in the 
play emphasizes the stabiliiY of substance, the "measure" of that which holds itself straight, 
raised, erected in the light, just as, imaginarily, is the case with the infant before the Lacanian 
29 Barbara Freedman, Staging The Gazes Postmodernism. Psychoanalysis and Shakespearean 
Comedy (Ithaca, 1991), p. 232. 
30 For an interesting study of Shakespeare that reads the cartographic paradigm of the early modern 
in relation to Lacan's model of ego construction, see Philip Armstrong, "Spheres of Influence: 
Cartography and the Gaze in Shakespearean Tragedy and History, " Shakespeare Studies, 23 
(1995), pp. 39-71. We might also bear in mind here that Lacan suggests a homology between what 
he calls the "ego's era" and an acceleration in the imperial project of "conquest, rape of nature, 
transformation of nature, hominisation of the planet. " Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller ed., The 
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mirror: "The stability of the standing posture, the prestige of stature, the impressiveness of 
statues [are what] set the style for the identification in which the ego finds its starting-point 
and leave their imprint in it forever. 01 
As Lacan was to assert time and again, however, there is a hole at the centre of the 
Imaginary that indexes the incursion of something that cannot yield to presence, although the 
whole notion of presence is constructed around it and can be established only by its elision. 
This elusive object, of course, is what Lacan was to call the gaze-as-object a: a blind spot in 
the field of the visible which is the structuring point of lack that, literally, allows every image 
in the miffor to "hold. " Indeed, it is in precisely this respect that we may read Antony's 
famous commentary upon his own loss of identity in those anamorphic and annihilating 
forms that render him unable to "hold this visible shape' (IV. xiv. 14). In other words, 
Antony articulates the danger posed for identity when the gaze qua- object g is no longer the 
blind spot in the field of the visible, but is included in the field of "reality" itself, in those 
labile forms that "mock our eyes with air' (11.7). The gaze as object, cleft from the eye, is 
precisely what is dissimulated by the image in which one recognizes oneself. As soon as the 
gaze appears as the pivotal point of self apprehension it introduces a rupture at the core of 
self presence: 
Sometime we see a cloud that's dragonish, 
A vapour sometime, like a bear, or lion, 
A tower'd citadel, a pendent rock, 
A forked mountain, or blue promontory 
With trees upon't, that nod unto the world, 
And mock our eyes with air. 
Seminar of Ja=es Lacan Book 1: Freud's papers on Technique 1953-1954, trans. John Forrester 
(Cambridge, 1988), p. 265. 
31 Jacques Lacan, "Some Reflections on the Ego, " International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 34 
(1953), pp. 22-45, p. 36. 
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now thy captain is 
Even such a body: here I am Antony, 
Yet cannot hold this visible shape... 
(IV. xiv. 1-7; 12-14) 
The strange forras recounted in this speech are "objectal" in the Lacanian sense, precisely 
insofar as they exceed the possibilities of specular reflection, Antony comes across the 
excess presence of some Thing that should not be present in reality. If, for Lacan, this pure 
semblance is ultimately nothing but another name for the subject, this too is the horrifying 
discovery made by Antony, who constitutively is "even such a body" (11.13). 
Throughout Antony and Cleopatra Romanitas is anxiously aligned with a desired mastery 
of the scopic field so that ideally, in the words of Caesar, being and knowing should coincide: 
"You may see ... and henceforth knoAV' (I. iii. 1). Indeed, the charismatic force of authority 
consists partly in a Roman scopophilia that comes to suggest more than a casual connection 
between theatricality and power. Caesar, for example, regards Octavia's unceremonious 
return to Rome as a violation of the necessary "ostentation of our love; which, left 
unshown, /Is often left unlove'd" (III. vi. 52-3). Not only is this viewed as an egregious failure 
in the protocols of Roman statecraft, throughout the text Rome is haunted by a more 
particular threat to the coherence of male subjectivity, which is given its most concise 
expression in a servingman's observation that "To be called into a huge sphere, and not to 
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be/seen to move in't, are the holes where eyes should be, which pitifully disaster the cheeks" 
32 (11. vii. 14-16). 
Time and again, then, Roman authority is shown to entertain a precarious relationship 
between the gaze and power. Suspicious of a still fashionable tendency within "culturalist" 
criticism that too precipitately conflates the categories of theatricality and power, Slavoj 
VV 
Zizek argues that "the dialectic of the gaze and power is far more refined: the gaze does 
connote power, yet simultaneously, and at a more fundamental level, it connotes the very 
opposite of power - impotence - insofar as it involves the position of an immobilized 
witness who cannot but observe what goes on. , 33 Indeed, is this not precisely the fear that 
is articulated by Enobarbus when he is met with the spectacle of Antony's military defeat?: 
Naught, naught, all naught, I can behold no longer: 
The Antoniad, the Egyptian admiral, 
With all their sixty fly, and turn the rudder: 
To see't, mine eyes are blasted. 
(III. x. 1-4) 
Commenting later upon his own humiliation at the hands of Cleopatra, Antony also uses an 
image that hints implicitly at the figures of castration in the text: "my good stars, that were 
my former guides, /Have empty left their orbs, and shot their fires/Into the abysm of hell" 
(III. xiii. 145-7). 
32Caesar, for example, is particularly opprobrious of Antony's dispensing of royal titles in the 
marketplace precisely because it is "in the public eye, " "I'the common show-place" ((Ill. vi. 12-13), and 
is anxious that Cleopatra's failure to submit to his demands will not "let the world see/His nobleness 
well acted" (V. ii. 42-3). 
V, V 33 Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 73. We might recall here that Enobarbus is 
horrified that Cleopatra's retreat from Antony's naval campaign was tantamount to "leaving his navy 
gazing" (III. xiii. 1 1). 
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It is, however, Cleopatra who is most frequently located at this rupture in the scene of 
presence, as that which extends beyond the dyadic exchange of miffor images. Indeed, 
Antony's desire for Cleopatra, as Philo's opening speech suggests, is articulated at the level 
of an occular repositioning of an implicitly masculine viewing subject: 
his goodly eyes, 
That o'er the files and musters of the war 
Have glow'd like plated Mars, now bend. now turn 
The office and devotion of their view 
Upon a tawny front 
(I. i. 2-6) 
In other words, Philo's indignation at such unmanly behaviour is implicitly linked to 
Antony's decentred status in a scopic field that is entirely given over to the spectacle of 
Cleopatra. Antony, in effect, becomes "feminized" through occupying a position that is 
capable of bearing only an oblique and "sideways" glance. Such a predicament, as 
Cleopatra's account of Pompey's seduction reveals, holds potentially fatal consequences for 
male subjectivity. To surrender the look to the Other is also to risk contact with the void 
that is opened up in the interval of difference that the gaze is meant to conceal. Pompey, in 
other words, encounters the gaze in the potentially lethal dimension of a subject who, in 
Lacan's words, "sees himself seeing himself': 
Great Pompey 
Would stand and make his eyes grow in my brow, 
There would he anchor his aspect, and die 
With looking on his life. 
(l. v. 31-34) 
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Also not entirely coincidentally, in Enobarbus's account of the barge scene Cleopatra also 
indexes the presence of a surplus visuality that produces even a "gap in nature, " that which 
can only be approached or "filled out" by an anamorphic gaze from aside: 
Her gentlewomen, like the Nereides, 
So many mermaids, tended her P the eyes, 
And made their bends adornings. 
(II. ii. 206-8) 
Moreover, Enobarbus's reference to how even "vilest things" become themselves in 
Cleopatra must be taken literally here in the sense implied by Lacan's use of the term 
"Thing": i. e. as some thing which can only be imbued with consistency through the act of a 
sideways glance that constitutively gives body to or "incarnates" Cleopatra as the object of 
q 
desire. For Slavoj izek, such "looking awry" is of paradigmatic significance in Lacan's 
account of the object: 
The paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own cause, i. e., the 
object a is an object that can be perceived only by a gaze 'distorted' by 
desire, an object that does not exist, since it is nothin2 bu the 
embodiment, the materialization of this very distortion. 34 
At an exegetic level too Cleopatra makes the very lure of presence even more urgent through 
her characteristic strategy of engineering a series of "missed encounters. " Antony's 
seemingly amorous conceit that "thou residing here, goes yet with me; /And I, hence fleeting, 
here remain with thee" (I. iii. 103-4) is a strangely eloquent gloss on the increasingly 
44extimate" kind of relation that Cleopatra comes to assume throughout the text: when 
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Antony arranges a rendezvous on land, she appears on the water; summoning Antony for a 
meeting, she leaves before his arrival; even Anthony's hope that he will be reunited with 
Cleopatra in death is thwarted by a "suicide" that is later revealed to be a hoax. Time and 
again, it seems, Cleopatra can be located only negatively, in relation to that which she is not: 
See where he is, who's with him, what he does. 
I did not send you. If you find him sad, 
Say I am dancing; if in mirth, report 
That I am sudden sick. 
(I. iii. 3-6) 
Crucially, in a text where the very question of location arouses deep political anxieties (most 
pointedly in response to Antony who, as Ania Loomba remarks, "oscillates between 
Cleopatra's territory and Caesar's, both literally and otherwise', 35 ), Cleopatra's "dis- 
locatedness" embodies a certain structural impass that, I would like to argue, also opens the 
very space of desiring subjectivity. 36 In this respect, the frequent metaphors of 
"overtaking" associated with Cleopatra in many ways recall Lacan's shorthand for the Real 
as a certain limit that is always missed, "we can overtake it, leave it behind us, but we cannot 
reac it.,, 37 Scarus, for example, wishes that "leprosy o'ertake" Cleopatra for abandoning 
Antony 'T the midst of the fight" (III. x. 11); emboldened by the news of her "death" 
Antony resolves that "I will o'ertake thee, Cleopatra, and/Weep for my pardon" (IV. xiv. 44- 
5). For Dolabella too Cleopatra urges this strangely precipitate behaviour: "would I might 
34 Slavoj Zizek. Looking Amy: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Pol2ular Cu ture (London, 
1997), p-12. 
35 Ania Loomba, Gender. Race. Renaissance Drama (London, 1988), p. 126. 
36 In this respect Cleopatra has much in common with the femme fatale who is also crucially 
dependent upon perpWtual ambiguity and ideas about the limits of vision in relation to knowledge. 
37 Quoted in Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Oblect of Ideology (London, 1989), p. 173. 
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never/0'ertake pursued success, but I do feel, /By the rebound of yours, a grief that 
smites/My very heart at root" (V. ii. 102-104). 
We are in a better position here to provide a properly Lacanian gloss to Catherine Belsey's 
thesis that, as a deictic marker of deferred presence, Cleopatra is an "element that is by 
,, 38 definition subtracted from what it is possible to say. What I also wish to suggest here is 
that, as an "element" that simultaneously organizes and destabilizes the scopic field through 
the very fact of her surplus visuality, Cleopatra's deictic function is also especially redolent 
of Lacan's thesis that "The field of reality rests upon the extraction of the object a, which 
nevertheless frames it.,, 39 Cleopatra, qua Lacan's object a-, frames the scene of presence only 
insofar as she so consistently eludes presence itself . 
40 
Not coincidentally, it is Cleopatra herself who provides the most articulate and, in some 
sense, characteristically Lacanian summation of this paradox in her conviction that "nature 
wants stuff/To vie strange forms with fancy" (V. ii. 97-8). By itself, in other words, nature, 
38 In an argument that retains an allusive connection to Lacan, Belsey maintains that "Cleopatra's 
seductive strategy is to exceed the alternatives of presence and absence. The play locates her aLa 
djiýtangq. " Belsey, gp. cit., , p. 43,46. 
39 Lacan, Ecrit , (Paris, 1966), p. 554. A 
40 Jacques-Alain Miller defines the contours of this paradox in a diagram which illustrates how that 
which escapes the field of reality also constitutes the illusory frame of its accessibility, see fig. 2 in the 
Appendices to this thesis. Miller maintains that "it is precisely because the object a is removed from 
the field of reality that it frames it. If I withdraw the surface .... the piece represented by a shaded 
square, I get whaýge might call a frame: a frame for a hole, but also a frame of the rest of the surface. " 
Quoted in Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry, pp. 94-5. As an index of "deferred presence, " then, Cleopatra 
intimates presence insofar as she constitutively embodies a lack that precipitates desire around a 
residue of signification. Enobarbus observes that the opulence of the barge scene "yarely frame the 
office" (II. H. 21 1), feigning surrender to Rome, a messenger assures Caesar that "of thy intents 
desires instruction, /That she preparedly may frame herself/To the way she's forc'd to" (W. 54-6). 
Moreover, Homi Bhabha has argued that "within a tradition of representation that conceives of 
identity as the satisfaction of a totalizing, plenitudinous object of vision, " Bhabha maintains that the 
construction of subjectivities within colonialist relations must always return as a "persistent 
questioning of the frame (emphasis added). " 
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as the various references to the Nile's predatory excess imply, is in a sense too real.: 
something has to intervene to appease or gentrify its brute reality. Cleopatra constitutively 
is this interval in the text: the syncope of a difference that stays marked. Like the Lacanian 
real, Cleopatra "can only be inscribed out of an impasse in formalisation. " 41 Variously 
animating the screen of fantasy, of making "defect perfection" (II. ii. 23 1), she distances 
reality from a potentially traumatic encounter with the unassimilable "thing" that, 
paradoxically, gives rise to the very illusion of presence. Those readers who are familiar 
with Lacan cannot help but associate the "stuff' of Cleopatra's rhetoric with the 
phantasmatic "stuff' of en oyment that simultaneously eludes and gives ontological j 
consistency to so-called reality. Her sublime powers, we should recall, are in fact productive 
of "a gap in nature" (Il. ii. 218), literally causing something to "fall out" of the frame of 
reality, of that which can be rendered accessible at the level of vision. Indeed, with its 
scenography of squares, fronting and facing, Antony and Cleopatra bears a close affinity to 
what Derrida calls "the quadrature of the text', 42 : i. e. figures that would intuit the presence 
of the present as that which forms a surface, enters squarely on the stage and institutes itself 
as something face-to-face. According to Derrida metaphysics routinely relates presence to 
one of the four faces, the one that seems to be open for the perception of 
the spectacle, for the 'now' of consciousness faced with its object, for the 
present tense of discourse - belonging, in a word, to the face as what one 
faces, a surface of envisaged presence. 43 
41 Quoted in Teresa Brennan, Histoty After Lacan (London, 1994), p. 69. 
42 Jacques Derrida, Of GrammatoW trans. Gayatri Spivak (London, 1981), p. 299. 
43 Ibid., p. 299. 
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What the square conceals, however, is the very paradox that Antony and Cleopatra 
foregrounds time and again: namely, that while characters are fascinated and glued to what 
presents itself, they are unable to see presence as such. "The word 'square' [carre], " Derrida 
reminds us, "is thus a square word ... Because of its empty square, its open surface, its 
discounted face, it does not enclose but rather leaves the way open for the intersection of 
, A4 meanings. The square proliferates. Pompey remarks of Antony and Caesar that "they 
should square between/themselves" (II. i. 43-4); Maecenas is suspicious whether "report be 
square" to the descriptions of Cleopatra (Il. ii. 184); Antony laments that he has "not kept 
my square" (II. iii. 6) and pontificates on "the brave squares of war" (III. xi. 40); Enobarbus 
hopes that "mine honesty, and I, begin to square" (III. xiii. 4 1); Lepidius reassures Caesar 
that he will "front this present time" (I. iv. 78); Cleopatra reflects upon her liaison with 
"broad-fronted Caesar" (I. v. 29) while Caesar himself accuses Antony of instigating wars 
"Which fronted mine own peace" (Il. ii. 6 1). 
In other words, it is possible to suggest along with Derrida that, despite its implicit 
scopophilia, Antony and Cleopatra cannot ultimately conceal the demand for "a certain 
squaring of the text, on the obligatory passage through an open surface, on the detour 
9A 5 through an empty square. In the succeeding sections of this chapter I want to pursue 
further how the text variously indexes the proximity of the very "stuff' of jouissanc as 
that which, simultaneously, procures an opening onto the space of representation and also 
that which poses a threat to the very coherence of the (Roman) Law itself. 
"Here Is My Space" 
44 lbid., P. 349. 
45 Ibid., P. 351. 
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Despite the frequent shifts of location that have long been regarded as the most striking 
feature of Antony and Cleopatra we might recall how this very aspect of spatial dynamism 
is denied Cleopatra who is characterized in the text by what can only be described as a 
profound inertia or, in Antony's words, as "idleness itself' (I. iii. 92). While Granville- 
46 - Barker's remark that Antony and Cleopatr is "the most spacious of the plays" is echoed 
in much of the subsequent criticism, Terence Hawkes makes the shrewdly observed rejoinder 
that 
.. on another 
level, [the] sense of 'embracing, ' of encircling in close physical 
contact, may be said to give rise to an opposite, claustrophobic effect. It is as if, 
despite the play's clamour, we and it remain no less obstinately tied down to this 
old earth.. 47 
Hawkes's observation that the text's apparent "amplitude does not prevent it from looking 
inward as much as outward, captures neatly the undulating forces of expansion and 
contraction in the play. He stops short, however, of addressing a related crucial paradox: 
isn't Cleopatra's apparent "elusiveness, " which has become such a venerable point of focus 
46 H. Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare, second series (London, 1930), p. 1 11. 
47 Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare's Talking Animals: Language and Drama in Sociely (London, 
1975), p-182. 
48 Ibid., 182. In this respect we might also bear in mind Jan Koff's assessment of the play as "a 
tragedy about the smallness of the world. " Shakespeare-Our Contemporary (New York, 1964), 
p. 93. 
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for predominantly male critics of the play, '9 brought into stark contrast with the somewhat 
elementary observation that she is never in fact permitted to leave Egypt? 50 
To adapt a Lacanian formulation that might assist in grasping the topological paradox that 
we are trying to get at here, we could risk the suggestion that, despite beggaring all 
description and consistently evading capture by a symbolic order that fails adequately to 
51 
represent her, Cleopatra nevertheless always returns to the same place. In a text where 
references to the "universal" ambitions of imperial Rome are typically juxtaposed with the 
microscopic observation of "gnats" on the Nile, it is Cleopatra who is routinely placed on 
the side of contraction. If, as Emrys Jones observes, there is no remainderless access to a 
character who is so frequently "caught, unprepared, in the glance of a bystander, "52 this 
elliptical structure is informed more generally by the text's problematic attempts to locate 
Cleopatra at-a-distance. Paradoxically, however, such distancing also takes the form of a 
minimal point of contraction in the various figures of incorporation that are routinely 
associated both with Cleopatra and Egypt throughout the text, and which, on occasion, 
threaten to abolish the very interval of distance as such. Referred to, for example, either as a 
mere "morsel for a monarch" (I. v. 3 1) or "a morsel .... a fragment of Gnaeus Pompey's" 
(III. xiii. 16-18) Cleopatra -a "wonderful piece of work" (I. ii. 15 1) - is produced as a 
49 See, for example, Linda T. Fitz's now classic study, "Egyptian Queens and Male Reviewers: 
Sexist Attitudes in Antony and Cleopatra, " in John Drakakis (ed) Antony and Cleopatra: 
Contemporary Critical EssW (London, 1994), pp. 1 82-212. 
50 Ania Loomba has also drawn attention to the Cleopatra's physical stasis in the play: "However 
slippery, inconstant and variable Cleopatra may be, however she may threaten the boundaries 
between male and female, political and private worlds, she remains geographically stationary. " Ania 
Loomba, "'Travelling thoughts': Theatre and the Space of the Other" in Antony and Cleopatra: 
Contempora[y Critical Essays, ed. John Drakakis (London, 1994) pp. 279-308, p. 289. 
51 1 am, of course, referring to Lacan's well known maxim that "the real always returns to the same 
place. " 
52 Ernrys Jones, op. cit., p. 14. 
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remainder here in a more troubling sense: as the inert and impenetrable substance that risks 
becoming too close. 
In many ways complicating the assumption that "woman seduces from a distance, " 
Cleopatra appears to frustrate the text's efforts to locate her at a proper distance. Following 
Derrida, we might even go so far as to suggest that, rather than being "some thing which 
announces itself from a distance, at a distance from some other thing, " Cleopatra radically 
calls into question this very taxonomy of retreat and approach. In a paradoxical movement 
that the term itself implies, we can only "catch" at Cleopatra in an approach that coincides 
with the very gesture of retreat: 
Perhaps woman -a non-identity, a non-figure, a simulacrum - is 
distance's very chasm, the outdistancing of distance, the interval's 
cadence; if we could still say such a thing, distance itself. 53 
Constitutively announcing that which can only take place out of place, 54 it is perhaps not 
surprising to learn that Cleopatra has been the focus of enduring critical efforts to determine, 
precisely, the "place" that she should properly be assigned when assessing the text's claim 
to greatness. For example, unable to resolve the question of whether she threatens to 
compromise the text's authentic identity as tragedy, the editor of the New Cambridge edition 
of the play somewhat ambivalently concludes that although Cleopatra is "a matter that could 
not be fitted into the normal tragic scheme, [she] was yet of such surpassing interest and 
53 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow (London, 1978), p. 49. 
54 We might also bear in mind here Luce Irigaray's contention that historically 
dwoman' is "assigned to be place without occupyinga place. " Luce Irigaray, "Place, Interval" in An 
Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. Carolyn Burke (London, 1994), pp. 34-56, p. 52. 
18 TI -, *I-, -: /is An.!: /5 em P, i r, - an0/j jr, - d 
219 
beauty as to compel incorporation. "55 Does not this apparently "formal" difficulty 
presented by Cleopatra come perilously close to a Lacanian account of the topological 
paradox that is constitutive of all self-identity tout court? That is, when a seemingly 
"surpassing" foreign "matter" on account of which a text eludes self-identity also becomes 
the ultimate guarantee of its identity? In other words, the text's alternating figures of 
expansion and contraction implicitly recall Lacan's formula of fantasy So q, which argues 
that there can be no subject (ý), no void of expansion and giving away, without a minimal 
contraction into an element where the positive support of meaning (i. e. the subject) is 
condensed. 56 Moreover, to this precise extent I would like to suggest that Rome and Egypt 
entertain a certain inverse symmetry to each other in the text: Rome is the site of expansion, 
of self-overtaking (desire) while Egypt is the phantasmatic region of a kind of inertia (drive) 
that frequently comes to exercise a threat to the very efficacy of the imperial project itself. " 
In other words, complicating the dialectic of presence and absence, Cleopatra is routinely 
" Antony and Cleopatra, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge, 1971), xxxii. 
16 We might also profitably refer here to Teresa de Lauretis who, in an analysis of the gendered and 
'imperialist' serniotics of plot construction, remarks that "the ain Ul figure of the hero crosses [a] 
boundary and penetrates the other space. In so doing, the mythical subject is constructed as human 
being and as male; he is the active principle of culture, the establisher of distinction, the creator of 
differences. Female is what is not susceptible to transformation, to life or death; she is an element of 
plot-space, a topos, a resistance, matrix and matter. " Alice Doesn't: Feminism. Semiotics. Cinema 
(Bloomington, 1984), p. 119. 
57 The drive, as Lacan insists, represents "some manifestation of inertia in organic life. " The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 1 61. However, is not this correlation inherently 
misogynist? i. e where "man" stands toward "woman'" as desire toward drive, as dynamic, self- 
VVsgressing movement against circular, repetitive inertia.? Rather we might bear in mind here Slavoj 
Zizek's comments regarding this specious kind of dualism: "The political over -determination of the 
first commonplace is obvious: drive is reactionary and desire revolutionary; i. e., desire designates 
the dynamic force of subversion and change, while drive stands for the repetitive inertia of a closed 
circular movement. Is then the late Lacan who elevates drive over desire conservative? Is, however, 
the notion of drive as that which insists in its subterranean work of slowly underynjning resistance not 
also the best exemplification of the logic of the revolutionary process? " Slavoj Zizek, The Abyss of 
E[gVJM, (Ann Arbor, 1997) p. 93, n. 29. In other words, we could say that what we call "desire" is in 
fact a compromise formation or defense against enjoyment. If the metonymy of desire is, in fact, 
something that tries to avDid the real of jouissance it is no surprise to find that for Lacan the only true 
ethics is that of the drive, of that which defines the contours of the subject's relationship to 
enjoyment. Moreover, Elizabeth Grosz has also argued against reading the drive as that which 
implies a subordinate and quiescent position in relation to desire. See Space. Time and Perversion: 
Essays on the Politics of -Bodies 
(London, 1995). 
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placed on the side of the Qb er here to ject in a strictly Lacanian sense. Indeed, we can ref 
Catherine Belsey's observation that "one of the strategies of Shakespeare's text [is] that our 
attention to Cleopatra is filtered. ý958 Is not this also the kind of skewed, incamating 
perspective of the Lacanian object a? According to Joan Copjec this object quite literally 
"splits the subject from the external world insofar as this world will no longer be 
encountered directly, but will be 'filtered through' the object . "59 
Insofar as Cleopatra complicates the very question of location in the play we might recall 
Susan Snyder's illuminating remark that even Cleopatra's verbs are intransitive, like the 
movement of the winds and the waves and the fans that constitute the dominant strain of 
imagery in Rome's mythographic accounts of her activity. Hopping forty paces in the street 
(II. ii. 232-3) in a seemingly unmotivated gesture that appears to have no "object" other than 
this very activity itself, Cleopatra's aptitude for self-consuming enjoyment can more 
properly be aligned with the drive in a strictly Lacanian sense. While Snyder is perplexed by 
the fact that Cleopatra appears to have no object beyond her activity, "it is surely in no way 
,, 60 to arrive anywhere, for Lacanian psychoanalysis this is precisely the kind of acephalous 
movement that also characterizes the jouissance of drive: i. e. the vicarious pleasure that is 
provided by the potentially painful experience of repeatedly missing one's goal. Unlike 
desire, which Lacan famously described as the leftover that results when need is subtracted 
from demand, the drive persists at the level of an impossible demand. 
58 Catherine Belsey, "Cleopatra's Seduction" in Alternative Shakespeares: Volume 2, ed. Terence 
Hawkes (London, 1996), pp. 38-62, p. 45. 
59 Joan Copjec, 'The Tomb of Perseverance: On Antigone, " in Giving Ground: The Politics of 
Ergping "it , ed. Joan Copiec (London, 1999), pp233-67, p. 255. 
60 Susan Snyder, "Patterns of Motion in Antony and Cleopatra, " Shakespeare Survey, 33 (1980) 
pp. 113-123, p. 117. 
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And is this not also precisely the kind of unfathomable challenge that Cleopatra poses for 
Antony in her very first appearance in the play?: "If it be love indeed, tell me how much" 
(I. i. 14). While this inquiry has generally been regarded as a characteristic example of her 
inveterate "playfulness, " Cleopatra also typifies one of the most disruptive features of the 
drive as the way in which "repetition.. is turned toward the ludiC.,, 61 It is this particular 
convergence that also informs the strangely idle forms of entertainment offered by Cleopatra, 
where time itself is marked not by progression but by repetition. Not only is Antony 
"barber'd ten times o'er" (II. ii. 224) in his first encounter with her, Cleopatra is later 
prompted to recollect "That time? 0 times! /I laugh'd him out of patience; and that night/I 
laugh'd him into patience" (Il. v. 18 -20). 
In other words, Cleopatra's self-reflexive postures throughout the text are a characteristic 
feature of the drive precisely insofar as they have no object other than this repetitive 
movement itself. Indeed, it is most obviously in her idiosyncratic gesture of contesting 
Roman discourse through mimicry that Cleopatra becomes an agent of repetition that 
threatens to alienate identity from essence. In the opening scene, for example, not only does 
Cleopatra delay the report of the "news from Rome, ' she does so through a mocking 
anticipation of Caesar's missive: 
Hear them, Antony: 
Fulvia perchance is angry; or who knows 
if the scarce-bearded Caesar have not sent 
His powerful mandate to you, 'Do this, or this; 
Take in that kingdom, and enfranchise that; 
61 11jid., p. 61. 
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perform't, or else we damn thee. ' 
(I. i. 19-23) 
Moreover, later in the play Cleopatra is similarly unresponsive to the numerous petitions of 
a Roman messenger to "hear" what is finally revealed to be the news of Antony's marriage 
to Octavia. Effectively, Cleopatra systematically delays its communication through a series 
of interruptions that repeats the fixed and empty presence of authority by articulating it 
syntagmatically within a range of differential knowledges and positionalities: 
Mess: Madam, madam, -- 
Cleo: Antonius dead! - If thou say so, villain, 
Though kill'st thy mistress... 
.................. 
Mess: Will't please you hear me? 
Cleo: I have a mind to strike thee ere thou speak'st: 
yet if thou say Antony lives, is well, 
Or friends with Caesar, or not captive to him, 
I'll set thee in a shower of gold... 
........ ......... 
Mess: But yet madam, - 
Cleo: I do not like 'but yet, ' it does allay 
The good precedence, fie upon 'but yet, ' 
'But yet' is as a gaoler to bring forth 
Some monstrous malefactor. 
(Il. v. 25-7; 31-5; 49-53) 
In other words, through the very gesture of interruption here Cleopatra enacts 
performatively the way that "meaning" itself is produced through what we earlier referred to 
as capitonnag , i. e., where the metonymic sliding of the signifier is retroactively brought to a 
halt through being pinned to a privileged signifier that, paradoxically, "bring[s] forth" a 
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meaning that is always-already marked by precedence. Somewhat appositely in this respect 
Lacan argues that 
in an interrupted sentence, as such always subtly articulated grammatically, 
meaning is present in two ways - as anticipated on the one hand, since it's a 
question of its suspension, and as repeated on the other, since [the subject] 
invariably refers it to an impression of having already heard it. 62 
It is, then, this very power of allowing interruption itself to speak, and in a potentially non- 
dialectical relation to alterity, that may be considered a species of what the Arden editor of 
the play obliquely refers to as Cleopatra's "perverse ... forms of affeSt.,, 
63 Alternatively we 
could say that Cleopatra routinely contests the protocols of a specifically Roman (i. e. 
masculine) temporal modality that Julia Kristeva has elsewhere called "obsessional time": 
"time as project, teleology, linear and prospective unfolding; time as departure, progression 
,, 64 and affival - in other words, the time of history. 
62 Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: Book 1111955-1956, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell 
Grigg (London, 1993), p. 1 14. 
13 Antony and Cleopatra, ed. M. R. Ridley (London, 1971), xxxi. 
64 Julia Kristeva, 'Woman's Time" in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 7,1, 
(1981)p. 17. Bearing in mind that the play has frequently been criticized for its apparent 
sluggishness in terms of plot development (most notable in this respect is the opprobrium of A. C. 
Bradley), it is perhaps not surprising to consider that the text discloses more of a generic affiliation to 
the archetypal love story than it does with tragedy; an observation that leads Coppelia Kahn to 
suggest that " as a'love tragedy'the play is a generic oxymoron. " Coppelia Kahn, Roman 
Shakespeare: Warriors. Wounds and Women (London, 1998), p. 1 10. Arguing how the love story 
contests normative (i. e. masculine) narrative paradigms, however, Mary Ann Doane offers the 
perceptive remark that the 'love story' posits "a thinning out of time, its expansion ... Women in the love story witness departures and arrivals, but there is little, if any progression. " Mary Ann Doane, 
The Desire to Desire: The Woman's Film of the 1940s (London, 1987), p. 1 07. 
Expert at contriving all kinds of entertainment designed to fill the "great gap of time" (l. v. 5) that signals 
Antony's absence, Cleopatra is in many respects the archetypal beloved who gives shape to 
absence, elaborates its fiction, for she has the time to do so. Conversely, Antony is in a condition of 
perpetual departure, of journeying, and the fact that he too comes to occupy a sedentary position is 
one of the most frequent causes of Roman censure. For example, Enobarbus's account of how 
"Antony/Enthron'd I'the market-place, did sit alone, /Whistling to the air" (Ii. ii. 214-160) while waiting 
for Cleopatra recalls Barthes' observation that"the man who waits and who suffers from this waiting is 
miraculously feminized. " Roland Barthes, A Lover's Discourse: Fagments, trans. Richard Howard 
(London, 1991), p-14. 
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What is scandalous about these improvised moments is that Cleopatra's "perverse forms of 
arrest" simultaneously produce the effect of repeating the origin in a gesture that also 
threatens to displace the origin as origin. In other words, Cleopatra unleashes a power of 
repetition that is neither an enslavement to or a simple reiteration of the original, but is an 
insubordination that appears to take place within the very terms of the origina . In this 
crucial respect Cleopatra's enunciative modality may more properly be identified as 
"performative" precisely insofar as it produces a potentially counter-hegemonic clash that, 
according to Homi Bhabha, forever haunts the colonial scene; "founded" as it is upon what 
he appositely describes as a" temporality of the 'in-between' which through the 'gap' or 
,, 65 6emptiness' of the signifier punctuates linguistic difference. This gap or emptiness, that 
which is (strictly speaking) deprived of any "symbolic" content, simultaneously produces 
desire and also confers consistency upon the symbolic order. Lacan's name for this empty 
integer is, of course, enjoymen . 
Crucially, what I wish to insist upon here is that this inveterate capacity for repetition not 
only brings Cleopatra into close proximity with the drive, what is also at stake concerns a 
certain relationship towards jouissanc as that which remains the immanent possibility of 
Roman Law itself To this extent, Cleopatra's potentially subversive appeal resides less in 
the alleged "power" of her sexuality than in her very suggestion that the 12ower edi f ice of 
Rome is itself sexualized: i. e. realized by the incursion of a radical stain of non-sense that 
65 Homi Bhabha, "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation" In Homi 
Bhabha (ed) Nation and Narration (London, 1990), pp. 291-322, p. 299. Jonathan Gil Harris, for 
example, makes the astute observation that Cleopatra's "very vividness is shown to be the gjLQý2 of a 
Roman desire for her presence, prompted by the gaps and absences that repeatedly afflict the play's 
attempts to represent her. " "Narcissus in thy face: Roman Desire and the Difference it Fakes in 
Antony and Cleopatra, " Shakespeare Quarterly, 45,4, Winter (1994), pp. 408-25, p. 417. 
224 T/ . 1,5 h13 oz P, rr. - P, n0b je d 
225 
also provides its unacknowledged support. Briefly, according to Lacan, in order for the 
"public" law of symbolic ritual and mandates to remain efficacious, it has to be "shadowed" 
by an unacknowledged obscene underside that is smeared with a stain of enjoyment. " It is 
precisely insofar as Cleopatra publicly identifies with this dysfunctional, empty repetitious 
movement that she also threatens to disclose how the play's much remarked upon sex/power 
nexus is overdetermined in a way that is unaccounted for by even the most rigorously 
Foucauldian approach to the text. 67 
In other words, while Jonathan Dollimore is surely correct in his assertion that Antony's 
"sexuality is informed by the very power relations which he, ambivalently, is prepared to 
sacrifice for sexual freedom, ', 68 it also is necessary to add a properly Lacanian gloss to this 
thesis. Enobarbus's remark that Cleopatra's appeal provokes even priests to "bless her 
when she is riggish' (II. ii. 239-40) already implies a dialectical tension between prohibition 
and license that, throughout the text more generally, secretes itself as the obscene condition 
of Roman power. While recent criticism of the text has remained sensitive to those 
occasions when Egyptian excess threatens to violate the efficacy of Roman discourse 
through its putatively carnivalesque energies, Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a more 
66 In an argument that, perhaps surprisingly, is implicitly Lacanian in this respect Northrop Frye 
maintains that "Egypt is not hell; it is rather the night side of [Rome]; passionate, cruel, superstitious, 
barbaric, dissolute. " Fools of Time: Studies in Shakespearean Tragedy (Toronto, 1967), p. 1 10. 
11 1 can only refer the reader here to Mladen Dolar's extraordinary Lacanian analysis of power V= 
Foucault where he concludes that "One can only think power in the space between the necessary 
hypothesis about the 'always already there' of the Other, which opens the space of power relations, 
and the insight that 'the Other lacks. ' The insight into its 'non-existence' cannot make the shortcut 
around its 'existence', its 'always already there, ' and perhaps the difficulty of Foucault's position - 
possibly its ultimate unsustainability - stems from his attempt to avoid and circumvent this paradox. " 
Mladen Dolar, 'Where Does Power Come From?, " New Formations, 35 (1998), pp. 79-92, p. 92. 
See also Joan Copjec's equally trenchant critique of Foucault in this regard in Read My Desire@ 
Lacan Against The Historicists (London, 1994), pp3-8. 
69 Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion. Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare 
and his Contemporaries (London, 1989), p. 217. 
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nuanced account of this relationship. It is not merely the case, as Antony impetuously 
remarks, that "pleasure ... does become/the opposite of itself' (I. ii. 121-3), jouissance also 
announces the paradox where, when ostensibly deprived of enjoyment, the subject in a sense 
epjoys this very deprivation. Enjoyment qua drive has very little to do with the 
procurement of an object that is somehow sufficient to desire; rather, a reflexive gesture 
occurs where it is the very circulation around the object itself that gives rise to enjoyment. 
Significantly, Antony reveals that it is not "love" per s that motivates his amorous exploits 
but a tautological "love of love" (I. i. 44). It is not surprising that this relation tends toward 
the masochistic attitude where it is the very "pain of punishment" (I. i. 38) that also implies a 
strange kind of surplus pleasure. 69 
If, for Lacan, masochism accentuates the function of the drive in so far as "the subject makes 
,, 70 himself the instrument of the Other's jouissanc , are not those occasions when Antony 
yields to Roman censure also conspicuously marked by this suggestion of residual 
enjoyment?: "My being in Egypt, /Caesar, what was't to you? " (II. ii. 35-6). Often it 
appears that Antony is both eloquently and passionately solicitous of rebuke: 
Speak to me home, mince not the general tongue: 
Name Cleopatra as she is call'd in Rome; 
Rail thou in Fulvia's phrase, and taunt my faults 
With such full license, as both truth and malice 
Have power to utter. 
(I. ii. 103-106) 
69 The trouble with joussance _= enjoyment 
then is not that it is unattainable, that it always eludes 
the subject's grasp, but, rather, that one can never get rid of it, that its stain drags along forever - 
therein resides the point of Lacan's concept of surplus-enjoyment: the very renunciation of 
Lo_Ui ýsange brings about a remainder/surplus of iouissance. 
70-Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, p. 320. 
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In short, what is taking place here (and which may be read as a revealing variation on the 
text's putative "theatricality") is nothing less than an attempt by Antony to look at himself 
from the position of the Other. Crucially, it is precisely this reflexive moment introduced by 
the virtual point of the gaze that demonstrates how jouissanc is constitutively and 
inescapably torn between the Symbolic and the Real: "On the one hand, jouissanc is 
6private', the kernel which resists public disclosure .... on the other hand, however, jouissanc 
6counts' only as [it is] registered by the big Other. , 71 While the overtly "political" 
anxieties of the text are largely generated through a conflict between the seemingly 
contrasting domains of "private" pleasure (Egypt) and that of "public" duty (Rome), with 
its endless procession of Roman emissaries the text tragically reaffirms the Lacanian insight 
that private pleasure is never possible. That is, the intruder who appears to "spoil" the 
game effectively crystallizes its enjoyment: "private" pleasure is minimally exhibitionist 
precisely because it requires the intrusion of the big Other from which it is granted a degree 
of ontological consistency. Conversely, the spectre of Egyptian excess, of that which 
threatens both to overflow and overthrow public (Roman) Law actually constitutes the 
inherent moment of the Law itself. It is not simply the case then that - to recount a 
somewhat tired formulation - power produces subversion; Egypt, rather, transposes the 
tension between Law and transgression into the inner splitting of the domain of Roman Law 
itself - where the Law's external relationship to its transgression is internalized into the 
Law's relationship to its own traumatic founding gesture. 72 
71 Slavoi Zzek, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and-Related Matters (London, 
1996), p. 132. 
72 It is not enough to say that the "repression" of some libidinal content retroactively eroticizes the 
very gesture of repression - this eroticization of power is not a secondary effect of its exertion on its 
object but its very disavowed foundation, its constitutive crime or founding gesture which has to 
remain invisible if power is to function normally. 
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Indeed, Slavoj Zizek maintains that this dialectical tension that obtains between prohibition 
and license more properly locates sexuality not as 
a traumatic substantial Thing that the subject cannot directly attain; instead, it is 
nothina but the formal structure of failure that can in principle 'contaminate' any 
activity. Any activity that fails directly to attain its goal and thereby gets caught 
in a repetitive vicious cycle is automatically sexualized. 73 
If, for Lacan, the function of the drive inheres in a compulsion to encircle again and again the 
site of loss as nothing but the retroactive embodiment of this loss, it is Cleopatra who 
announces this monstrous persistence of the drive in its degree zero: "Age cannot wither 
her, nor custom stale/Her infinite variety" (II. ii. 235-6). Indeed, this strangely aim-inhibited 
(qua sexualized) activity of Cleopatra is recalled in another episode by Enobarbus which 
may be read as a more explicit comment on the drive as nothing other than the repetition 
proper to the "death drive" as such: 
Cleopatra catchin but the least 
noise of this dies instantly. I have seen her die twenty times 
[ ... ]I do think there is mettle in death, which commits some loving act upon her, she hath such a celerity in dying. 
(I. ii. 137-142) 
73 Slavoi li'zfek, "Love Thy Neighbour? No, Thanks! " in The Psychoanalysis of Race ed. 
Christopher Lane (Chichester, 1998), pp. 154-176, p. 170. That is to say, any activity becomes 
"sexualized" when it fails to achieve its asexual goal and gets "caught" in the vicious circle of 
repetition. We enter the domain of sexuality proper when a gesture that "officially" serves some 
instrumental goal becomes an end in itself, i. e. when we start to enjoy the very repetition of this 
gesture and thereby suspend its "purposefulness. " 
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Not only does the drive exceed the determinations of any subjective attitude it also 
designates "something in which the subject is caugh ,a force ... which persists in its 
repetitive movement. , 74 Rome is not only dependent upon Egypt's seemingly foreign and 
irrational drives, it has simultaneouLly to maintain a proper distance from them to avoid 
being similarly "caught" in its pre-predicative abyss. If Cleopatra succeeds in beggaring 
description it is because she so often signals the proximity of something that, strictly 
speaking, lies beyond both the wall of language and any naive notion of "intersubjectivity" 
as such. Enobarbus's observation that "there is mettle in death/which commits some loving 
act upon her" (l. ii. 149-5 1) is typical of the way that Cleopatra is not so much described 
throughout the text as "caught" unexpectedly in her moment of jouissance Time and again 
Roman commentators alight upon some compulsive gesture or strange idiosyncrasy of the 
queen that merely inscribes this unfathomable intensity of the real of jouissance According 
to Antony, for example, even her silent summons proves irresistible so that her "beck from 
the bidding of the gods/Commands me" (III. ii. 60- 1). 75 
Significantly, not only does she "catch" the news of Antony's departure for Rome, 
throughout the text it is Cleopatra who is most frequently identified with this motif- 
imagining her lover to be a "tawny-finn'd fish" that she draws up and... thinks "every one 
an Antony, /And say 'Ah, ha! y'are caught" (II. v. 13-14); she expresses wonder that after his 
military campaign that Antony has returned from "The world's great snare uncaught" 
74 Slavoi Zizek, The Ticklish Sub'ect: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London, 1999), 
p. 297. 
75 In a particularly resonant discussion of the drive, which may be read as illuminating the 
phantasmatic basis of Rome's vicarious encounters with Cleopatra, Lacan argues that "desire is 
merely a vain detour with the aim of catching the *ouissance of the other - insofar as the other 
intervenes, the subject will realize that there is a 'ouissance beyond the pleasure principle. " Jacques 
Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, pp. 1 83-4. 
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(IV. viii. 19); berating Seleucus on his betrayal she threatens to "catch thine eyes/Though 
they had wings" (V. ii. 155-6); even at her death Caesar's obsequies state that "she would 
catch another Antony/In her strong toil of grace" (V. ii. 345-6). 
While, traditionally, this imagery has been read in terms of Cleopatra's predatory nature, it 
also links Cleopatra to a motif that, strictly speaking, does not have at its disposal the 
unified space of a figure. 76 Like the drive, Cleopatra exceeds the alternatives of the active or 
the passive and, instead, comes to figure as the articulated point of tension between the two 
categories. 77 Indeed, Cleopatra's warning to Iras that "saucy lictors/Will catch at us like 
strumpets" (V. ii. 213-14) suggests that, rather than defining a subjective attitude, to catch or 
be caught entails the interval of what may be called a proximate distance, it implies a 
relationship toward something. Following Luce Irigaray, we may also suggest that 
Cleopatra, like "Woman, " is historically on the side of the drive as a marker of sexual 
difference insofar as "woman always tends toward without any return to herself as the place 
where something positive can be elaborated. "78 As I argue in the next section, however, 
Antony and Cleopatra is as much concerned with other topological paradoxes or metastases 
that come to have a crucial, if often enigmatic, bearing on the very production of subjectivity 
itself 
"Wrinkled Deep in Time" 
76 According to Lacan, the drive is that which exceeds the categories of the active or the passive that 
involves a kind of self-reflexive turn, not a simple reversal of the active into the passive. The drive, in 
other words, can only ever remain "snatching at its object. " Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (London, 1994), p. 167. 
77 In this respect we might say that Cleopatra frequently seeks to assume the position not of the 
object of desire, but that of the drive. She assures Antony, for example, that her "becomings" are 
intended to "Eye well to you" (1-iii-98-9). 
78 Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Carolyn Burke trans., (London, 1993), p. 9. 
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Having been promised "sixty sails" from Cleopatra, Antony resolves that "our overplus of 
shipping will we burn, /And with the rest full-mann'd [ ... ] Beat the approaching Caesar" 
(III. vii. 49). A little later in the play Enobarbus is informed that "Antony/Hath after thee 
sent all thy treasure, with/His bounty overplus" (IV. vi. 20-22). Bearing in mind Terry 
Eagleton's observation that in Antony and Cleopatra "the language of politics no longer 
meshes with the discourse of value, and the play simply dramatizes their contradiction, , 79 
the two references to overplus here are particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that this 
term appears in no other play by Shakespeare. 
it does, significantly, appear in a document in defence of colonial trade by Thomas Hariot in 
1587, who argues that there is "such an overplus sufficiently to be yeelded, or by men of 
skill to be provided, as by way of traffique and exchange with our owne nation of England, 
will inrich the providers .,, 
80 Despite Hariot's somewhat anxious reference to "our owne 
nation of England, " it was precisely this seemingly elusive "overplus" that threatened to 
deplete the nation's wealth in the increasingly nebulous networks of contemporary 
commerce. Most notable in this respect was the ambivalent response to the success of the 
East India Company which regularly became the focus of suspicion that, in Patricia 
Fumerton's words, "something strange was happening to England's wealth, and no one 
knew exactly where to point the finger. , 81 Inquiring in 1623 into the whereabouts of East 
Indian trade, King James was informed by the deputy governor of the company that "having 
79 Quoted in John Drakakis (ed) Shakespearean Tragedy (London, 1992), p. 398. 
80 Quoted in R. H. Tawney (ed) Tudor Economic DOCUMentS (London, 1946), p. 73. 
81 gp. Lit., Fumerton p. 174. 
. s--ubjr, -rjA1?, y ;, nrtrjl 231 
232 
first served his Majesty's dominions, the overplus is transported to foreign parts in the 
,, 82 nature of a home bred commodity. As Fumerton suggests, encounters with the "new 
world" led to "a nervous realization about market forces in the Jacobean world. Once 
located, strangeness 'out there' was discovered to be 'in here' in the English identity 
itself 9583 Indeed, the term "overplus" in many respects can be read as a precursor to what in 
the transition to capitalism proper came to be known as "surplus value" - which, as Lacan 
argues, is not a claim to property so much as to the excess or usufruct generated by it: in 
other words, what is implied is a certain relationship to enjoymen . 
As I tried to sketch out in the previous section, Antony and Cleopatra also suggests that the 
ethnic moment proper to the colonial scene implies a certain relationship towards 
enjoyment, not least insofar as Egyptian "pleasure" is something that comes to threaten the 
coherence of Rome's national identity. Typically, Rome's criticisms of Antony routinely 
focus on the way "he fishes, drinks, and wastes/The lamps of night in revel" or how he will 
"stand the buffet/With knaves that smell of sweat" (I. iv. 4-5; 20-1). Indeed, Caesar's 
recollection of how previously Antony did "eat strange flesh/Which some did die to look on" 
(11.67-8) is a particularly revealing insight into how it is, quite literally, a certain "relationship 
toward the Thing, structured by means of fantasies, that is at stake when we speak of the 
menace to our 'way of life' presented by the other. , 84 In other words, the national identity 
of Rome in Antony and Cleopatra appears to be maintained so long as its specific enjoymen 
continues to be materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national 
myths that structure these practices. The conflict between Rome and Egypt in the play is 
82 lbid., p. 175. 
83 Ibid., p. 183. 
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not merely a clash of cultures that can, as numerous critics of the play would appear to 
suggest, be reduced to a series of binary oppositions (private/public, male/female, 
from/content etc. ). Rather, what appears to be at issue here exceeds the dialectic of self and 
other and opens onto a more radical level of estrangement that, strictly speaking, cannot be 
accounted for purely in terms of socio-symbolic features. It is precisely this paradox, I 
would like to suggest, that is addressed in Jacques-Alain Miller's seminar on what he calls 
46extimite": 
Why does the other remain Other? What is the cause for our hatred of him, 
for our hatred of him in his very being? It is hatred of the enjoyment in the 
Other. This would be the most general formula of racism ... a 
hatred of the 
particular way the Other enjoys ... the Other as 
he who essentially steals my 
own enjoyment. 85 
Indeed, in aj ourney to the Orient in 1600 John Cartwright relates how "In this place is to be 
seen the strange sights of fireworks, of banquets, of music, of wrestling, and of whatsoever 
,, 86 triumphs else there is to be shown, for the declaration of the joy of this slothful people. 
according to Jacques-Alain Miller, it is "Jouissance ... that grounds the alterity of the Other 
when there is no Other of the Other, , 87 at a phantasmatic level what many contemporary 
accounts of the Orient appear to disclose is precisely this confrontation of incompatible 
84 Slavoi Zizek, "Eastern Europe's Republics of Gilead, " New Left Review, 183 (1990), pp. 50-63, p. 
51. 
11 Jacques-Alain Miller, "Extimite" in Lacanian theory of Discourse: Subject. Structure and Society, 
ed. Mark Bracher et. al. (London, 1994), pp. 74-87, p. 79. 
86 Quoted in Early Modern Tales of Orient: A Critical Anthology, ed. Kenneth Parker (London, 
1999), p-116. 
117 Jacques-Alain Miller, "Extimte, " p. 79. In a gesture of counter-identification that is typical of 
Cleopatra's rhetorical strategy in the text, she responds to Antony's accusation that she Is "idleness 
itself" with the conceit that tis sweating Iabour, /To bear such idleness so near the heart/As 
Cleopatra this" (I. iii. 93-5). Indeed throughout the text, there is a strange preoccupation with the 
expenditure of energy: Octavius is presented as "labouring" (Il. vi. 14) for Julius Caesar, while his 
revelry on the barge is characterized as a "monstrous labour" (Il. vii. 98); Canidius remarks that "With 
news the time's in labour, and throws forth, /Each minute, some" (Ill. vii. 80-1) and according to Antony, 
Mardian's safe return from battle "Does pay thy labour richly" (IV. xiv. 36). 
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modes of jouissanc that, as this excerpt suggests, is centred upon "the way in which the 
Other obtains a 12lus-de-jouir: either he does not work or he does not work enough, or he is 
useless or a little too useful, but whatever the case may be, he is always endowed with a part 
,, 88 of jouissanc that he does not deserve. 
In this section I want to develop further how this "overplus" - this radically ambivalent 
marker of identity -qua enjoymen 
that constitutively "Werflows every measure" - also 
cannot be thought outside consideration of a certain textual superfluity in Antony an 
Cleopatr that similarly throws into doubt the notion of any pure loss or expense. Bearing 
in mind Miller's discussion of extimite, I now wish to examine more explicitly those ways in 
which the text negotiates a relationship to an alterity that exceeds the determinations of any 
clearly defined demarcation between exteriority and interiority. In this respect we will 
consider how the question of enjoyment opens inevitably onto the question of jouissanc as 
that which constitutes the very play of the signifier upon which "meaning" itself comes to 
be negotiated. 
We might begin in this respect by considering how the much noted theatrical quality of the 
play itself also involves a kind of interminably repeated supplementation. Arguing that the 
play in many ways comes to speculate upon its own "metastasis, " Michael Goldman not 
only avers that "Antony and Cleopatra are each other's best audience, " but that "this is a 
88 Ltjid,, p. 80. Again Cleopatra offers a particularly resonant example of this paradox, and which might 
profitably be read in the light of Slavoj Zizek's discussion of the femme fatale as the locus of a certain 
"surplus enjoyment": "What bestows on her an aura of mystery is precisely the way she cannot be 
clearly located in the opposition between master and slave. At the moment she seems permeated 
with intense pleasure, it suddenly becomes apparent that she suffers immensely; when she seems 
to be the victim of some violence, it suddenly becomes clear that she enjoys it. We can never be 
quite sVrg if she enjoys or suffers, if she manipulates or is herself the victim of manipulation. 
Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Lacan Through Popular Culture, p. 65. 
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play in which we identify with audiences, with Antony and Cleopatra as each other's 
,, 89 audience, with ourselves as audience and with the audience characters on stage. Similarly, 
Linda Charnes observes that "no other Shakespearean play is filled with as many reporters 
and messengers as Antony and Cleopatra. "90 What this infrastructural economy of re- 
marking in the play appears to suggest, however, is that there is something within the text 
that cannot yield to presence. Arguing how the very possibility of meaning relies upon "a 
structural opening [that] allows context to transform itself or to give way to another 
context, " Derridean differance bears upon the way that every mark is always already a re- 
mark precisely insofar as "self-identity" is nothing but the inverted representative of the 
space of its own condition of (im)possibility. 91 Indeed, Derrida argues that this 
supplementary re-marking is immanent to the theatrical event insofar as "theatre does not 
show 'things in themselves, ' nor does it represent them; it shows a representation, shows 
itself to be a fiction; it is less engaged in setting forth the image of things than it is in setting 
,, 92 up the machine. 
This is precisely the kind of ignominious fate that Cleopatra seeks to avoid at the hands of 
her Roman captors whose "mechanic slaves/With greasy aprons, rules, and hammers 
89 Michael Goldman, Acting and Action in Shakespearean Tragg-dy (Princeton, 1984), p. 1 38. 
go Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity: Materializing The Subiect in Shakespeare (London, 1993), 
p. 106. John Danby also argues that "characters judge and comment on each other more than in any 
other Shakespeare play. " "Antony and Cleopatra: A Shakespearean Adjustment, " in Antony and 
Cleopatra: Contemporary Critical EssayS, ed. John Drakakis (London, 1994), pp. 33-56, p. 36. 
91 Derrida, for example, argues that "every mark has the force of detachment which not only can free 
it from such and such a determined context, but ensures even its principle of intelligibility and its mark 
structure - that is, its iterability (repetition g12-d alteration). A mark that could not in any way detach itself 
from its singular context - however slightly and, if only through repetition, reducing, dividing and 
multiplying it by identifying it - would no longer be a mark. " Politics of Friendship, trans. George 
Collins (London, 1997), p. 216. 
92 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London, 1981), p. 238. 
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shall/Uplift us to the view" (V. ii. 209-1 1). This speech, which has so often been singled out 
for discussion as the text's "self-reflexive" commentary upon its own position of 
enunciation, is remarkable in the way that the frame of the text is both inscribed into, and 
accounted for, by the text itself That is to say, the "theatrical" here is always already co- 
opted by a certain "writing" or "mechanical repetition" described by Geoffrey Bennington 
as "the necessity of a contamination of any essence by a generalized 'technology. "' If it is 
indeed the case that, as one critic avers, Antony and Cleopatra betrays a dangerous over- 
proximity to "the mechanics by which characters make meaning, "93 Derrida argues that it is 
this "alterity i-n the same" that is unthinkable outside of its relation to a "machine.. thatpulUs 
or works, 1994 In other words, Antony and Cleopatra cannot avoid a certain necessity of 
"stand[ing] on mechanic complimenf ' (IV. iv. 31-2), insofar as the theatrical itself is 
something that inscribes this essential impossibility of any absolute synchronization. 95 
What I wish to suggest here is that Antony and Cleopatra frequently comes to signal the 
incursion of jouissanc or "non-synchronous temporality" that Homi Bhabha has also 
discerned in the colonial scene as 
.. the 
'foreign' element that reveals the interstitial; that insists in the textile 
superfluity of folds and wrinkles; and becomes the unstable element of 
linkage, the indeterminate temporality of the in-between, that has to be 
engaged in creating the conditions through which 'newness' comes into the 
world. 96 
93 Kent Cartwright, Shakespearean Tragedy and Its Double (New York, 1991), p. 245. 
" Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London, 1978), p. 127. 
95 Derrida provides a more extensive consideration of these issues in his excellent essay on Romeo 
and j. UHjQj entitled "Aphorism Countertime" in Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge 
(London, 1992), pp. 414-33. 
96 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, 1994), p. 227. 
236 717 j* S- ýIi-P. An.!: p es air, -;, = nGIj j* rI 
237 
This "indeterminate temporality of the in-between" is nowhere more explicit than in what 
one critic of the play somewhat appositely refers to as its preponderant strain of "iterative 
imagery. q197 Indeed, Derrida's inventory of motifs that he relates to the "remark" bear a 
striking resemblance to figures that also populate Antony and Cleopatra. Crucially, for 
Derrida the structure of the remark is not only suggested "in the movement of a fan" but also 
includes the many-faceted figure of wings, pages, veils, sails, folds, plumes, 
etc., constituting and reconstituting itself in an endless breath of opening 
and/or closing .... through a tropic twist.. [they] 
inscribe above and bUond 
that movement the very movement and structure of the fan-as-text, the 
deployment and retraction of all its valencies; the spacing, the fold, and 
hymen between all these meaning-effects.. 98 
While the "divided disposition" (l. v. 53) of Antony and Cleopatra has long been noted 
thematically in those speeches that try to negotiate a "midway/'Twixt extremes"(Ill. iv. 19- 
20), the text also traces a certain play of spacing in figures that come to inscribe this essential 
vacillation. Indeed, it is at this level of a certain "metastasis" that the sublime power of the 
text comes to inscribe the movement or pulsation around the contours of an invisible void 
that yawns in the scene of presence. 99 
97 Leo Kirchbaum, "Shakespeare's Cleopatra, " Shakespeare Association Bulletin, 19 (1944), 
pp. 1 61-171, p. 1 65. For a bizarre yet strangely illuminating study of the play in this respect, see 
James E Harting, The Ornithology of Shakespeare (London, 1978). 
98 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London, 1981), p. 251. 
99 It is to this extent that what we earlier referred to as the drive becomes the accomplice of this 
strange topology in the text. Lacan, for example, discusses the drive as an "outwards-and-back 
movement, " "a thrust that emerges through the rim only to return as its target, after having encircled 
something I call the object g. " The Four Funjamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 178, p. 1 94. 
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Not only is Antony characterized as a victim of "fretted fortunes" (IV. xii. 8), Antony an 
Cleopatr is preoccupied with figures of textile weaving that similarly clude the possibility 
of any straightforward stitching, leading one critic to compare the play to an infelicitous 
"welding together of material. "100 Following his defeat at the hands of Caesar, for example, 
Antony claims that "The seven-fold shield of Ajax cannot keep/The battery from my heart. 
0, cleave, my sides" (IV. xiv. 38-9); Cleopatra's betrayal by Seleucus and her humiliation 
before Caesar is signaled by being "unfolded/With one that I have bred" (V. ii. 169-70); 
Charmian's speculates upon a lover that may be made "fifty-fold a cuckold" (I. H. 64), and 
Antony's determines that Scarus is to be rewarded "ten-fold/For thy good valoue' 
(IV. vii. 15-16). 
Insofar as the security of spatial boundaries routinely become the focus of some political 
anxiety in the play, we might recall here Timothy Clark's analysis that 
[ ... ] the structure of the ontico-ontological difference may be described as a "fold, " specifically a dissymetric fold. An entity becomes apparent in an 
a1212earin (being) which withdraws in a structure of erasure as folding- 
back. Language is itself a fold of this structure in that, in its very effect of 
bringing to presence, it witholds itself and may not appear as an object. "' 
Perhaps equally significant in this respect is the sheer number of times in the play when 
words, literally, come to withold themselves, as something lodged in the gullet of the 
signifier: Cleopatra admonishes Antony for being "entangled with those mouth-made 
vowsjWhich break themselves in swearing" (I. iii. 30-1); Alexas relates that Anthony's 
"speech sticks in my heart" (l. v. 41); Channian is rebuked for favouring Caear over Antony: 
100 Levin Schucking, Character Problems in Shakesl2eare's Plays (London, 1922), p. 146. 
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"Be chok'd with such another emphasis, /Say the brave Antony" (I. v. 69-70); and even 
Caesar confesses that "mine own tongue/Splits what it speaks" (Il. vii. 121-2). Octavia too is 
similarly burdened with the unspeakable, suspended upon a "tongue [that] will not obey her 
heart, nor can/Her heart inform her tongue, " words are again swallowed in the instant of 
being spoken. Or, rather, they come to swell in the very space of their disappearance, not 
only as a promise, but as a kind of metastasis which recalls how "The higher Nilus swells) 
The more it promises" (Il. vii. 20-1): 
... the swan's down feather, That stands upon the swell at the full of tide, 
And neither way inclines 
(Ill. ii. 47-50) 
It is this strange spatio-temporal movement in the play - Imobilis et mobili - that also 
increasingly comes to suggest that "presence" is something that "swells" or affects itself 
without ever giving birth to itself 102 
101 Timothy Clark, "Being in Mime: Heidegger and Derrida on the Ontology of Literary Language, " 
Modern Language Notes, 101,5 (1986), pp. 1003-1021, p. 102. 
102 Indeed, even at the close of the play, Caesar's inquiry after "the manner of their deaths? I do not 
see them bleed" (V. ii. 335-6), Cleopatra's body offers nothing to Caesar's gaze but the impenetrable 
and ineffable exigence of a dead weight: 
If they had swallow'd poison, 'twould appear 
By external swelling: but she looks like sleep, 
As she would catch another Antony 
In her strong toil of grace. 
(V. ri. 343-5) 
Refusing initially to yield to an erotisme des corps that would make of it a site of legibility, the body 
remains an unfathomable and weightless density so concentrated and reposed upon itself that it 
"looks like sleep. " And yet it soon gives itself away, enfolded on itself so that an unexpected contact 
is made: "Here on her breast, /There is a vent of blood, and something blown" (11.347-8). In this 
weightless contact where depth distends toward the surface without simultaneity, we find a strange 
relation of autoeroticism where the body touches itself without making its way back to itself. 
Cleopatra's body is indeed made 'tremulous' here, not only as the site of an essential vascillation, but 
as the immanence of its own swelling echoic depth. 
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In this respect, the text's excrescent doublings and multiplications do not so much suggest 
some uniform spatial expanse as a disymmetry of cleavages and folds that give rise to a more 
enigmatic kind of spacing. While wars between Antony and Caesar "would be/As if the 
world should cleave" (III. iv. 30-1); anticipating defeat Antony imagines how his arms will be 
"pleach'd", that is, both folded and intertwined, in a fate of "penetrative shame" (IV. xiv. 73- 
5); Pompey is fearful of how Antony and Caesar "May cement their divisions, and bind 
up/The petty difference" (ILH48-9); Octavia's marriage allows the hearts of Caesar and 
Antony to be "knit/With an unslipping knot' (II. ii. 126-7) so that they are "for ever knit 
together" (II. vi. 112); Antony praises how his severed navy "Have knit again" (III. xiii. 17 1); 
applying an asp to her breast Cleopatra urges that "With thy sharp/teeth this knot 
intrinsicate/Of life at once untie" (V. ii. 302-4); Antony goads Caesar that "If you'll patch a 
quaffel, /A matter whole you have to make it with" while Caesar accuses Antony of "patch'd 
up" excuses (II. ii. 53.55). 
In other words, if Antony and Cleopatra has frequently been arraigned for its langorous 
refusal to get to the point, it is perhaps because its multiplicity of points are shown to be 
nothing but the knotted inflection of its folds. From Philo's "Nay, but.. " (11i), not only is 
the "beginning" of the text revealed already to be implicated in a middle, lines of force 
typically fail to run between two points and in a play that is more inclined to "tie up [its] 
points" (IV. iii. 34) in an invaginated structure that eludes the determination of an indivisible 
edge. 103 Opining to Antony that she is caught "twixt extremes, " Octavia is advised to "let 
her love draw to that point which seeks/best to preserve it" (Ill. iv. 21-2). What, in fact, the 
103We might recall here that Caesar refers to "unhackd edges" (11.1.10) while, contemplating suicide, 
Cleopatra speculates whether "knife, drugs, serpents have/Edge, sting, or operation" (IV. xv. 24-5). 
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"point" amounts to here is less a site anterior to the vicissitudes of difference than a product 
of differential relations and competing magnetic pulls. 
From its initial mention of "the bellows and the fan" of a gypsy's lust, Antony an 
Cleopatr is comprised of a surfeit of figures that variously threaten to exceed the very 
confines of figurality in a paradoxical movement of auto-fissure that, according to Derrida, 
characterizes every "mark" as such. What distinguishes these figures, perhaps the fan most 
ingeniously so, is a spatio-temporal torsion that appears always already to have divided the 
movement of departure from a first time: a "movement" whose enigma is most powerfully 
condensed in Antony's determination to "let that be left which leaves itself' (III. xi. 19- 
20). 104 Perhaps most conspicuously so, it is in the account of Cleopatra's barge progress 
where language assumes a rhetorical power that is in direct proportion to the way that it 
trembles before the very threat of its own disappearance: 
Purple the sails, and so perfumed that 
The winds were love-sick with them; the oars were 
silver, 
Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke, and made 
The water which they beat to follow faster, 
As amorous of their stroke. 
(II. ii. 193-97) 
In other words, throughout the speech signifiers transport themselves in a movement from 
limit to limit that takes place in and as syncopation, yet which cannot be said to take place 
as such. Rather, borrowing Jean-Luc Nancy's recent definition of the sublime, "meaning" is 
offered here only "in the schematic spacing and throbbing of the trace of figures, and thus 
104 This strange movement has not gone unnoticed by critics of the play. Emrys Jones, for example, 
observes that "though [it is] not without movement it is in a way static. " Jones, =&Ai., p. 11. 
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only comes to pass in the syncopated time of the passage of the limit to the limit" (emphasis 
added). 105 The language of the speech does not so much seek to mime the ponderous 
passage of the barge but suggests, rather, that the very anchorage of "meaning" itself is the 
product of a more enigmatic kind of slippage. The celebrated sensuousness of the speech (its 
strokes, its beats, its bends, its fans) privileges the heterogeneity of touch as that limit 
where, simultaneously, form gets carried away into the absence of form - making the 
formless itself stand out as such: "At the helm/A seeming mermaid steers: the silken 
tackle/Swell with the touches of those flower-soft hands" (II. ii. 208-10). It is impossible to 
speak of contact here; rather, language is sensitive to itself only at a certain limit of tactility 
that swells between extreme tension and distention, so that "touching [becomes] the limit of 
itself. the limit of images and words, contact - and with this, paradoxically, the impossibility 
of touchin inscribed in touching, since touching is the liMit.,, 106 That is to say, meaning 
literally insists throughout the speech as suspension, as a diaphanous weaving of spirit that 
is more comparable to the diffusion of a perfume in an unresisting atmosphere: 107 "From the 
barge/A strange invisible perfume hits the sense/Of the adjacent wharfs" (II. ii. 211-13). 
Touch, in other words, as that which announces a peculiar spacing of proximate distance, a 
joui-sens of weightless contact that, if we can risk such a formulation, "makes one sense 
what makes one sense (what it is to sense). "108 
105 Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Sublime Offering" in Of The Sublime: Presence in Question, ed. 
Rodolphe Gasche and Mark C. Taylor (New York, 1993), pp. 25-55, p. 45. 
106 ibid., p. 46. 
107 1 am, of course, touching here upon certain motifs more commonly associated with the thought of 
G. W. F Hegel. See Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford, 1977), p331. 
108 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf (California, 1996), p. 17. If language appears 
to unburden itself of all material weight here it is no less the case that the text consistently calibrates 
the densities of its forms and the voluminosity of its depths through this implied (non)interval of 
touching: Charmian demands from the soothsayer "a matter of more weight" (I. ii. 65-6); Ventidius 
pursues Anthony "with what haste/The weight we must convey" (Ill. ii. 36); Caesar accuses Anthony of 
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While several critics have praised the "suggestive" and ethereal quality of the speech, its 
convoluted folds of contact also suggest another kind of "floating" which, for Derrida, 
provides the figure of "suggestion" as such, as that which is "barely revealing at all, on the 
point of disappearing, the indecision of that which remains suspended.. "' 09 Indeed, the 
"divers-colour'd fans" not only evoke this lateral movement, they do so in an image of 
vacillation that (somewhat infelicitously) seeks to grasp the simultaneity of the same at the 
point of bifurcation so that the "wind did seem/To glow the delicate cheeks which they did 
cool, /And what they did undid" (II. ii. 203-5). ' 10 
Significantly it is, once again, Cleopatra who is the animating source of this strange kind of 
auto-affection (qua jouissance): procuring a space of representation that also threatens to 
unmoor signification from any anchorage in referentiality. Beggaring all description, it is 
precisely Rome's fear that language cannot "unveil" the thing itself that is shown 
simultaneously to produce desire and also give rise to what Derrida has elsewhere termed 
66apotropaic anxiety. " With its surfeit of maritime figures the entire scenography of 
Enobarbus' speech is uncannily reminiscent of one that Derrida associates with the 
ambivalent role of "woman" who, in phallogocentric discourse, "regulate[s] the play of sails 
"lightness" so that Rome "bear[s] /So great a weight" (I. iv. 24-5), while Enobarbus predicts that"the 
full Caesar will/Answer his emptiness" (III. xiii. 36). Outwitted by Caesar because his ships are "heavy" 
(ill. vii. 38), Anthony's defeat is announced by the fact that he is "full of lead"([ I I. A. 72). Not only is it a 
"happy horse" that bears the "weight"(I. v. 21-3) of Antony, he invites Pompey to "weigh/what is worth 
embrac'd" (Ii. vi. 33-4); Cleopatra's remark that Antony's "loss" is proportionate "to the weight" 
(V. ii. 101-2) is ironically recalled in the spectacle of Antony's conveyance to the monument: "How 
heavy weighs my lord! /Our strength is all gone into heaviness, /That makes the weight' (IV. xv. 40). 
log Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, p. 239. 
110 Nicholas Royle has also suggestively drawn attention to "the uncanny motion without motion" in 
the text. See Telepathy and Literature: Essays on the Reading Mind, (Oxford, 1991), p. 156. 
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(of a ship, for example) around ..... apotropaic anxiety. "' 
11 Cleopatra is made homologous 
with the promiscuous passage of the signifier which "perforates even as it parries, " and 
which "derives its apotropaic power from the taut, resistant tissues, webs, sails and veils 
which are erected and unfurled around it.,, 112 Significantly, even the rigging and the sails 
designed to arrest any involuntary movement are, paradoxically, entrusted to the lubricious 
folds of "silken tackle" (II. ii.. 219). If, according to Derrida., there are no figures without 
"woman" because she "is the mast or mainstay that fixes all meanings in phallogocentric 
thought, "' 13 what the entire speech hints at somewhat more capriciously - with its cast of 
dimpled boys, mermaids, cupids and nymphs - is that any disturbance in the rigging that 
tries to navigate the ordinance of the signifier also threatens to erase the mark of sexual 
difference itself, abandoning meaning to "float between the masculine and the feminine. "' 14 
The polysemy of "curls" (V. ii. 300), "folds" (V. ii. 169-70) "pinches" (I. v. 28/ V. ii. 294) and 
even "wrinkles" (l. v. 29/II. xi. 37) to be found in Antony and Cleopatra, then, not only weave 
the text in manifold ways, they also mark the spacing of a semantic void in a movement of 
auto-affection that threatens to exceed phenomenality itself. ' 15 That is to say, it is within 
I" Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietszche's Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow (London, 1978), p. 41. 
112 ibid., p. 41. 
113 Wendy O'Shea-Meddour, "The Seduction of Sirens: Derrida and Woman" in Textual Practio, 13, 
3 (1999) , pp. 465-86, p. 469. 
114 O'Shea-Meddour, "i ., p. 473. Indeed, in Enobarbus' peroration that "Holy priests bless her 
when she is riggish" (11.1i. 239-40) we encounter the contradictory etymological cleavage between 
riggishness as that which refers to a wanton and licentious nature, go-d the more commonplace 
meaning of rigging as the very armature of that which polices the boundary itself. 
115 Cleopatra's "hops" ( ll. ii. 229 ), Antony's preparedness to "leap"(III. xiii. 51) and Caesar's calculation 
that his fortune lies upon a "jump" (Ill. viii. 6) are not only motifs of anticipated movement that 
"condense down toward the point of an idea, " following Derrida they may also be read as 
"descriptions/inscriptions of the structure and movement of the literary textile, a 'hesitational' turning 
into writing. " And isn't it also this uncanny sense of motion without motion that Antony invokes as the 
vacillation essential to the time of desire?: 
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these very folds that the textuality of the text is itself re-marked, and in a movement so 
"intrinsicate" (V. ii. 303) that it can only relate to itself through dividing itself. Indeed, this 
plurivalent aspect of the text is perhaps most evident in the prodigious throng of its scene 
changes. Arraigned famously by Samuel Johnson for neglecting "any art of connection or 
care of disposition, " 116 as one of only six other plays in the Folio that are not divided into 
acts or scenes, the scenic form of Antony and Cleopatra has provoked more critical debate 
than perhaps any other Shakespearean text. Printed in twenty-nine double-column pages 
that are in turn folded upon themselves and set in a relation of contiguity rather than 
sequentiality, the Folio's peculiar morphology perhaps most astutely bears witness to the 
scene of writing as the theatre and principle of an endogenous folding. As even the most 
rigorous bibliographical scholarship has demonstrated, efforts to adduce any reliable clue to a 
structure that is immanent in the play is more likely to be enveloped in the text's own 
66strange forms" in a way that no amount of editorial argumentation can efface : "like the rest 
of the Folio, [Antony and Cleopatra] was not set page by page in sequence, but by fonnes, 
and that the formes were composed and printed 'from the inside outward. "" 17 
Let us go, Come; 
Our separation so abides and flies, 
That thou, residing here, goes yet with me; 
And 1, hence fleeting, here remain with thee. 
Away! 
(f. iii. 102-5) 
Moreover, if Caesar is variously characterized as the agent of a "speed' that "carries beyond belief" 
(III. H. 56) this movement exceeds comprehension because it pertains to a certain mobility that, strictly 
speaking, has nothing at all to do with movement. Rather, what such speed announces is an 
"ecstasy of movement" that obliterates movement as such. At once moving and non-orientable, 
temporality offers itself both here and elsewhere in the text in a doubly contradictory dimension: as 
heterogeneity and instantaneous disjunction that perhaps most powerfully reveals the cinephilic* 
aspect of the text first noted by John Danby. 
116 Quoted in M. R. Ridley, gp--Qit., A 
117 John Wilders (ed) Antony and Cleopatra, (London, 1995), Introduction, p. 78. 
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Divided from itself from the start, involuted upon itself in a way that problematizes the 
illusion of any dialectical egress or regress, Antony and Cleol2atr returns to itself only under 
this obligation of a certain-departure from itself. It is in this respect that the spatio-temporal 
paradoxes of the play open onto the question of a metastasis whose borders question the 
intangibility of every edge. The much remarked upon "expansive" mood of the text is more 
obsidional than it is directional, the site of a strange auto-affection that has no signiflable 
reality that is prior to this undecidable process of opening/closing that reforms itself without 
let up. If "according to the structure of supplementarity, what is added is always a fold and 
this addition gives way to a kind of multiple division or subtraction that enriches itself with 
zeros as it races breathlessly toward the infinite, "' 18 in Antony and Cleopatra we find an 
equally breathless logic of execrecent expanse: Antony either agonizes over the "Ten 
thousand harms" (I. H. 126) that his Egyptian revelry may provoke or is proffering kisses to 
his lover that are either "many doubled" (I. v. 40) or "many thousand" (IV. xv. 20); praising 
Pompey's martial skill Enobarbus remarks that "you have well deserv'd ten times as 
much/As I have said you did" (Il. vi. 77-8); Antony excuses the indignities he has endured at 
the hands of Rome "and thousands more of semblable import" (III. iii. 2-3); preparing for war 
Antony promises to be "treble-sinew'd, hearted, breath'd" (III. xiii. 178); he accuses 
Cleopatra of having "a million moe" (IV. xiv. 18) hearts other than his own and honours Eros 
as being "Thrice-nobler than myself' (IV. xiv. 95); no stranger to hyperbole himself, 
Enobarbus calculates that Caesar is "twenty times of better fortune, /He is twenty men to 
one" 
118 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, p. 262. 
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There is something more at stake here than, as one critic avers, merely celebrating "the 
feeling that bigness is wonderful. "119 The sheer exorbitance of Antony and Cleol2atr 's 
multiplications and incessant re-foldings produces vicariously a sense of the text's 
materiality rather than simply being revealed by it. In this crucial respect the play offers an 
exemplary case of what is, according to Derrida, the most enduring if generally 
unacknowledged ruse of textuality insofar as "it makes us take agglomerates for 
substances. " 120 Indeed, we might recall here one critic's revealing summary of the text as 
that which "heap[s] up together all that is most unsubstantial, frivolous, vain, contemptible 
and variable, till the worthlessness be lost in this magnitude, and a sense of the sublime 
99"' If it is the case that, as Slavoj iV spring from the very elements of littleness. Z zek 
suggests, "the process of 'transubstantiation' gets under way when substance itself 
becomes the predicate of (what was) its own predicate, " 122 this paradoxical overplus in 
Antony and Cleopatra also increasingly comes to assume the spatio-temporal contours of 
the very space of what we call the "subject" as such. 
"I have fled myself" 
119 Harry Berger, Jr., "Hydra and Rhizome" in Russ McDonald (ed) Shakespeare Reread: The Texts 
L-e---Qo-ntexfta (London, 1994), pp. 79-105, p. 92. Ln Nw 
120 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (London, 1981), p. 246. 
121 Anne Brownell Jameson, Characteristics of Women: Moral. Poetical and Historical (New York, 
1967), p. 259. 
v 
122 Slavoj Zilek, The Plague of Fantasies (London, 1997), p. 45. 
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This principle whereby an identity becomes what it is by realizing its inherent negativity - 
that is, by taking cognizance of its own death - is one that radically subtends those "strange 
forms" that are such an invincible preoccupation of the text. Indeed, Antony's bungled 
attempt at suicide and his protracted death scene locate him more precisely in the domain 
that Lacan was to call "between the two deaths. " Alongside Jonathan Dollimore's 
observation that Antony's heroic identity is a product of the very structures that render him 
obsolete and in fact hasten his death, a Lacanian gloss pennits the further suggestion that 
both Antony and Cleopatra are "already dead" and that, to a large extent, the unavowed 
project of the text is to remind them of this fact. 123 
If, traditionally, critics have formulated an ambivalent response to Antony's death, it is 
perhaps because of the generally unacknowledged suspicion that such a death is in fact 
already upon the hero even before the play can properly be said to begin. Indeed, we may 
refer here to A. C. Bradley who sought to justify the exclusion of Antony and Cleol2atr 
from the pantheon of the "great tragedies" in precisely these terms: "[When] the splendour 
[of passion] vanishes, we do not mourn, as we mourn for the love of Romeo or Othello, that 
a thing so bright and good should die. And the fact that we mourn so little saddens us. " 124 
For Bradley, paradoxically, it is our very failure to moum the death of the lovers that 
constitutes the only available site of mourning. Indeed, in a text that problernatizes the very 
123 As numerous critics of the play have long noted, Antony's extended "leave taking" risks 
descending into comedy. Yet, from a Lacanian perspective, this conspicuous lack of tragic dignity is 
a symptom of that moment when the subject is reduced to a void of absolute alienation since, 
according to Lacan, there is no Cause to which he can sacrifice his being (even Cleopatra's death, 
we should recall, proves itself to be a hoax). Antony's seemingly noble conviction that it Is left to 
"Ourselves to end ourselves" (IV. xiv. 1 9) and Cleopatra's encouragement that "none but 
Antony/Should conquer Antony" (IV. xv. 16-17) merely emphasizes the fact that Antony is deprived 
of any substantial Destiny that can find support in the symbolic order. Ultimately, in terms of an 
ethical posture as it is defined by Lacanian psychoanalysis, Antony's suicide may be read literally as 
an empty gesture that "functigr. V as the index of a subjective deadlock which can no longer express 
itself in tragic pathos. " Slavoj Zizek, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related 
Matters , p-117- 
124 A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poet[y (Oxford, 1909), p. 304. 
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idea of any initial and initiating point of departure, both Antony and Cleopatra might be 
said to have. always already constituted themselves as their own mourners. 125 
I would also like to suggest here that a more complex relationship obtains between Antony's 
death(s) and the very possibility of symbolization tout court. While Antony is "already 
dead" at the level of the symbolic order, crucially this must be accompanied by his 
actual/biological death if the signifying network is to retain a minimal degree of internal 
consistency. Lacan's seemingly otiose assertion that everybody must die "at least twice" 
(Cleopatra, we should recall, is typically exorbitant in this respect, enjoying no fewer than 
twenty "deaths"), is largely concerned to emphasize the retrospective character of the 
signifying proccss. That is, for Lacan any attcmpt at symbolization/histori'Cization implics 
an empty place, the exigency of that which is, in fact, a non-historical kernel or structural 
impasse around which the symbolic order itself comes to be constituted. The crucial 
dialectical point not to be missed here, of course, is that this deadlock which appears to 
prevent the symbolic order from constituting itself in its (impossible) synchronous unity is 
also the retroactive product of the very act of symbolization itself. 
Dollimore's suggestion, then, that Antony encodes an identity that is "becoming but not yet 
residual"126 assists in grasping how Antony is so routinely located at the site of what may 
125 What can be discerned in Bradley's comments then, is a profound dissatisfaction that there is no 
point of reference in Antony and Cleopatra where the lovers can be rescued from the text's 
prepossessing posture of "leave-taking. " Bearing in mind that Bradley's opprobrium of the text 
elsewhere is also informed by the perception that it is too often caught in the act of constituting its 
own fictions, that it fails ultimately to occlude the traces of its own means of production: "in calling 
Antony and Cleopatra wonderful or astonishing, we appear to be thinking first of the artist and his 
activity, while in the case of the four famous tragedies it is the product of his activity, the thing 
presented, that first engrosses us. " Quoted in the Introduction to John Drakakis (ed) Antony- and 
Cleopatra: 
- 
A New Critical Casebook (London, 1993), ppl -25, p. 3. 
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be called a temporal ek-stasis throughout the play. Repeatedly unable to posit an essential 
identity that inheres in a moment of undivided presence, Antony is either brooding over the 
fact that Caesar keeps "harping on what I am, /Not what he knew I was" (III. xiii. 142-3), or 
he takes succor from the conviction that "I am Antony yet" (III. xiiii. 56): a statement where, 
in the very gesture of registering his proper name, we find an inflation of the loss that 
threatens to isolate "Antony" from any designated reference. 
Indeed, throughout the text Antony is situated in relation to a certain surplus or variation on 
the paradox of an "overplus" that we spoke of earlier, and which finds its most concise 
expression in Enobarbus's claim that "sometimes, when he is not Antony, /He comes too 
short of that great property/Which still should go with Antony" (I. i. 56-8). Even though this 
statement is offered as a rebuke, the strange syntax conspicuously draws attention to this 
contradiction between the universal and the particular. While these remarks appear 
ostensibly to be saying the opposite, the redoubled references to "Antony" are invoked as 
markers of identity even when Enobarbus appears to be criticising Antony for his failure to 
incarnate the predicates ("that great property") that define the very identity of "Antony" as 
such. As the rhetorical axis of excess and lack makes clear, Anthony's identity appears to be 
made even more resonant at the very point when it encounters itself in its antithetical 
'0 %1 determination. While Slavoj Zizek argues that the "subject exists only within [a] failed 
encounter between the Universal and the Particular, " 127 Enobarbus' comments here similarly 
imply that Antony is nothing but a name for this constitutive discord. 
126 Dollimore, p. 205. 
127 
VV 
Slavoj Zizek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Facto , p. 46. 
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This rhetorical failure to posit a reliable limit of totalization is a recurring motif in the text's 
efforts to render definitively Antony's "great property, " or what is elsewhere enigmatically 
referred to as his "own particularity" (IV. ix. 20). What is often revealed in the play is 
nothing short of an onto-dramatization of this very contradiction. On the one hand Antony 
is pure negative universality, a solipsistic identity that makes abstraction of every particular 
content. According to Caesar he "is the abstract of all faults/That all men follow" (Liv. 10); 
as a species that appears to encompass its own genus, Antony is similarly referred to as the 
"man of men" (l. v. 72), "the word of war" (H. H. 44). Indeed, this passage of the genus into 
species is evoked in suitably vivid terms when Antony fantasizes to his soldiers that "I wish 
I could be made so many men, /And all of you clapp'd up together in/An Antony" (IV. ii. 16- 
18). On the other hand we find in Caesar's comment that Antony "becomes his flaNV' 
(III. xiii. 34) the suggestion that Antony is this abstract power of negativity which comes into 
existence in the very domain of its determinations. In other words, "self identity" here 
implies the coincidence of an entity with the empty place of its inscription, an "ovcrplus" 
that becomes incommensurate to any predicate. 128 The text's rhetoric of transubstantiation 
is, in this respect, less concerned with any notion of transcendence than in disclosing the 
politically charged exigencies of how, in Ernesto Laclau's words, "the universal emerges out 
of the particular not as some principle underlying and explaining the particular, but as an 
incomplete horizon suturing a dislocated particular identity. " 129 
128 In terms of the many "economic" metaphors associated with Antony throughout the play, Antony 
is represented as having so much honour that he can afford to spend it endlessly. That is to say, 
"excess" is not something that appears to be attached to Antony but that which appears to constitute 
him originally. Indeed, we could say that Antony, paradoxically, routinely comes to augment his 
'I'dentity" precisely insofar as he "loses" it. 
129 Ernesto Laclau, "Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Idenity" in Emancipationj 
(London, 1996), pp. 20-36, p. 28. This passage of the genus into the species Is also the very figure of 
over -determination as such; that is, the process whereby "totality" comprises a particular element 
that embodies its universal structuring principle. And isn't this precisely also the basic paradox of the 
Lacanian logic of "non-all"? That is, in order to produce the illusion of totality one has to add or 
subtract (which amounts to the same thing in a differential order) a paradoxical element which "in its 
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We may suggest, then, that Antony himself is to some extent the embodiment of the text's 
failure to secure its own temporal homeostasis. Indeed, the sheer ubiquity of the term "yet" 
in Antony and Cleopatra perhaps most conspicuously announces this relation of the future 
anterior which, for Lacan, inscribes subjectivity within a self- referential 'short-circuit' as 
something that 'will have been, ' that is never present ... It is always-already 'past, ' 
although it never appeared in the past itself. [it is] constituted ... as the result of the 
way the past's mirroring in the future is mirrored back in the present. 130 
Eluding any moment of pure undivided presence, as simultaneously "residual" and 
"emergent" Antony's subjectivity constitutively is the inscription of this essential 
vacillation. Indeed, Cleopatra's dream of Antony not only attempts to remythologize her 
dead lover, her very effort to do so encodes this strange time of that which "will have been. " 
Dolabella's incredulity towards the queen's enquiry of whether "there was, or might be such 
a man, " (V. ii-94) is further compounded by Cleopatra's response that only serves to 
reaffirm her initial equivocation: "but if there be, or ever were one such, 4t's past the size of 
dreaming" (11.96-7). 131 
VV 
very particularity, embodies the universality of the genus in the form of its opposite. " Slavoj Zizek, 
For They Know Not What They Do, p. 44. 
130 Ibid., p. 15. It is worthwhile recalling here Lacan's account of the relationship between the 
subject and the signifier: "What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is 
no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I 
shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming, " Lacan, M&2., 1977, p. 86. At its most 
basic level, then, subjectivity is nothing other than this very inconsistency of the signifying chain. 
131 Isn't it also possible to discern at the heart of the text's self-reflexive commentaries how the very 
possibility of theatre itself is mired in this essential contretemps? That is to say, there is an Implied 
degree of convergence between text's problematic inscription of history and the early Jacobean 
theatre's equally ambivalent role as a producer of significations whose meaning arises apres coup: 
or, rather, in Cleopatra's strangely apposite term, "extemporally" (V. ii. 216). In both cases we are 
intimately concerned with a relationship between the signifier and symbolization that, in Lacan's 
words, inscribes a "history [that] is already producing itself on the stage where it will be played out. " 
Jacques Lacan, "Function and Field of Speech and Language' in Ecrits: A Selection, Alan Sheridan 
trans., (London, 1977), pp. 30-113, p-52. 
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Such revisionist mythmaking is not an uncommon feature of a text that frequently identifies 
improvisation as the site specific to the emergence of both subjectivity and history: as 
something that "will have been, " decided afterwards through inscription in the symbolic 
order. Indeed, we might recall here the victorious Caesar's determination to record "How 
hardly I was drawn into this war, /How calm and gentle I proceeded still/In all my writings" 
(V. i. 74-6). Such politically astute sensitivity to the fact that one can become a "tale of 
oneself only by ceasing to be oneself' 132 stands in marked contrast to the account of 
Antony's suicide which is represented as a defiant act of self-sufficiency that, paradoxically, 
also comes to flout the very device of textuality as such: 
he is dead, Caesar, 
Not by a public minister of justice, 
Nor by a hired knife, but that self hand 
Which writ his honour in the acts it did. 
(V. i. 19-22) 
In other words, the text appears to hint that any symbolic rewriting of the past attests to the 
presence in the symbolic network of a foreign kernel that can only acquire meaning "after the 
fact. " As I have argued in earlier chapters, it is precisely this very impossibility of 
elaborating a continuous passage from genesis into structure that constitutively gives rise to 
132 Stephen J. Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (London, 
1980), p. 238. Alternatively, we might recall the posthumous fantasy-scene invoked by Antony 
'Where souls do couch on flowers, we'll hand in hand, /And with our sprightly port make the ghost 
gaze' (IV. xiv. 51-2). This fantasy of an impossible gaze, where Antony "outlives", Ppself to bear 
witness to the spectacle of his own death, is a scenario that, according to Slavoj Zizek, provides "a 
contrario proof that the status of the subject is that of a missing link, of a void whio, )Vithin the 
synchronous set, holds the place of its foreclosed diachronous genesis. " Slavoj Zizek, For They 
Know Not What They Do, p. 1 98. 
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every "subject effect. " Indeed, the strange time of passage that we find in Antony's 
determination to "let that be left which leaves itself' (III. xi. 19-20) implies this essential 
vacillation between protention and retentional traces so that, in another example of the text's 
strange kind of auto-affection, there can be no accession to an event that is not, in a sense, 
preceded by its already having been left behind. 
Bearing in mind here how the colonial discourse of the text would have acquired particular 
resonance for a Jacobean culture that was itself embarking upon a neo-colonialist project of 
its own, according to Homi Bhabha this constitutive discord between genesis and structure 
also inscribes the ambivalent moment of the colonial itself "as the continual dramatization of 
emergence - of difference ... as the beginning of a history which is repetitively desired. ""' As 
I have argued, Antony and Cleopatra so consistently evokes the very idea of a first time as 
that which is most enigmatic, that even the moment of Cleopatra's "death, " "What should I 
stay -" (V. ii. 312), presents a posture of leave-taking that is suspended upon the tantalizing 
suggestion that she might, in fact, remain. Similarly, both in the curious lineation of the verse 
and in the metaphor that he employs, even Caesar's attempts to negotiate political 
agreement with Antony locates an "edge" as something that is inscribed upon the curvature 
of a retum: 
.... if I knew What hoop should hold us staunch, from edge to 
edge 
O'th' world I would pursue it. 
(H. ii. 121-4) 
133 Homi Bhabha, "The Other Question: The Stereotype and Colonial Discourse" in The Sexual 
Subiect: A Screen Reader , ed. Stephen Heath (London, 1996), pp-312 -332, p. 328. 
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That is to say, these ambivalent and chiasmic intersections of leaving/following in Anton 
and Cleopatra more properly open onto the disjunctive dimension of a symbolic order 
which, in Lacan's words, is itself suspended between "non-being and insisting to be a 
symbolic order in travail, in the process of coming, insisting in being realized. qs134 
Again, not insignificantly, it is Cleopatra who provides a strangely resonant if complex 
elaboration of this tension through the example of her seemingly inexplicable attack of 
amnesia. Prior to Antony's first departure for Rome the queen's obsequies soon spiral into 
a circuit of negation: 
Sir, you and I must part, but that's not it; 
Sir, you and I have loved, but there's not it; 
That you know well. Something it is I would - 
Oh, my oblivion is a very Antony, 
And I am all forgotten! 
(I. iii. 89-93) 
Cleopatra's predicament here (which elaborates yet another case of a character in the 
ambivalent throes of leave-taking) is exemplary of the psychoanalytico-existential paradox 
which claims that there is no substantial content to be lost that is previous to the experience 
of loss itself : i. e. where it is through the very activity of recovering the lost object that 
"loss" is constituted as such. Poised precariously between Being and Nothing, the speech 
134 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 11 The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the 
Technique of Psychoanalysis (Cambridge, 1988), p. 326. 
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strives vainly to possess the determination of a "something" whose content endlessly 
relapses into a "nothing in the form of something. " 135 
In other words, this decidedly enigmatic textual intromission illuminates succinctly the 
play's broader examination of the paradoxical way in which being retains its consistency 
only insofar as it is endlessly posited from the perspective of becoming, i. e. where "being" is 
nothing but another name for the subject in this essential posture of 'leave-taking. " Indeed, 
Antony's seemingly contradictory observation that "I have fled myself' (III. x. 8) acquires 
epigrammatic significance here as an account of how subjectivity comes to be only insofar as 
it coincides with the very moment of its own self-impediment, i. e. the "subject" as it is 
famously referred to in Lacanian algebra as 
ý. 136 In other words, Lacan's assertion that 
"The already found is already behind, but stricken by something like oblivion" 137 argues that 
symbolization constitutively runs behind the signifying chain of production itself so that, 
effectively, subjectivity is this asemic space of inscription that the signifter refers to in order 
to find any measure of consistency. 
In this respect, the rhetoric of self-relating negativity so peculiar to Cleopatra is significant 
beyond her fabled prowess in theatrical self presentation. Cleopatra does not simply reduce 
135 The dialectical point to be grasped here, however, is that without this constitutive tension, Being 
and Nothing would in fact coincide and the space of subjectivity itself would be eclipsed as such. In a 
way that the strange auto-affective dimension of the text perhaps makes most legible, it is the very 
MWMgDJ of lost presence that will already have instituted the process of its appropriation. 
q' 136 Indeed, Slavoj Ziz"ek offers a scenario remarkably similar to Cleopatra's predicament when he 
argues that "in order to 'forget' (or to 'lose') something, one must first forget that there is nothing to 
forget: [where] this oblivion make, ý possible the illusion that there ja something to forget in the first 
place " (emphasis added). Slavoi Zilek, Eor They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As A Political 
Facto , p. 60, n. 41. 
137 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 7. 
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subjectivity to a void, this void is itself constitutively opened up by the very contexts that 
strive vainly to replenish it. Most obviously so in the barge scene, Cleopatra is indexically 
registered rather than rhetorically troped by the signifiers whose very movement she in fact 
constellates. Enobarbus's panegyric that "vilest thing-s/Become themselves in her" (II. ii. 238- 
9) acquires special resonance in a text where the indefinite pronoun as well as the noun 
"nothing" proliferates. 138 Cleopatra is structurally homologous here with the deictic 
function of the "things" that ostensibly "become themselves in her"; she is, in other words, 
rendered the equivalent of a grammatical shifter wherein the specificity of reference depends 
upon renewable context. Somewhat appositely, in this respect, Lacan provides a gloss on 
the elementary "grammar" that informs Freud's account of how the nascent ego's first 
judgements of attribution are similarly organized around "vilest things": 
There are no good and bad ob ect, there is only good and bad, and besides j 
that, there is the Thing. Good and bad already enter into the order of 
VorstLIlung (representation) as indices of that which orients the position of 
the subject. 139 
Cleopatra is indeed an index of the sublime, but in a characteristically Lacanian sense: 
precisely insofar as the signifying chain produces its own constitutive impediment in order 
to maintain the possibility of generating new symbolizations. Enobarbus's exaltation of 
Cleopatra as that which "Age cannot wither, nor custom stale" (Il. ii. 235) is particularly 
suggestive of the way that symbolization is productively aligned to an ahistorical "missing 
linIC' that is, paradoxically, unaccounted for by the very synchronic horizon to which it 
gives rise. 
138 The ubiquity of its use in Shakespeare (eleven times in all) is surpassed only by King Lea . 
139 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis , p. 78. 
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It is in this respect it is that the text's rhetoric of "precipitous identification" most astutely 
bears witness to the inconclusive character of the causal chain. What is perhaps most 
striking is the sheer number of times where characters fashion their identities not in some 
positive content but in a purely self-referential signifying fonn which alludes to a "meaning- 
to-come. " Caesar's insight that man is "ne'er loved till ne'er worth love, /Comes deared by 
being lacked" (I. iv. 43-4) is more than simply a wistful acknowledgement of the fickle quality 
of public opinion. Rather, examples of this non-synchronous temporality resonate 
throughout the text in anxieties which reveal that, in the space of symbolic intersubjectivity, 
it is impossible for characters to ascertain what they are for the other, so that "objective" 
social identity becomes established through the expedient of "subjective" anticipation. It is 
through an equally sinuous commentary on "good precedence" that Pompey calculates the 
political advantage of assassinating his political rivals: 
'tis not my profit that does lead mine honour; 
mine honour, it ..... 
.... being done unknown, I should have found it afterwards well done, 
But must condemn it now. 
(II. vii. 77-8; 79-81) 
Indeed, Menecrates' paradoxical claim that we "profit by losing of our prayers" (IV. iii. 69) 
suggests that the exigencies of profit and loss enter into a strange kind of symbiosis insofar 
as, precisely, the substantial content of any act is rendered meaningful only when it is 
registered in the symbolic order as that which is "found ... afterwards. " Enobarbus's 
reflection that "things outward/Do draw the inward quality after them" (III. xiii. 32-3) comes 
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perilously close to acknowledging that it is the symbolic order itself which constitutes the 
subject's decentred cause in the recursive movement of that which only "will have been. " 140 
"Let That Be Left Which Leaves Itself" 
Caesar's characterization of public opinion as that which "Goes to and back, lackeying the 
varying tide" (I. iv. 46-7) is only one of a series of figures in the text that are strangely 
suggestive of this paradoxical movement that is caught between protension and retention: 
where "movement" as such threatens to become the site of its own arrest, as something 
which "rots itself with motion' (11.48). This disymmetry may even be discerned in the scene 
of humiliation that Antony imagines will be his fate in Rome, when he is placed before "the 
wheeled seat/Of fortunate Caesar, drawn before him, branded/His baseness that ensued" 
(IV. xiv. 76-8). The sinuous grammatical construction here radically undermines any attempt 
to posit a logical temporal priority between "before" and "after" so that, in a strange sense, 
the image of being "drawn before" Caesar coincides with the movement of that which comes 
ficafter" Caesar. 
140 The increasingly familiar 9nnui that appears to seize most of the Roman protagonists throughout 
the play might properly be termed "melancholic" insofar as subjectivity is revealed to be installed 
repeatedly and metonymically in the field of the Other. In a text that, following Freud, routinely 
implicates loss as "the loss of some abstraction .... such as one's country, liberty an ideal and so on, " Homi Bhabha's suggestion that melancholia is a necessary symptom of the colonial encounter offers 
a particularly illuminating gloss on how "loss" is cathected in Antony and Cleopatra: "If we take 
Freud at his word - melancholics display an insistent communicativeness which finds satisfaction In 
self-exposure - then the narrative of melancholia preserves the icon of the Ideal - Nation - but by 
virtue of identifying with it from a position of loss and absence, exile and migration; the signifying act 
that gives it meaning cannot be contained or incorporated within the sign. " Homi Bhabha, "A 
Question of Survival: Nations and Psychic States" in Psychoanalysis and Cultural Theory: 
JLLUholds, ed. James Donald (London, 1991), pp-89-105, p. 101. 
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In a text that never ceases to interrogate the logical confusions that arise when, in Cleopatra's 
words, "good precedence" is both allayed and delayed, this ambivalence appears to inscribe 
a movement of coming afte as the very condition under which anything comes to be in the 
first place. Most memorably evoked perhaps by the figure of fans where what "they 
did/Undid" (II. ii. 204), this movement does not simply encode the time of that which might 
come, stay a while and then depart. Rather, "following" Samuel Weber, we could suggest 
that the text announces the strange time of something that comes to pass, which "arrives 
,, 141 
only in passin , or inversely, [where] it is only in passing that 
it arrives. The fact that 
the "movement" of the drama is not uncommonly referred to as, in Speaight's words, 
"difficult to follow, " 142 acquires added relevance here precisely because in the text following, 
like leaving, is constituted as the site of a difficulty that is, strictly speaking, non- 
thematizable. In short: we do not merely encounter a text that is difficult to follow, but a 
difficult following that the text itself dramatizes as its own immanent and ineradicable 
difficulty. 
Time and again the text variously encodes this metastasis where what ostensibly is left 
behind is also that which, in a strange sense, is still to come: so that self-leaving becomes the 
irruptive driving force of life itself. Bemoaning his fate to Eros, for example, Antony claims 
that "the exigent should come, which now/Is come indeed: when I should see behind mefMe 
inevitable prosecution of/Disgrace and horror" (IV. xiv. 63-6). Antony's apparent assurance 
here that his fate is "come indeed" is complicated almost immediately by reference to an 
exigency that cannot in fact be arrested in a moment of undivided presence. What is 
141 Samuel Weber, Mass Mediaurus: Form. Technics. Media (Stanford, 1996), p. 140. 
142 Robert Speaight, Nature in Shakespearian Tragedy (London, 1955), p. 1 38. 
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"behind" here is not that which assumes a relation of anteriority or even that which may be 
resumed in the simplicity of a present: it refers, rather, to a past that is still to come. 
Following Jacques Derrida we could say that the competing figures of protention and 
retention here actually "imply each other in strange fashion. What is anticipated in 
protention disjoins the present from its identity to itself no less than what is retained in the 
trace. " 
143 
Whether brooding upon "these strong Egyptian fetters I must break" (I. ii. 1 11) or how he 
"must from this enchanting queen break off' (11.125) the text's amplified references to 
breaking, which for Derrida "is inseparable from the concept of differance, " 144 cumulatively 
reinforce the perception that the very notion of any absolute leaving is something that is, 
strictly speaking, impossible. Prior to his first "departure" for Rome, for example, we find 
Antony engaged in a lengthy and anxious performance of leave-taking that only appears to 
further emphasize his apparent paralysis: "I must haste from hence" (I. ii. 129); "I must be 
gone" (11.133); "[Rome] Cannot endure my absence" (11.170); "1 shall break the cause of our 
expedience to the queen" (11.176); "our quick remove from hence" (11.194). 
In a text that so frequently evinces an awareness of its own constitutive and constituting 
belatedness, it is Antony and Cleopatra who are most conspicuously revealed to be the 
retroactive embodiment of their own fictions. Already in many respects the crystallization 
of their own historical possibility, they serve crucially to illuminate this "difficulty .... in 
conceiving that what is imitated could be still to come with respect to what imitates, that the 
143 Jacques Derrida, Of GrammatoLgW, - p-95. 
144 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p. 18. 
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image can precede the model, that the double can come before the simple. "145 It is this 
apparent dysfunction in the trajectory of classical mimesis that most astutely bears witness 
to the paradox of symbolization itself. of how death can "happen" only insofar as it keeps 
on happening. Indeed, Caesar's seemingly contradictory declaration that Cleopatra "hath 
pursued conclusions infinite/ Of easy ways to die"(V. ii. 353-4) is a succinct and strangely 
articulate comment on how, especially in this text, any event is radically informed by a 
simultaneity of singularity and repetition that cannot yield to the simplicity of a present: so 
that "death" is always already co-opted as the sustaining force of the symbolic order itself. 
In this respect, Antony and Cleopatra discloses representation as that which "can defend 
itself against death only through an econom of death, through defennent, repetition, reserve 
- [so that] it is the idea of a first time which becomes enigmatic. " 
146 Indeed, Cleopatra's 
determination to engineer a suicide that is "after the high Roman fashion" recalls the less 
than noble example of Antony's suicide which, intended to "Wertake" Cleopatra, actually 
"follows" a death that supersedes him. In other words, what Antony putatively "follows" 
is an example that, strictly speaking, follows him. 
Similarly, delivering her property up to Rome Cleopatra exhorts Caesar to behold "How 
pomp is follow'd! mine will be yours, / And should we shift estates, yours would be mine" 
(V. ii. 150-1). Again, the chiastic tension between leaving/following discloses how what 
appears as a limit of the point of departure is already the determination of a certain kind of 
following, the extreme of its negative relationship. 147 Cleopatra's remembrance of Antony's 
146 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, Alan Bass trans. (London, 1978), p. 202. 
141 There are several examples in the text of this paradox. Caesar, for example, complains that "I 
wash my brain and it grow fouler' (I Lvii. 94), while Pompey predicts that in the concord between 
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erotic presence as "dolphin-like" (V. ii. 89) most vividly suggests this undulating process of 
transgression in which a surface is exceeded, but where that very excess comes retroactively 
to encounter and augment its source. 148 In fact, this idea is brought into even sharper focus 
when Caesar resolves to "take my leave, " an observation that prompts Cleopatra to remark 
that "[Caesar] may through all the world: 'tis yours.. " (V. ii. 132-3). Addressed as it is to 
"the universal landlord" (III. xiii. 72 ) Cleopatra explicitly draws attention here to the way 
that imperialism is itself an expression of the onto-dramatic problem of leaving/following: 
Caesar so appropriates all space that his departure from one location is coterminous with his 
arrival in another. And, in another variation of this paradox, we find that Enobarbus remains 
a "follower" of Antony even in the act of becoming the master-leaver: 
Forgive me in thine own particular, 
But let the world rank me in register 
A master-leaver, and a fugitive: 
0 Antony! 0 Antony! 
(IV. ix. 20-23) 
Caesar and Antony "That which is the strength of/their amity shall prove the immediate author of/their 
variance" (I Lvi L 124-7). 148 For example, Caesar remarks of Antony's dwindling military fortunes that "when valour preys on 
reason, /It eats the sword it fights with" (III. xiii. 1 99-200) while Antony fantasizes that to "bathe my 
dying honour in the blood/Shall make it live again (N. H. 3-6). A similar paradox appears to be at issue 
in Enobarbus's description of how Cleopatra "having lost her breath, she spoke, and panted ... And, breathless, power breathe forth" (Il. ii. 230-32). In other words, it is precisely when breathing is on the 
verge of "leaving" its own condition of possibility that it also finds its most pronounced aspect of 
articulation. We might recall here that for Lacan the unconscious indicates a topology of "gaping, 
flickering, an alternating suction... the structure of that which closes is inscribed in a geometry 
wherein space is reduced to a combining: strictly, it is what is called an Q-du. " Jacques Lacan, 
"Position of the Unconscious" in Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's Four Fundamental Concepts of 
psychoanalysis, ed. Richard Feldstein et. al., trans. Bruce Fink (Albany, 1995), pp. 259-83, p. 267. 
Between subject and other, then, the unconscious 1.1 this breaking edge that offers glimpses of the 
subject only as something that is a flickering in eclipses, the "subject" as that which constitutively 12 
this topological paradox. 
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If, as I have argued, this strange movement of incerto tempore finds itself in close proximity 
to writing in the text it is insofar as writing condenses the enigma of this ungraspable 
anteriority of the beginning again in relation to every power to begin: "the quest for a 
rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal responsibility. " 149 The 
constitutive belatedness of that which defers presence, of that which becomes conceivable 
only on the basis of deferred presence, also inscribes the paradoxical "movement" of a loss 
that will always already have set in motion the process of its re-appropriation: a "bounty" 
that grows "the more by reaping" (V. ii. 86). l5O 
Again, it is the barge scene that perhaps makes most legible how signification "follows" the 
sound and echo of its ongoing amplitude: i. e. carried over into a mimesis where, if we can 
risk such a formulation, imitation leaves what it ostensibly follows by exceeding it. In an 
image that most powerfully conveys this dialectic of voiding-and-filling, the water vainly 
tries to keep up with the gashes produced by the silver oar 
Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke, and made 
The water which they beat to follow faster, 
As amorous of their strokes. 
(II. H. 195-7) 
149 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosoph , trans. Alan Bass (London, 1982), p. 6. 
150 The kind of "metastasis" or spatio-temporal paradox that I have in mind here is nowhere more 
effectively addressed than in Derrida's comments on the trace: ".. leaving the trace is also to LQM it, 
to abandon it, not to insist upon it as a sign ... In the concept of trace is inscribed in advance the re- 
treat [re-trailt of effacement. The trace is inscribed in being effaced, and leaving the traced wake of its 
effacement in the re-treat.... The word 'leave' in the locution 'leave a trace' now seems to be charged 
with the whole enigma. It would no longer announce itself starting from anything other than the trace, 
and especially not from a letting-be. Unless letting-be be understood otherwise, following the sign 
the trace makes to it where it is allowed to be effaced.. " Jacques Derrida, ýAt This Very Moment in 
This work Here I Am, "' in A Derrida Reader: Between The Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf, trans. Ruben 
Berezdevin (New York, 1991), pp. 403-39, p. 426. 
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Mark and erasure, trace and loss: to leave and yet remain, the remainder that leaving leaves. 
Indeed, we may relate the text's tropological network of wounds, gaps and gashes to 
Derrida's discussion of the 12unctu as that which punctures space and, in as much as it is 
unlocatable, it is not just a particular space that it punctures, but the very sense of space 
itself According to Derrida the punctu is heterogeneous to space and yet, at the same 
time, is not simply opposed to space. It leaves the definition of place behind, but it is onl 
in being left behind, only in the wound that marks the puncture, that there is a sense of 
place: "a wound no doubt comes in (the place of the point signed by singularity, in (the) 
place of its very instant (stigme), of its point. But in (the) 121ace of this event, the place is 
left. "151 
In other words, what is left behind, the trace of the trace, is place. It is, perhaps 
appropriately, "the market-Place" (III. vi. 3) which most powerfully condenses this sense of 
a place that falls infinitely outward into an open economy where voiding and filling, 
presence and absence, profit and loss enter into a decidedly equivocal relation. Enobarbus 
recalls that before Antony's first meeting with Cleopatra 
The city cast 
Her people out upon her; and Antony, 
Enthron'd I'the market place, did sit alone, 
Whistling to the air; which, but for vacancy, 
Had gone to gaze on Cleopatra too, 
And made a gap in nature. 
(II. ii. 21 1-18) 
151 Jacques Derrida, "The Deaths of Roland Barthes" in Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since 
Mgdgaq: EgM, ed. Hugh Silverman (London, 1988), pp. 259-296, p. 295. 
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What is left here, after even space has gone to follow Cleopatra, is leaving itself Yet this is a 
leaving that cannot leave entirely, for the non-remainder creates a vacuum, a non-place that 
takes place as a "a gap in nature" (11.218). Leaving's leftover (what leaving leaves behind), 
then, is leaving itself - what remains in the mobile reality of its own possibility. 
In a text where identity so routinely comes to augment itself through being divided from 
itself, through losing itself, perhaps all that is indeed left behind, as Cleopatra remarks, are 
"cinders" (V. ii. 172). For Derrida, of course, "cinders" become trace, the incineration of 
experience, "remains without remaining [ ... ]a remainder without a remainder" that always 
threatens to be blown into abhorring. 152 Yet as Martin Frobisher's strange discovery 
perhaps most powerfully revealed, what "remains" is always already enjoying the miracle 
of its own transformation - into nothing less than the very stuff of history itself. 
152 Jacques Derrida, "There is No One Narcissism" in Jacques Derrida: Points .... Interviews. 1974- 1994, ed. Elizabeth Weber (California, 1995), pp. 196-216, p. 209. 
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Conclusion 
Shakespeare, Enjoyment and the Law 
The Real Thing 
What's in a name? In a recent advertising campaign for its soft drink the Coca Cola 
company undertook a radical rewriting of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. Just at the 
moment when the star-cross'd lovers are about to perform the exchange of love's faithful 
vow, Juliet decides to jilt Romeo in favour of a soft drink and then announces to the camera 
that you "Can't beat the feeling ... Coke. " For John Drakakis this example is adduced as 
evidence of the way that the "Shakespeare myth" authorizes a "combination of universal 
culture and global capitalism locked in an arabesque of mutual validation. "' From a 
psychoanalytical perspective, however, there is something more at issue here than a 
potentially counter-hegemonic clash of cultural registers. 
At one level the advertisement discloses how desire gets under way around a locus of 
nonsense; in other words, Coca-Cola has become such a successful mass media symbol 
insofar as, in a succession of campaigns, the very seductiveness of its appeal is staged in the 
I John Drakakis, "Shakespeare in Quotations, " in Studying British Culture: An Introduction, ed. 
Susan Bassnet (London, 1997), pp-53-67, p. 60. 
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very negation of "meaning" itself. Coca-cola, as this particular example suggests, is the 
bearer of a surplus jouissanc - "Can't beat the feeling" - so that "Coke" is, effectively, a 
filler for this very void in meaning itself. What appears to be at issue here is the paradoxical 
function of what Lacan was to call the "pure signifier. " As Slavoj Zizek has argued, "Tbe 
only possible answer to the question 'What is CokeT is already given in the advertisements; 
it is the impersonal 'it' (Toke, this is it! ') - 'the real thing, ' the unattainable X, the object- 
,, 2 cause of desire. To this we should add that, more recently, the advertising slogan has been 
condensed further into the vaguely menacing injunction that Lacan identifies explicitly with 
the pressure imposed by the superego: "Enjoy! " (Lou-is ! ). 3 
Do we not also find here an elaboration of Lacan's formula for fantasy (S 0a) at its most 
basic level: i. e. where the subject (1) finds in an object (g) the condensed "cause" of its 
desire? If the tragic dilemma of Shakespeare's lovers is posed in the perplexing question of 
"What's in a name?, " the Coke advertisement alleviates this ontological uncertainty 
precisely insofar as the "object-Coke" takes the place of this impasse in the symbolic order 
in its role as the "Real Thing, " the materialized incarnation of jouissanc itself Moreover, is 
it merely a coincidence that it is specifically Juliet who, through a mysterious smile and a 
wink at the camera, appears to have some privileged access to this enjoyment? If, according 
to Lacan, what endows the symbolic order (the Law) with meaning and authority is also 
what irretrievably bars it, it is significant that it is "Woman" who is placed here at the point 
of this inherent lack that Coke (as object a) comes to cover. For Lacan, of course, this point 
2 Slavoj ýizek, The Sublime Obiect of ldeoLIQ9Y (London, 1989), p. 96. 
3 "Nothing forces anyone to enjoy Gg-u-ftj except the superego. The superego is the imperative of 
jouissance - Enjoyl" Jacques Lacan, Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX, ed. Jacques- 
Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (London, 1998), p. 3. 
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of the lacking foundation of the Law has an intrinsic relation with femininity and the non- 
existence of "Woman": "The woman relates to S (4), which means that she is already 
doubled, and is not all. "4 
The "joke" implicit in the advertisement is, of course, that Juliet chooses Coke over pursuing 
a "meaningful" relationship with Romeo. What our Lacanian reading would suggest, rather, 
is that "Coke" itself is a sublime object precisely insofar as it dissimulates the less appealing 
knowledge that "there is no such thing as a sexual relationship. "5 In short, Coke is nothing 
but the embodiment of a non-dialectizable remainder that haunts the symbolic order from 
within and which forever prevents a "natural" relationship to obtain between man and 
woman. For Lacan every "love story" is in fact a mirage that attempts to fill out the void of 
this impossibility of any "relationship" between the sexes. "Coke" qua object 4 literally 
puts itself in the place of what cannot be glimpsed of the Other: "object a plays the role ... of 
that which takes the place of the missing partner. ,6 The point, then, of Lacan's well-known 
statement that there is no sexual relationship is precisely that the subject's relationship to 
the Other is always inadequate, even perverse, insofar as the subject relates to the Other as 
object a -qua the embodiment of some excessive 
jouissanc . Borrowing a formulation from 
Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, we could say that the advertisement implicitly acknowledges the fact 
that "it takes three to love: the lover, the beloved, and the object a that causes the fantasy of 
4 Quoted in Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne: Feminine SeKO-131y, ed. Juliet Mitchell and 
Jacqueline Rose, (London, 1982), p. 152-3. 
5 Jacques Lacan, Encore, p. 34. Lacan supplements this statement with contention that "What 
makes up for the sexual relationship is, quite precisely, love, " p. 45. 
Ibid., P. 63. 
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love. "7 For Lacan, moreover, it is precisely on the basis of this impasse "that love is put to 
the tCSt.,, 
8 
Let us turn our attention here to a point of reference a little closer to Shakespeare's play 
where, in The Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton recounts a scenario which he regards 
as endemic to the fascination of falling in love: 
Many lovers confess, when they came in their mistress' Presence, they could 
not hold off their eyes, but looked steadily on her, inconnivo aspectu, with 
much eagerness and greediness, as if he would look through, or should never 
have enough sight of her: Fixis ardens obtutubus hoeret [his eyes clung to her 
with fixed and burning gaze]. So she will do by him, drink to him with her 
eyes, nay, drink him up, devour him, swallow him. 9 
Burton's suggestion that the male voyeur is transfixed by his beloved, precisely by his 
attempts to "look through" the surface spectacle, indicates that his desire is motivated by 
something that remains inapprehensible at the level of vision. According to Lacan voyeurism 
is concerned less with desire than the function of the scopic drive, of an attempt to look at 
something that cannot in fact be seen: 
[ ... ] what is the subject trying to see? What he is trying to see, make no 
mistake, is the object as absence. What the voyeur is looking for and finds is 
7 Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, "Plato's Symposium and the Lacanian Theory of Transference: Or, What Is 
Love? " in South Atlantic Quarterly, (1989), 88,4, pp. 725-55, p. 744. Moreover, this is also the force 
of Lacan's otherwise obscure comment in his unpublished Seminar from 1974, where he makes the 
claim that "If something ex-ists with respect to something else, it is precisely inasmuch as it is not 
coupled, but rather Iripled'to it, if you will allow me this neologism. " Quoted in Bruce Fink, The 
Lacanian Subiect: Between Language and Jouissance (Chichester, 1997), p. 1 95, n. 34 
Jacques Lacan, Encore, p. 144. 
Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (London, 1972), p. 1 39. 
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merely a shadow, a shadow behind the curtain. There he will phantasize any 
magic of presence ... 
10 
In other words, what is at stake in the encounter between the lovers is a relationship toward 
the gaze in a Lacanian sense: i. e. the blind spot in the field of vision whose elision, precisely, 
renders it the Real "cause" of desire. Denied the gaze of the constituting Other the love 
relation dramatizes the predicament of a subject that is looked at from somewhere other than 
the position from which one sees. The attempt of Burton's lover to "look through" what is 
offered to his eye is precisely such a vain attempt to overcome this constitutive split 
between the eye and the gaze, to see oneself from the 121ace of the Other. To avoid 
psychosis, it is necessary that the subject be confounded in its attempts to dialectize this 
antinomy which for Lacan is, famously, the ontological snag around which all love turns: 
"When, in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and always missing is that - 
You never look at me from the place from which I see yo ." 
11 
In Burton this opacity of the object locates woman at a paradoxical deadlock within the 
scopic economy: at the same time woman is all surface spectacle, "counterfeit, composed 
and artificial ... [who] inveigles and deceives, " and she is the unfathomable abyss where 
"without doubt, there is some secret loadstone ... a magnetic power, a natural 
inbred affection, 
which moves our concupisence. "12 Can we not detect in this reference to a "secret 
loadstone" the phantasmatic "stuff' of jouissance that Lacan also referred to as a secret 
treasure or agalni : that within the subject that is "more" than the subject and, precisely 
10 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 182. 
II Lacan, 2L_C2., p. 103. 
12 Burton Mg2., p. 87. 
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insofar as it eludes cognitive grasp at the level of empirical content, becomes the driving force 
of desire? For Lacan beyond love, which in essence is narcissistic, there is desire, caused by 
this hidden agalma. Which is to say that beyond the dressed-up image, there is the residue, 
i. e. the object a which makes every image "hold": "his eyes clung to her with fixed and 
burning gaze. " 13 
The illusion that pertains to a qua surplus enjoyment is the illusion that, behind it, there is 
the lost substance oflau-issLan-ce. Both "woman" and the "object" deceive in a Lacanian way: 
not because they are a deceitful substitutes for the Real, but precisely because they invoke 
the impression of some substantial real behind the semblance. Indeed, John Herrick, a 
contemporary of Burton, concludes his own ruminations "Upon Some Women" with the 
charge that they are "False in legs, and false in thighes; /False in breast, teeth haire, and eyes: / 
False in head, and false enough; / Only true in shreds and stuffe. "14 Again, "stuffe" here must 
be read in the light of Lacan's well known reference to the object a as pure semblance, the 
phantasmatic "stuff'of the subject which is "a substance caught in the net of the shadow, 
and which, robbed of its shadow-swelling volume, holds out once again the tired lure of the 
shadow as if it were substance. "15 Beauty here becomes a dissimulation, a lure that protects 
the subject from directly confronting the nullity that is "woman. " For Burton too female 
beauty is also that which, if approached too closely, puts the lover in danger of being 
engulfed in the abyss of jouissanc : to "drink him up, devour him, swallow him. " Let us 
13 Iji., P. 139. 
14 Michael Davis ed, John Herrick: A Selection (London, 1967), p. 56. 
Is Jacques Lacan, "Subversion of the subject, " in Ecrits: A Selection, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, 
trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977) pp. 292-324, pp. 315-16. 
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now, briefly, develop some of these issues a little further through more explicit reference to 
Shakespeare's Romeo and Julie . 
"It Had To Be You" 
Romeo's first encounter with Juliet offers, in fact, an even more articulate example of the 
way that the gaze comes to function as a "cause" of desire in amorous discourse. After 
inquiring of her identity Romeo then offers what is by now a familiar panegyric: 
... she doth teach the torches to bum bright. It seems she hangs upon the check of night 
As a rich jewel in an Ethiop's ear - 
Beauty too rich for use, for earth too dear 
(l. v. 44-7) 
Presented as a site of excessive iridescence Juliet, like the jewel to which she is punningly 
compared, is the site of a potentially oppressive visuality. Indeed in his seminars on the 
function of the gaze Lacan also remarks that "the point of the gaze always participates in the 
ambiguity of thejewel. "16 Moreover, is not the idealization of Juliet here triggered by the 
dissimulation of that other "precious object" Lacan was to call the agalm , the 
kernel that is 
in the beloved something more than the beloved herself precisely insofar as it eludes escapes 
16 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concegts of Psychoanalysis, p. 96. 
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any (specular) structure of exchange? 17 Significantly, Lacan claims that the lover most 
often uses this object "as a stopper" 18 which, by its fascinating and eblouissant presence 
attempts to render invisible the constitutive lack in the Other qua the symbolic order. 
From a psychoanalytical perspective, then, do we not find in Romeo's perplexing conceit 
that Juliet "hangs upon the cheek of night/As a richjewel in an Ethiop's ear" (11.45-6) a 
particularly anxious form of realignment around this absence? In the reference to the Ethiop 
we not only find a racially inflected adaptation of the text's competing master tropes of light 
and dark, Juliet is also located ambivalently at a site both of exoticism and strangeness, of 
fascination and radical alterity. Moreover, in the conceit's "metaphorical" displacement 
from the eye to the ear (that other privileged eretogenic zone which, for Lacan, is also a 
localized site of jouissanc ) Juliet comes to function quite literally here as a "stopper" for 
the hole in the whole: a surrogate for the void in the Other that is the subject's constitutive 
64cause. " 19 
17 In his discussion of Plato's Symposium Lacan redefined the agalmata (the 'jewel' of identification) 
as the agalma insofar as beyond love, which in essence is narcissistic, there is desire, caused by this 
hidden agalma. Beyond the imaginary features of the beloved there clings a residue, i. e. the object 
.a which makes every 
image 'hold. ' 
18 According to Michel Silvestre, when confronted with this object the lover "can either try to encircle 
it or to stuff it with a stopper. " Michel Silvestre, Demain la psychoanalyse (Paris, 1987), p. 301. 
19 Bearing in mind here Lacan's definition of sublimation as "the elevation of the object to the dignity 
of the Thing, '"Romeo's conceit was already part of the literary topoi of Elizabethan England. In 
Amoretti , for example, Edmund Spenser not only characterizes his beloved as something that is infused with an aura of unreal wealth, the idealizing fiction of her "secret treasure" brings another kind 
of surplus into play, the one referred to in Lacan's notion of plus-de-ioui . As the following extract demonstrates, desire circulates primarily around the orificial gaps in the body's integrity that procures 
this surplus enjoyment. For Lacan, of course, surplus enjoyment is foremost a bodily 
whose role is to fill out those orifices that constitute the erotogenic zones: 
For loe my love doth in her selfe containe 
all this worlds riches that may farre be found: 
if Saphyres, loe her eies be Saphyres plaine, 
if rubies, loe her lips be Rubies sound: 
if Pearles, hir teeth be pearles both pure and round. (Sonnet 15) 
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In Romeo's metaphor that Juliet "hangs upon the cheek of night" the gaze is organized 
around a constitutive lack that insists, quite literally, in a relation of radical suspension; as a 
point of intcgumcnt which constitutcs at oncc the limit of and the acccss to jouissanc . 
20 
Indeed, Romeo's suspicion that "some consequence yet hanging in the stars" (Liv. 107) may 
be the omcn of some disaster finds a bitter echo at the close of the text when, preparing for 
suicide, Juliet speculates whether "some poison doth yet hang" on her lover's lips 
(V. iii. 165). 21 The play of desire not only takes place around an ambiguous spatial interval, 
this disjunctive relation also announces the topological paradox proper to love itself, 
succinctly formulated by Mladen Dolar as "the junction of a contingent exterior with the 
most intimate exterior. ', 22 For Lacan not only is all subjectivation coterminous with a 
moment of suspension of subjectivity to the Other, "falling in love" is in many ways a 
paradigmatic example of the way that the subject is in fact an effect of this suture. 
Famously, Romeo articulates what is perhaps the most enduring expression of "love at first 
20 It is important to recall here Lacan's definition of the objectaas the primordial traces of iouissance 
that'fall from the body'when the subject accedes to the symbolic order. In his seminar on the gaze 
Lacan claims that "the subject is strictly speaking determined by the very separation that determines 
the break of the sl that is to say, the fascinatory element introduced by the gaze. " The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 1 18. What we should again bear in mind then, apropos 
Lacan's discussion of the object g is that we are dealing with a concept that comprises itself and its 
own dissimulation. Objectg is simultaneously the pure lack, the void around which desire turns and 
which, as such, causes the desire; and the imaginary element which conceals this void, renders it 
invisible by filling it out. The point, of course, is that there is no lack without this little piece of the real , this element filling it out. The rich jewel that causes Romeo's desire conforms precisely to this 
paradox of a filler that is sustained by that which it dissimulates. 
21 Indeed, the word 'hang' resonates throughout the text in a way that constellates implicitly around 
this dual association with love and death. Immediately prior to his duel Mercutio somewhat 
portentously claims that he will "be hanged" if Romeo wears Tybalt's livery (111.1.56); deaf to Friar 
Laurence's calls for caution Romeo wishes to "Hang up philosophy" (Ill. iii. 57); equally unresponsive 
to her father's will an exasperated Capulet inveighs against his daughter to "Hang thee young 
baggage" and to "hang I Beg! Starve! Die in the streets" (Ill. v. 160; 192); the musicians wish to "hang" 
Peter (IV. v. 1 40) and Romeo observes of the apothecary that "Contempt and beggary hangs upon 
thy back" (W. 71). 
22 Mladen Dolar, 'At First Sight" in Gaze and Voice as Love ObiqQ-t-q, ed. Renata Salecl and Slavoj VV Zizek, (London, 1996), pp. 129-53, p-129. 
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sight": "Did my heart love till now? Forswear it, sight. /For I ne'er saw true beauty till this 
night" (11.51-2). The gaze operates here in terms of the dissimulation of a foreign body in the 
signifying chain which makes possible a seamless reconstitution of contingency into 
necessity. Following Roland Barthes we could say that, as the archetypal lover, Romeo 
disloses this "deception in amorous time" insofar as "love at first sight is always spoken in 
,, 23 the past tense it might be called an anterior immediacy. Commenting more specifically 
on the Lacanian implications of this motif, Mladen Dolar argues that every evocation of love 
at first sight is, in fact, a compromise formation produced by the structural impasse of the 
gaze au4 object a: 
If the gaze comes to fill the lack of sense in that senseless fortune, it also 
creates it by filling it, for it is only looking backward that one sees the lack, 
and only as a lack destined to be filled. Life didn't 'make sense' before, but 
now, suddenly, it does. 24 
Can we not also discern in Dolar's analysis here the libidinal traces of Lacan's "mirror 
stage, " that primordial (and ambivalent) moment ofjubilation when the child falls in love 
with its own image? 25 In other words, Lacan's drama of recognition also implicates the 
function of the gaze in a strange embodiment of fate: that is, as a time loop where the 
subject, in a sense, comes to be what it recognizes itself always to have been. Perhaps even 
more pointedly, in one of his later seminars Lacan was to assert that "the displacement of 
negation, from contingency to necessity, is the point of suspension to which all love attaches 
23 Roland Barthes, A Lovers Discourse: Fragments (London, 1990), p. 194. 
24, Mladen Dolar, *At First Sight" in Gaze and Voice as Love Objqgta, ed. Renata Salecl and Slavol 
Zizek (London, 1996), pp. 129-53, p. 134. 
25 "The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation.. " 
Ecrits: A Selection, pA 
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itself. "26 In a text where any idealized vision of romantic "destiny" variously comes into 
conflict with increasingly urgent social and political contingencies, it is precisely this passage 
from what Lacan calls the tuche to the automaton that may be regarded as the illusion proper 
27 to love 
-qpa response 
to the real. That is to say, the automatism of love is set in motion 
when some contingent, ultimately indifferent, (libidinal) object finds itself occupying a pre- 
given fantasy -place. 28 
Indeed, Hollywood's most recent version of the play is, perhaps surprisingly, quite 
revealing in this respect. In Baz Luhrmann's adaptation the initial exchange of glances 
between the lovers is in fact mediated through the semi-transparent and distorting glass of an 
aquarium. Momentarily the face of each lover is anamorphically distended before they come 
to gaze "directly" upon each other. At least from a heuristic standpoint, this scene offers a 
suggestive gloss upon Lacan's repeated assertions that love is a kind of anamorphosis: an 
26 Quoted in Gregory L. Ulmer, Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedaaoay from Jacgues Derrida to 
Joseph Beuvs (London, 1992), p. 212. 
27 Lacan argues that tuche ('as if by chance') is "the function of the real as encounter - the encounter 
in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter. " The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 55. 
28 Moreover, this automatism does not only operate primarily by the gaze, it is also deflected toward 
the voice, that other privileged Lacanian object. In the balcony scene it is precisely the case that even 
"a few sentences overheard in the dark7 is enough to become the phantasmatic stuff that makes the 
lovers' passion hold: 
I should have been more strange, I must confess, 
But that thou overheard'st, ere I was aware, 
My true-love passion; therefore pardon me, 
And not impute this yielding to light love 
Which the dark night hath so discovered. 
(11.11.102-6) 
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optical illusion that tries to give body to the substance of enjoyment through "a construction 
,, 29 around emptiness that designates the place of the Thing. 
In other words, this detail in Luhrmann's film is in many ways strictly homologous to 
Lacan's insistence that it is precisely such a screen of fantasy that, while seemingly posing 
as an obstacle between the subject and its desire, actually confers ontological consistency on 
the object of desire as such. Moreover, it is also in this sense that anamorphosis, as I have 
suggested at several points in preceding arguments, is closely aligned to the temporal short 
circuit that, in this case, also underpins the paradigm of "love at first sight. " In both cases, 
what is ostensibly assumed to be the "cause" of desire is in fact revealed to be-posited by 
desire itself. "The paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own cause, i. e. the 
object p is an object that can be perceived only by a gaze 'distorted' by desire, an object that 
,, 30 does not exist for an 'objective' gaze. More pointedly, what Romeo and Juliet reveals 
time and again is that "love, " rather than extending beyond the reach of the Law (as most 
conservative representations of the play would have it) is, in a very radical sense, something 
that arises precisely in response to the fact the Law (qua the symbolic order) is already 
truncated from within, invaded by a kernel of non-sense that prevents it from ever coinciding 
fully with its own "explicit" rules. 
29 Jacques Lacan, Tourtly love as anamorphosis" in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: 1959-1960, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (London, 1992), pp. 139-55, p-140. 
/7v, - hahorp oatraar, Objorl 
279 
"In You More Than You" 
It is a well known fact that Romeo and Juliet is one of Shakespeare's most punning plays. 
M. M. Mahood observes that "even a really conservative count yields a hundred and 
seventy-five quibbleS.,, 31 In The Arte of English Poesie (1589) George Puttenharn has 
occasion to remark upon "your figures Auricular that worke by Surplusage. , 32 Puttenham's 
other reference to punning is described in terms of "vicious speech" in which "we speake or 
write doubtfully and that the sence may be taken two ways" which he calls "the ambiguou 
,, 33 or figure of sence incertaine. It is precisely this ambiguous "sense" that is the focus of the 
sadistic wordplay which takes place between Sampson and Gregory at the beginning of 
Romeo and Juliet: 
Sampson: I will be civil with the maids, 
I will cut off their heads. 
Gregory: The heads of the maids? 
Sampson: Ay, the heads of the maids or their maidenheads; 
take it in what sense thou wilt. 
Gregory: They must take it in sense that feel it. 
(I. i. 2 1 -6) 
What is immediately discernible in this exchange is the suggestion of how an illicit pleasure is 
reflexively produced by the fact that language contradicts its own ostensible claims to 
I Slavoj ýIek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (London, 
1997), p. 12. 
31 M. M. Mahood, Shakespeare's Wordpla (London, 1979), p. 56. 
32 Quoted in John Drakakis "JýM. Shylock is my name. ': Speech-prefixes in The Merchant of Venice 
as symptoms of the early modem, " unpublished paper, p. 1 5. 
33 B on, p. 15. 
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univocal meaning or "sense. " Strictly speaking, what is at issue here is not so much 
"pleasure" as such, as a stain of jouissance which, as Ellie Ragland astutely observes, "marks 
language as an essence that bespeaks aI beyond' i-n language itself, conveying the 'sense' of a 
,, 34 meaning that is always more (or less) than the words spoken. We might even advance the 
claim here that punning is possible precisely because language is inhabited by a residue of 
nonsense which, for Lacan, also inevitably brings words into a certain relationship with 
jouissanc . Indeed, Lacan frequently punned jouissanc as "jouis-sense" to indicate how 
"pleasure" and "sense" constitutively infringe upon each other so that, in the words of 
Stephen Melville, the joint problematic here might be called one of ... enjoy-meant, ' 
combining the logic of pleasure with the pleasure Of logiC.,, 35 
Like Puttenham, then, Lacan was also intrigued by the effects of an ineradicable "surplusage" 
that inheres within words and which, perhaps more menacingly, threatens to derail language 
as a purely neutral machinery of symbolic mediation. To this end, Lacan coined the term 
lalangu to refer to those inconsistent sprouts of enjoyment (exemplified above all through 
punning and wordplay) which violates the formal constraints of language: "That the 
unconscious is structured like a language, can be said precisely because the effects of 
lalanQu , which are a knowledge already there, expand beyond all that the being who speaks 
is able to utter. , 36 In short, the subject is able to understand jokes, slips of the tongue and so 
m Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, "An Overview of the Real: With Examples From Seminar I" in 
Readina Seminars I and Ile The Paris Seminars in English, ed. Richard Feldstein et. al. (New York, 
1996), pp. 192-211, p. 195. 
35 Stephen Melville, *Pychoanalysis and the Place of Jouissance in Critical Inqui , 13, Winter (1987) 
pp. 349-370. p. 351. 
I Jacques Lacan. Encore, p. 33. 
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on, not because of language but because of lalangu ." For Lacan the effects of lalanvu are 
most palpable in those rarified occasions when the locutionary markers of "love" and "hate" 
expose the symbolic structure as both porous and inadequate to the task of representation. 
That is to say, the symbolic order can never achieve its full completion and close its circle 
because its very constitution involves a point at which "meaning" stumbles against its own 
boundary and suspends itself in enjoy-meant. In a text whose formal deficiencies have often 
been excused on the grounds of the "sheer might of [its] poetry, iiH we might profitably 
recall here Lacan's assertion that lalangu indexes both a lack of symbolic sufficiency and an 
irredeemably "poetic" facility of seeking to convert this lack into a surplus: 
The map of lalangu is the map of the 'points of poetry' where lack is 
cancelled, where it becomes excess, and where what is impossible to utter is 
said in a poem. 
39 
Moreover, in many respects lalangue indexes the emergence of a social pathology hinted at in 
Mahood's suggestion that "our pleasure [in wordplay] comes from the verbal ingenuity 
itself, and the impulses to be aggressive, exhibitionist or sceptical [ ... ] because they act as a 
safety valve for these anti-social instincts. "40 It is necessary to add to this account that, 
conceived as a species of lalangue, wordplay in fact offers a glimpse into what we earlier 
VV 37SIavoj Zizek, by way of Hegel, offers an even more pithy definition: 'llanguage flalanaue is 
language in so far as its external boundary that guarantees its identity-with-itself is reflected-into-it 
and assumes the sDaLpe of an inherent impediment that transforms its field into an inconsistent, 'not- 
all'totality. " Slavoi Zivzek. Eor. -They 
Know Not What They Do: EnioYment as a Political Facto 
(London, 1994), p. 1 11. For an exemplary extended introduction to Lacan's idea of lalangue and 
how it is pivotal to the way that the Law stumbles upon this constitutive limit, see Renata. Salecl, "See 
No Evil, Speak No Evil: Hate Speech and Human Rights" in Radical Evil ed. Joan Copjec (London, 
1996). pp. 150-69. 
38 H. B. Charlton, Shakespearean Tragedy (Cambridge, 1948), p. 62. 
39 Jacques Lacan, Encore, p. 75. 
40 Mahood, Wg2., p. 29. 
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referred to as the "illegal" underpinning of the social Law itself; that is, how symbolic 
authority is rendered efficacious by an obscene underside that Lacan calls the superego. 
Insofar as the superego qna lalangu discloses the intrusion of enjoyment into the field of 
ideology, the opposition of symbolic Law and superego assists in helping us to clarify the 
constitutive tension that obtains between ideological meaning and enjoyment: "symbolic law 
guarantees meaning, whereas superego provides enjoyment which serves as the 
unacknowledged support of meaning. "4 I 
Indeed, we might recall here that the childish baiting by Sampson and Gregory is initiated 
under the very sign of the law: "Let us take the law of our sides" (1136). Gregory's 
subsequent imputation of disgrace, "I will bite my thumb at them"(11.40), not only instigates 
an argument around the "meaning" of this gesture, it also betrays a more primal kind of 
"infantile" bahaviour insofar as "Lalangue is something that one sucks, it is the maternal part 
,, 42 of language that undergoes jouissanc . And doesn't Puttenham's reference to "vicious 
speech" find its more contemporary counterpart in the phenomenon of "hate speech" which 
41 Slavoi ý&, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causalfty (London, l 994), 
pp. 60-61. 
42 Juan-David Nasio, Five Lessons on the PsychoanalZic Theoty of Jacques Lacan, trans. David 
Pettigrew (New York, 1998), p. 50. We should also bear in mind here that, for all its poetry, 
elsewhere in the text it is possible discern evocations of this primordial state. Significantly, it is 
immediately before she recounts Juliet's first attempts at speech (her accession to the symbolic 
order) that the Nurse also nostalgically reflects upon a time when Juliet "did taste the wormwood on 
the nipple/Of my dug and felt it bitter, pretty fool" (I. iii. 30-31). Moreover, this ineluctable association 
between satisfaction and loss (i. e. death) that Lacan repeatedly aligns with jouissance perhaps finds 
its most vivid expression in Friar Laurence's sinister ruminations upon the nurturing and death- 
dealing properties of 'The earth that's nature's mother is her tomb: /What is her burying grave, that is 
her wombVAnd from her womb children of divers kind/We sucking on her natural bosom find" (11. iii. 5- 
8). 
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also operates "via a passing obscene innuendo or an aggressive joke [that] makes itself heard 
in the interstices of the 'civilised' democratic discourse"? 43 
Moreover, both the implicit and explicit violence directed toward the body throughout the 
text (most conspicuously so in the bawdy wordplay) invariably alight upon the orificial gaps 
in bodily integrity or object a that in fact "bespeak" the loss of jouissanc (which is written 
in Lacanian algebra as J 1). Paradoxically, then, these objects variously become sites of 
"identification" in the text precisely insofar as they are non specularizable; i. e. to the extent 
that they point beyond a purely dyadic (Imaginary) structure of exchange. Lacan, of course, 
named these points of identification, that are bifurcated between body parts and loss itself, 
44unary features. " Crucially, these unary features (le trait unaire) link identification not to an 
"image" but to a "signifier, " to some trait in the other that is wholly depersonalized and 
without any content. In other words, stripped of every symbolic determination, the 
66unary feature" compels identification at a point of pure difference (which, in Lacanese, is 
notated as the signifier S I): i. e. in those "idiosyncratic" details or gestures which testifies to 
the way that the other satisfies his or her enjoymen . 
For example, do we not find in Mercutio's reproachful rejoinder to Benvolio's "talk of 
peace" a demonstration of how the impulse for violence is, quite literally, "caused" by those 
VV 43 Slavoj Zizek, The Indi isible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters (London, 
1996), p. 108. In other words, 'hate speech' and seemingly garbled speech bring us closer to the 
, stuff, of language than well articulated phrases, and may be said to serve as something of a bridge 
between the symbolic and the real. Lacan's notion of falangue reveals the way that even when 
words are emptied of a strictly referential content they make an impact. As Romeo and Juliet reveals 
time and again, it is in this more radical sense that we can claim that'words matter, ' acquiring a 
phantasmatic materiality and weight that escapes the ordinance of the symbolic order. We need only 
recall here the fact that Lacan explicitly lists the 'phoneme' as one of the 'objects'that causes desire: 
"An unthinkable list, if one adds, as I do, the phoneme, the gaze, the voice - the nothing. " 
"Subversion of the Subject, " p. 315. 
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spectral attachments to the body that can only signify (and are partially signirtable through) 
seemingly incompatible modes of ? That is to say, in those enigmatic ways that 
the other's body "speaks" the unfathomable ways that it seeks to satisify the drive? : 
Thou? Why, thou wilt quarrel with a man that hath a hair more or less in 
his beard than thou hast. Thou wilt quarrel with a man for cracking nuts, 
having no other reason but because thou hast hazel eyes. What eye butsuch 
an eye would spy out such a quarrel? [ ... I Thou hast quarrelled with a man for coughing in the street .... Didst thou not fall out with a tailor for wearing 
his new doublet before Easter; with another for tying his new shoes with old 
riband? And thou wilt tutor me from quarrelling! 
(III. i. 16-20; 24-30) 
Mercutio's elaboration here of the "divine details" of unconscious identification both recalls 
and privileges (perhaps not entirely fortuitously) Dora's identification with her father's 
66cough" as the concrete void place hin 
the subject's signifying chain as that which betokens 
the enigmatic cause of desire. In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis Lacan details specifically the 
reasons for the hostility experienced by the subject when s/he is confronted with this 
that is by its very definition "strange, " "other" and dissimilar: 
I do not experience jouissanc as 'strange' because it is the jouissanc of the 
Other, but, on the contrary, that it is because of this jqujaý that I 
perceive my neighbour as (radically) Other and 'strange. ' (emphasis added)44 
Ultimately, then, for Lacan (and Mercutio it seems) the kernel of the problem is more 
properly to be located in the fact that the subject experiences its own jouissanc as 
something that is both strange and hostile. Rhetorically, Mercutio's otherwise "playful" 
vv 
44 Alenka Zupancic, "The Subject of the Law" in Cogito and the Unconscious, ed. Slavoj Zizek 
(London, 1998), pp. 41-73, p. 44. 
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opening gambit that Benvolio will "quarrel with a man that hath a hair more or less in his 
beard thou hath" is, from this Lacanian perspective, a fairly reliable indication that what is 
actually at stake here is enjoyment. 45 Vacillating between lack and excess, this almost 
negligible mark of difference which precipitates violence (la 12etite difference: a hair, no less) 
illuminates the paradox of how, quite literally, the subject's "Thing" is both inaccessible to 
46 
the other and, at the same time, threatened by him. If Prince Escalus' implicit exhortations 
throughout the play (and the "ethical" ideal that the lovers' deaths are explicitly called upon 
to realize) is that one should "love thy neighbour as thyself, ' according to Lacan such an 
attitude also urges silently the compunction to love "that most neighbourly of neighbours 
who is inside" the subject: namely, its jouissanc . 
47 
45 Jacques-Alain Miller's analysis of "extimacy" is again indispensable here: "Why does the Other 
remain Other? What is the cause for our hatred of him, for our hatred of him in his very being? It Is the 
hatred of the enjoyment in the Other [.. ] a hatred of the particular way the Other enjoys [ ... I The 
question of tolerance or intolerance is not at all concerned with the subject of science and its human 
rights. it is located on the level of tolerance or intolerance toward the enjoyment of the Other, the 
Other as he who essentially steals my own enjoyment [ ... ] There is no other enjoyment but my own. If 
the Othpr is in me, occupying the place of extimacy, then the hatred is also my own. " Quoted in 
Slavoj Zizek, TarUing With The Negative: Kant. Hegel. and the Critique of Ideology (Durham, 1993), 
p. 203. 
46 To the extent that we can read this speech as a strangely articulate meditation (and perhaps 
apologWor the ostensible "cause" of violence in the play we can again refer profitably to the work of 
Slavoi Zizek. Specifically addressed to thp... Vay that "nationalism" is the privileged domain of the 
eruption of enjoyment into the social field, Zizek avers that we must apprehend 0 Cause as the 
Fredian Thing (das Dina), [as] materialized enjoyment [ ... ] the 'other' wants to steal our enjoyment (by 
ruining our'way of life') and/or it has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. In short, what gets 
on our nerves, what really bothers us about the 'other, ' is the perculiar way he organizes his 
enjoyment [ ... ] The basic paradox 
is that our Thing is conceived as something inaccessible to the 
other and at the same time threatened by him; this is similar to castration which, according to Freud, is 
experienceO V something that 'really cannot happen, ' but whose prospect nonetheless horrifies 
us. " Slavoi Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture 
(London, 1997), p. 165. 
47 In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan explicitly poses the question of "what is more of a 
neighbour to me than this heart within which is that of my iouissance and which I don't dare go near? " 
Moreover, for Lacan how ever variously it is phrased the injunction to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' Is 
the same thing as the barrier to eouissance, and not its opposite.. 1 retreat from loving my neighbour as 
myself because there is something on the horizon that is engaged in some form of intolerable 
cruelty. In that sense, to love one's neighbor may be the cruelest of choices. " Jacques Lacan, R-Q 
_Eth'Ics _ofPsycqb9an 
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In other words, throughout Romeo and Juliet the relationship between "love" and "hate" 
implies a certain inverse symmetry that has remained largely unaccounted for in critical 
discussions of the play: what makes the other an object of love (as well as hate) is the very 
18 jgqjaLqý that is linked to the way that the other satisfies his or her drive. As both 
Romeo and Juliet's rhapsodies demonstrate time and again, the loving subject is also both 
perturbed by and attracted to this jouissanc of the other, to the ungraspable trait unaire that 
in fact generates every fantasy about the beloved. 
"There's No Such Thing 11 
Let us conclude by turning our attention briefly to a more recent example which finds 
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet implicated in a narrative where both the "sexual 
relationship" and the Law inevitably come to circulate around a certain impasse in the 
symbolic order itself. On February 14 1997 -The 
Washington Post published a Valentine's 
Day message that was later revealed to be a cryptic "love note" from Monica Lewinsky to 
President Bill Clinton. In a quotation that seeks to refashion the 21 year old intern's 
imbroglio with the President as a species of "forbidden love" the ad reads as follows: 
48ILacan was to return to this point time and again. Even in the early seminars of the 50s (when Lacan 
had not yet fully formulated the central importance that the Real would subsequently come to play in 
his 'return to Freud') we find the following remarks: "If love aspires to the unfolding of the being of 
the other, hate wishes the opposite, namely its abasement, its deranging, its deviation, its delirium, 
its detailed denial, its subversion. That is what makes hate a career with no limit, just as love is. " 
Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book If: -The 
Ego in Freud's Theo[y and in the 
is 1954-1955, trans. John Forrester p. 277. In later years, of course, 
Lacan would argue that there is, in fact, a paradoxical limit involved here: namely that of 'ouissance. 
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HANDSOME 
With love's light wings did 
I o'er perch these walls 
For stony limits cannot hold love out, 
And what love can do that dares love attempt. 
- Romeo and Juliet 2: 2 
Happy Valentine's Day. 
m. 49 
Leaving aside for the moment how this identification with the "star cross'd lovers" would 
acquire bitter irony in the ensuing months (in the person of a certain Kenneth Starr), Rome 
and Juliet implicitly functions here as a fantasy frame through which the lovers will 
subsequently try to negotiate a sexual relationship. Upon their next encounter the President 
not only acknowledged having seen Lewinsky's love note but also expressed "his fondness 
for Romeo and Juliet. "50 Indeed, it was also on this occasion that "for the first time, she 
[Lewinsky] performed oral sex through completion. "51 
This enigmatic connection between Shakespeare and sex is pressed even further in a 
remarkable letter to the President where Lewinsky invokes the bard in slightly less lyrical 
terms. Confessing to her own fondness for Shakespeare Lewinsky confides that she 
49 
of preaLd9nL Qfinton, (London, 1998), p. 1 12. Even more portentous, perhaps, is the fact that 
Lewinsky's final 'love note'to the President "was inspired by the movie Titanic. " p. 183. 
50 Ibid., p. 1 14. 
51 1 ., p. 115. Mid 
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[ ... ]finds solace 
in works from the past that remain profound and somehow 
always poignant ... one must read him like one tastes a fine wine or good cigar - 
take it in, roll it in your mouth, and savour it! 52 
Bearing in mind Roland Barthes' contention that all textual pleasure retains libidinal traces to 
"the motions of ungratified sucking, of an undifferentiated orality,,, 53 this extraordinary 
passage may be read not only as an example, reductio ad absurdum, of how Shakespeare has 
become a "consumer" activity, but also how contemporary erotic investment in Shakespeare 
is, in the words of Scott Wilson, typified by "a mastication detached from any material, 
alimentary need, concerned only with the manipulation of status signs and the exchange of 
hollowed out cultural values and meanings .,, 
54 "Shakespeare, " at least in psychoanalytical 
terms, operates here not so much as a signifier of desire so much as that of the drive itself. 
Indeed, a closer examination of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal offers a revealing summary of 
how both "enjoyment" and the "law" inevitably come to constellate around a certain 
impasse in the symbolic order that Lacan, of course, refers to as the "(non) sexual 
relationship. " 
Apart from re-enacting the fantasy of Romeo and Juliet, the infamous Clinton-Lewinsky 
predilection for "telephone sex" is another example which hints at the fact that sex is in a 
sense always already virtual - mediated through the expedient of a "fantasy frame. " That is 
to say, far from diluting the spontaneous experience of the sexual act, sex is always 
formalized minimally through a fantasy scenario that serves effectively to crystallize its 
52 lb*ld., p. 136- 
53 Roland Barthes. The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York, 1975), p. 5. 
54 Scott Wilson, Cultural Mate ialism: Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1995), p. 92. 
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enjoyment. Jouissance qua "surplus-enjoyment" is not a surplus that merely supplements 
some norma fundamental enjoyment precisely because enjoyment as such emerges only in 
this surplus, because it constitutively is an "excess. " As we argued in connection with 
Antony and-Cleol2atra if this surplus was to be subtracted enjoyment itself would be lost. 
To this extent Lacan's formula for fantasy (S 0 a) indicates how a minimum of distance is 
retained between the subject and a potentially nauseating contact with the object-Thing, the 
meaningless and potentially traumatic stain of enjoyment. Significantly, we find that on the 
evening when Clinton and Lewinsky are alleged to have used Romeo and Juliet as part of 
their sexual foreplay before finally "performing oral sex through completion, " the President 
testified to feeling "sick after it was over. "55 
It is, however, Clinton's ingenious pedantic quibbles over the ostensible definition of sexual 
relations that unwittingly brings him into alignment with psychoanalysis: particularly in 
tenns of Lacan's well known maxims that 'il n'y a pas de rapport sexpel' and (more 
ambivalently) that attempts to posit "the ideal or typical manifestation of behaviour in both 
sexes, up to and including the act of sexual copulation, are entirely propelled into comedy. qs56 
Indeed, we need only refer here to the extraordinary intervention made by the Judge 
presiding at the deposition of the Paula Jones case who provided the following definition of 
64sexual relations": 
[ ... ]a person engages 
in 'sexual relations' when the person knowingly 
engages or causes contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, 
55 The $tarr R part , p. 115. 
56 Jacques Lacan, "The Meaning of the Phallus" in Feminine Sexuality: Jacque5 Lacan and the 
Egoe-F ludienne, ed. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York, 1982), p. 84. Le 
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or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person [ ... ] 'Contact' means intentional touching, either 
directly or through clothing. 57 
In this bizarre (even comic) attempt to formalize the rules of sexual interplay, the Law is 
compelled into further eroticizing the very practices that it is called upon to censure. What 
we are presented with here is the most conspicuous example of the way that the Law 
simultaneously authorizes and prohibits access to putatively "illegal" forms of enjoyment. 
In short, this is possibly the most compelling example from the entire Clinton saga where an 
obscene-su lement is revealed to be the unacknowledged support of every relationship. TpL- 
The "official" seemingly indifferent face of the public Law is already split from within, 
traversed by a constitutive impossibility that is also its obscene spectral double (i. e. the 
menacing agency of the "superego" that we saw ventriloquized in the Coke advertisement's 
. senseless 
injunction to 'Enjoy! ). 58 It is also from within this context that we can begin to 
account for the popular perception of Clinton's misconduct at the time. Far from becoming 
the target of scathing criticism and moral outrage (despite the best efforts of his political 
adversaries) Clinton was tolerated as a comic and even "carnivalesque" figure of fun. 
59 Even 
more remarkable is the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the scandal not only did 
57 Jhq aE Re or , p. 202. , Star - 
58 It is worth repeating once again that for Lacan the "sexual" dimension of enjoyment is not to be 
understood in an explicitly 'genital' sense. Rather jouissance is marked by its mythical destiny of 
tending toward absolute pleasure, to be consumed in the incestuous act. It is to this extent that Law 
in Lacanian psychoanalysis always implicitly relates to the myth of the primal horde. Lacan frequently 
draws attention to this paradoxical (and constitutive) relationship between the Law as an agency of 
prohibition and the Law as that which contains an incitement toward enjoyment: "[ ... ] not only does 
the murder of the father not open the path to 'ouissance that the presence of the father was 
supposed to prohibit, but, in fact, strengthens the prohibition. The whole problem is 
there ... Although 
the obstacle is removed as a result of the murder, iouissance is still prohibited; not 
only that, but the prohibition is reinforced. " Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (London, 
1996), p. 176. 
19 See, for example, lain Dale and John Simmons (eds) The Bill Clinton Joke Book: Uncensored 
(London, 1998). 
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Clinton's personal popularity ratings improve but the Democratic party actually increased 
their representation in Congress. 
In many ways the response of the American electorate demonstrates quite powerfully the 
Lacanian insight that was also addressed in our earlier discussion of Richard III: that it is not 
so much identification with the public (symbolic) Law that holds society together, but rather 
identification with a specific form of transgression of the Law, i. e. with a sl2ecif ic form o 
eniQy-me-nt. What "Fornigate" most effectively reveals then (to borrow a formulation that 
has gained a wide critical currency in Lacanian studies) is how enjoyment is necessarily a 
political category. As we demonstrated in our discussion of Richard II, it is the protective 
circulation of fantasy around a certain structural deadlock in the symbolic order that, 
properly speaking, also negotiates the very space of subjectivity itself. 
Ultimately, what we call "subjectivity" is nothing other than this 66 object" precisely insofar 
as it is radically incommensurate with every subject as such. To suggest, as I do now, that 
this putatively Lacanian object is always already "Shakespearean" is to draw attention to 
one last temporal paradox that, it seems, we have been aware of all along. Recalling our 
discussion of Hamle we could say that "there is no such thing as a relationship between 
Shakespeare and Psychoanalysis, " so much as what Lacan calls extimite: the intimate 
exteriority of the material letter, the mute signifier lodged through primal repression and 
incorporation in those significations that cause both "Shakespeare"' and "psychoanalysis" to 
become the objects of our desire. 
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Appendices 
Figure 1. 
c 
t. 0 
Graph I 
5/ 
This part of Lacan's 'graph of desire' is intended to illustrate the retroactive constitution of 
meaning. We have the signifying chain (S --- S') crossed by another vector starting from a 
mythical pre-sYmbolic intention and ending, after it passes through the signifier, with the 
subject ($). The vector of (subjective) intention retroactively 4quilts' or fixes the vector of 
the signifying chain: it enters the signifying chain at an 4ulterior* point and leaves it at an 
*anterioC point. The effect of the operations of such a 'quilting poinV (12oint de capiton) is 
that the subject recocynizes. in a contingent series of signifiers, the Meaning (of his existence). 
This moment of the recognition of Meaning is the moment of subjectivation. I 
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01 
'The field of reality rests upon the extraction of the object a, which nevertheless 
frames it. ' 
We understand that the covert setting aside of the object as real conditions the stabilization 
of reality. as --a bit of reality. - But if the object a- is absent. how can it still frame reality? 
Figure 2. 
it is precisely because the object a is removed from the field of reality that it frames it. If I 
withdraw from the surface of this picture the piece I represent by a shaded square. I get 
what we mi2ht call a frame: a frame for a hole. but also a frame ýf the rest of the surface. 
Such a frame could be created by any window. So object a is such a surface fragment. and it 
is its subtraction from reality that frames it. The subject. as barred subject - as want-of- 
being - is this hole. As beinLy. it is nothina but the subtracted bit. Whence the equivalency of 
the subject and object -a. 
' 
I Jacques-Alain Miller, "Montre a Premontre, "Anal)dica, 37 (1984), pp. 6-7. 
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Glossary of Some Lacanian Symbols 
$- (Read "barred S. "). The subject has two faces: (1) the subject as alienated in/by 
language, as castrated (ý alienated), as precipitate of "dead" meaning; the subject here is 
devoid of being, as it is eclipsed by the Other, that is, by the symbolic order; (2) the subject 
as spark that flies between two signifiers in the process of subjectivization, whereby that 
which is other is made "one's own. " 
a- Written object a, object (a), petit , objet or objet petit . In the early 1950s, the 
imaginary other like oneself In the 1960s and thereafter, it has at least two faces: (1) the 
other's desire, which serves as the subject's cause of desire and is intimately related to the 
experiences of jouissanc and loss thereof (examples include the breast, gaze, voice, faeces, 
phoneme, letter, nothing); (2) the residue of the symbolization process that is situated in the 
register of the real; logical anomalies and paradoxes; the letter or signifiemess of language. 
SI- The master signifier or unary signifier; the signifier that commands or as 
commandment. When isolated, it subjugates the subject; when it is linked up with some 
other signifier, subjectivization occurs, and a subject of/as meaning results. 
A- The Other, which can take on many forms: the treasure-house or repository of all 
signifiers; the mOther tongue; the Other as demand, desire or jouissanc ; the unconscious. 
ý- (Read "barred A") The Other as lacking, as structurally incomplete, or as experienced as 
incomplete by the subject who comes to be in that lack. 
S(ý) - Signifier of the lack in the Other. As the Other is structurally incomplete, lack is an 
inherent characteristic of the Other, but that lack is not always apparent to the subject, and 
even when apparent, cannot always be named. Here we have a signifier that names that lack; 
it is the anchoring point of the entire symbolic order, related to every other signifier. 
$ () a- Matheme or formula for fantsay, usually the "fundamental fantasy. " It can be read 
as "the barred subject in relation to object a, " that relation being defined by all the meanings 
the lozenge in the middle of the matheme takes on. With object a understood as the traumatic 
experience of that brings the subject into being in the encounter with the Other's 
desire, the formula for fantasy suggests that the subject tries to maintain just the right 
distance from that dangerous desire, delicately negotiating the attraction and the repulsion. 
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